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PRE F ACE 
This thesis is a work of sociological theory. While it 
does have recourse to sources in Russian (and in French), most 
of the sources used are in English, and are either analy~es of 
the Soviet Union itself or sociological works (or both). The 
aim of the thesis has not been to examine hitherto unused source 
material (although this proved necessary in the case of Kritsman, 
because of the vari~ty of views in English concerning the merits 
of his work), but to evaluate a wide range of material with a 
view to making a theoretical contribution to the sociology of 
the Soviet Union. Consequently, it is the theoretical portions 
of the thesis which can lay claim to being original, and which 
it is hoped throw new light on the empirical evidence discussed. 
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(i) 
SUMMARY 
This thesis analyses the extent and forms of class relations 
in the Soviet Union. The theoretical approach adopted to the 
analysis 'of the Soviet class structure is based on a critique of 
the classical Marxist approach to class, as well as of common 
sociological approaches to class, particularly the Weberian 
conception of class. These issues ~re the concern of the 
Introduction, which outlines an alternative approach to class 
structure based on a conception of relations of production which 
differs from the classical Marxist approach, particularly in 
avoiding any reliance on the labour theory of value for defining 
relations of production and hence for demarcating class boundaries. 
Chapter One provides an outline of developments in the Soviet 
rural class structure in the 1920s, and by criticising common 
conceptions of such developments~ argues that the strategy of 
socialist transformation adopted in the policy of forced 
collectivisation was economically unnecessary and politically 
disastrous. The purpose of this Chapter is to throw the 
contemporary class structure of the Soviet Union into historical 
relief, by indicating the historical context out of which many 
contemporary features of the Soviet Union developed. It is 
hoped that this will indicate that many features of the contemporary 
social structure are historically specific, rather than being 
necessary features of a state socialist society. 
Following from this, the analysis of relations of production 
in the 1960s and 1970s is begun in Chapter Two, where the relations 
between different kinds of economic agents, particularly collective 
economic agents (economic units) are examined, using the approach 
developed in the Introduction to analyse the relations of production 
as relations between economic agents, which affect the relative 
economic capacities of agents. It is argued that, because such 
(ii) 
capacities are always subject to change through processes of 
struggle and negotiation, an important but hitherto rather 
neglected aspect of the relations ,of production concerns the 
policies of economic agents. Consequently, the manner in which 
agents at various levels in the economy calculate both their own 
internal state and the course of action which they adopt with 
respec~ to other agents is subjected to detailed scrutiny in 
this Chapter. 
Chapter Three analyses the legal and political conditions 
of the relations of production, since in the Soviet Union such 
economic relations are operative primarily between state agencies, 
or collective agencies whose relations to the state agencies are 
legally and politically regulated by the state. Consequently, 
the issue of the 'withering away of the state' with the decline 
of private property is considered, as well as various common 
Western conceptions of Soviet politics. Following on from this, 
the analysis of politics in terms of a series of 'arenas of 
struggle' is proposed, and in the light of this approach the 
capacities of the main central party and state agencies to 
regulate the economy (and hence to determine the relations of 
production by implementing effective economic plans) is reviewed. 
The conclusion from this review is that there are serious limits 
on the capacity of such central party and state agents to 
co-ordinate the division of labour, so that theories of an 
all-powerful totalitarian party or elite dominating Soviet 
politics and the economy are misguided. Nevertheless, it is 
argued that there is sufficient central control of the state 
agencies for one to be able to say that various state agencies 
do not pursue autonomous objectives. In other words, political 
relations between state agencies are not such as to preclude 
socialist planning of the ove~all economy. 
(iii) 
Chapter Four examines welfare and social policy as a means 
of assessing the importance of non-wage forms of income, and 
concludes that the overall effect of such forms of public 
expenditure is probably, as intended, to equalise incomes. 
This point is taken up again in Chapter Five, where the occupational 
structure and wage differentials are examined, prior to an overall 
assessment of the distribution of income, which concludes that a 
policy of income equalisation has been pursued fairly successfully 
over the past twenty-five years or so. While such a policy may 
now be running into difficulties of various kinds, in so far as 
it has been successfully pursued, it has meant that the connection 
between the distribution of income and the access of agents to the 
means of production has been partially undermined. Hence class 
relations have been seriously weakened in the Soviet Union, and 
it is concluded that they are non-existent within the state sector 
of the economy. However, this does not mean that there is no 
class structure in the Soviet Union~ since collective farm members 
are still in a different class position from state employees. 
There may also be capitalist relations in the so-called 'parallel 
economy' but their extent must be severely limited by the official 
prohibitions on such activities~ which means that, if resources are 
diverted from official purposes, this is largely done on an 
individual 'self-employed' basis. It is also argued that the 
'intelligentsia' cannot be considered as a single, separate stratum 
from the state employed 'working class' or the collective farm 
members. Consequently, the official theory of the Soviet class 
structure must be considered to be seriously deficient. 
1 • 
Introduction: The Analysis of Relations of Production and 
Class Structure 
The purpose of this introduction is to indicate what kind 
of approach is being used to analyse the Soviet Union in this 
thesis. This is necessary because of the continuing prevalence 
in socioldgy of analyses of class structures which fail to 
define sufficiently clearly the basis of the categorisation of 
classes. In other words, it will be argued that the prevailing 
modes of analysis of what is often called 'social inequality' 
or 'social stratification' fail to provide sufficiently clear 
theoretical grounds for distinguishing different classes, or 
for analysing class relations. 
This is not to say that there is ready to hand a clear 
mode of analysis which is easy to use and which suffers from 
no problems, but rather that the prevailing approaches scarcely 
even 'attempt to analyse the determinants of class relations. 
The only exception is provided by analyses in the Marxist 
tradition, which at least attempt to theorise the determinants 
of class relations, using some conception of 'relations of 
production'. However, while such approaches have the merit of 
at least posing the problem of the determinants of class 
relations, it is not clear how far they have satisfactorily 
resolved the issues which t~ey raise. 
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the issues involved 
would be to make a brief, and by no means comprehensive or 
systematic, examination of the history of the concept of class. 
Without going into too much detail, it is clear that Marx was 
correct to acknowledge that he did not 'discover' classes. 
2. 
The concept was being used by the Physiocrats, if not by earlier 
economists, and was related to their theory of the distribution 
of income. The concept of class was based on the classification 
of the population of, say, eighteenth century France, into 
distinct groups, each with their own source of income. What 
made the groups distinct in such analyses was their possession 
of an asset which gave them that income or revenue. Usually, 
there were three such assets in classical political economy: 
land, labour and capital, with entrepreneurial or managerial 
skill sometimes forming a fourth asset. The basis on which these 
'factors of production' constituted assets for the classes 
which owned them was not posed as a problem by these economists 
(including those whom Marx called 'vulgar'). That is, the 
social conditions, which both made these 'factors of production' 
generate revenues and enabled the factors (and hence their 
revenues) to be appropriated by certain categories of economic 
agents called classes, these conditions were not considered 
problematic. Consequently, as we shall see, there was no 
theoretical basis for saying there should only be three classes, 
and not more: as has just been indicated, sometimes a fourth 
factor (or asset) was admitted, which implied a distinction 
between profit (entrepreneurial skill) and interest (capital) 
as forms of revenue. The analysis of the way in which these 
factors generated revenue went little further than an 
acknowledgement that such revenues were generated in production 
and/or exchange. The theory was more concerned with the amount 
of income distributed to each class and with features affecting 
the flow of revenue than with the analysis of the determinants 
of such revenues. 
3 • 
This concern with what Marx called 'relations of distribution' 
was the main target of Marx's critique of such theories of class. 
It is precisely the kind of problem generated by the 'revenues' 
approach to class which Marx is criticising in hi~ famous 
unfinished chapter on class at the end of Capita11 • The chapter 
on classes comes in a section entitled "Revenues and their 
Sources", and follows a chapter on "Distribution Relations and 
Production Relations", in which he says (page 882); 
"let us moreover consider the so-called distribution 
relations themselves. The wage presupposes wage-
labour, and profit - capital. These definite forms 
of distribution thus presuppose definite social 
characteristics of production conditions, and 
definite social relations of production agents. 
The specific distribution relations are thus 
merely the expression of the specific historical 
production relations." 
After demonstrating this with respect to profit (of enterprise), 
interest, and capitalist ground rent, Marx continues (page 883); 
"The so-called distribution relations, then, 
correspond to and arise from historically 
determined specific social forms of the process 
of production and the mutual relations entered 
into by men (sic) in the reproduction process 
of human life. The historical character of 
these distribution relations is the historical 
character of the production relations, of which 
they express merely one aspect. Capitalist 
distribution differs from those forms of 
distribution which arise from other modes of 
production, and every form of distribution 
4. 
disappears with the specific form of production 
from which it is derived and tOWlich it corresponds." 
Thus, when in the chapter on classes Marx criticises the 
conception of classes as constituted by the identity of revenues 
and sources of revenue, it is already clear to the reader that 
he considers that the sources of revenue are determined by the 
relations of production, which are social conditions (and 
consequently subject to historical mange). It is also implicit 
that the analysis of revenues (for example, of their amount and 
the forms of their distribution) should not be completely 
identified with the analysis of the sources of revenue, that is, 
with the analysis of the social conditions which constitute them 
as revenues. HOwever, distribution relations are one aspect of 
production relations, so the analysis of the forms of 
distribution of income is a part of the analysis of production 
relations, and hence of the class structure. 
To reiterate, the 'revenues' approach, which treats clas~ 
relations solely in terms of relations of distribution, without 
analysing the social conditions of their existence, forms the 
object of the critique developed by Marx in the unfinished 
chapter on class. If one has no theoretical basis for saying 
that these groups (and not others) possess these assets (and 
not others) as their source of income, and that the possession 
of these assets is what constitutes these groups as classes, 
then there is no defence against adding other groups to the 
class structure. A class then becomes any group constituted 
by the possession of a socia11y distinct source of income. In 
criticising this position which treats revenue as determining 
class, Marx says: 
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"However, from this standpoint, physicians and 
officials for example would also constitute two 
classes, for they belpng to two distinct social 
groups, the members of each of these groups 
receiving their revenue frome one and the same 
source. The same would also be true of the 
infinite fragmentation of interest and rank into 
which the division of social labour splits 
labourers as well as capitalists and landlords 
" 
In other words, although classical political economy divided 
society up into three great classes (the 'holy trinity' of 
landowners, labourers and capitalists, whose sources of 
revenue - land, labour and capital - are as naturally homogeneous 
as beetroot, music and lawyers' fees), it did so on a basis 
which allowed for the 'elaboration of "an infinite fragmentation 
of interest and rank" since it lacked an adequate analysis of 
the division of labour. It thus opened the way for the analysis 
of the class structure in terms of an inadequately theorised 
concept of stratification, that is, in terms of a geological 
metaphor of strata which did not distinguish strata in terms 
of some theory of the social relations operative between the 
members of the different strata. This latter approach requires 
a principle of stratification, that is a quantitative measure 
which enables one stratum to be placed higher or lower than 
another on what is implicitly a qualitatively homogenous scale. 
Initially this principle of stratification was the amount of 
income. 
6. 
As Marx's analysis indicates (contrary to those who treat 
the unfinished chapter on classes simply as evidence of the 
difficulties of Marx's own position), the tendency to add to 
the number of classes, and to analyse them simply in terms of 
the distribution of income, these tendencies result from an 
inadequate theorisation of the division of labour. An adequate 
analysis of the division of labour would enable one to sust~in 
a defensible categorisation of economic agents into classes. 
This categorisation would be defensible on the grounds of the 
social relations which the theory stated were in operation 
between the different economic agents. 
Before turning from Marx's critique of the classical 
position to Marx's own position, it is worth indicating that 
his critique is also applicable to much sociological thinking 
on classes since his death, because of the continuing, if 
unacknowledged, influence of classical political economy on the 
sociological analysis of class. The work of Max Weber provides 
an illuminating and influential example of the sociological 
elaboration of the 'revenues' approach to class. Weber defines 
a class as any group of persons occupying the same class position 
(so the most pertinent kind of economic agent is the human 
individual). The concept of class position for Weber2 (page 424) 
refers to: 
"the typical probability that a given state of 
(a) provision of goods (b) external conditions of 
life and (c) subjective satisfaction or frustration 
will be possessed by an individual or a group. 
These probabilities define class position in so far 
as they are dependent on the kind and extent of 
control or lack of it which the individual has 
over goods and services and existing possibilities 
7. 
of their exploitation for the attainment of 
income and receipts within a given economic 
order." 
A little later Weber writes: 
"The concepts class and class position as such 
only designate the fact of identity or similarity 
in the typical situation in which a given 
individual and many others find their interests 
defined. In principle control over different 
combinations of consumer's goods, means of 
production, investments, and capital funds 
constitute class positions which are different 
for each variation and combination." 
Ignoring the subjective aspect (satisfaction or frustration) 
of this definition of class, which is related to his conception 
of economic action, it is clear from the definition of class in 
terms of control of goods and services and their exploitation 
for incomes and receipts that Weber is using a 'revenues' 
conception of class. The result is that class positions are 
different for each variation and combination of assets, thus 
producing an "infinite fragmentation of interest and rank", or 
in other words, a highly differentiated stratification hierarchy 
in terms of class position. Precisely because there is no 
theorisation of what constitutes an asset, or possession of an 
asset, there is no clear basis for demarcating class positions 
from each other. Consequently any lines drawn between the 
strata are necessarily arbitrary. 
A skill can be an asset, and a high level of skill constitutes 
for Weber a 'monopolistic asset' commanding a monopolistic 
position, which enables him to treat the working class as a 
series of different class positions because of its 'qualitative 
8. 
differentiation', that is, the variety of skills within it. 
This basic definition of class position (in terms of 'chance in 
the market' as determined by the acquisition of assets) is later 
added to by Weber: as well as 'acquisition' class, Weber also 
introduces the concepts of 'property' class and 'social' class. 
A property class is one where the class position of its members 
is primarily determined by the differentiation of p~operty holdings. 
This produces .two difficulties for Weber's theory. Firstly, it 
indirectly subverts the distinction between 'class' and 'status 
group', the latter being defined in terms of 'social honour'. 
For example, slaves change from being a negatively privileged 
status group to a negatively privileged property class. This 
is inconsistent with the original definition of class which 
refers to actors in the market. Slaves are not actors in the 
market. Secondly, it creates problems as to the definition 
of an acquisition class. Weber's concept of property is not 
theoretically elaborated - it is simply an enumeration of 
such things as human beings, land, mining property, fixed 
equipment, ships or money. Consequently it is difficult to 
distinguish it from the assets which determine the chance in 
the market of an acquisition class. For example, shipowners 
appear as both a property and an acquisition class, and many of 
those listed as members of acquisition classes might under the 
above listing of property be considered as members of property 
classes~ namely, industrial and agricultural entrepreneurs, 
bankers and financiers. The concept of a 'social' class also 
has its problems: it is actually a plurality of class positions 
between which an interchange of individuals on a personal basis 
or in the course of generations is readily possible or typically 
observable. In other words a 'social' class refers to a unity 
of various different class positions on the basis of what would 
nowadays be conventionally termed 'social interaction' or else 
9. 
on the basis of 'social mobility'. An example of a 'social' 
class is the working class as a whole. This is ironic in view 
of Weber's criticism of Marx 3 : 
"The unfinished concluding section of roarl Marx's 
Kapital was evidently intended to deal with the 
problem of class unity of the proletariat, which 
he held existed in spite of the high degree of 
qualitative differentiation." 
It should be clear that this is a misunderstanding by 
Weber, but Weber's use of the concepts of 'property' class 
and 'social' class clearly represents an attempt to have one's 
cake and eat it. Weber is able (at considerable theoretical 
cost) both to maintain a highly differentiated view of the class 
structure, and to refer to what to him plausibly appear as 
important lines of demarcation within the stratification hierarchy. 
The other interesting aspect of Weber's theory is, of course, 
the distinction which he makes between class stratification and 
stratification in terms of other phenomena which affect 'the 
distribution of power', namely, 'status groups' and 'parties'. 
This is the major development which sociology has added to the 
class analysis of classical political economy - the supposed 
generalisation of stratification to other non-economic aspects 
of social relations. In the case of Weber this is related to 
his attempt to develop the micro economic theory of transactions 
in the market into a general theory of social action. Each of 
these two other aspects of the distribution of power requires a 
principle of stratification analogous to the amount of income 
in the class hierarchy. In other words, they each require a 
quality or attribute or dimension (call it what you will) which 
the strata possess or do not possess to some degree. The 
1 o. 
theoretical basis for the two stratification principles 
introduced by Weber is even more opaque than that for level of 
income. The two principles are prestige and political power, 
and the latter is implicitly distinguished from the more 
generalised conception of power to which all three aspects of 
stratification are thought to refer. At least the level of 
income is measurable by a sociaily determinate means in a market 
economy, namely money. The concepts of prestige and political 
power used by both Weber and the many later studies using a 
'three-dimensional' .(and sometimes'multi-dimensional') approach 
to stratification require subjective judgement, either by the 
researcher, a panel of judges or those being investigated, as 
to the distribution of prestige and political power. This 
produces the most banal kinds of research, such as correlations 
of the degree of 'status consistency' between the rankings on 
each dimension or international comparisons of prestige hierarchy 
rankings. It is not the process of ranking according to some 
quantitative index that is the problem with such research, nor 
the use of the word 'stratification' (which is also used by some 
Marxists, usually in the phrase 'class stratification'), but the 
failure of such approaches to adequately theorise the determinants 
of the stratification with which they are concerned. 4 
Since Marx's critique of classical political economy raised 
the problem (not yet resolved in conventional sociological theory) 
of the determinants of the class structure, it is appropriate to 
examine his own position. As is clear from his critique, the 
determinants of class are to be found for Marx in the analysis 
of the relati ons of prod ucti on, which, in sh owing the relations 
between various economic agents, amounts to an analysis of the 
division of labour. Because most of Capital is concerned with 
capitalist relations of production, Marxists frequently tend 
11 • 
to argue that the whole of Capital is about class analysis, but 
this is of little help in deciding which are the most salient 
features of the relations of production for class analysis. 
Fortunately Marx gives some indication in the critique discussed 
above which appears at the end of Volume Three: the reproduction 
schemas in Volume Tw0 5 , which indicate how the capitalist mode 
or production as a whole reproduces itself, are of considerable 
importance, since in reproducing itself, capitalism reproduces 
its class structure. To situate the discussion of the 
reproduction schemas, one must first discuss the labour theory of 
value and the reproduction of the individual capitalist enterprise 
(which appear in Volume One 6 and already constitute a partial 
analysis of capitalist relations of production). 
While there is some dispute amongst Marxists about whether 
the 'law of value' only applies to the production of commodities, 
even those who limit it to commodity production usually see it 
as related to-,a more general law of the distribution of labour-time 
among different production processes. 7 If the latter, more 
general law is also referred to as 'the law of value', then the 
law of value expresses the proportion of the total labour-time 
available to a society (within a given time-period, say a year) 
which is devoted to a particular production process. Each of 
the products of that production process thus embodies a value 
which is a fraction of the proportional labour-time devoted to 
t hat production process. In other words, if one thousand products 
are produced in a year, then each product embodies one thousandth 
of the value of that production process. If two thousand products 
a re produced, then the value of each product is halved. Thus the 
value of each product is inversely proportional to the productivity 
of the production process associated with it. The value of a 
product thus refers to the amount of labour time (as a proportion 
of the total socially available labour-time) which is necessary 
12. 
to produce it: the value of a product is the embodiment of the 
socially necessary labour-time required to produce it, and the 
socially necessary amount of labour-time depends on the productivity 
of the particular production process and its economic relation to 
other production processes. In the case of commodity production, 
according to Marx, where the fact that commodities are exchanged 
has an eff~ct on the social distribution of labour-time between 
different 'production processes, the absolute amount of labour-
time embodied in a product is not measured. Only the relative 
amount of labour-time is measured, and this occurs in the process 
of commodity exchange where the relative amount of labour-time 
is expressed by the ratios in which the commodities exchange 
for each other. If one pound of sugar regularly exchanges for 
ten pounds of potatoes, then for Marx this is because these 
physical quantities of the products each take the same amount 
of socially necessary labour-time to produce. Whether that 
labour-time is one hour or five days cannot be directly measured 
by this exchange ratio of one to ten, which only indicates the 
relative value of the products. This'exchange value', as Marx 
calls it, forms the basis for the price of commodities, once 
money becomes an integral part of commodity exchange. According 
to Marx, this occurs on the basis of one commodity becoming a 
socially acceptable measure in terms of which all the other 
exchange ratios are established. 
Commodity exchange, then, for Marx, establishes a series of 
social relations between economic agents (including monetary 
relations) which allow the distribution of labour-time among 
different production processes to develop considerably, involving 
profound changes in the division of labour. In cases where this 
leads to the development of capitalist production, which depends 
crucially on commodity exchange (and particularly on the social 
1 3. 
appearance of labour-power as a commodity), the economic 
reproduction of each capitalist enterprise (with its associated 
production processes) depends on commodity exchanges. Marx 
~us begins analysing capitalist relations of production by the 
analysis of the reproduction of the capitalist enterprise in 
terms of the value embodied in each of its elements and the 
value created by that enterprise. Sch ematically, thes e elements 
are designated in the following diagram: 
M/M.O.P.~ 
~ /p C M' 
L.P.(L) 
As is well known, in this schema M represents a sum of money 
sufficiently large (with the right social conditions) to be used 
as capital, that is, to be used to purchase means of production, 
M.o.P., and labour-power, L.P., which are necessary for capitalist 
production. Labour-power is the capacity to labour (a capacity 
which entails both physical and intellectual capacities), and it 
is this capacity or ability which is purchased by the capitalist. 
However, as with any production process, capitalist production 
requires the combination of labour, L, the activity of work, with 
the means of production. It is the amount of time spent in 
labour, the socially necessary labour-time, which determines the 
new value of the product of each production process. However the 
total value of the product also includes the value of the means 
of production (which are themselves products embodying labour-
time) transferred to the product over a period of time. The 
product, P, is treated as a commodity, C, and is sold for money, 
M', the superscript indicating that this is usually more than the 
original sum of money. 
14. 
In other words, Marx is arguing that commodity relations, 
conceptualised in terms of the theory of value, establish certain 
relations between the elements of the capitalist production 
process which enable it to reproduce itself economically. The 
value of the product, a commodity, is determined by the value 
transferred to it by the means of production and by the value 
of the labour-time spent on producing it. For the value of 
the product to be greater than the outlay spent on prod~cing 
it, Marx argues that the value of the labour expended on it must 
be higher than the value of the labour-power which was bought 
by the capitalist for the period of the production process. 
This is possible precisely because labour-power (a capacity) 
is not the same as labour (an activity), and the very conceptual-
isation of value (as a proportion of the total socially available 
labour-time) means that only labour can create value. The value 
of the means of production which is transferred to the products 
over a period of time, as the means of production depreciate, 
cannot exceed the labour-time embodied in them, unless for some 
reason their replacement cost increases. Because labour is for 
Marx the soUrce of the extra value of the product, or surplus 
value, Marx calls the capital spent on the purchase of labour-
power 'variable capital', whereas the capital spent on the 
purchase of the means of production is called 'constant capital'. 
The variable capital varies in amount between the beginning and 
end of the production process, because it is the source of the 
surplus value which appears as profit when the commodity is sold. 
To sum up Marx's analysis of the reproduction of the 
individual capitalist enterprise, then, it can be said that it 
presupposes a certain social distribution of the means of 
production such that certain economic agents, capitalists, possess 
them while others, agents, wage-labourers, do not, and must 
1 5. 
therefore sell their labour-power to reproduce themselves 
economically. Starting from this differential access to the means 
of production, the analysis indicates how a process of production 
of commodities by means of commodities can reprrrduce that social 
distribution of the means of production, with capitalists able to 
purchase them. and wage-labourers unable to p~rchase them. 
provides a part~al analysis of how the class structure is 
reproduced. 
It thus 
As Marx recognises in Volume Two, ah analysis of how capitalist 
enterprises reproduce themselves cannot be a full account of how 
a capitalist economy reproduces itself. An analysis of the 
distribution of labour-time (value analysis) is necessarily 
partial if it is not related to an analysis of the physical 
distribution of the product: an analysis in terms of 'use-value' 
as Marx calls it. The concept of 'use-value' refers to the physical 
preperties of the product (as understood by science at a particular 
time) and to the demand or 'need' for the product: if a product 
is not wanted, it has no use-value, so it is a waste of labour-
time to prcduce it, and hence has no value either, according to 
Marx. The main aspect of the use-value of products with which 
Marx is concerned in the reproduction schemas of Volume Two is 
whether the products are means of production or means of 
consumption. As is already evident from the analysis in Volume 
One, the class relations between different categories of economic 
agent are concerned with their relation to the means of production 
(crudely, possession or non-possession of the means of production), 
so an analysis of the distribution of the product which is conducted 
in terms of a distinction between means of production and means of 
consumption is likely to elucidate the process of the social 
distribution of the means of production, and consequently aid the 
analysis of the class structure. 
1 6. 
Since Marx is dealing with a wholly capitalist economy, 
all production processes are capitalist and hence reproduce 
themselves by commodity exchange. In this sense, they are 
economically independent of each other in that the continuing 
economic activity of each enterprise depends on the success of 
its commodity operations. A capitalist enterprise producing 
means of consumption will purchase its means of production 
from one or more capitalist enterprises producing means of 
production. A capitalist enterprise producing means of 
production will be staffed by personnel who purchase their 
means of consumption from a variety of capitalist enterprises. 
Marx thus sees the interdependence of the production of means 
of production (Department I) and production of means of 
consumption (Department II) as an important aspect of the 
division of labour. The reproduction schemas of Volume Two 
of Capital are concerned with how the different classes of 
economic agents (capitalists and wage-labourers) in the two 
Departments derive their revenues from their differential 
access to the means of production. Capitalist and wage-
labourers in Department I buy their means of consumption from 
Department II, as do capitalists and wage-workers in 
Department II. However, only capitalists buy the means of 
production from Department I, and this is true whether they 
themselves are Department I or Department II capitalists. In 
other words, only other capitalist enterprises are customers 
for Department I products, whereas both wage-labourers and 
capitalists are customers for Department II products. Indeed 
it is the social character of the demand for the product, 
rather than its physical properties, which determines whether 
it counts as a Department I or Department II product. Coal or 
electricity, for example, can be both means of production and 
means of consumption. 
1 7 • 
Since each capitalist enterprise is attempting to make 
a profit, and, if successful, is in Marx's view reRroducing 
itself according to the value diagram reproduced above, what 
the reproduction schemas must do is indicate how this is 
possible for a whole economy composed of capitalist enterprises. 
This means that the amount of labour-time devoted to producing 
Department I products must be such as to satisfy, broadly 
speaking, the requirements of Department II for means of 
production (consisting mainly of raw materials, ancillary 
materials and instruments of production). Similarly Department 
II must be able to broadly satisfy the demand for its products 
from capitalists and wage-labourers in both Departments. In 
explaining the reproduction of the capitalist economy, theD, 
the reproduction schemas simultaneously explain several things: 
(a) the proportional distribution of labour-time between 
different production processes, which must enable 
individual enterprises to make a profit. 
(b) the physical distribution of the product, so that the 
economy is physically capable of continuing with production. 
(c) the social distribution of the means of production, which 
is effected through the physical distribution of the 
product by means of commodity exchange, at the same time 
as the means of consumption is distributed. 
The social distribution of the means of production, 
however, is the main determinant in this process. It 
determines the form of the production process (the conditions 
under which labour is combined with the means of production), 
and consequently which agent disposes of the product. Hence 
it determines the kind of revenue (profit, wages) available 
to each class of economic agent and the relative amounts of 
these revenues. The social distribution of the means of 
production thus determines the social distribution of the means 
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of consumption. In other words, the reproduction schemas, in 
explaining the relations of production, also explain the 
relstions of distribution and the basic class structure of a 
capitalist economy. This is what might be called the 'hidden 
secret' of the reproduction schemas. As already mentioned, 
Marx refers to these schemas in Volume Three when mounting 
his critique of the view of class maintained by classical 
political economy, so it is only 'hidden' from those sociologists 
who tend not to read the apparently technical economic parts of 
Marx's work. 
Of course, the reproduction schemas are of considerable 
potential interest to economists from two points of view: 
(a) in the history of economic thought, they constitute a 
link between Quesnay's Tableau Economique and the 
development of both input-output analysis and the Soviet 
use of material balances. 
(b) the reproduction schemas, in indicating the complex 
conditions to be fulfilled, according to Marx, for the 
reproduction of the capitalist economy, also indicate 
that the potential 'problem areas' are numerous, and are 
thus also the starting point of Marx's theory of capitalist 
crises. However, the reproduction schemas will not be 
appraised from those standpoints here. What is of concern 
here are the possible problems with this analysis, and the 
extent to which it can be used as a basis for class analysis. 
It is evident that the labour theory of value is an 
important element in this analysis. In this sense, Lenin's 
well-known summary8 of the Marxist position on classes is 
quite correct: 
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"Classes are large groups of people differing 
from each other by the place they occupy in a 
historically determined system of social production, 
by their relation (in most cases fixed and formulated 
in law) to the means of production, by their role 
in the social organisation of labour, and, 
consequently, by the dimensions of the share of 
social wealth of which they dispose and the mode 
of acquiring it. Classes are groups of people 
one of which can appropriate the labour of 
another owing to the different places they occupy 
in a definite system of social economy." 
The problem which must be raised in the light of recent 
critiques of the labour theory of value 9 is its role in the 
analysis of class, and if it is to be abandoned, the problem 
of possible alternative ways of analysing relations of 
production and class structure must also be discussed. 
No attempt will be made here to provide a detailed exposition 
of the recent critiques of the labour theory of value, or of 
. t·· f th 10 crl lClsms 0 em. Rather a few comments will be made 
indicating the limitations of the concepts associated with 
the labour theory of value for the analysis of the division 
of labour11. This can most readily be done by examining 
various other aspects of the division of labour, since Marx's 
analysis of the division of labour is by no means exhausted by 
the reproduction schemas. There are clearly present in 
Marx's work three aspects of the division of labour, although 
he does not designate them by the following terminology: 
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(a) The technical division of labour 
This refers to the form of organisation of the unit of 
production, here called the 'enterprise' for brevity. 
Marx refers to this as the 'division of labour in the 
factory', which refers to the way in which labour is 
combined with the means of production. This entails 
determinate forms of co-operation and supervision, 
and is related among other things to the technology 
being used. 
(b) The division of social production 
This refers to the division of production into socially 
distinct branches, such as steel, aviation or electronics. 
It could also be used to refer to the division between 
Department I and Department II, although certain parts 
of some branches of industry (such as coal, electricity 
or water production) could be considered to be in 
different Departments. Marx sometimes refers to this 
as the 'division of labour in society'. 
(c) The social division of labour 
This refers to the division of economic locations such 
that the agents occupying them have differential access 
to the means of production. These agents need not be 
human individuals, for example, a joint stock company 
could occupy the position of capitalist. Marx's 
analysis of the relations of production is about precisely 
this - the social distribution of economic agents in 
relation to the social distribution of the means of 
production. 
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The distinctions which Marx makes by discussing these 
aspects of the division of labour constitute a significant 
advance over most economic and sociological discussions of 
the division of labour. Theorists from Smith to Durkheim 
have treated the division of labour as in effect emanating 
from individual differences in aptitude and hence skill. 
Thus they tend to treat all aspects of the division of labour 
as arising out of the division of labour in the factory (or 
on the hunt). While the other aspects of the division of 
labour may be described, the fact that they are treated simply 
as effects of an apparently primary (or even primordial) cause 
means that the articulation of these three aspects is poorly 
theorised. In Marx, on the contrary, there are various 
indications as to how to theorise their articulation. The 
division of social production, for example, clearly affects 
the technical division of labour. The development of a new 
branch of production, say microprocessors, may well affect 
the technical division of labour within enterprises in other 
branches of production. This has already happened recently 
with the introduction of rudimentary robots into car production, 
~nd is now affecting the technical division of labour in the 
enterprises of car component manufacturers, as microprocessors 
are introduced as car components to improve economy and 
reliability of performance. 
However, some of the effects which Marx attributes to the 
technical div~sion of labour and the division of social 
production create problems for his conception of the 'social 
division of labour' if it is defined in terms of the relation of 
economic agents to the means of production. For example, the 
increase in the scale of production, according to Marx, means 
that the scale of production becomes too great for one person 
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to supervise. This is related in Marx's analysis to the virtual 
disappearance of the 'captain of industry' and the development of 
a category of managers. This is just one indication among 
several which show that Marx himself a~gues that various economic 
activities which he attributes to capital can become specialised 
and differentiated, rather than residing in a single agent. 
Rather than the individual capitalist owning his own money 
capit~l and means of production (including his factory and land), 
who supervises the production process and sells the product, we 
discover a whole series of economic agents at various points in 
Capital. Each of these agents has its own source of revenue. 
With the increase in the scale of production, the capitalist 
may borrow money for investment from bank capital (interest), 
while the land may be in the possession of a landowner (capitalist 
ground rent). The supervision of the production process involves 
a management hierarchy drawing wages (Marx likens it to the ranks 
of an army), while commercial capital specialises in wholesale 
and retail selling (commercial profit) and employs clerks as 
well as manual workers for book-keeping and warehousing purposes 
(again, drawing wages). The joint stock company, as already 
mentioned, may replace the individual capitalist (interest 
of various kinds, including share dividends). While Marx 
attempts, with varying degrees of success, to reconcile the 
explanation of these sources of income with the labour theory 
of value, the concept of value does not really explain why such 
agents app~ar. Consequently, the differentiation of economic 
activities attributed to capital threatens to disrupt the 
conception of the 'social division of labour' because it is 
clear that the relation to the means of production is not the 
same for all agents whom Marx treats as capitalist. Whereas 
Marx can allow for specjalisation amongst labourers as part of 
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the development of the technical division of labour, the 
specialisation amongst capitalists raises the issue of the 
basis of capitalist possession of the means of production. The 
distinction between possessors and non-possessors of capital 
seems to be based on the labour theory of value, yet it is not 
easy to explain the incomes of some of the 'capitalist' agents 
in terms of the distribution of surplus-value. This can be 
briefly indicated by po~nting to the problem of capitalist 
ground rent and the problem of the distinction between productive 
and unproductive labour. 
Both kinds of differential rent (I and II), and absolute 
ground rent presuppose the formation of a general rate of 
profit under capitalism. They appear as a surplus profit over 
and above the general rate, and accrue as a source of revenue 
to the landowner (who may also be the capitalist). Rent thus 
accrues as an effect of technical (fertility or market location) 
determinants in the case of differential rent, or of political 
or legal determinants in the case of absolute rent. Furthermore 
the social development of a 'class' of landowners is also 
apparently a matter which cannot be explained in terms of the 
labour theory of value. Hence a variety of other determinants 
are introduced as affecting the division of labour without 
recourse to the labour theory of value. Yet they are thought 
necessary to explain the distribution of income. A similar 
point can be made with unproductive labourers such as managers 
and clerks ina manufacturing capitalist enterprise, and clerks 
and manual workers engaged in warehouse work in a commercial 
capitalist enterprise. These workers are not thought to produce 
surplus value, hence they are unproductive; yet they are 
necessary to the processes of capitalist production and commodity 
exchange. Here again agents are introduced as determining the 
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distribution of surplus value, yet they are explained in terms 
of either the technical division of labour or the social division 
of production. 
In other words, the labour theory of value on its own does 
not enable one to decide where to demarcate the boundaries 
between classes. Do any of the agents just mentioned constitute 
classes in their own right or are they fractions of a larger 
class? On what basis does one decide? Clearly any ~uch 
decision must be made on the basis of the social relations 
which the theory postulates as operative between the different 
categories of economic agent, but the problem here is that both 
the production (or non-production) of surplus value and other 
determinants are introduced by Marx to explain the social 
relations operating between the various agents (the relations 
of production, and relations of distribution which are an 
aspect of production relations). The introduction of the 
other determinants is an implicit recognition of the 
inadequacy of the labour theory of value on its own for 
explaining class relations, yet the other determinants create 
difficulties for the labour theory of value, as the continuing 
debates on ground rent and unproductive labour bear witness. 
The introduction of determinants of the division of labour 
which are not derived from the labour theory of value also 
opens the door for other such determinants, for example, what 
may be loosely referred to as ideological determinants. It 
would, for instance, be possible to construct an argument that 
the economic activities of various religious bodies (maintaining 
priests and buildings and so on) also affect the relations of 
distribution. If one treats all those who are not manual 
wage-labourers in the primary and secondary 'sectors' of the 
economy as unproductive, in an attempt to reconcile the diversity 
of economic agents with the theory of value, then one would find 
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oneself arguing that the majority of the population were 
exploiters. Any attempt to widen the category of the exploited 
by introducing other agents into it would involve the recognition 
of the pertinence of some determinants of the division of labour, 
but not otherso It is extremely difficult on the basis of the 
labour theory of value to see on what grounds the choice could 
be made to recognise only some of these determinants, particularly 
since it is clear that Marx's position allows for a constantly 
changing division of labour. 
If the labour theory of value cannot explain why some 
agents should be counted as possessors of the means of production 
(with their income deriving from this possession thereby counting 
as surplus-value), and if other determinants of the division of 
labour are to be recognised for the purpose of demarcating class 
boundaries, then a variety of problems have to be faced. (Indeed 
some of these problems have to be dealt with even if one does 
accept the labour theory of value, but wishes to allow for 
additional determinants of the class structure). If a variety 
of determinants are to be admitted as relevant to the definition 
of classes, there is a danger of a collapse into the 'infinite 
fragmentation' position which I have criticised in Weber and 
the other 'revenues' theorists of class. This is because the 
'intersection' of a variety of determinants of the division of 
labour may well produce a whole series of demarcation lines 
between groups of economic agents. There is no need for all 
such cleavages to demarcate the same groups of agents. In other 
words, the effects of some determinants may be to cross-cut or 
else to sub-divide the groupings of agents genera~ed by the 
effects of other determinants. One possible way round this 
problem is to treat some determinants as relevant for the 
purposes of class definition, and others as not relevant. This 
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is what the labour theory of value in effect attempts to do. 
However, in my view it fails because, in realising that theoretical 
priority cannot be given to the physical act of labour and thus 
in emphasising the social conditions of labour, the labour theory 
of value 'allows back in' other determinants of the division of 
labour without a clear specification of their relevance. In so 
doing, it not only allows a differentiation of the labourers, 
but a differentiation of the non-labourers who possess the means 
of production, namely the capitalists. The acceptance of the 
differentiation of capitalists threatens Marx's concept of 
effective possession of the means of production {whether this is 
defined as legal ownership or de facto control}, since each of 
the different kinds of capitalist specified by Marx controls 
~ of the conditions of production, and consequently secures 
a revenue. Yet none of these capitalists could be said to 
possess the means of production in the sense of controlling them 
to the exclusion of other kinds of capitalist. It is only in 
relation to the labourers that the capitalists might be said to 
collectively possess the means of production. Yet even this 
remark does not resolve the problem of the unproductive labourers 
whose work is a condition of the specialisation of the different 
kinds of capital. Can one say that unproductive labourers such 
as managers do not also control some of the conditions of 
production? 
What is needed, then, are grounds for treating some 
determinants of the division of labour as relevant for the 
definition of classes, and others as not relevant. However, 
even if one succeeds in defending such grounds, the very 
admission of a variety of determinants of the division of labour 
still poses a problem for any theory of class. This problem is 
that there is no reason to suppose that different determinants 
{whether legal, political, technological or whatever} will be 
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equivalent in their mode of operation or effect. Even if only 
some of the determinants affect the class structure, the other 
determinants are still operative. Hence even in a classless 
society, the social organisation of production involves various 
different demarcations between economic agents. Why then does 
class matter? Without denying the importance of other lines of 
demarcation between economic agents which are not usually 
consid~red as class boundaries (for example, gender or race) 
one can say that the class structure matters because an 
economic agent's location in relation to the means of production 
can be a significant condition of action of that agent. This 
may seem a rather bland justification for the study of class 
relations, compared to the claims made by both Marxism and 
Weberian sociology that the class structure forms the basis for 
identifying significant or potentially significant collective 
actors. Yet this argument has something in common with such 
claims, for to say that the relation to the means of production 
can be a significant condition of action of an economic agent 
is to imply that such an agent may potentially act with other 
agents who have the same or a similar relation to the means of 
production. 
In the Weberian tradition, parties are organisations aiming 
to affect the policy of the rulers, and may be formed on various 
bases, including status groups or (less likely in Weber's view) 
class position. The sort of class most likely to act 'communally' 
in Weber's view was a social class, which was defined in terms 
of the social interaction among its members. The classical 
Marxist use of class to identify potentially significant 
collective actors rests on the claim that the economy either 
directly or 'in the last instance' determines the superstructure, 
so that politics is primarily a matter of class struggle. In 
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my view this claim has been cogently criticised as reductionist,12 
but it is still possible to say that economic agents may be 
politically engaged in struggle along class lines (in the 
enterprise and elsewhere over other conditions of production) 
without reducing politics to class action. The problem of 
reductionism is that it attempts to reduce one level (or domain 
or instance) which is supposed to have effects in .its own right., 
to another level. The lngical problem is how to reconcile the 
claim that a level has effects of its own with the claim that it 
is determined from outside, from another level with which it is 
somehow structurally connected but not merged. This is the 
problem of 'relative autonomy' of a superstructure determined 
'in the last instance' by the economy, the problem being crudely 
that either politics is wholly determined by the economy, in 
which case it is difficult to treat them as distinct levels, 
or else the effects of the economy on the separate domain of 
politics are theoretically indeterminate, in which case the 
claim of 'determination in the last instance' cannot be 
sustained. 
Yet it is possible to argue that class structure is 
potentially relevant to political struggle if politics is not 
treated as a structurally separate domain., but as a process of 
struggle (including negotiation) between socially defined agents. 
If some agents are in a position to control the conditions of 
production, and hence to permit access to the means of production 
by other agents on conditions which they, rather than the other 
agents, largely determine., then potentially the relation to the 
means of production could either become an issue over which 
struggle takes place or a demarcation line along which agents 
engaged in some other struggle form into contending forces. 
However, although the class structure could be considered a 
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basis for identifying potential collective actors, whether 
political struggle takes place along class lines is less important 
than the way the relation to the means of production opens up or 
reduces the capacity for action of the various economic agents. 
To put it another way, the class structure matters not because 
political struggle primarily or potentially takes place along 
class lines, but because the relation to the means of production 
gives greater freedom of action to some agents and restricts the 
capacity for action of other agents in a fairly systematic way. 
If this cannot be demonstrated, then the concept of class cannot 
be considered an important tool for analysing forms of social 
organisation, no matter what grounds one offers for drawing 
class boundaries. 
Why should the social organisation of production give rise 
to fairly systematic variations in the capacities of economic 
agents because of their relation to the means of production? 
As we have seen, the classical Marxist answer has been because 
the relation to the means of production determines the sources 
of revenue and the associated levels of income and consumption. 
This could perhaps be criticised on ~he grounds that production 
and consumption are interrelated, so that there are no grounds 
for giving priority to the relation to the means of production 
as the defining characteristic of classes. It is certainly true 
that if one abandons the labour theory of value, one cannot claim 
any ontological privilege for the production process Eer se, 
and in an economy with an advanced djvision of labour other 
economic activities increase in importance as conditions of 
production, and cannot be treated as passive effects of the 
production process. However, since production is a necessary 
part of any economy, and since other econom~c activities can be 
considered as conditions of production, the use of a concept of 
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relation to the means of production as a tool for analysing the 
division of labour as a class structure does not preclude 
reference to other economic relations. Rather it is a way of 
dealing with the interconnections of economic relationships, 
since treating them as conditions of production relates other 
economic activities to production (which must be a feature of 
any economy so the concept of relation to the means of production 
has a general applicab~lity) without giving production a privileged 
position as the main or ultimate cause of the structure of the 
economy. 
To some extent Marx was approaching such a position in his 
discussions of the differentiation of capitalist activities, 
many of which (such as banking) are not directly associated with 
production, but which do form important conditions of production. 
It is because for Marx they formed such important conditions of 
capitalist production that he was able to treat them as providing 
access to the means of production which was basically the same 
kind of access as that of the industrial capitalist; in other 
words, Marx argued in effect that control of such conditions as 
finance capital and commercial capital provided access on the 
various capitalists' 'own' terms, by and large, whereas the 
access of the labourers to the means of production was for Marx 
largely on the terms of the capitalists. The problem with Marx's 
position lay not in his treatment of the class structure in terms 
of relation to the means of production, but his attempt to 
specify possession and non-possession of the means of production 
in terms of the labour theory of value. The specialisation of 
capitalists meant that possession could no longer be adequately 
conceived in terms of the legal analogy of a single agent with 
complete rights of use and disposal of the possessed object, 
since the control of the social conditions of use and disposal 
of that possession gave other agents effective access to the 
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benefits of that possession (the means of production). Consequently 
the distinction between a class of agents possessing the means of 
production and a class which did not possess them was threatened, 
and the idea of a single line of demarcation between the classes 
based on the labour theory of value ran into serious (and in my 
view, fatal) difficulties. However, as already indicated, if 
one does not have a single line of demarcation between agents, 
and if one admits of a variety of determinants of the relation 
to the means of production (and hence a variety of agents whose 
relation to the means of production differs in important 
respects) then there is a danger of falling into an 'infinite 
fragmentation' position, or denying that class matters. 
Paradoxically, the solution to this is probably to concede 
that the traditional concept of possession or control of the 
means of production is problematic. If it is conceded that 
possession can never be totally exclusive to one agent, or even 
to a class of agents, because the capacity to use and dispose 
of a possession is always dependent on social conditions and 
hence on the relative capacities of other agents, then one is 
forced to specify what the relative capacities of the various 
agents are and to analyse how far these capacities determine 
and are determined by access to the means of production. In 
other words, since the social organisation of production always 
involves relations between economic agents (the relations of 
production), all economic agents have ~ access to the means 
of production, since they condition the access of those agents 
most directly concerned with production. Relations between 
economic agents become class relations when certain agents are 
able to establish a predominance over the conditions of access 
to the means of production; that is, when certain agents are 
able to establish a relatively exclusive control over the means 
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and conditions of production. When this occurs, other agents 
are only able to gain access on terms which are significantly 
determined by the 'possessing' agents, and thus the capacity 
to act of these other agents is significantly restricted. If 
one argues that there are various agents with differential 
access to the means of production, then the only way to avoid 
falling into the 'infinite fragmentation' approach is to argue 
that the relations between some of those agents are such that 
collectively those agents effectively establish relatively 
exclusive access to the means of production; that is, other 
agents' access is largely determined by the relations between 
the first group of agents. Thus one is not talking of legal 
ownership or control by a particular kind of agent as the 
criterion for class relations, but rather of the relations 
between various different kinds of agents being such that these 
somewhat different kinds of agents' relations with each other 
establish a set of conditions which restrict the access to the 
means of production by most other economic agents. 
, 
If such a boundary demarcating fairly systematic differences 
in the capacity for action of various economic agents can be 
shown to be a feature of the social organisation of production, 
then a class structure is a significant aspect of the social 
formation in question. This is not to deny that economic agents 
on different sides of this boundary are differentiated by other 
determinants which also affect their capacity for action; nor 
is it to deny that such other determinants may be more important 
than relation to the means of production, even in affecting the 
wayan economy is organised. It is simply to affirm that the 
class structure is a theoretically significant feature of a 
social formation wherever relations of production generate a 
series of social locations, the conditions of which give the 
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agents occupying them differential access to the means of 
production in a manner which fairly systematically enhances 
or diminishes their capacity for action. Since the conditions 
of production are always changing in response to the struggles 
between agents, the enhancement or diminution of the capacity 
for action of agents consequent upon their differential access 
to the means of production can never be a static affair. That 
1S why it is difficult to be more specific a~out the extent or 
forms of access which determine such fairly systematic differences 
in the various agents' capacity for action, when making such 
general remarks about the class structure. What can be said 
in general is that differential access to the means of production 
not only enables all agents to act in the division of labour, 
since it provides their conditions for action; differential 
access to the means of production also enables some agents to 
act more effectively £ll the division of labour. That is, their 
relation to the means of production also enables some agents to 
co-ordinate the diverse economic activities of other agents, 
thus partially determining the conditions for their own actions. 
It is for 'this reason that the relation to the means of production 
can be considered a potentially important demarcation line 
between economic agents, because it can enhance the capacity 
of some agents to act upon their own conditions of existence, 
while restricting the capacities of others to do so. 
In the case of capitalist relations of production, the 
restrictions on the access to the means of production are 
effected through the 'control' by some agents of the conditions 
of commodity exchange. The accumulation or concentration of 
substantial amounts of money as capital enables the agents in a 
position to decide how that capital is to be used to become 
predominant in determining the social distribution of the means 
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of production and the distribution of income, while the capacity 
of other agents to determine such outcomes is seriously reduced. 
The maintenance of such systematic differences in the capacity 
for action must be in part an effect {even if unintended} of 
the policies of those agents with access to the means of production 
on favourable terms. Otherwise in circumstances where other 
agents were struggling to improve their access to the means of 
production there would be little to stop those other agents 
from eventually altering the conditions of production in their 
own favour, since the very fact of the division of labour means 
that all economic agents have some impact, however minimal, on 
the conditions of production. Consequently, both the maintenance 
and the transformation of relations to the means of production 
involve policy decisions on the part of various economic agents. 
In the case of state socialist societies, one of the issues 
for analysis is the extent to which access to the means of production 
is open, that is, the extent to which class relations have been 
abolished. Certainly this is the main criterion by which such 
societies judge themselves and justify their policies, and it 
forms one of the main issues for debate in commentaries on such 
societies. How would one decide whether or not there was fairly 
exclusive access to the means of production? In other words, 
what pattern of differential access to the means of production 
would prevent some agents from predominating in a fashion which 
seriously diminished the capacities of other agents? To claim 
that a situation arises where no set of agents predominates in 
determining the conditions of access comes close to claiming that 
the division of labour does not produce differential capacities 
in economic agents; in other words, that the division of labour 
does not produce important effects, and does not really matter. 
This would amount to saying that the conditions of action of 
economic agents either did not affect economic agents, or 
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affected them all equally. In that case it would make no sense 
to talk of a division of labour. However, if a set of agents 
does predominate in determining the conditions of access to the 
means of production, this does not necessarily mean that they 
are able to determine access on terms which systematically 
favour themselves. The co-ordination of the diverse activities 
of various economic agents is almost bound to place the 
co-ordinating agents in.a position where they predominate in 
determining the terms of access to the means of production, 
and hence the distribution of income. Yet such agents do not 
form a class if they are unable to use their predominant 
position to secure for themselves a disproportionate share in 
the distribution of income, or otherwise substantially enhance 
their capacity for action at the expense of other agents. In 
other words, a set of agents may predominate in determining 
access to the means of production in a way which prevents other 
agents from 'dictating the terms' of access, yet those predominant 
agents might themselves be unable to use their position to 
'dictate their own terms'. In such a case, the predominant 
agents cannot be considered a class. The central planning 
agencles in state socialist societies could in principle be 
considered as such a set of agents, provided it could be 
demonstrated empiricallY that they were only 'holding the ring', 
in the sense of following policies which prevented all agents, 
including themselves, from securing the disproportionate 
benefits which can result from privileged access to the means 
of production. This would imply that non-class societies would 
have a very egalitarian policy with respect to the distribution 
of income and that this policy was being fairly effectively 
pursued. 
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To sum up the discussion so far, then, it could be said 
that various determinants of the division of labour only produce 
relations of production which can be called class relations when 
they generate conditions of access to the means of production 
which permit substantially greater scope for some economic 
agents to act in and on the division of labour y taking on 
functions of co-ordination of the diverse kinds of economic 
activity engaged in by various economic agents, and when the 
conditions for this predominant access to the means of 
production permit the predominant group of agents to secure for 
themselves substantial benefits, particularly in the form of 
diverting to themselves a disproportionate share of the total 
real income of the social formation in question. Consequently, 
while it is difficult to envisage a division of labour in which 
no agents have a predominant access to the means of production, 
the conditions under which in certain social formations some 
agents do predominate may be such that agents with a lesser 
capacity for action are able to establish sufficient access to 
the means of production to prevent any agent or group of agents 
from using their predominance to substantially affect the 
distribution of income in their own favour. This would imply 
'multiple' access to the means of production, that is a series 
of overlapping forms of access. 
It follows from this argument that the concept of 'social 
ownership of the means of production' which has traditionally 
been used by classical Marxism to describe socialist or communist 
relations of production must be reconsidered. If any division of 
labour entails agents with different capacities, some of which 
are determined by their different relations to the means of 
production (differential access), then non-class relations of 
production cannot be conceived of as referring to the ownership 
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or control of the means of production by society as a whole. 
That would be to deny that the division of labour does indeed 
differentiate economic agents. Nor could the means of production 
be considered to be under the control of an agency which somehow 
represents society as a whole, since any such agency would 
necessarily be composed of sub-agents who could be considered 
to have privileged access to the means of production, particularly 
if.a serious criticism could be mounted of the claim by that 
agency to represent the whole of an internally differentiated 
social formation. Hence any concept of social ownership of the 
means of production (that is, of classless relations of 
production) must take account of the very complexity of an 
advanced division of labour, which implies a multiplicity of 
relations between economic agents. That very multiplicity or 
complexity of relations may well provide the conditions in 
which agents who would otherwise be less powerful could gain 
sufficient access to the means of production to prevent the 
predominant agents from using their social location largely for 
their own benefit. Thus any concept of 'social ownership' or 
'communal possession 1 cannot refer to a series of undifferentiated 
agents, each of which has access to the means of production on 
the same terms, but rather to a set of conditions where the form 
of access of one set of agents does not seriously preclude the 
access of other agents. This would imply a situation of 
continuous negotiation and struggle between agents to prevent 
unacceptable restrictions on their own capacity for action 
deriving from their differential relations to the means of 
production. Since the outcome of such a continuous struggle 
could not be guaranteed, classless relations of production 
cannot be conceived of as a 'point of stasis', a state of 
affairs which could be thought of as necessarily reproducing 
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itself. Thus a classless society cannot be considered as the end 
point of a process. In particular, it cannot be considered as 
the 'goal of history' and social formations cannot be assessed 
by 'measuring their distance' from such a goal. State socialist 
societies are often considered as 'transitional social formations'. 
However, this is not because they are at a certain staging point 
down the road of progress to an ideal state of affairs, but 
rather because it presumably can be demonstrated that class 
relations have been seriously weakened. Since the continuous 
process of struggle between agents means that there is no state 
of affairs in which the process of restoration of class relations 
cannot begin, it is probably better to avoid the phrase 
'transitional social formation', or else to restrict its use 
to designating social formations where major transformations of 
the relations of production are taking place. The 'state of 
play' of the relations of production, with regard to whether 
these involve a class structure, and if so what the conditions 
and effects of this are, this 'state of play' can only be 
decided after a fairly detailed examination of various possible 
determinants of the division of labour. 
The position which will be adopted in this thesis, therefore, 
will be to concentrate on analysing relations of production and 
class structure without attempting to reconcile this analysis 
with the labour theory of value. Instead, the decisions as to 
the demarcation of different positions within the class structure 
will have to be made in the light of historically specific 
analyses of the division of labour in a particular society, 
the Soviet Union, without attempting an a priori delimitation 
of the determinants of the division of labour. This implies 
having recourse to empirical analysis (probably the most 
difficult kind of theoretical work to do well), but it is 
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hoped that this thesis will avoid the pitfalls of the more common 
approaches to empirical work on class. 
The main pitfall has already been indicated with reference 
to Weber and approaches influenced by him, namely that the 
absence of a clear theorisation of the social relations 
operative between different agents has meant that the class 
structure has usually been treated as qualitatively homogenous 
(classes having more or less of some quality, attribute or 
possession). Where the stratification hierarchy has not been 
treated as qualitatively homogenous, as in certain 
'multidimensional' approaches, the strata or classes have been 
conceived as defined by the concatenation of various dimensions, 
which are themselves poorly theorised, and whose interaction in 
structuring the strata is also unclear. Thus the avoidance of 
treating stratification as entailing a homogenous hierarchy is 
achieved after a fashion, but the benefits are dubious. However, 
this has still resulted in theoretically arbitrary dividing lines 
being drawn between the classes (or class positions) leading to 
the adoption of an empiricist approach to research. 13 A good 
example of an approach influenced by Weber can be found in the 
well-known article by Goldthorpe 'Social Stratification in 
Industrial Society,.14 This article establishes a distinction 
between market stratification which is, so to speak, unconscious 
or unintended, and political stratification, which is deliberate. 
Yet there is no real attempt to specify the kinds of social 
relations between the strata which are produced by these 
different stratifying mechanisms, the market and the political 
structure. Consequently there is no real basis for empirical 
analysis based on conclusions drawn from this distinction, 
since the nature of the different kinds of strata is opaque. 
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The analysis of the class structure, then, requires a 
theoretical specification of the causal mechanisms generating a 
variety of economic locations and of the possibly distinct 
mechanisms distributing agents to the different locations, as 
a basis for categorising agents into classes. It has been 
argued herA that a concept of relations of production which 
admits of a variety of determinants of the division of labour 
would be the best way to. approach this specification, and that 
this causal specification must be historically specific. 
However, as should be clear from the above discussion of the 
problems involved, only those determinants which affect the 
access of agents to the means of production, and consequently 
their capacity for action in and on the division of labour, can 
be considered as relevant for the analysis of class, On the 
basis of this theoretical specification of class relations, 
it is possible to appraise empirical indices of the class 
structure in terms of their pertinence to the theoretical 
concerns of the analysis. A technically competent piece of 
empirical work may well be irrelevant to the concerns of the 
analysis, but often the researcher is in a position of being 
able to use empirical material compiled by others whose theoretical 
concerns were different from those of the researcher. They 
may nevertheless be in a form that renders them open to 
reworking, that is, to recalculation which transforms them 
into indices y albeit imperfect ones, of the theoretically 
specified mechanisms in which the researcher is interested. 15 
This was precisely the problem confronted by Lenin in his 
use of zemstvo statistics in The Develo~ent of Capitalism in 
. 1 6 
RUSSla , and by agricultural researchers in the Soviet Union 
in the 1920s~ as will be seen in Chapter One. It implies that 
empirical work where one is using already existing sources (and 
one is thus not in control of the research design) must be 
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conducted on the basis of both a theoretical critique of the 
conceptual basis of the research and where necessary what might 
be termed a technical critique of the process by which the 
empirical results were compiled. Clearly, the more details 
recorded about the process of collecting, sorting and performing 
the original calculations on the material the better, since 
they are then more amenable to reworking in terms of the critique. 
This means that even where a decision is made to use certain 
indices of the class structure, their pertinence to the analysis 
being conducted will vary. The relative merits of the various 
sources is thus a worthy matter for discussion in each case. 
What should be avident, however, is that the use of such indices 
by themselves does not entail the use of theorstically arbitrary 
demarcation lines between the different class positions. It 
does not, in other words, entail a collapse into empiricism, 
precisely because it is related to a theory of the social 
relations operating between the various agents. It must be said, 
however, that adoption of certain Marxist concepts does not create 
a talisman which guarantees immunity from adopting an empiricist 
approach to research. 17 Consequently, the relationship between 
the theoretical basis of the empirical material being used and 
the analysis being conducted must be kept under constant review. 
It is hoped that this thesis succeeds in doing so. 
In the light of all these considerations, the structure of 
the thesis can now be outlined, together with the rationale for 
this structure. Chapter One is concerned with the rural class 
structure in the 1920s, because this formed the main set of 
conditions which had to be taken into account in the formulation 
of a strategy of industrialisation and socialisation of the 
means of production in the Soviet Union. As such the rural class 
structure formed a major starting point of the process of social 
transformation which led to the modern Soviet Union. The extent 
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to which capitalist relations of production were developing, and 
how far such developments acted as a constraint on kind of 
socialist strategy which was possible, are issues which often 
appear in debates on the contemporary Soviet Union. It is 
hoped that an examination of such issues will illuminate the 
current social structure of the Soviet Union, if only by 
indicating the extent to which it has been able to transform 
the ~onditions which posed such acute dilemmas for a socialist 
strategy in the 1920s. 
Chapter Two is an ex~mination df the Soviet economy of 
the 1960s and 1970s~ paying particular attention to relations 
between various economic agents~ such as the central planning 
agencies, state enterprises, collective farms and retailing 
outlets, as well as various individual human agents, such as 
enterprise managers. The main concern of this Chapter is with 
the conditions of action of such agents, as determined not only 
by their relation to other agents, but also by their internal 
forms of organisation and modes of calculation. 
Chapter Three is concerned with the law, the state and 
C' 
po1itics~ in so far as these are determinants of the division 
of labour and affect access to the means of production. In 
particular, the treatment of politics as a process of struggle, 
which continuously changes the conditions of action of various 
agents, including economic agents, is elaborated, The 
implications of this treatment of politics for theories of 
socialist democracy are considered, and in the process of 
relating this view of politics to the Soviet Union~ various 
other approaches to Soviet politics are criticised. However, 
the main concern of this Chapter is to analyse the legal and 
political determinants of the relations of production. 
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Chapter Four follows on from this analysis by examining 
the policy outcomes of such political struggles in so far as 
they affect the distribution of income. Hence it investigates 
the various agencies most directly concerned with distributing 
non-wage forms of income such as housing, health care and 
assorted welfare benefits. It is thus concerned with social 
consumption and the extent to which an effectively egalitarian 
policy on the distribution of income is being" pursued. 
Chapter Five attempts to build on the work of Chapters 
Two to Four, which are concerned with major determinants of the 
division of labour, to examine the mechanisms differentiating 
economic locations, the mechanisms distributing agents to those 
locations and the consequent distribution of income to determine 
whether the relations of production in the Soviet Union can be 
said to involve class relations. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET RURAL CLASS STRUCTURE 
IN THE 1920S 
Introduction 
No analysis of the contemporary Soviet Union can safely ignore 
its history. Yet this history is complex and has already been exten-
sively studied. Despite this, the developments of the 1920s have been 
the object of renewed interest in recent years, largely because various 
historical op~ions were still open at that time and because of the high 
standard of debates in various arenas on how .the Soviet Union should 
develop. Since the concern of this thesis is the analysis of the class 
structure of the Soviet Union, the peri od of the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) from 1921 to 1928 is of particular interest. NEP represented 
an attempt to construct a non-coercive socialisi: policy towards a 
peasantry which was not conceived of as a class or as a unified social 
force. The historically anti- democratic effects on the Soviet Union 
(and on world politics) of the failure of this attempt are extremely 
well known, at least in broad outline. There is a lot to be gained 
from the analysis of the reasons for this failure, both in terms of 
understanding the contemporary Soviet Union and in terms of the 
pertinence of the problems faced under the New Economic Policy to 
the contemporary problems of developing countrie s. This acknowledge-
ment of the importance of the 1920 s provide s the justification for 
inany of the studies of that period, yet precisely because of the 
complexity of the se developments, the richnes s of the empirical 
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sources and the hi~.standards of the various debates, the contempo-
rary debates in the West about the 1920s are still continuing. This 
chapter can hardly lay claim to being a definitive analysis of the 
class structure in the 1920s, but it does attempt to investigate some 
relatively neglected aspects of that intellectual area, in the light of 
the growing view in some quarters that the policy of forced collecti visa--
tion of the peasantry was not only economically and politically unnecessary, 
but actually impeded the implementation of the first Five Year Plan. 
The prevailing view among many shades of political opinion has 
tended to accept the terms of the Soviet industrialisation debate. within 
the Bolshevik leadership as an adequate definition of the problems 
which the country then faced. A good example of this approach is the 
essay by Professor Nove entitled 'Was Stalin Really Necessary?' in the 
1 
book of the same name containing a collection of his es says. The 
ar gument there accepts that the period of restoration of the economy 
from the ravaglS of civil war had passed by the latter 1920s, and that 
the reconstruction of the economy was reaching the point where further 
investment would have to be on a much greater scale than before if 
production was to continue growing at the same pace and if the country 
was to be industrialised. Since the majority of the population were 
engaged in agriculture, the investment funds would have to corne from 
agriculture. Thus basically the investment would have to take place at 
the cost of a relative or even absolute decline in the incomes of the 
peasantry, with the 'surplus' being pumped into industry. Industrialisa-
tion under the direction of the Bolshevik Party thus almost necessitated 
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forced collectivisation as a means of controlling the peasantry while 
the surplus was pumped out of agriculture. In this sense, if the 
Bolshevik party were'to retain power, Stalin probably was necessary, 
according to this line of reasoning. The main alternative view has 
tended to be that collectivisation was necessary in order to increase 
agricultuldl productivity beyond the limits set by small- scale peasant 
production, but that forced collectivisation, rather than voluntary 
collectivisation, was not only very costly in lives and highly detri-
mental to the whole political structure, but reduced the scale of the 
surplus that might otherwise have been extracted from the peasantry. 
The latter kind of argument has been common, for example, among 
Marxists of various persuasions. Briefly, then;. most analyses have 
accepted that collectivisltion was a precondition for socialist industriali-
sation because of the limitations of small-scale peasant agriculture. It 
has often been part of such arguments that without collectivisation any 
agricultural surplus would be under the control of small-scale rural 
capitalists or I :kulaks I who would thus be in an economic position to 
challenge the Bolshevik control over the pattern of industrialisation. 
The main challenge in English to this latter point carne (at least until 
the mid-l970s) from writers such as Chayanov2 or Shanin 3 , who argued 
that the peasantry was not undergoing a process of substantial class 
differentiation along capitalist lines. 
However, the terms of the debate were somewhat changed, even 
for those who might have been reluctant to acaept arguments along the 
lines of Chayanov or Shanin, by the work of BarsO\' appearin~. in the 
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Soviet Union itself which apparently demonstrated that the first 
Five Year Plan was carried through without the extraction of an 
agricultural 'surplus'. Not only had the real incomes of collective 
farm workers (kolkhozniki) declined, but agricultural deliveries to 
the towns and industry had also declined. Collectivisation had proved 
irrelevant to the procesB, of industrialisation, in the sense that it did 
not deliver any agricultural 'surplus' for investment. The implications 
of this were already beginning to be registered in the well-known debate 
between J. Karcz and R. W. Davies on tIE 'grain problem' of the late 
4 1~20s. and were further discussed in Harrison (1978), Hussain and 
5 
Tribe (1981), and in Smith (1979) . The last two publications have 
criticised the conception of agricultural surplus involved in the previous-
ly prevailing terms of the debate, and have stressed the possibility of 
generating investment funds within the industrial sector itself by 
various means, including organisational improvements both in the plann-
ing proces s and in terms of the technical division labour. The conclu-
sion is that such changes must have been the main source of investment 
funds, since agriculture did not provide them. Such a conclusion has 
many implications, but the main one which will be pursued here is that 
it changes the terms in which developments in the class structure in 
the 1920s should be appraised. It also changes the terms of appraisal 
of state policy towards the rural clas s structure of the time. 
Whatever changes in the class structure may have been registered 
by ~esearch or official statistics, one need no longer analyse them 
primarily' in terms of their impact on the delivery of an agricultural 
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surplus to provide the basis for an industrialisation programme. 
This is not to deny that the division of social production meant that 
agriculture supplied both raw materials to industry and consumer 
goods to the town. It simply means that the appraisal of the role 
of agriculture need not be conducted in the same terms of those used 
. by the leadership and Left Opposition of the Bolshevik Party. In 
particular the "development of capitalism within agriculture, with the 
supposed capacity of capitalists to control the delivery of the surplus 
by controlling its production, did not neces sarily threaten to subvert 
the industrialisation programme, as most of the Bolshevik leader-
ship increasingly came to believe. 
The conceptualisation of industrialisation as requiring the extract:ion 
of an agricultural surplus (as a source of rapid accumUlation) was 
prevalent in the 1920s, and its influence among later commentaries is 
evident. Yet the rejection of such a line of reasoning does not imply 
an indifference to the rural class structure of the 1920s, nor does it 
entail a denial of the view that collectivisation could have eased and 
speeded the process of industrialisation by providing additional sources 
of investment and consumption goods. It simply means that these issues 
were not as critical for the development of socialism as the Bolshevik 
leadership came to believe, even though some form of industrialisation 
v.as acondition for the survival and development of socialism in the SO'Viet 
Union. 
The conclusion that collectivisation was not a critical precondition 
for industrialisation can also be established on the basis of the analysis 
6 
of the NEP itself by Grosskopf (1976) . A major conclusion to be drawn 
from her superb study is that the difficulties of the NEP at the end of 
the 1920s were due primarily to policy failure in implementing 
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the NEP, so that the NEP itself did not constitute a major obstacle 
to th e industrialisation programme. Grosskopf's work has been cited 
7 
by Hussain and Tribe and by Smith , but it also forms a major influence 
on the somewhat different work on the 1920s by Bettelheim ('1978)8. 
The reliance by Bettelheim on Grosskopf means that Part Two of 
Volume Two of his work is probably the best known indication so far 
available in English' of Grosskopf's arguments, but the positions of 
GrGls skopf and Bettelheim should not be equated. Grosskopf's work 
does lend support to the analysis of the peasantry developed by Lenin 
towards the end of his life, but it is convincing because of its extensive 
use of primary empirical sources 9 • On the basis of an extremely 
detailed analysis of developments during the peri od of NEP, Grosskopf 
demonstrates that the '3mychka', that is the union or linking between 
the peasantry and the proletariat, was by no means economically 
moribund after the crisis of 1925-1926 and that the later crisis of the 
NEP in 1927-1928 was primarily due to the failure to 'learn the lessons' 
of the earlier crisis. This occurred despite the comparatively clear 
analysis of the problems by Dzerzhinsky prior to his death in 1926, 
so the failure was not an analytical one but a political one. A more 
rigourous pursuit of certain neglected aspects of the NEP, particularly 
of the supplying of means of production to the poor peasantry, would 
have substantially increased agricultural output, making industrialisa-
tion that much easier. Thus her analysis shows that the supposed 
l1imits' of small scale production could be considerably extended by an 
appropriate policy of state support for the poor peasantry. More to the 
point, such support for the poor peasantry would have provided the 
economic conditions for voluntary forms of cooperation and collectivisa-
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tion, that is it would have facilitated the undercutting of capitalist 
relations of production and the development of socialist relations. 
It is from this standpbint, rather than a concern with a surplus for 
industrialisation, that the class structure of the 1920s will be examined 
in this chapter. 
However, despite the considerable importance of Grosskop~ls 
work, it must be said that she devotes comparatively little space to 
the direct analysis of the processes of class differentiation of the 
peasantry. She concentrates instead on the appraisal of state policy 
towards the peasantry, on economic relations between agriculture and 
industry and on the economic effects of the se on the production and 
distribution of agricultural produce, particularly grain. These do 
constitute the main social conditions of the processes of class differen-
tiation (or lack of differentiation) among the peasantry, and Gros skopf 
does refer to the main sources of research in her estimate of the extent 
of class differentiation, including Khryashcheva ,Gaister, Strumilin, and 
Kritsman. Nevertheless, there is scope for a more detailed discussion 
of these processes within the context of the analysis provided by 
Grosskopf. There is still to-day a considerable amount of controversy 
over the mechanisms and extent of such class differentiation, as the 
works of Chayanov and Shanin already mentioned indicate. In addition, 
any critique of the state policy towards the cou.ntryside which is 
concerned with its effectiveness (or Th.ck of it) in fostering socialist 
relations of production must include an analysis of the mechanisms 
10 
and extent of development of capitalist relations of production 
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Kritsman's Work 
r 0 elucidate the processes of developrnent of 
capitalist relations of production and a capitalist class structure, a 
substantial part of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the 
work of Kritsrnan, particularly of his 1926 work Class Stratification of 
11 
the Soviet Countryside Kritsrnan's work has recently been the 
object of renewed attention. For exarnple, 12 Shanin (1972). discusses 
his work as follows (pages 60 a:nd 61): 
"The rnain group of party scholars, led by 
Kritsrnan, developed research whose direction was 
governed by ideological cornrnitrnent to detect a 
rising tide of polarisation. The hiring-out of horses 
and equiprnent was seen as the rnain new forrn of 
class-exploitation •• It was predicted that socialisrn in 
the countryside would corne as a result of state inter-
vention and a rise in urban wages and productivity, 
which would rob richer farrners of their wage-labour 
and rnake their influence crurnble. Few only defended 
the purity of the, Marxist definition by which capitalist 
clas s- differentiation could be rneasured only qualitatively, 
ie. in terrns of the predorninance of wage-labour - which 
would have put it, in this period, next to nil'.'. 
Later, in discussing the rnethodological problerns involved in the 
use of quantitative indices of wealth to analyse stratification, Shanin 
rernarks (pages 132 and 133): 
"The stratification by land SOMJ. was bitterly 
denounced by Kritsrnan and his lieutenants in the 
agrarian section of the Cornrnunist Acaderny. They 
claimed that this index was suitable only for the pre-
capitalist period and that it helped to conceal real 
differentiation - processes because of the levelling 
of land-holdings which had taken place during the 
revolutionary period. Stratification of peasant 
households by capital and incorne was proposed as 
an alternative and put into operation in a Ts. S. U. 
(Central Statistical Adrninistration - G. L.) handbook 
and in a study by Gaister, both published in 1928. 
This rnethod revealed sorne new rnethodological 
weaknesses, however. The arnount of land held was 
not taken into account, since it was not considered 
part of capital - a lirnitation which rnade estimates 
of actual production factors in terrns of 'capital' 
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doubtful. Moreover, any estimates of capital 
and income for peasant households in a type 
of economy producing a great part of its own 
needs were extremely dubious. In fact, the 
advantages of using indices of wealth and income 
in money terms were quite offset by the difficul-
ties of correctly estimating them. 11 
However, 
13 
de spite various criticisms of Shanin' s own position, 
inte.rest in Kritsman" s work as providing a pos sible alternative mode 
of analysis did not' appear in Western publications until the work of 
14 
Solomon (1977) . A comparatively favourable review by Harrison 
(1978) 15, however, suggests that Solomon is somewhat influenced by 
the multifactorial approach of Shanin. For this reason the more recent 
work bl Cox (1979a, 1979~/6 is of considerable interest, as is the 
1979 article by Harrison17 . Cox in ~ 979 a), 'Awkward Class or 
Awkward Classes?', contrasts the positions of Shanin and Kritsman, 
and concludes his article by saying: 
11 furthermor e, the Soviet research of 
the 1920s sh'O\Vsthat Marxists have been able to 
deal with problems in'the analysis of peasant 
society in a more flexible way which offers real 
insights into the complexities and peculiarities of 
the peasantry which neither Shanin nor the type of 
Marxism he attacks have been able to reveal. 11 18 
In his (1979b) paper, 'Class Analysis', Cox fU"rther develop his remarks 
on Kritsman and his colleagues, pointing to differences in interpreta-
tion among them, indicating the originality of K ritsman' S 'ow;n approach 
and defending him from some of Solomon's criticisms. Harrison, on 
the othe r hand, is somewhat more critical of the 'Agrarian Marxists', 
including K ritsman, but primarily on the grounds that they failed to 
transform their critique of the Chayanov school into a practical theory 
forming the basis of the construction of an alternative, socialist mode 
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f 1 . . 19 o rura lnterventlon • In this way they constituted an early 
example of what Harrison calls 'subordinate Marxism', which tends 
to be restricted to an academic critique, rather than the pres.entation 
d · l' 20 an practlce of an a ternahve strategy 
Yet it is not clear to me that Kritsman had no strategy for the 
socialist transformation of agriculture. He certainly had fairly well":' 
developed ideas on cooperatives as a potential path to socialism, as 
well as of the conditions under which cooperatives could foster capitalist 
relations. For example, in a November 1927 article entitled 'Ten 
Years on the Agrarian Front of the Proletarian Revolution' in Kritsman 
(1929), he argued that rural cooperation was a field of fierce struggle 
between capitalist and socialist tendencies of development. Both forms 
of transformation of the petty- bour geois economy depended on the self-
activity of the small farms, and where capitalist elements did not pre-
dominate, this self-activity (collective, not individual) was a product 
of the interlocking of the petty- bour geois economy and the state economy 
of the proletariat. This interlocking opened a way for the petty- bourgeois 
economy which was a non-capitalist road to the predominance of the 
petty economy, but not on the basis of its destruction, but of its.organic 
development. Consequently, Kritsman was critical of the 1925 abolition 
of the direct formal prohibition (sustained for four years after the 
transition to the NEP) of capitalism in agriculture. This de jure 
recognition of what was already to a significant degree recognised 
de facto led among other things to the downfall of the hopes of the poor 
as a so cial stratum. to retain the means of raising up their own indivi-
dual farm, because they did not dispose of enough of their own means 
of production to conduct their own farms. (Elsewhere Kritsman argued 
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that the proletarian state should not create proletarians in the 
countryside). In other words, Kri tsman' s view of a socialist strategy 
in the countryside ,¥as to provide the poor peasants with enough 
meCins of production to engage in petty farming in their own right, 
and to encourage various forms of cooperation: a conclusion 
remarkably similar to that of Grosskopf. In addition, as a means 
of cOlTIbatting Soviet bureaucratism, Kritsman advocated in this 
article the raising of the cultural level of wide strata, both 
ruling Cind ruled, above all of the mass of the peasantry, and the 
attraction of large masses into social work and work of direction, to 
cr..eCite the preconditions for the gradual liquidation of this 'survival 
of the past'. Superficially, at least, such a position is rather similar 
to that of Lenin and Bukharin as described by Harrison2l• Kritsman's 
analysis of the mechanisms of class differentiation of the peasantry 
is thus related to a strategy for socialist development which was 
influenced by Lenin, but is also based on extensive knowledge of the 
research conducted nd;only by the Chayanov ('Organisation and Production') 
School but also the- research conducted by h,is colleagues in the Agrarian 
Section of the Communist Academy. It is precisely because: his appraisal 
of the empirical material is related to a conception of forms of development 
of socialist relations of production that his work is so interesting. 
Shanin is correct that part of Kritsman' s strategy of socialist 
development involved the development of urban wage-labour to absorb 
rural unemployment (a change in the division of social production which 
would alter the social division of labour), but as already indicated, he 
was more concerned with preventing the generation of that rural 
unemployment by developing socialist forms of organisation in the country-
side, and by providing the means of production to poor peasants to sustain 
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their farms until such times as they could enter or establish 
collective farms. Kritsman had reservations about the development 
I 
of urban labour (at least in the short term) to absorb rural 
unemployment, because although urban employment was expanding, so 
was urban unemployment. 22 Thus for Kritsman the mode of state 
intervention to encourage socialist relations could take a variety 
of forms, including theorganmation of rural wage-labourers (batraki). 
This approach to agrarian problems forms the background to 
Kritsman's investigations of the extent and forms of development 
of capitalist relations of production in the Soviet countryside 
of the 1920s. While such developments were important for a 
socialist strategy of transformation of the relations of production 
(one has to know the problem in order to solve it), Kritsman was 
careful not to overestimate the strength of rural capitalist 
development and to point to the social bases of socialst transformation 
(including the small but growing proportion of collective farms and 
state ownership of the commanding heights of the economy). This is 
particularly clear from Class Stratification of the Soviet 
Countryside, which is discussed at length in the Appendix. 23 
I have devoted a considerable amount of space to an extended 
exposition of one of Kritsman's works for a variety of reasons. 
Firstly, it is not widely available and provides an excellent account 
of the first half of the 1920s. Readers can readily decide for 
themselves how adequate my commentary is on Kritsman, but it seems 
fairly clear that a process of capitalist class differentiation was 
taking place, although it was in its early stages, as Kritsman 
emphasised. Given the debate still surrounding Kritsman's approach, 
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the presentation of a detailed exposition seemed the best way to 
avoid misunderstandings as to the nature of his analysis. Secondly, 
Kritsman's work Class Stratification of the Soviet Countryside is 
exemplary in its painstaking attention to detail and its methodological 
sophistication. It is hardly a dogmatic approach; for example, he 
refused to argue by analogy (in the two industrial volosti with 
insufficient data) that class stratification must be taking place. His 
grasp of the complexities of the changing division cif labour and of 
regional diversity meant that he was unlikely to favour the use 01 
any single index of das,s d::;Jierentiation, and this probably formed 
one of the bases of his critiques even of members of his own 'school'. 
Such critiques were not purely negative; they were clearly made in 
order to improve later research - hence the preliminary nature of 
his conclusions based on the empirical material presented. 
Thirdly, Kritsman's work was related to both a historical analysis 
of the period and a strategy which was similar to that of Lenin 
or Dzerzhinsky, and in some respects to that of Bukharin. As Cox 
21r 
points out, Kritsman had a conception of structure s 
within the Soviet social formation that was influenced by Lenin's 
analysis in The Tax in Kind, but Kritsman considered that Feudalism 
as a structure could be added to the 5 structures mentioned by Lenin, 
Z5 
especially for some parts of Central Asia. This conception of 
coexisting structures which interpenetrated each other was related 
to Kritsman's view of the predominant role of the state sector in 
structuring the economy. He argued that coopera-
tion was a way of integrating the commOdity peasant farms into the 
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general system of the Soviet national economy. 
For this reason Kritsman placed great emphasis on the plann-
ing of agriculture.' This was surely the reason for his devastating 
critique of the Five Year plan produced by Kond_rat'ev and Oganovskii 
for the Narkomzem, the People's Kommissaxiat of Agriculture. 26 
This is briefly discussed by Jasny (1972), in my view without 
.,.,7 
indicating how penetrating Kritsman's critique was. Part of the 
reason for his interest in the minutiae of the collection of agricultural 
statistics was because of their potential for plan construction and 
policy formation, a potential that was very real because of the 
extensive apparatus for collecting statistics developed after the 
Revolution. The relation between the collection of statistics and 
planning is 'described' in Grosskopf (1976, Preamble and Chapter One, 
Section III). Grosskopf describes the lack of relation between the 
collection of statistics and plan construction between 1917 and 1921, 
and it is evident from Kritsman' s critique of the above 1924 Five 
Year plan of the Narkomzem that these problems had not been 
fully overcome. 
Similarly, .he placed emphasis on 'particular policy measures 
which would help foster the socialist development of the peasantry. 
F or example, he drew attention to the burden of taxation on 
the poor peasants, and noted that it had been lifted. However, 
as Grosskopf points out, in the absence of other policy measures, 
this adversely affected the marketing of grain. Yet these 'absent' 
policy measures were of the kind also advocated by Kritsman, or 
at least implied by his analysis: (a) a credit policy favouring the 
poor peasantry, which would enable them to buy means of produc-
~f' 
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Hon and thus secure their independence of the prosperous peasantry 
(as well as providing the preconditions for cooperative work, since 
there would be a basis for joint purchase and use of such means 
of production). (b) a pricing policy on means of production so 
that they were cheap for the poor peasantry. (Adequate indices 
for the identification of poor peasants would have perhaps even 
made a differential pricing policy possible which favoured the poor.) 
As Grosskopf points out, a policy of supplying implements at 
prices the poor could afford would have encouraged them to deliver 
grain to market even in the absence of tax pressure. Grosskopf, 
and following her Bettelheim, draws attention to the economic 
conditions of such a policy of supplying cheap means of production 
\ 
to the poor peasantry. It required the development of Department I 
industry, and not only in the form of heavy industry or only in the 
towns. This implied a diversion of resources away from what 
might be considered luxury consumer goods for the towns, but it 
would have rapidly and cheaply led to increased agricultural produc-
tion, including production of industrial crops as raw material for 
various industries, e specially textiles. This was precisely what 
Lenin intended by his advocacy of an alliance between heavy industry 
(metal for agricultural implements) and the peasantry. It was a 
precondition for developing cooperatives and collective farms on a 
voluntary basis, with the incentive of rising living standards for the 
poor and middle peasantry. (c) finally, Kritsman's analysis of 
trading capital and his criticisms of the practices of trading coop-
eratives and mutual aid committees implied a policy of much more 
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attention to these non- state forms of potentially socialist organisa-
tion. On this issue his views were similar to those expressed by 
Lenin in 'On Cooperation' Z8 but Kritsman was not simply follow-
ing an official party line (which was in any case increasingly 
ignored): his views were clearly founded as much on the empirical 
material as on Lenin's remarks. 
As Grosskopf demonstrates, the developing crisis of NEP, 
which finally came to be mistakenly considered in the party 
leadership as a 'grain strike' by the kulaks, was closely related to 
the failure to pursue such policies properly. Bettelheim in Class 
Struggles in the U. S. S·.R, Volume Two, provides additional grounds 
for adhering to such a view. Yet it is clear from Kritsman' s analysis 
that the 
. \ 
kulaks were \ ofteh not a direct political danger - they were 
often in the party and were beneficiaries of ,its policies in many 
unintended ways. Neither were theY.lserious economic danger, given 
the strength of the state sector, even if they were economically 
powerful in their own localities. Furthermore, the process of 
capitalist stratification had only just begun and could have been read-
ily undercut by the sort of policies indicated above. One wonders 
how much attention was paid by the party leadership to these studies, 
despite Kritsman's prominence. 2;9 It is doubtful if Stalin read the 
material (compiled by Central Committee members) presented 
on the Urals and Siberia before embarking on his 'U rals - Siberia' 
methods. 
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This is not to say that Stalin was unaware of the activities 
of Kritsman and the school of Agrarian-Marxists. According to 
Solomon's account,3o the first attack on Kritsman's analysis which 
both came from a Marxist and was coupled with a call for "the 
congruence of research findings and Party dicta" had come from 
S.M. Dubrovskii. 31 By April 1929 the Agrarian Marxists were 
being accused of holding positions that conflicted with party 
policy in the countryside~32 By November 1929, the campaign to 
start immediate collectivisation of the peasantry had begun, and 
in December a Politburo commission was established to devise 
methods of implementing collectivisation. It was preparing to 
submit its proposals to the Politburo, just around the time when 
rural scholars were assembling in Moscow on December 20th 1929, for 
the start of the First All-Union Conference of Agrarian-Marxists. 33 
While the Con~erence w~s to some extent remote from the political 
developments at the time, it is clear that the proceedings of the 
conference were being noted. For some reason, members of the 
Agrarian-Marxist group launched an attack on Dubrovskii. 
Dubrovskii's reply centred on what he claimed was Kritsman's 
insensitivity to the heightening of class conflict in the period 
of transition to socialism. 34 Solomon does not stress the point, 
but this was a departure from the lines df Dubrovskii's earlier 
attack on the Kritsman approach, where he had claimed that there 
were too many capitalists and poor peasants and too few middle 
peasants. 35 The December 1929 reply by Dubrovskii thus appears 
to have been a volte-face, falling in line with Stalin's theoretical 
innovation of the time, the supposed exacerbation of class 
contradictions prior to their eradication with the completion of 
the transition to socialism. 36 It is therefore not completely 
surprising, with hindsight (although from Solomon's account, it 
electrified the Conference at the time), to discover that it was 
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after Dubrovskii's defeat by Kritsman (on 27th December, 1929) 
that Stalin appeared to address the delegates, and made his 
famous announcement that the kulaks were to be liquidated as a 
class. 37 The most immediate effect of this historic intervention 
was to neutralise the victory of the Kritsman school over 
Dubrovskii, and to prevent the development of what might be called 
an 'Agrarian-Marxist establishment' whose views did not fit in 
with the now-pr~dominant line on the countryside. Within months, 
the Agrarian-Marxist school was being forced to leave the field 
of rural inquiry, a process which was completed early in 1932. 
The End of NEP 
Perhaps more than any other single event, Stalin's intervention 
in the Agrarian-Marxist Conference signalled the end of the New 
Economic Policy, although for some time after it was claimed in 
. \ 
some quarters that NEP was still being implemented. As indicated 
earlier, there is still debate today over whether NEP was compatible 
with a programme of industrialisation; this is usually taken to 
mean that NEP implied a policy of concessions to the kulaks, forced 
on the Soviet state by the reaction of the peasantry to the forced 
requisitions of War Commission. Such a view of NEP is common in 
Western histiography, as Grosskopf points out,38 but she argues 
convincingly against the view that the Soviet regime had a tragic 
destiny to coerce the peasantry into a socialist orientation. Such 
an approach, she argues, is heavily influenced by the 1925 ideology, 
associated with Bukharin, which was a response to the fact that the 
government had practically neglected the poor peasantry during the 
39 years 1923 to 1925. 
This neglect of the poor peasantry was exacerbated by the 
'Provisional Ordinances' promulgated in the spring of 1925, which 
decisively accelerated the differentiation of the peasantry~40 
In the spring of 1925 there was a grave shortage of agricultural 
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implements, since there had been virtually no process of replacement 
of implements since the beginning of the First World War, and they 
had worn out. The 'Provisional Ordinances' were designed to reduce 
the great disproportion between the extent of land and the few 
instruments of production possessed by the majority of the peasants y 
which was retarding the optimal development of agricultural 
productivity. However, this was attempted by repealing the 
agrarian code of 1922, whose objective had been {o protect the 
disadvantaged peasants against exploitation from the kUlaks. 
(It will be remembered that Kritsman protested against this 
precisely because of its effect on poor peasants). According to 
the source cited by Gros~kopf, this removed restrictions on the 
employment of poor peasants as wage labourers. It was above all 
the large individual farms of the most important cereal regions 
(North Caucausus, Urals, Siberia, the Crimea) which profited from 
this possibility. Rabkrin (The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection) 
showed in 1927 that in these areas, 75 per cent of wage-labourers 
were working on average 13 hours per day. Thus the 'Provisional 
Ordinances' reinforced the dependence of poor peasants on the 
kulaks, a development which is sometimes treated as the enlargement 
of NEP (or 'neo_NEp,).41 This policy amounted to a provisional 
abandoning of the passage to a socialist ~griculture, as the party 
leaders of both right and left acknowledged. 42 It was precisely 
in 1925 that the terms of credit for the poor peasants deteriorated, 
so that implements were not delivered to them until too late, after 
the autumn. The result was the situation which Lenin had warned 
against in 1920: it became difficult to supply the towns with 
food. The failure of the Soviet government to provide the 
qualitative social conditions to assure commodity production by 
agriculture led to the grain crisis of 1925. It was ~bove all 
the poor peasantry which refused to sell its harvest (the fiscal 
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pressure to do so had also been rela~ed). 
Far from this being a "kulak grain strike, as Kamenev supposed, 
it was a policy fail~re by the Soviet government. Instead of the 
government making its planned 70 per cent of all its grain purchases 
by 1st January 1926, it had scarcely more than half the grain it 
needed by then. The figures on which Kamenev based his view of a 
"'kulak grain strike' (a theme later taken over by Stalin) were 
challenged by a government "commission. 43 The decisive mistake, 
however, had been that Kamenev had confused the indications of the 
Central Statistical Administration on the distribution of grain 
surplus with those on the distribution of marketed grain. Even 
peasants with little or n'o surplus in fact sold part of their 
harvest, although they had later to buy back, at a greater price, 
the grain necessary to feed themselves. Thus, although Grosskopf 
does not put i't this way, Kamenev' s confusion is related to a 
form of agricultural planning which was mistakenly restricted to 
working on net surpluses from agriculture. Because of this, 
calculations tended to be based on an overall balance of supplies 
between agriculture and industry, which ignored the conditions of 
existence of different types of peasant enterprise and hence class 
relations. (This mistake is also evident in the 1924 Narkomzem 
plan, judging by Kritsman's comments.) The result of this mistake 
in Kamenev's case was the illusion that only the kulak supplied 
produce to feed towns or raw material for industry. The poor 
peasants had few means of getting the money to pay the former tax 
in kind (which had been changed in 1924 to a money tax). In the 
most important grain regions, the possibility of getting money 
from non-agricultural pursuits was greatly reduced. 44 Yet the 
poor peasants normally bore the brunt of the agricultural tax. 
The poor and middle peasants also bought the majority of urban 
manufactured products, rather than the rich peasants, as Kamenev 
claimed. 
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Kamenev claimed in 1925 not only that the rich peasants were 
most involved in commodity. exchange, but that the co-operatives 
mostly helped the rich peasants. 45 Certainly Kritsman's work 
provides some evidence that this was so, but he also pointed to 
the genuinely co-operative use of the means of production, a point 
which is further reinforced by Grosskopf. Grosskopf argues that 
the willingness of the poor peasants to engage in the supryaga 
(collective use of means of production, and even in her view, 
of credits) and other forms of spontaneous mutual aid was responsible 
for an increase in the proportion of middle peasants by 1926-27, 
compared to 1924-25. The result of this was to lead to a specific 
feature of rural class differentiation in the later 1920s. The 
growth in the numbers of the rural proletariat was not at the 
expense of the middle peasantry, but as a result of the decomposition 
of the class of poor peasants: while one part of the poor peasants 
completely lost its economic independence, because of the difficulties 
just described, and enlarged the ranks of the rural proletariat, 
another part succeeded in integrating with the class of middle 
peasants, the number of which continued to increase throughout 
N.E.P. According to Grosskopf, this evidence confirmed certain 
party claims on the pattern of rural class differentiation. 46 
This development suggests very strongly that while capitalist 
relations were developing fairly rapidly in the countryside, 
particularly after the 'Provisional Ordinances' of 1925, the option 
of undercutting this development by a policy of support for the 
poor peasantry still remained. Such a policy would have generated 
a much greater marketing of agricultural produce than the kUlaks 
could manage on their own. 
However, such a policy was more difficult to pursue after 
1925, because agricultural productivity went down after 1925 as 
the price policy of the Soviet government from then on meant that 
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the poor peasants lost hope of escaping from their misery by their 
own efforts, and as the price policy confirmed their dependence on 
kulaks as normal. This reduction in productivity took place 
despite the fact that at this point agricultural technical 
equipment began again to be made available. When the Soviet 
leadership provisionally renounced the pursuit of the road to 
.socialism in the rural sector, they deprived themselves of an 
important means of increasing cereal pr8duction, according to 
Grosskopf. 47 This corroborates the view expressed by Kritsman, 
and while there is undoubtedly some truth in it (the political 
conditions of economic performance are often neglected), the 
reduction in productivit~ may have been partly due to the weather 
and to remaining equipment wearing out even faster than it was 
replaced. 
The effects of this approach to agriculture became evident 
by the winter of 1927-28. Despite the fact that when the 1927-28 
plan was definitively fixed in August 1927, it was estimated that 
the grain harvest would be 2.5 per cent down on the previous year,48 
the plan envisaged an increase in grain deliveries of 11 per cent 
(and an increase in the agriculture surplus of 14.1 per cent) over 
the previous year. The months October to. December were essential 
to the campaign of collecting grain, since at that time both the 
demand by the national economy and the supply of grain were at 
their maximum. The cereal crisis of 1925-26 had shown that the 
factors determining the supply of grain from October to December 
were mostly subject to Soviet power and could be methodically 
regulated. The policy on grain collection during 1926-27 showed 
that the government had accepted this: the agricultural tax had 
been reimposed, a lot of industrial commodities had arrived in 
the grain surplus regions from October to December 1926 and the 
costs of collecting grain had been reduced considerably (making it 
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possible to reduce the gap between state and private prices, and 
between autumn and spring prices, at least outside the villages). 
Consequently, marketed grain reached a new record. 49 This made 
the state policy during 1927-1928 all the more remarkable. 
Sufficient grain stocks were not built up during the summer of 
1927. Manufactured goods which could have been sold in grain 
surplus regions were diverted to urban markets, because of the 
so-called 'goods famine' again, which resulted from increased 
wages in state industry in the summer of 1927. 50 On top of this, 
to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Revolution~ the poor 
peasantry had received a dispensation from the payment of almost 
all the agricultural tax~ and the taxes on the other sections of 
the peasantry had not been raised. With a reduction in taxes and 
the absence of a stock of commodities to exchange against cereals, 
the mistake of. the autumn of 1925 had been repeated. Rich peasants 
had sold significantly during the summer of 1927, prior to the 
anticipated price reduction in October, but from October to 
December,fue supply of grain had greatly diminished. Far from 
being a kUlak grain strike, this was a 'strike' by the poor and 
middle peasants, exacerbated by the passive attitude of the 
state and co-operative collecting organs. 51 This passive attitude 
was partly the result of poor preparation and contradictory orders 
from the state, which wished to prevent competition between 
purchasing agencies from undermining the state price policy, 
although the control figures of Gosplan indicated that no such 
competition was likely and Gosplan was insisting that the buyers 
pursue an active policy of encouraging peasants to market their 
products. 
Yet the grain collection results were not particularly bad 
after the end of December 1927. They only appeared bad in the 
light of the annual economic plan mentioned above, and in relation 
to the XV Party Congress held in December 1927 which discussed 
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the implementation of the first Five Year Plan. In 
1925-26 the Soviet government had been able: (after the autumn 
crisis) to considerab).y improve grain purchases, so that 
eventually the growth in the agricultural marketed surplus 
for that year surpassed th~ increase in gross production. 
At least one of the devices use~ earlier was still available 
in January 1928: an increase in agricultural prices was 
rightly rejected because it would have, as before, led to 
grain speculation the following year. However, an increase 
in prices in certain regions, coupled with an increase in 
deliveries of commodities would have been economically 
and politically effective: This was because what were 
usually grain surplus areas had a relatively poor harvest 
in 1927, whereas areas in the industrial centre, for example, 
. \ 
had a more successful harvest. On top of this, state purchase 
prices, which had been 27 per cent above cost prices in 1925-26, 
were only 1 per cent above cost prices in 1926-27, and 0.4 
per cent above in 1927-28. An increase in price, coupled 
with a greater supply of commodities, in the relatively 
successful areas would almost certainly have yielded bigger 
state purchases. Instead, from January to July 1928 ("lith a 
short break in April) 'extraordinary measures' were taken, under 
the direction of Stalin, who toured the regions normally 
considered as grain surplus areas, plus Siberia. 52 (Hence 
the 'extraordinary measures' were sometimes referred to as the 
'Urals-Siberia' methods, before the rest of the party came to 
appreciate the significance. of the phrase). 
The result was that in the spring of 1928, peasants in 
the normally grain surplus areas unexpectedly repurchased grain, 
on the open market (as opposed to the intra-village market). 
For all regions, the open market purchases by peasants exceeded 
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those of the previous year by 40' per cent. This caused unexpected 
difficulties for the distribution of the grain surplus, with the 
overall result that, far from increasing by 14.1 per cent over the 
previous year, as envisaged in the plan, it diminished by 18.5 
per cent. Thus the pace of industrialisation seemed threatened, 
both in terms of grain exports and supplies to the towns. Thus 
,the cereal crisis of the summer of 1928 was the result, not of 
a kulak grain strike, but of the 'extraordinary measures' 
themselves. As Grosskopf puts it, 53 it became clear at this 
point, precisely because of the exigencies of a methodical and 
a:ccelerated industrialisation, that the rules of NEP had to be 
strictly followed. Thes~ rules were, firstly, that agriculture 
should not supply its products beyond its own capacity, or 
peasant repurchases would increase further, and secondly, that 
the Soviet state should not suppress private commerce before 
it was able to replace it. Grosskopf follows this with a 
critique of Stalin's famous article liOn the Grain Front", 
which used NBmchinov's data to claim that small scale' peasant 
production was incapable of supporting industrialisation. 
Grosskopf argued th~t thanks to the technical alliance between 
industry and agriculture, and the social alliance between the 
working class and the poor and middle peasantry, such a strategy 
would have been possible. However, the technical alliance 
advocated by Lenin had not been implemented: in 1926-27 the 
instruments of production in agriculture had reached at most 
60 per cent of their 1913 level (and this, rather than peasant 
consumption, as claimed by Stalin, was the main cause of the 
restriction of agricultural deliveries to the town). S irnil arl y, 
the 1925-26 crisis had shO\.,rn how fragile the social alliance was. 
Nor had co-operatives been seriously promoted by 1926-27. Thus 
the principal tasks of NEP as outlined by Lenin had scarcely been 
undertaken by 1926-27. 
r' 
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As is well known, the grain crisis of 1928 (prompted by 
the 'extraordinary measures' which contradicted the party line 
established at the XV Party Congress and which were conducted 
without the knowledge of much of the party leadership) produced 
a wider crisis in NEP. The reaction of the peasants to these 
measures was the same as to the grain requisition of the Civil 
\{ar - to So\-l less. This then appeared to justify to a wider 
section of the party the use of 'extraordinary measures' and 
to gain support for the idea of a sharpening of class conflict 
in the transition to socialism, as well as for the idea of 
rapid collectivisation of the peasantry. The "use of 'extra-
ordinary measures' was repeated on a larger scale in 1929, and, 
as was mentioned in the discussion of KritSman, by December 1929 
a Politburo Commission was established to devise methods of 
implementing collectivisation. These developments were 
tragic, but also ironic in view of the fact that the technical, 
political and organisational preconditions of collectivisation 
had been virtually neglected during NEP. The technical 
conditions were the supplying by industry of the instruments of 
production to raise the level of equinment above the 1913 level. 
The political conditions were to ensure tpat this equipment was 
distributed to the poor and middle peasants; and the 
organisational conditions were the encouragement of cooperatives 
as a means of achieving the transition to a socialised agriculture. 
Grosskopf's evidence indicates that in the later 1920s such 
developments were happening to some extent an~Nay, despite the 
neglect of most of the party leadership, and that where they 
occurred, they were having the expected effect of encouraging 
both the marketing of grain and the development of collective forms 
of agriculture. Furthermore, contrary to Stalin's suggestion that 
peasant consumption was a potential threat to industrialisation, 
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G~osskopf shows that urban consumption was a greater threat 
since it adversely affected ,exports by 1927 in comparison with 
1913. 54 While the intensification of agriculture h~d taken 
place during the 1920s, particularly in oil-seed and vegetable 
crops, rather than grain, it was still the case that in 1928-29, 
between 25 and 30 per cent of the 1913 sown area in the former 
'-granary' area was still fallow. Grain production was still 
10 per cent less per capita' than before the First World War, 
although production of other foodstuffs such as milk and meat 
had surpassed the 1913 level. 55 Thus the grain figures were 
misleading if one took them on their own, 'ignoring the changing 
structure of agricultural ·production. Nevertheless, there 
wa,s still a great potential to increase grain production in 
the fallow areas by supplying more means of production. The 
effect of the "extraordinary measures' was to reduce the amount 
of livestock, vlhich meant les,s- meat and milk, and greater 
difficulty in ploughing. While Stalin was in a sense correct 
that grain was marketed less than before the First World War, 
this was offset by the production and marketing of other agricultural 
products which were important for the national economy. The 
growth in urban consumption between 1926 and 1927 was entirely 
at the expense of exports. 
On the evidence provided by Grosskopf, it is clear that 
Western (and to some extent, as she says, Soviet 56) historiography 
was wrong to take its analysis of the 'need' for collectivisation 
from Stalin's analysis of small-scale peasant consumptionist 
farming being incapable of supplying the raw material for industry 
and the food for the towns and for export. Far from the NEP 
policy being played out economically, it had in important respects 
not been given a proper chance in agriculture. A policy of 
supplying further means of production, quite apart from aiding 
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a further intensification of agricultural production, would 
have facilitated a growth of grain production by recultivating 
the fallow land in the pre-War 'granary' area. 
Conclusion 
One must conclude that the demise of NEP was largely 
a result of its faulty implementation. The dangers of an 
incorrect method of implementing NEP were signalled as early 
as the 'Scissors Grisis' of 1923, but they should have been 
clear enough by the time of the cereal crisis of 1925, when the 
restoration of industry to pre-war levels was virtually complete, 
while the restoration of agriculture was only just beginning • 
. 
As Grosskopf points out, Dzerzhinsky clearly analysed the general 
lines NEP should take prior to his death in 1926. During 
1926-27, the Soviet go~ernment implemented its agrarian policy 
in a manner which suggested it had learned the lessons of the 
previous year. The change of course in the follm>1i ng year 
seems primarily to be related to the struggle going on in the 
party leadership at the time. The XV Party Congress had not 
been a clear victory for Stalin, and this appears to be related 
to his clandestine use of 'extraordinary measures' against the 
peasantry, mobilising the support of that' section of the party 
which had always seen NEP as a retreat and who were only too ready 
to believe that Kamenev's mythical 'kulak grain strike' was again 
a reality in the autumn of 1927. 
Clearly in this situation, the emphasis of the Agrarian 
Marxists, and particularly of Kritsman, on the careful evaluation 
of the mechanisms of class differentiation, its extent and its 
implications for the constrruction of economic plans, this emphasis 
was completely vindicated. While the Kritsman school were 
not the only ones to supply important evidence on the statfr of 
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agrarian class relations in the 1920s, and to attempt to relate 
it to economic policy, they were just reaching the point of 
sufficient pre-eminence in the field to have a real potential 
for influencing party. policy in favour of continuing NEP as a means 
of industrialising the economy and collectivising the peasantry, 
when Stalin intervened so dramatically to neutralise them 
as a potential political force. It will never be known how the 
Agrarian Marxist school would have developed, but their careful 
definition of class indices meant that they were aware in 
1927-28 that the middle peasant was not disappearing. On the 
evidence of Grosskopf, this was due to mutual aid, rather than 
the effects of periodic repartition of farms. The work of the 
Agrarian Marxist school ciearly has implications for current policy 
in some developing countries. They were interested in the 
agrarian class structure not just as a matter of academic curiosity, 
but as a vitally important component of a rural (and urban) 
development strategy. Precisely because the class structure 
affects the capacities of various economic agents, it has a 
considerable impact on the effectiveness of state policy. 
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who challenged the planners' view that agriculture 
would continue to be conducted by a large decentralised 
mass of individual farms. He was apparently silenced 
with the assertion that socioeconomic change in the 
countryside was out of tune with the Party line in the 
rural sector. Solomon also points out that this 
plan has not received much attention from Western 
historians, apart from E. H. Carr. For this reason, 
it is perhaps worth giving a brief account of Kritsman's 
criticisms of this plan. Kritsman argued that the 
principles of the plan were either commonplace or wrong. 
(~lan Sel'skogo Khozyaistva i Industrializatsia' , 1925, 
reprinted in pages 67 - 78 of Kritsman, 1929). It 
. \ 
was a platitude for an economic plan to envisage the 
development of the productive forces. The other 
principle of the plan was either a general phrase or 
wrong, namely, a two-sided agrarian-industrial development, 
similar to the United States. Kritsman argued against 
the idea of an undefined 'Narodnik-mystical' harmony 
of agriculture and industry, bu~ he was also against 
industrialisation at the expense of agriculture. The 
facts showed that the Soviet Union was not developing 
agriculture in proportion to industry. In the last 
two years, agriculture had been growing at 4 per cent 
perr annum, as against 30 - 40 per cent for industry, so 
that agriculture after the famine was at the same level 
as in 1920. 
Kritsman then distinguished between 'projection' 
plans and plans of 'current' production, arguing in 
1925 that it was only possible at that time to plan 
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'current' production for one year ahead. (He added 
in a 1929 footnote that in the changed situation one 
could plan further ahead). The use of an extrapolation 
or 'projection' type of plan showed that agriculture 
could not be much influenced at that time from the 
outside, but if that were accepted, then Kritsman 
argued that one should go in for short-term extrapolation. 
A 5 year· extrapolation was unfulfillable; a.5 year plan 
was only possible when one could regulate what was 
planned. He showed that even within a year, the 
differences between the plan and the actual figure were 
huge. The extrapolations had been poor; they were 
mostly too pessimistic, and this may have undermined 
the confidence of the agricultural section of Gosplan. 
The perspecti¥e plan had failed brilliantly (that is 
because it was so overfulfilled, with various branches 
achieving between 50 and 90 per cent of the 5 year 
target in one year). This did not occur accidentally. 
One should not approach the charting of a perspective 
plan for agriculture by individual branches, as this 
plan sought to do. For such an approach to be realistic, 
it was necessary to narrow the limits of the plan (to one 
year). Otherwise the plan bad to be constructed in another 
way. A detailed calculation of the market, of the 
possibilities of selling, and of tbe possibilities of 
production, was necessary. This meant one had to take 
account of the class structure of the peasantry, or at 
least recognise that it was difficult to plan where 
class differentiation was not what was assumed in the 
plan. Kritsman argued that such a calculation was not 
taken into account in the plan. The plan talked of the 
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peasantry in general, not of its division into groups, 
and then m@ntioned as a general phrase: "The process 
of socioeconomic differentiation of the countryside •••• 
in its turn is a factor ••• the significance of which must 
be taken into accountll. 
Yet Kritsman did not overstress this differentiation, 
arguing that it was less in the countryside than in the 
towns. He argued that in each branch of agriculture 
it was necessary to separate the commodity side from the 
consumption side. To do so, it was necessary to take 
account of the interesting data on how the batrak (rural 
wage labourer) was paid wages. This varied in different 
regions. There were not enough data on this, but 
without an aPRortionment of the commodity producing 
groups of the peasantry in market areas, it was easy 
to arrive at erroneous conclusions. Cons e quen tl y, 
it was necessary first, to classify branches (of 
agriculture) into market and non-market areas, and, 
second, in the market areas themselves to separate 
commodity and non-commodity farms. Related to the 
latter were the (in essence) proletarian part of the 
peasantry, on the one hand, ,,,rhich worked a cert3.in plot 
of land with alien means of production, and on the 
other hand, partly related to this were some groups 
of peasants who were independently running their own 
farm; in so far as they did not produce for the market. 
Without such an analysis (which was fraught with 
difficulty, of course) the serious elaboration of a 
perspective plan for agriculture was impossible. 
It was also insufficient to give definite figures 
for an agricultural (as for an industrial) plan: one ought 
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to give plan variants and say how it would work 
in relation to other plans. Not only was this plan 
unsatisfactory from the point of view of the resolution 
of the problems posed (which among other things was 
showed by a comparison of the plan and its realisation), 
it was also distinguished by its quite exceptional 
slovenliness, and by the rather strange (to say no 
more) character of the work, which it was extremely 
rare to encounter. Des~ite the published criticisms 
of various faults, the Narkomzem did not try to correct 
the plan. It had fallen to Kritsman to show the 
various statistical and arithmetical errors, primarily 
in the work of Professor Oganovskii. A special 
commission had been set up in Narkomzem, which confirmed 
\ 
everything shown by Kritsman, but was limited to these 
points. Then'Professor Kondrat'ev appeared in print 
with the observation that Kritsman's charges against 
him were unsubstantiated. Kri tsman had then shO\ved 
that his charges in relation to Kondrat'ev were more 
than sufficiently substantiated. Following this a list 
of printers' errors were published. Kritsman then 
pointed out various other problems with the plan, such 
as its claim that between 1921 and 1923 the number of 
working horses had increased by 5.1 per cent, whereas 
in a footnote Professor Lositskii said that the number 
of vlOrking horses went down by 6 per cent in 1922, 
giving an overall reduction in the number of horses 
by 1923. Such inconsistencies were even acknowledged 
in the main text of the plan. Kritsman took the view 
that a plan completed in this manner could not serve as 
a basis for judgement. The plan could not calculate 
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the resources of the peasantry, nor the resources of 
the state, since its compilers were mistaken on both 
counts. 
The plan had only been fulfilled in a bureaucratic 
sense. The calculation of Professor Makarov showed 
that the plan was not implemented; the conclusions 
of the agricultural section (of Gosplan) on each point 
sho'wed that the plan was not implemented. It could 
not be implemented., By the whole of its construction, 
the perspective plan for the development of agriculture 
presented a strange combination of a Marxist and non-
Marxist approach to the matter. The latter approach 
had been correctly characterised in the journal 
Bolshevik as a 'turn of the century' approach, and 
\ 
it was visible in many parts of the works of Zemplan. 
This was evident in their treatment of the Soviet Union 
as an example of state capitalism, which vlaS like private 
capitalism, only regulated by state ~ower, an approach 
which contrasted with Lenin's. Furthermore, the growth 
of the national population was taken as one of the bases 
for the construction of the plan: Kritsman argued that 
this amounted to the theory of rural overpopulation as 
the basis for the growth in productive possibilities, due 
to the quantity of workin8 hands, quite contrary to the 
views of Marx on the relative decline of the agricultural 
pODulation. The attempt to base agricultural development 
on population growth meant in practice a huge army of 
unemployed, the basic solution to which was the gro\-Tth 
in industry. On the supply side, there was no need in 
current conditions to fear a lack of workers. If one 
approached the matter of population growth from the 
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demand side,then the growth in population played 
a different FOle for the two main parts of agriculture: 
for that part of a'gricul ture which supplied the means of 
production (that is, raw materials for industry) and for 
that part which supplied the means of consumption (that 
is, food products). If one proceeded from the point of 
view of the market for food products, then of course the 
growth of population played a colossal role. But it 
would be laughable on the basis of changes in the 
population of the U.S.S.R. to seek to form the extent 
of the market for foodstuffs. This would require an 
examination of the dependence of foreign markets on 
foodstuffs produced in the U. S. S. R. 
In conclusion it was necessary to say that th~ 
perspective plan bore a quite strange character, 
combining an attempt at a communist, Marxist approach 
with an approach of a quite different sort which appeared 
in many places, in conclusions and in the posing of 
questions. It was right to return this work 
to the Narkomzem and to propose that it be reworked in 
a radical manner, both in its principles and its execution. 
Here as in other cases, it was necessary to say what was 
the state of affairs, and thus to achieve the correction 
of what was done badly. 
It should be clear from the brief account of Kritsman's 
criticisms of this plan that he was not so much advocating 
'socioeconomic change' as Solomon puts it (although he 
definitely favoured the growth of cooperatives as a way 
of transforming agriculture) but was criticising the 
theoretical assumptions of the plan, as well as the shoddy 
workmanship which was evident in its construction. It 
should also be clear that his interest in the various 
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processes of differentiation of the peasantry was related 
to his interest in plan construction: adequate plans 
for both de,veloping agricultural production and developing 
socialist relations in the countryside (and town) had to 
take account of the changing class relations, including 
the development of commodity production, and their impact 
on the markets for agricultural products. 
28. V. I. Lenin (1966) 'On Cooperation', in Collected Works, 
Volurre 33, Lawrence and Wishart, London. 
29. See M. Lewin (1968), Chapter 3, pages 71 - 78 for a 
discussion of the controversy over the definition of 
the kulak, including the views of Kritsman and his 
colleagues. Only in June 1929 did the Sovnarkom accept 
the qiring out of equipment as a criterion for including 
a farm in the kulak category (ibid., page 74). Lewin 
also describes the controversy over stratification and 
the reception of Kritsman's work in Chapter 2 (ibid), 
especially page 47. However, although he is right 
that the significance of the indices of stratification 
varied, by not explicitly setting these variations in 
the context of an analysis of the division of labour 
(and of geographical variations in it) Lewin seems to 
undervalue the usefulness of Kri tsman' s 1Nor1{. Lm·Tin vIaS 
right to argue (page 49): "For the moment, the difficulties 
of studying the stratification of the peasantry proved 
insurmountable, and in the end no valid and authoritative 
survey of this intractable problem was ever produced." 
However, it is surely evident from Lewin's account that 
this was partly because of the political debate which 
forced some of Kritsman's colleagues, such as Gaister, 
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to retract their results. The studies were not 
authoritativ~ in the sense of being accepted, but despite 
their problems they were surely authoritative in terms 
of their level of analysis. Gaister was apparently 
forced to retract his results because they were being 
used by the Left Opposition to support its own arguments. 
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This attack in January 1928 had little effect at the time. 
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mada this .charge at this point. 
33. ibid., page 163. 
34. ibid.~ page Ib5. 
35, ibid., page 148. 
36. As Harrison points out in his 1978 (op. cit.) review 
of Solomon, she provides no account of Stalinism, which 
Harrison rightly argues should not be treated as 
impacting on academic life from outside. The 
attack on Kritsman by Dubrovski~ can surely only be 
understood as giving voice within the academic agrarian 
debate to the views of the ascendant Stalinist sections 
of the party. However, such a conclusion is based 
purely on the theoretical similarities between 
Dubrovskii's remarks and the ascendant Stalinist line 
on the countryside. Solomon does not draw attention 
to these similarities, ~hich seems to corroborate a 
remark made by Cox (1979b, op.cit): "The problem 
with her interpretation, both on this specific question 
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and on the work of the Agrarian Marxists in general, 
is that in attempting to locate the research in its 
social and political context she tends to lose sight 
of the theoretical basis of the research which 'provides the 
logic of the categories chosen". Paradoxically, in the 
case of the December 1929 attack on Kritsman by Dubrovskii, 
losing sight of the apparent theoretical basis of the 
remarks makes it somewhat more difficult to locate them 
in their political context. The similarities of 
Dubrovskii's remarks and the position of the Stalinist 
sections of the party are fairly evident, and this suggests 
that there may have been some substance to Kritsman's 
charge, in reply, that Dubrovskii'was an opportunist, 
(Solomon, op.cit., page 167). In my view Solomon is 
complBtely misleading in treating Kritsman and Dubrovskii 
as showing an almost equal lack of intellectual honesty 
and restraint. Dubrovskii had indeed taken Kritsman out 
of context, as the latter claimed. 
37. Stalin began this speech with a denunci~~on of five 
'bourgeois' prejudices which he claimed were rampant in 
current rural enquiry, including those of the Chayanov 
school. In my critique of Chayanov (Littlejohn, 1977, op.cit) 
I give the impression in a footnote that Chayanov was the 
main opponent of the Marxist anproach to the peasantry, 
and that this was why Stalin attacked him. It is clear 
from Solomon's account, which desnite certain disagreements 
I found very interesting and informative, that the 
criticisms of 'bourgeois' prejudices were merely a prelude 
to the cor~ of the speech. Chayanov's school had in many 
respects already lost the argument to the Agrarian-Marxists, 
38. 
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and the speech, particularly its famous announcement 
on the liquidation of the kulaks as a class, rendered 
the entire Agrarian Marxist e.onference irrelevant. 
s. Grosskopf (1976), op.cit., pages 283-284. .She 
draws particular attention to Lewin's exposition of 
such a position: see M. Lewin (1968), op.cit., pages 133-135. 
However, on page 317 she does not forget to point out 
the similarities in the work of E. H. Carr (1970), 
Socialism in One Country, pages 259-303, Volume 1, 
Harmondsworth. 
39. S. Grosskopf, op.cit., page 286. 
40. ibidl .. , pages 316-319, entitled 'L' importance sociale de 
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la crise des cereales de 1925'. 
41. ibid., page 3f7. 
42. ibid., page 317, where Grosskopf quotes both Rykov and 
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Trotsky to this effect. Thus it is not only Western 
historeography which has shared the view that 
agricultural investment required concessions to the kulaks; 
in effect, the entire party leadership took this view. 
Its corollary is of course that the kulaks were an 
obstacle to industrial investment. 
ibid., page 140. It was a Rabkrin commission, directed 
by Yakovlev, Tsyl'ko, Rybnikov and Chelintsev, and its 
members included Paskovskii, Lositskii, Lifshits, 
Vishnyevsl{ii, Groman and Strumlin. The definition of 
the social categories of peasants in the evidence available 
to Kamenev was on the basis of SQl-ln area, which the 
commission criticised. (Thus Kritsman was by no means 
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alone in his scepticism about the use of sown area 
as an index of class relations). The results of 
this survey were ~ubJ_ished in extracts in Pravda in 
December 1925 and republished in a 100 page brochure 
in 1926. It is difficult to see how the party 
leadership could have been unaware of this. 
44. ibid., page 142. 
45. ibid., page 169. 
46. ibid., page 311. In a footnote, she argues that this 
contradicts the supposihon of Lewin Cop.cit., pages 
56-57) that such a pattern of class differentiation 
only existed in·the proclamations of the party. It seems 
to me that Grosskopf's evidence should not simrly be taken 
at face value, however. Kritsman's emphasis on the 
diversity of forms of cooperation, and the diversity of 
effects of this in terms of class relations, is probably 
correct. While Grosskopf's evidence is more systematic 
and apparently convincing than that of Lewin, Kritsman's 
remarks on what could be reported as 'supryaga' makes 
one a little wary of the evidence supplied by Grosskopf. 
The same is true of her evidence on page 312 of the 
growth of 'simple' production cooperatives during NEP. 
Yet it must not be forgotten that in the late 1920s 
Kritsman was also emphasising the growing spontaneous 
movement into cooperatives and collectives. Furthermore, 
Grosskopf's case against Lewin on this point is supported 
by bow further points vlhich she makes elsewhere in her 
book. Firstly, on page ~396, she refutes the suggestion 
of Carr and Davies (1969, page 117) that during NEP the 
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process of redivision of farms was extended to the 
middle and poor peasants. This refutation is on the 
basis of ev~dence provided by Khryashcheva. Many of 
the redistributions were fictional to avoid tax on large-scale 
enterprises. If this is the case, then one of the 
grounds disappears for Lewin's doubts . about the 
supposedly 'special nature of differentiation' at this 
time. Lewin claims (op.cit., page 57) that if the 
numbers of serednyaks (middle peasants) were not 
decreasing, it was because they were being reinforced 
by frequent divisions of households, whose members, while 
formally continuing to be classified as seredynaks, were 
becoming poorer as a result of these divisions. 
Grosskopf argues that repartitions were only about 
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2 to 3 per cent of all farms, and that these were more 
numerous among the prosperous than the middle peasants. 
This argument, if accepted, certainly undercuts the 
grounds for Lewin's doubts about the 'special nature of 
differentiation' . The second point which Grosskopf 
makes which strengthens her case on the role of 
cooperatives in supporting some of the poor peasantry 
is the evidence and argument on pages 415-419 which shows 
the growth in cooperatives for soil improvement, use of 
agricultural machinery, improvement of seeds and livestock 
breeding and rearing. None of this was reported under 
the heading of 'supryaga' so the doubts raised by Kritsman 
about some forms of fsupryaga' do not apply to these cooperat-
ives. In any case, according to Solomon,op.cit., Chapter 6, 
the Agrarian Marxists themselves found that the middle 
peasant refused to disappear. 
47. S. Grosskopf, op.cit., page 319. 
48. 
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ibid., page 327. A few months later it became clear 
that the harvest was in fact 6 per cent less than the 
previous year. 
49. ibid., page 329. 
50. c. Bettelheim in Class Struggles in the U.S.S.R., Volume 2, 
Ope cit., dwells on this point at length: see Part III, 
on the contradictions and class struggles in the industrial 
and urban sectors. N. Lampert (1979) The Technical 
Intelligentsia and the Soviet State, Macmillan, London, 
Chapter 2, also provides evidence on some of the tensions 
within the industrial sector in the 1920s, which suggests 
that attempts were made to bolster up the authority of 
the technical intelligentsia in order to help restore 
Soviet industry. It is possible that wage increases 
to the workers were an attempt to contain the resentment 
generated by this strengthening of managerial authority. 
Whatever the causes of the wage increases, they fostered 
the diversion of manufactured goods away from the 
countryside, which did not help the 'Smychka' between 
workers and peasants. 
51. S. Grosskopf, op.cit., page 333. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
ibid., pages 334-336. 
ibid., page 343. 
ibid., pase 351. 
ibid., page 349. 
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56. Se~ for example, Part I, Chapter 1 of Yu. V. Arutyunian 
(1971). Sotsial' naya Struktura Sel' skogo Naseleniya 
SSSR',) Mvsl', Moscow. There one can find arguments 
that in the'1920s peasant commodity production was not 
sufficiently mobilised for the needs of industrialisation, 
because of the poor price relations for the peasantry, 
called forth by the backwardness of light industry 
(pages 23 - 24, .my emphasis). On page 28 we find the 
claim that the peasantry applied its means of production 
irrationally, and on page 31 we find a discussion of 
agrarian overpopulation. All of these arguments ignore 
the basic lack of means of production of the peasantry, 
and in effect blame the peasantry for the failure of NEP. 
The remark on the irrational use of means of production 
is reminiscent of Stalin's claim to Churchill that the 
, \ 
peasantry were reluctant to use tractors and other 
machinery. Grosskopf shows that this was not the case 
in the 1920s: op.cit., pages 248-250. 
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CRAFTER TWO 
ECONOMIC UNITS 'AND ECONOMIC CALCULATION 
Introduction 
The purpose of this Chapter is to explore the 
relative capacities of various economic agents. It was 
argued in the overall Introduction to this work that 
a theory of the class structure could only demarcate the 
boundaries between economic agents on the basis of specifying 
importan~ differences in their capacities for action, deriving 
from their relation to the means of production. Thus the 
relations of production, that is the relations operating 
. 
between economic agents deriving from their differential 
access to the means of production, must be examined in some 
detail if Gne is tOI have adequate grounds for either claiming 
or denying that class relations exist. The relations between 
the agents concerned need not be exclusively interpersonal 
relations: indeed they cannot be exclusively interpersonal 
if some of the economic agents are collective agents. If 
a monastic order can be a feudal landowner, or a joint stock 
company can be a capitalist, then a theory of the relations 
of production which restricts itself to relations between 
humar agents runs the risk of missing vital aspects of the 
social formation in question. 
However, if it is accepted that non-human agents are 
potentially important in the relations of production, then 
the conditions of such agents must be analysed. If one is 
to avoid treating them in a rationalist manner, as a collective 
subject capable both of recognising the appropriate means to 
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realise its ends and of acting on those means (for example, 
in the manner of Parsons' collectivities), then the following 
features of collective agents are pertinent to the formation 
of their objectives and their capacity to conduct a course 
of action in pursuit of those objectives. Firstly, the 
internal form of their organisation. Collective agents 
cannot be treated as unitary entities, and sub-agents 
within them may be crucial in affecting the relations of 
the collective agent with other agents. Secondly, their 
means of calculation. Concepts which may be widely available 
in the social formation, or specially developed for the 
collective agent in question (or some admixture of the two) 
are necessary if the agent is to monitor its own internal 
state and to calculate courses of action with respect to 
other agen~s (for ~xample, struggle over access to the means 
of production). Unless the means of calculation are treated 
as having some effects of their own, then the collective 
agent will in effect be analysed as if its objectives were 
the result of its 'consciousness', and as if the means of 
realising its ends were somehow directly observable in the 
real. Thirdly, the resources at its disposal. These 
resources may be 'internal' (that is," directly at its 
disposal) or may be accessible because of the economic 
location of the agent. 
In addition to these considerations which seem to be 
implicit in accepting that collective agents are pertinent 
to the relations of production, the examination of the 
relations of production in a planned economy carries other 
implications. Not only must one pay particular attention 
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in such an economy to relations between non-human agents, 
examining their respective capacities, but one must consider 
whether class relations might operate directly between such 
collective agents, or between collective and individual 
agents, or finally between individual ~eents as a result of 
the relations between collective agents. Furthermore, in 
any economy with an advanced division of labour, one must 
assess the relations between units of production in agriculture 
and in industry, as well as retail distribution units, and 
units of social consumption (the latter is a category which 
includes families, as well as hospitals, schools, and, in the 
case of the Soviet Union, cultural and holiday centres). 
However, as well as these kinds of collective agents, in the 
case of the Soviet Union, one must also examine the capacities 
of the various state agencies involved in plan construction, 
\ 
and the regulation of plan implementation. This is because 
Soviet national economic planning involves the attempt to 
coordinate the division of labour at the level of the 
overall social formation. If it is at all effective, it must 
have a major impact on the relations of production, either 
exacerbating or mitigating class relations. The means 
of economic calculation within all these various kinds of 
agencies involved in the construction and implementation 
of the overall economic plans will thus be a concern of this 
chapter, although units of consumption will be more the concern 
of Chapter Four. 
The concern with the means of economic calcul~tion 
in this Chapter is not simnly because it is relevant to the 
organisational forms of collective agents, but also because 
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it is important for the analysis of policy formation and 
hence to the analysis of struggles between agencies. 
Ultimately, it is such struggles which deter~ine the relative 
capacities of agents, so without neglecting both resources 
and organisational forms as determinants of the capacities 
of agents, a particular concern of this chapter will be 
with forms of economic calculation. This is because different 
economic units (agents) use different means of calculation, 
and these cannot be totally unified (otherwise the distinct 
economic functions of different units would be nullified, 
that is, there would be no division of labour). 
This Chapter is divided into two main sections, agriculture 
and industry. This is primarily because conditions in Soviet 
agriculture have historically 'lagged behind' those in 
industry, largely as a consequence of the policy of forced 
collectivisation of the peasantry at the beginning of the 
1930s. Consequently the organisational forms and the 
capacities of agricultural economic units are different from 
those in industry. It is also important to examine agriculture 
carefully to be in a position to evaluate the official Soviet 
theory of the class structure, according to which collective 
farmers are in a different class from state employees. Because 
some agricultural units, the private plots and the collective 
farms, have a particular relation to urban consumption, the 
discussion of retailing units at the end of the section on 
agriculture is used as a device to lead into the section on 
industry, where the main units discussed are the state 
enterprises, production associations, Ministries and the 
central planning agencies. 
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I. Agriculture 
The condition of agriculture in the Soviet Union is 
still a serious cause for concern,. some half a century after 
the forced collectivisation of the peasantry. Partly this 
is due to the difficulties of making good the neglect of a 
generation, a process which really only started around 1965. 
Partly it is due to the positive damage done, not only by 
the forced collectivisation itself, but also by the 1941-1945 
war {'The Great Patriotic War'} and later by Khrushchev's 
voluntarist attempts at a sudden improvement in agriculture. 
The inadequate performance of agriculture is also partly 
because of current policies, forms of planning and economic 
organisation, even though these have been improved since 
the fall of Khrushdhev. Since this is not a thesis on Soviet 
agriculture, the developments before the 1960s will only be 
mentioned in passing, even though their impact on contemporary 
agriculture is still eVident. 1 
The main changes in agriculture under Khrushchev were 
the abolition of the Machine Tractor Stations {M.T.S.} in 
many 
1958 and the conversion ofholkhozy in~o sovkhozy, mostly 
between 1955 and 1962. The other related change was the 
increase in the size of the kolhozy, often produced by 
amalgamating them into a single large one. However, as 
Stuart2 points out, structural change in agriculture has 
been going on since 1950. In addition to the amalgamation 
of small kolkhozy to form larger units, there have been two 
forms of conversion of kolkhozy into sovkhozy {either 
attachment of kolkhoz to an existing sovkhoz, or combination 
of kolkhozy to form a new sovkhoz} and land has been taken 
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On a somewhat longer time-scale, Lavigne (1979) gives 
the following picture of structural changes in agriculture: 4 
Table 2 
Number of ent~rprises and agricultural exploitations 
Kolkhozy (in thousands) 
Sovkhozy (in thousands) 
Enterprises, organisations, 
unions associating kolkhozy 
and sovkhozy (in thousands) 
Individual farms of poor and 
middle peasants (in millions) 
.1927 1940 1950 1977 
14.8 236.9 123.7 27.1 
1.4 4.2 5.0 20.1 
7.7' 
23.7 3.6 0.7 
Farms of kulaks (in millions) 1.1 
The sovkhozy i~'1977 had an average area of 5,600 
hectares each, whereas the average for kolkhozy was 3,800 
hectares, so although there were fewer sovkhozy in 1977, 
" \\ 
they formed 52.6 per cent of the area, with the kolkhozy 
farming 46.2 per cent and the remaining 1.2 per cent being 
constituted by the 'personal plots,5 of kolkhozniki, workers 
and employees. As in the 192os, sown area is only of limited 
use as an indication of economic relations, not only because 
the personal plots produce just over 25 per cent of all 
agricultural output, specialising in, ,vegetables, meat, milk 
and eggs, but also because an adequate analysis of Soviet 
agriculture must confront the issue of the interrelation of 
these three forms of property, as well as their relation to 
other agencies such as the planning and supply agencies, 
the kolkhoz market and so on. 
1212 
26.4 
20.8 
9.3 
The Kolkhozy .LUb. 
To start with the kolkhozy, the changes in size of the 
kolkhozy and the conversion of some of them into sovkhozy 
have been related to other practices which have changed the 
internal structure of the kolkhoz as an economic unit. 
Stuart produces the following figure (in addition to 'figures 
showing regional differences in the same indices). 
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Figure 
number of 
sovkhozy 
kolkhoz capital 
investment 
_ _ - kolkhoz sown area 
---- ---- kolkhoz labor force 
- number of kolkhozy 
-- number of brigades (kolkhoz) 
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
Structural Change in Soviet Agriculture: Selected Indica-
tors, 1959-1965 (1959 == 100). Source: Narkhoz, selected volumes. 
The figure indicates that ·for .the U.S.S.R. as a whole 
from 1959 to 1965 the number of kolkhozy went down, but 
tha~ the sown area and labour force w~nt down less, while 
'kolkhoz capital investment' (Stuart's phrase) went up. 
The number of brigades went down more than the number of 
kolkhozy, which indicates that the brigade increased in size 
(and, as we shall see, in importance in some respects). There 
are various kinds of brigades (which are the main sub-unit 
of the kolkhoz). For the period between 1953 and 1957 Stuart 
distinguishes between them in terms of (a) time and (b) task: 
(a) temporary, seasonal and constant brigades 
(b) specialised and combined brigades 
./ 
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To the extent that a temporary brigade performed a 
single task, such as repair or land reclamation, it was 
also a specialised brigade, but Stuart uses the latter term 
to refer to a bTigade with a particular regular production 
task. After 1957, and particularly after the abolition of 
the M.T.S. in 1958 (which both laid the financial burden on 
the kolkhozy of purchasing tractors and made them responsible 
for handling mechanisation), brigades were classified 
according to the structure of output and the method of 
handling mechanisation: 
1. The complex brigade (crop and animal production) 
2. The branch brigade (field brigades, tractor-field 
brigades, potqto brigades and so on) 
3. The specialised brigade (single product) 
4. The tractor-complex brigade (after 1958) 
\ 
The complex and tractor-complex brigades grew from just 
over 14 per cent of all brigades in 1957 to 34 per cent in 
1962 and remained about that proportion until at least the 
late 1960s. 6 This form of brigade is used where production 
is not highly specialised, and where both field crop and 
animal breeding sectors are relatively highly developed. 
Despite talk of agricultural specialisation, many Soviet 
writers seem to see the complex brigade as the most appropriate 
form of organisation within the kolkhoz, and in certain areas, 
even though it does not differ from other complex brigades, 
it may be called a department (otdelenie) which is the 
pattern of organisation prevailing on the sovkhoz. 7 In 
e~sence, a department is a complete farm as a sub-unit of 
the kolkhoz. It closely resembles an entire collective farm 
of the late 1940s. It may well be the most appropriate 
organisational form, but that lack of specialisation in turn 
may be related to the inadequate distribution network {poor 
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roads, poor quality vehicles, inadequate storage facilities 
and an insufficient n~mber of retail distribution points). 
Not all ko~khozy have the same organisational structure, 
even over time. Stuart gives three examples of organisational 
structure, one for a farm in the 1940s, one in the 1950s and 
one in the 1960s. The latter farm seems to have the most 
sophisticated technical division of labour, and this cannot 
simply be attributed to the fact that it was one which 
Stuart had visited and therefore knew more about: farms 
clearly became more complex internally as they grew in size, 
but there is still regional variation in their internal 
structure. Both the' brigade and the kolkhoz are nowadays 
sufficiently large that product specialisation can be handled 
by sub-units within the brigade. It is not at all clear how 
far this specialisation within a multi-product brigade has 
helped to raise productivity. Stuart attributes to the 
Soviet leadership a tendency towards the promotion of 
"agricultural gigantomania", yet he does seem to consider 
that there are benefits to it. In a large multi-product 
unit, the problem of the seasonal employment of labour may 
be reduced by the broadening of the output structure. It is 
difficult to know to what extent labour is transferable 
between animal breeding (non-seasonal) and field crop growing 
(seasonal) tasks. It may be that less specialised workers 
are shifted according to seasonal needs, ffid that specialised 
workers are fully employed in large units. Yet if this is 
so, it is not clear why complex brigades did not take over 
to some extent from the various kinds of branch and specialised 
brigades during the 1960s, instead of remaining at roughly 
one-third of all brigades. 
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It may well be that to transfer more brigades to the 
complex brigade system would have required a greater 
expenditure on equipment and on the education of personnel. 
This in itself would perhaps explain why this favoured system 
is not more widely spread, since the kolkhozy themselves 
would have difficulty in obtaining the equipment,and although 
there is a system of in-service education for kolkhoz 
personne18 , it is not cle~r how successful it is. Certainly 
formal educational qualifications are very low at brigade 
or ferma levels, although they are higher among kolkhoz 
h . 9 c alrmen. Thus the conditions for the spread of the complex 
brigade may not be present. 
The relBtively poor education may be more of a bottle-
neck hindering the improvement of agricultural performance 
. \ 
than it appears at first sight. For example, the evidence 
already cited from Stuart indicated that kolkhoz investment 
increased in the early 1960s, even after the purchase of 
machinery from the abolished M.T.S. Much of this investment 
would be on machinery {since the state takes responsibility 
for major infra-structural works such as roads}, yet it was 
not apparently very productive investment. A rough indication 
of this can be seen from the figures cited by Lavigne10 on 
the growth of agricultural production: from 1950-1954 it 
grew by 22 per cent, from 1955-1959 by 49 per cent, but from 
1960-1965 it only grew by 14 per cent. This latter period 
was precisely when the relative investment in kolkhozy was 
increasing, according to Stuart. Naturally this is only a 
very rough indication of the efficiency of investment: 
kolkhozy were already a declining proportion of agricultural 
enterprises, there was still considerable net emigration from 
rural areas at this time which the investment may have partly 
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offset, and the high percentages of growth in the early 
1950s were partly because the starting point was so low. 
Nevertheless, there were {and still are} reports of machinery 
lying idle not simply because of lack of spare parts, but 
because of inadequate maintenance. In this sense, the level 
of skills of kolkhoz personnel may be an important aspect of 
their relative inefficiency in some areas of agricultural 
activity. 
Furthermore, the relatively low level of skills may well 
be one of the reasons for the complex internal organisation 
of the kolkhoz as a whole, with complex brigades, field 
brigades, the ferma !concerned with livestock rearing, and 
headed by a zoBtechnician} construction brigades and so on. 
The organisational diversity means that, apart from the 
complex brigades, 8 specialist {often with higher formal 
educational qualifications than the chairman} can oversee 
the work of unskilled workers within a relatively narrowly 
specialised 'span of control'. The organisational rigidity 
produced by the proliferation of relatively narrow specialisations 
among heads of different kolkhoz sub-units may well account 
for both the limiting of the spread of complex brigades and 
for the apparently continuing high cost of certain aspects of 
farming, such as livestock rearing, which creates the economic 
opening for the 'personal plots' (the 'private sector'). 
For this reason, Stuart's conclusion (page 76) on the 
development of the internal structure of the kolkhoz ~s 
somewhat misleading: "Increasingly, the brigade (or department) 
is a large multi-product permanent unit, typically with its 
own mechanisation and encompassing both the production of 
field crops and animal products. From an organisational 
point of view, the typical kolkhoz has come to resemble the 
sovkhoz. More important, though, the brigade of the present 
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day differs very little from the pre-amalgamation collective 
and, indeed, has come to be a farm in its own right." While 
other authors also priint to the increasing organisational 
similarity bet~een kolkhozy and sovkhozy, a point which will 
be taken up later, it is clear from Stuart's own evidence 
(page 64) that the picture of the multi-product brigade 
only refers to around one-third of all brigades, even in 
the late 1960s,with the other brigades being more specialised. 
While he argues (page 73) that the various types of branch 
and specialised brigades remain in wide, though declining, 
usage, the evidence which he presents for the decline in 
their usage only goes up to 1961. 
This picture of comparative stagnation in terms of the 
'formal organisational blueprint' within the kolkhoz since 
the early 1960s w,ould also be more consistent with Stuar.t' s 
suggestion (page 195) that the 'good' kolkhoz may be less a 
function of the organisational form as such and more a function 
of other factors, for example, natural conditions and state 
credits. The lack of development of the apparently more 
flexible complex brigade system, in so far as it is an 
effect of organisational rigidity (as opposed to, say, being 
ecologically unsuitable, which could be true for certain 
parts of the U.S.S.R.), would then be related to other 
organisational features which are difficult to change and 
which are in part responsible for the poor performance of 
Soviet agriculture. 
This organisational rigidity, rather than sheer size 
alone, or the combination of size and product diver"sity as 
11 Nove seems to argue, would appear to be one of the reasons 
for the poor system of economic incentives. This incentive 
system, even after the abolition of the trudoden' (labour-day 
unit) in 1966 makes it difficult for the kolkhozniki to 
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calculate the relation between effort and reward and subjects 
the kolkhozniki to very detailed supervision. The detailed 
supervision is in part the effect of the fact that the 
"rewards of higher level managerial personnel depend directly 
upon the performance of lower level managers" as Stuart puts 
it. The usual success indicator problem exists on the kolkhoz, 
as in other economic units, where a multiple system of 
(perhaps mutually inconsistent) indicators,are related to a 
bonus system which may not be used in many cases due to its 
complexity: there is a severe shortage of personnel trained 
in economics and available to collective farms, according to 
Stuart. 
In addition to the difficulties which face personnel 
working within the kolkhoz in calculating appropriate courses 
\ 
of action,' the system of decision-making (forms and conditions 
of calculation) pertaining to the kolkhoz as a whole is also 
fraught with difficulties. As both Nove and Stuart point 
out, although the juridical status of the kolkhoz as a 
co-operative has given it a formal autonomy, this has been 
limited in practice by constant outside intervention. The 
autonomy in fact has often had the effect, as Stuart points 
out (page 107), that kolkhoz chairmen "were not integrated 
into the important information flows of the planning system, 
did not participate broadly in the important decisions of 
production and distribution of the product, and were not 
sufficiently well trained to perform a significant managerial 
role." Since the ending of the trudoden'system in 1966, it 
has been possible for the first time to calcUlate costs, gross 
output, gross revenue and net revenue, and the basic indicator 
of plan fulfillment is the volume of state procurements. 
Even more than in industry, agricultural capacity is difficult 
to define, which makes the planning of state procurements 
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difficult, and has led to a tendency to informally continue 
planning inputs, particularly in terms of crop rotation 
patterns. This, combined with the organisational rigidity 
(and poor transp'ort facilities within the kolkhoz) which 
restricts the flexibility of labour supply12, means 'that 
administrative pressure to increase agricultural production 
produces an acute 'labour shortage' which can only be 
overcome by investment. According to Nove{1977, pages 
131-132) agricultural investment rose from an average of 
under 3 milliard roubles a year in 1951-55 to 7.27 milliards 
in 1961 and then to 23.7 milliards in 1973 - over 24 per 
cent of total investment in that year.13 Nove provides an 
excellent analysis (pages 132-137) of why 'unbalanced planning' 
of inputs makesmuch of this investment inefficient, and the 
figures from Lavigne (1979) cited above suggest that much 
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of the investment may indeed be inefficient. However, the 
point which I am emphasising,here is that in addition to the 
problems mentioned by Nove, the very internal structure of 
the kolkhoz itself causes problems, both in creating a 
'labour shortage', which may be generating an additional 
demand for investment, and in making it difficult for the 
kolkhoz to calculate its own investment priorities, which 
would enable it to relieve Gosplan and the Ministry of 
Agriculture of some of their planning burdens. 
Nove is well aWare that there are no easy answers to 
the problem of the relation of economic units (including 
state enterprises and Ministries) to the central planning 
organs, so that one cannot simply advocate 'decentralisation'. 
The difficulties of the kolkhoz in calculating its costs 
and investment priorities appear to be even greater than for 
industrial state enterprises because of the connection between 
the 'personal plots' and the kolkhozy (and sovkhozy). In 
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addition, even such scope as exists for autonomy in investment 
decisions seems to be poorly utilised: Stuart, following 
James R. Millar, points out (page 133) that the finance 
policy of the kolkhoz sector is on balance very conservative. 
Although it has access to credit, _it has for the most part 
utilised funds obtained from increased prices and has tended 
to pursue a policy where income must precede outlays, 
To be fair, this autonomy 
due to access to credit may be more apparent than re~l, since 
kolkhozy ~re probably given very low priority in the case of 
conflicting demands on the State Bank for credit. Certainly 
Stuart points out (page 195) that it is more difficult to 
channel state assistBnce into kolkhozy than into sovkhozy, 
and this must be related to their juridical status as 
co-operatives, which, while not really protecting them from 
. \ 
a tendency by the state to plan inputs, does not help them 
in the political struggle over investment. One of the 
major problems of planning investment at the level of the 
kolkhoz is that machinery and equipment tends to be held at 
brigade level, and this is where its purchase and utilisation 
will be planned, according to Stuart. Yet the planning of 
investment is even at this level related to technical norms 
which must tend to ossify the planning of investment even if 
deliveries of machinery are planned 'from above' and thus do 
not fit in completely with brigade plans. Stuart describes 
the calculation and resulting adjudication of competing 
claims as follows (page 133): 
liThe utilisation of equipment will be a function 
of the targets facing the brigade and the technical 
norms translating these targets int~ specific 
fulfillment tasks. This translation is typically 
accomplished with the use of a technological map 
(tekhnologicheskaia karta). If additional 
equipment is needed, the brigadier forwards a 
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request to kolkhoz management which in turn is 
forwarded to the raiispolkom. If the request 
is for a deficit ·commodity, the decision as to 
who will in fact receive the equipment is 
apparently' made at the raion level. The 
equipment is recorded at the-brigade level 
as an asset and depreciated according to 
standard norms (usually over a. ten year period). 
Capital repairs are planned in advance and based 
upon anticipated usage. The costs of these 
repairs are recorded at brigade level although 
the brigade does not make payment." 
Stuart's description is now out of date, since 
Sel'khoztekhnika, not the raion, is now the supply agency 
for agriculture. Ho'wever, one can still conclude that it 
is difficult to make the calculation that the brigade could 
meet its targets by organisational improvements or practices 
raising the productivity of existing equipment, or by 
re-organisi~g relations (and the distribution of equipment) 
between brigades. The planning of investment at this level 
thus tends to perpetuate the existing internal structure of 
the kol~hoz, generate a certain amount of otherwise unnecessary 
demand for investment (by precluding certain kinds of economies) 
and restrict the ability of the kolkhoz as a whole to 
manoeuvre vis-a-vis the planning of deliveries of equipment. 
The rural tolkach can look foward to a long existence in 
these circumstances, particularly when the problem of lack 
of spare parts (a problem throughout the Soviet economy) is 
taken into account. Despite the shortage of equipment, 
Stuart cites a Soviet source for 1965 showing that 15 per cent 
of tractors stand idle every year due to technical 
inoperability. 
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If there are problems about the farm calculating its own 
costs and investment needs, the difficulties of calculating 
the costs of the kolkhoz faced by the central planning agencies 
are also formidable, even with the introduction of wage-payments 
in 1966. This becomes clear when the accounting practices 
are examined more closely: the costs of the kolkhoz are 
'monetised' by the attribution of a rouble cost to physically 
determined inputs. Thus the technological map will have a 
regionally defined scale setting forth the rouble cost of a 
specified kind of tractor operating on a particular kind of 
land for a specified time-period. But the interpretation of 
whether the land falls into that category will be left to 
that kolkhoz. Even if farms within a region give a similar 
interpretation to such a technological norm, inter-regional 
comparisons of costs are more difficult, and it is these 
. \ 
which are likely to be of most interest to the central 
planners. In addition there is the problem, familiar to 
students of Soviet industry, of the slow rate of change of 
such technical norms, despite constantly changing conditions. 
Such problems of costing methodology are the subject of 
continued discussion, and like the issues of land rent charges 
and 'capital' charges, must be resolved if a satisfactory 
form of measuring agricultural costs is to be developed. 
Without a form of measuring costs in a manner that does not 
perpetuate existing practices, but rather helps indicate how 
costs could be reduced, the poor performance of agriculture 
is likely to continue, and agricultural investment is likely 
to remain a high proportion of total investment. 
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The Convergence of Ko1khozy and Sovkhozy 
Many of these problems apply also to the sovkhozy, since 
the administrative and operational differences between the 
two kinds of farm have diminished over the years, as both 
Nove and Stuart indicate. This raises the issue of.the 
extent to which they can be conceived of as distinct forms 
of property. Nove (1977, page 122) argues that the following 
are .the significant differences between kolkhozy and sovkhozy: 
"Firstly, the' juridic/al fact of co-operative as 
against state ownership. Secondly, the formally 
elective nature of the kolkhoz chairman and 
management committee, as against the appointed 
sovkhoz director. Thirdly, the degree of 
autonomy, legal and to some extent real, of a 
kolkhoz is greater, in that a sovkhoz is 
directly subordinated to a territorial sovkhoz 
administration ••••••••. , whereas the nominally 
co-operative nature of the kolkhozy gives them 
greater leeway. Fourthly, the kolkhozy finance 
the bulk of their investments out of revenue, 
while sovkhozy receive more grants from the 
state, though with the spread of 'full 
khozrgschet' among the sovkhozy .•.••.•.. this 
element of difference is diminishing. Finally, 
despite the changes introduced in 1966 there is 
a greater dependence of incomes in the kolkhozy 
on the financial results of that kolkhoz. That 
is to say, subject to a mimumum, there is a greater 
variation in payment to labour than in sovkhozy. 
There is at present a clear trend towards 'bringing 
closer together' the two types of property, as a 
number of party pronouncem8n~s bear witness, 
above all by involving them in joint enterprises 
and other activities." 
Some of the differences are more important than others. 
The juridical position of the kolkhoz (apart from the 1977 
Constitution and other statutes)is set out in the 1969 
Model Kolkhoz Charter, which replaced the 1935 Standard 
Charter, both of which are reproduced as appendices in Stuart. 
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The greater dependence of kolkhoz incomes on financial 
performance, and the poorer pension rights, poorer state 
aid for investment, and so on, are only juridic,lIllly possible 
on the basis of the distinction between co-operative ownership 
and state ownership. Yet as Stuart makes clear, the'kolkhoz 
chairman is not really elected, and the a~tonomy of the 
kolkhoz is limited within the planned economy, even though, 
as Stuart puts it (page 45) lithe mechanisms utilised to 
integrate the kolkhoz into the planned economy have differed 
from those utilised for other organisational forms in the 
Soviet economy". This may be a reference to the Territorial 
Production Administrations, established in 1962, although 
Stuart points out tha~ these have faded into the raion 
administrations as organs of local control over agriculture. 
Although Stuart seems to consider, like Nove, that the kolkhozy 
do have gr~ater au~onomy than the sovkhozy, one could take a 
jaundiced view and argue that the autonomy exists when it 
comes to looking after themselves and their members, but 
does not exist when it comes to fitting in with state 
economic plans. Although Nove argues that the greater 
autonomy of the kolkhoz is to some extent real, he does 
point to examples of detailed operational supervision by the 
party (however, it also applies to sovkhoz directors) and 
Stuart suggests that at least in some areas the party in the 
late 1950s was extending its membership and improving its 
organisation within the kolkhozy. Whatever the extent of 
kolkhoz autonomy (and in the absence of developed forms of 
calculation extended autonomy would only be of limited use to 
its members anyway), the development of joint enterprises 
linking kolkhozy and sovkhozy, together with the increasing 
power of Sel'khoztekhnika over maintenance, repairs and certain 
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services, may well have reduced kolkhoz autonomy as part 
of the process of assimilating the two forms of property. 
The development of these organisational links between 
kolkhoZy and sovkho~y is one of a series of measures taken to 
improve agriculture since 1965, and the impact of these is 
perhaps best described by Lavigne (1979). She divides the pre-
1965 period up into a period before 1958, characterised by a 
poli::y of constraint and the period 1958-1965, characterised by 
a policy of liberalisation. Yet despite the changes after 1958, 
the policy of intensification of ~griculture was not well conducted 
since (among other things) the kolkhozy did not have enough 
resources to buy machinery or to develop the use of fertilisers. 
The 1965 reforms improved the situation much more noticeably_ 
This was when sales, rather than total production, became the 
main plan target. Yet beginning in 1975, because of the mediocre 
results of agriculture (the targets of the 1971-75 five-year plan not 
having been reached) a tendency developed towards the return to 
voluntarist planning. The margin between the anticipated volume 
of production and the plan _of sales fixed for the kolkhoz narrowed. 
For example, in 1976-80, for cereals, total production was to 
increase by 19 per cent, but sales were to increase by 33 per 
cent; for meat the percentages were 9 and 13 respectively. 
(Admittedly, despite the implication of Lavigne's argument, produc-
tion could rise faster than sales, if, for example, the on-farm 
use of cereals remained relatively stable, but, realistically, to 
sustain increased production, a greater proportion would preso.mably 
be have to be used for seeds, and as fodder.) The part of sales in 
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addition to the plan waS thus expected to decrease (this being 
compensated by an increase in price payed to the kolkhozy), but 
in addition purchases over and abovl"! the plan became obligatory 
to the collecting organisations, for a certain number of products 
(potatoes, cotton, beetroot, sunflower seeds - some of these, in 
my view, being crops where the 'persona1.plots' have had a better 
record than the kolkhozy and sovkhozy). It was no surprise when 
from 1976 the sales plan was not realised for a whole series of 
products. 
A de9ree effective from the beginning of 1968 set up a system 
of contracts between the collecting organisations and the kolkhozy, 
based on the detailed sales plan. As in industry, this system 
began to be abused by the modification of the contracts by the 
collecting organisations, with the latter sometimes for cing kolkhoz 
chairmen to sign blank contracts. As in industry, in other words, 
there was a return to directive planning, since the experiments 
in managing direct relations with the kolkhoz customers, such as 
food-processing enterprises or shops, were not always crowned 
with succes s. 
De spite this, the position of the kolkhozy improved in several 
respects. Base prices of cereals were raised after 1965, and above-
plan sales were priced at an extra 50 or 100 per cent (depending 
on the products). In 1970, base prices were raised for livestock 
products, potatoes, vegetables and fruits,. and supplements were 
introduced for above-plan sales. The same procedure was introduced 
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in 1972 for sugar beet, in 1975 for flax and in 1979 for milk, wool, 
mutton and astrakhan fur. These measures influenced the 
'profitability' of the kolkhoz, which increased from 20-41 per cent 
between 1964 and 1966, then returned to 25 per cent in 1975. 
high rate of profitability was necessary to finance investment 
This 
(apart from large infra- structural projects). High purchase prices 
from agriculture combined with low retail .prices have meant a 
heavy burden of subsidies on the state budget. The effect of the 
1979 price rises alone has been estimated by Brezhnev at 3.2 
milliard roubles of s.ubsidy. Relating this to the figures cited 
above by Nove on agricultural investment, this is more than the 
total annual agricultural investment for the years 1951-55. 
From 1965 the tax burden on kolkhozy was lightened, and 
given the exemption for kolkhozy with a rate of 'profitability' of 
over 15 per cent, most kolkhozy these days will escape the tax, 
although members earning a wage over the minimum guar-q..nteed 
wage for industry will be taxed at a rate of 8 per cent. In addition 
debts prior to 1965 were annulled, and they gained access to both 
long and short term credit (though according to Stuart they seem 
to make little use of it, as mentioned above). Finally kolkhozy were 
encouraged to develop their non-agricultural activities, particularly 
by means of the inter- kolkhoz organisat ions, grouping several 
kolkhozy: for the construction of small electricity stations, irriga-
tion schemes, building construction; for the construction and use 
of enterprises for the transformation and treatment of agricultural 
products; for the use of centres of artificial insemination incubation 
, , 
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and so :on. In addition, a 1967 decree encouraged the development 
of auxiliary enterprises or handicraft workshops wi thin the Jto.lkhoz 
to encourage the use of seasonally unemployed labour-power. 
The intention of the authorities is clear, particularly in view 
of the large investment programme. Despite tne voluntarist 
tendencies of plan implementation, the kolkhoz sector is not 
perceived as a sector to be "pressured" but an element of the 
economy to be developed by means related to its material interest. 
The aim is to produce a convergence between agriculture and 
industry. Between 1967 and 1975, state farms were reformed on 
the basis of 'full khozraschet' and run like state industrial enter-
prises. Similarly a series of measures have been taken which 
appear to be aimed at reducing differences between kolkhozy and 
at running them more like sovkhozy. Following a kolkhoz congress 
in 1966, a series of kolkhoz councils were set up at federal,., 
republican and regional levels. While according to Nove (page 143) 
it does not appear that the councils have either executive authority 
or an effective representative function, they may well serve to 
standardise certain kolkhoz practices with a view to improving 
overall standards. Eor example, the federal council of kolkhozy 
met for the first time in 1970 and decided that the management 
of the kolkhoz social insurance funds (created in 1964) be run by the 
trade union system under the overall charge of the federal council 
of kolkhozy. At the centre, the regulations on the constitution and 
, 
use of the social insurance funds are decreed jointly by the federal 
I 
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council of kolkhozy and the central federal council of trade unions. 
This form of standardisation of practice seems to have paved the 
way for the 1976 recommendation of the XXV Party Congress that 
kolkhozniki could enter an agric.ultural trade union, on a strictly 
voluntary basis. In 1977 a regulation was issued adapting to the 
kolkhoz committee the 1971 statute on trade union committees at 
workshop, factory and local levels. These measures have brought 
the state and collective sectors closer together. 
Clearly bringing the two main sectors of agriculture closer 
together will ease the ·task of bringing agriculture as a whole closer 
to industry. According to Lavigne, the aim seems to be continue 
to industrialise agriculture, by mechanisation, use of chemicals, 
electrification (still not fully achieved all these years after Lenin's 
famous slogan and the Goelro plan), and also by developing the 
means of transport, by techniques of preservation and transforma-
tion of agricultural products. Despite all this, L~vigne quotes 
Brezhnev's speech to the Party Central Committee in July 1978 to 
show that all the old defects in the abov,e aspects of agriculture 
are still present. The other way of bringing agriculture 'and 
industry closer together, started in 1965 and formally confirmed 
in 1976, is to concentrate agricultural enterprises, not .,?y the 
former methods of armlgamation into larger kolkhozy and conversion 
into sovkhozy, but by the already mentioned method of forming of 
associations or unions between sovkhozy and kolkhozy, and by the 
creation of lagro-industrial complexes', integrating industrial and 
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agricultural activit~es. In 1978 there existed 8,000 enterprises 
of this type, associating 90 per cent of the kolkhozy and 60 
per cent of the sovkhozy, many of them participating in several 
enterprises. These enterprises employed 1. 6 million workers 
in 1978. Lavigne says that the Republic of Moldavia has served 
as the field of experimentation for this (organisational) formula 
since the 1960s, and in 1978 almost two-fifths of agricultural 
production came from these entities. This is interesting because 
according to Nove, Moldavia is also the place where the kolkhoz 
council carries out administrative functions, unlike the rest of 
th e U. S . S . R . He argues (1977, page l43): IIThis may be an 
interesting e ~eriment. But such a trend runs counter to the 
policy of joining kolkhozy and sovkhozy together. ~I Yet Moldavia 
appears to manage to do both, which suggests that the distinction 
between state and collective property is already becoming quite 
blurred in Moldavian economic practice, if not in Soviet juridical 
discourse. 
The development of agro-industrial complexes is according 
to Lavigne the first step towards a profound transformation of 
rural life, the urbanisation of the countryside. In other words, 
the final aim is to unify as much as possible the living conditions 
of town and country dwellers, offering them an equivalent set of 
services. At the moment the level of 8.chools, hospitals, cultural 
and commercial establishments is less dense in the countryside. 
The introduction of pensions in 1965 slowed down the rural exodus, 
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but did not keep the young in the village. The introductIon of 
the work-permit for kolkhozniki, from 1977, meant that a member 
leaving the kolkhoz did not lose her or his pension rights, which 
favoured labour mobility. The idea of the agrogorod (agro-town) 
seems to have been resurrected,although in a different form 
from that advocated by Khrushchev in 1950 (and later). This could 
have adverse effects, as W~dekin has pointed out, on the 'personal 
plots' which is one of the reasons why, as Lavigne remarks, 
kolkhozniki seem -to be attached to their individual houses. Indeed 
many of these ambit:i,ous hopes for agriculture could well imply 
a transformation (or even eventual abolition) of the 'personal plots'. 
Consequently, this third form of agricultural property must now 
be examined. 
Personal Plots 
As.W~dekin (1973) makes clear, 'personal plots' do not 
simply belong to kolhozniki, but also to workers and employees. 
The latter are often thought to be employed in sovkhozy, but as 
/I 
both Nove and Wadekin make clear, they also consist of state-
employed persons working in suburban or urban areas. The 
distinction between those plots on kolkhoz land, and those of 
sovkhoz land is of very little significance, ex cept that sovkhoz 
plots are usually smaller, which is related to higher wages of 
sovkhoz workers. In contrast to earlier times, the income of 
kolkhozniki from 'per sonal plots' is now only a secondary income. 
It might well be possible to argue now that the most significant 
difference among 'per sonal plots' is that between sovkhozy and 
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kolkhozy on the one hand, and the agricultural activities of urban 
workers and employees on the other. However, the scanty empirical 
material available makes such an argument difficult to sustain. 
In urban areas, ·personal plots' are granted by municipal soviets. 
but not directly to households. whereas they are granted by the 
kolkhozy or sovkhozy directly to households in rural areas. Thus 
the juridical conditions of existence of these plots are the legal 
designation of households, and the legal powers of the political 
or economic agencies concerned, which are empowered to grant 
the plots. This is why the extent of the plots can be legally 
limited and changed in certain circumstances. 
The urban 'service' plots (those at some distance from the 
house) are usually allotted for a limited period only (W~dekin, 
page 34), and they are registered in the name of the enterprise, 
local authority, organisation or institution which has issued them 
to the individual. Yet eVEn. these plots appear to be retained 
year after year, and in the case of retirement or invalidity are 
normally retained for life. Tenure in all other plots is for an 
unlimited time and free of charge. In contrast to a simple dis~ 
I' tinction between town and country plots, Wadekin (page 35) 
classifies plots as belonging to the households of: (a) workers and 
employees in rural areas engaged in agricultural or connected 
occupations (b) workers and employees in rural areas not engaged 
in occupations connected with agriculture (c) workers and employees 
ln urban areas. Like the kolkhozniki, the workers and employees 
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in rural areas are given no legal confirmation of their tenure: the 
right is merely delegated to them by the kolkhoz or sovkhoz. So 
rural plots are certainly not legally private property, although the 
means of production used on them (including livestock) and the 
products themselves are legally private property. Some urban 
plots surrounding private houses are indistinguishable from private 
property even though all land is nationalised. However, apart 
from such urban and suburban plots (whose economic importance 
/I 
is hard to assess but which seems to be considerable from Wadekin's 
description of the enormous extent of informal suburban development 
" round some large cities), the main impression given by Wadekin's 
painstaking work to glean evidence from a large variety of sourceS' 
is of the interdependence of kolkhoz {or sovkhoz} and 'personal plot' 
sectors. 
This interdependence applies to mutual aid {not all of it legal} 
between the kolkhoz and 'personal plot' in terms of inputs, and 
what is effectively a division of labour between them in terms of 
products, with the 'personal plots' concentrating on what the 
kolkhozy do badly - potatoes, vegetables, eggs, fruit, meat and 
dairy prOduce. This division of labour has become more evident 
with rising living standards, so that the private plots did not just 
produce means of consumption for the kolkhozniki., but began to 
cater for developing urban markets for the above products rather 
. 14 
than for the staple foods based on gralns. To some extent 
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this interdependence mitigates the tension mentioned by Nove 
arising out of division of v.ork time between 'private' and collective 
(or state) work. II Wadekin's argument implies that some Soviet 
'writers on this issue are mistaken in emphasising the tension 
over alloc.ation of time between collective and plot work. He 
argues tJ;1at most work on the plots is spare time as far as the 
kolkhoz is concerned. Nove himself points out that much of the 
work on plots is done by middle aged women, and Stuart's 
evidence (admittedly for an earlier period) suggests that very 
few fail to do the minimum work required of them, although 
W~dekin suggests it is different with overtime. Since there is a 
'labour shortage', a.ertime could be important for plan fulfilment, 
which lends support to Nove's view of the situation. 
The interdependence between kolkhoz and personal plot both 
h~lps to explain why the latter appears so productive (for example, 
it receives feed grazing and young anima:B for its livestock rearing) 
and why plots continue to exist. They compensate (or have in the 
past) for the underinvestment in agriculture by producing output for 
very little investment. Furthermore, in adapting to the market, 
they have provided the kind of flexibility which has been precluded, 
it seems, by the organisational rigidity of kolkhozy, but which is 
required in the face of varying harvests, often voluntaristic 
approaches to agriculture and, more recently, the changing demand 
for agricultural products. However, the role of the 'personal plots' 
appear s to be declining: in 1950, they amounted to 5.1 per cent of 
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of total sown area in the USSR, by 1959 they were 3.7 per cent 
any by 1969, they were 3.2 per cent (Wcidekin, page 45).' In the 
last, decade, the decline has continued: thus according to 
Lavigne (as already mentioned) in 1979 they were only 2.7 per 
15 
cent of total sown are,a. This is somewhat puzzling, since 
both Nove and W~dekin cite Soviet sources which either make favourable 
comments on the 'household plots', or point to the counterproductive 
of 
effectslrestricting the activities associated with this sector, or 
else. which argue that the unsatisfact:Hy productive performance 
of the sochlised sector precludes the ending of the reliance on the 
1/ 
plots. In the light of such arguments, which in view of Wadekin's 
analysis I accept, the plots, even if they are considered as 'private 
property', are scarcely an 'alien cancer' undermining the socialised 
sector. However, it may be that the Soviet authorities wish to 
check the tend encies towards the development of lar ge areas of 
what seem to be effectively suburban private market gardens. This 
is probably why some sovkhozy have been set up close to cities. 
HOVlever, overall the official policy to;vards the plots has been 
favourable since the mid-1960s. The decline in the private plot 
may be in part simply a demographic effect, as old people ln 
kolkhozy and SGvkhozy die, while the household rights to their plots 
are not transferred to a new households because younger people 
have been moving out of the countryside. If this is so, it may In 
itself be the cause of a slight deterioration (or stagnation) in 
overall agricultural performance in the Soviet Union, because of 
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the economic support which the private plots give to kolkhozy 
and sovkhozy. 
Yet this decline in sown area devoted to 'personal plots' 
has not been matched by a 'proportionate decline in output. It 
still produced in 1979 25.5 per cent of total agricultural produc-
tion (and sustained 21 per cent of the livestock), according to 
Lavigne. She rightly stresses the dependen<;:e 01 the plots on 
the kolkhozy, but if Wadekin is right that the plots also help the 
kolkhozy in certain respects, the reduction in the numher of 
private plots, as just indicated, may be slightly detrimental to 
kolkhozy performanc~ and thus to overall agricultural performance. 
The non-kolkhoz plots (which do not benefit from interdependence 
with the kolkhozy and may thus with perhaps more justice be called 
'private') seem to have been expanding at the expe:p.se of the 
Ii 
kolkhoz plots. According to Wadekin (page 345) even by 1968 
the output of the nonkolkhoz population amounted to 44 per cent 
of total private agricultural output, and by 1971 may have risen 
to one half. If this trend has continued (the reasons being the 
decline in the kolkhoz population and the growth in demand for 
fruit and vegetables) then the 'personal plots I producing directly 
for urban markets are probably much more important now than 
has generally been realised. This would help explain why their 
proportion of total output has remained around 25 per cent, 
while at the same time their positive contribution to the 
socialised sector has gone down ,resulting in a disappointing 
overall agricultural performance. This raises the issue of the 
kolkhoz markets, and retail trade, since the urban private plots 
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are p,articularly geared to these. 
RetaIl Trade 
No~e says that turnover statistics show that retail sales in 
rural areas have been rising' steadily, but argues that judging from 
criticisms, there is ample scope for improvement in marketing, 
particularly by the rural consumer cooperatives. He mentions 
the most pressing physical problems - poor roads, inadequate 
transport, a serious lack of packaging materials and of storage 
space. Quite ~part from these problems, retailing enterprises 
are reluctant to take perishable goods, since spoilage adversely 
., 
affects profitability .. Wadekin also emphasises the scope for 
cooperatives, and mentions their reluctance to take perishable 
goods. Despite high level official support for the kolkhoz, markets, 
of 
W~dekin reports continual instanceslkolkhoz and so.vkhoz chairmen 
forbidding kolkhozniki and sovkhoz workers to sell products on 
the kolkhoz market. Price limits, it seems, were still being 
illegitimately being fixed in the late 1960s, and raion authorities 
still at times forbade people to sell in neighbouring towns, so 
that they had to sell to local procurement agencies at the lower 
state prices. Construction plans for kolkhoz markets were still 
not being fulfilled almost everywhere. These comments refer to 
the period up to 1970. It is not clear how far the raising of state 
prices during the 1970s has reduced the incentive to interfere with 
the kolkhoz market in order to meet state procurement plans. 
Not too much stres s should be laid on the kolkhoz market, 
however. In 1977, according to Lavigne, state commerce and 
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retailing coopera tive commerce were responsible for 69.6 per cent and 
28 per cent respectively. of all retail turnover, both food and non-food. 
Hence the kolkhoz market in 1977 accounted for 2.4 per cent of all 
retail turnover. Thi s figure compares with 2.8 per cent in 1969 
and 2.6 per cent in 1979. So while the share of the kolkhoz market 
in all retail turnover ha s not really fallen during the 19 70s, it is 
still not a very high proportion of all reta il tra de. Nevertheless, 
the kolkhoz market is somewhat more important if one concentra tes 
on food retailing alone, which is what they specialise in. (They 
should not be confused with retailing cooperatives which deal in 
various kinds of goods. The kolkhoz markets provide a retail outlet 
for the output of producers' cooperatives, the kolkhozy, which is not 
ta ken up in the sta te procurement plan. In addition, they provide a 
\ 
retail outlet for some of the produce from the private plots). If 
one restricts oneself to food retailing, then according to Wa dekin 
(page 133), the kolkhoz markets accounted for 8.7 per cent of turnover 
of 'comparable products' in 1969 not in volume, but according to the 
effective prices of these sales, which would be higher in the kolkhoz 
commerce than the socialised (state and retail cooperative) commerce. 
In 1979, this percentage wa s 9.4, according to Lavigne (private 
communication) . However, the reference to 'comparable products' 
is somewhat misleading if one is attempting to assess the share of 
the kolkhoz markets in the retail turnover of all food products. The 
phra se 'comparable products' refers to the range of products which are 
sold both in sociali sed commerce and in the kolkhoz markets. However, 
the socialised commerce sector also sells an additional range of food 
products, mostly processed foods, which are not available in the 
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kolkhoz markets. If one ta kes kolkhoz market sales a s a 
percentage of all food sales, then the share of the kolkhoz market was 
4.5 per cent in 1969,4.3 per cent in 1977, and 4.7 per cent in 1979. 
Consequently, after a period of relative decline in the 1950s and 1960s, 
the kolkhoz retail markets have stabilised their share of the food markets 
in the 1970s. The rise in the share of the state and cooper?tive 
retailing sector I even in food, up to the late 1960 s may have been 
partly due to the retail cooperatives purcha sing directly from the kolkhoz 
and urban priva te plots I and selling the se products both in their own 
shops and on the premises of the kolkhoz markets. Thi s practice 
ha s certainly been advocated for some years I but it is not clear to 
what extent it ha s actually occurred. It could Equally be the ca se 
that state and cooperative sector 'middle management' opposition to 
kolkhoz markets is effectively restricting their development. This 
may be responsible for the apparent move into the 'informal sector' 
of the black market, the grey market and so on I which seems to have 
grown considerably in recent years. 
The defects of the current system of retail trade are well-known 
and are adeptly summarised by Lavigne: these remarks also 
ap'ply to the retail distribution of industrial goods. De spite a 1969 
regulation I direct enterpri se- shop contract s rema in the exception. 
The system does not function a s an intermediary between production 
and consumption: it does not transmit demand to the enterprises I 
and does not inform the consumer. The methods of planning production 
do not adapt supply to the consumer's needs I so that 
enterpri ses are slow to adapt to the changing structure of demand I 
and to plan for complementarities {for example I ski-boots a swell 
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as skis). There are absolute shortage::; which are related to the 
priv,ileging of heavy industry, which are 'dealt with' by decrees, 
such as the 1976 decree which said that consumption goods would 
increase by 70 per cent between 1976-1980, when the five year 
plan for the same years only envisaged an increase of 32 per cent 
and investment had already been fixed on that basis. (The priority 
given to heavy industry meant that it had the means to make up 
for some of defects of light industry, for example, by making 
regrigerators. In 1965, 19 per cent of consumption goods came 
from heavy industry,. and this rose to 28 per cent in 1976). The 
functioning of retail trade leaves a .lot to be desired, with ·very 
poor stock management, too few sales points, es.pecially in new 
residential areas, and irregular supplies. These features lead 
to cl1eues even where there is not an absolute shortage of goods. 
The shortage of rural retail outlets brings rural customers into 
towns. There is inadequate priority given to services,and these 
are even worse than commerce in goods. The reform of commerce 
started in 1970 did not do much good, and the 1979 decree, with 
its centralising emphasis, made the Ministry of Commerce 
re sponsible for satisf¥ing demand, with provisions for long-term 
contracts between commerce and industry, and a planned increase 
in shop s selling a particular trade- mark. Lavigne rightly doubts 
the virtues of such centralisation in this part of the economy, but then 
she doubts whether the di stribution system could function in a 
still worse manner. 
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Overview of Agriculture 
It is now possible to try to discuss agriculture as a 
whole. Clearly the distinctions between kolkhozy and sovkhozy 
are diminishing, a task which requires a massive allocation of 
re sources to agriculture both to inv est and to subsidise agricultural 
prices. As Neve points out, the geographical and climatic feature s 
of the Soviet Union mean that for a particular volume of output 
it will probably always require greater investment than, say, the 
United States. Nevertheless, a lot of the resources devoted to 
agriculture must be wasted both because of forms of planning, 
and because of the organisational forms of the 'socialised sedor' 
and their inadequate meanS of calculation. As Lavigne puts it, 
it is astonishing and disturbing that the Soviet Union cannot cover 
its needs for agricultural products, nutritional produce and raw 
materials when 22 per cent of its population is engaged in agricul-
ture and such a high proportion of total investment is devoted to it. 
Yet even in October 1980 Brezhnev was still pointing to the 
inadequate performance of agriculture. This global underdevelop-
ment leaves the way open for the activities of the 'private sector' 
which even if it is selling to consumer cooperatives is still very 
prosperous and produces one-quarter of total agricultural output. 
Unless and until organisational forms and means of calculation 
can be developed which will enable the sovkhozy and kolkhozy to 
produce as efficiently as the 'personal plots' on the same products, 
agriculture will continue to be a chronic problem. The distribution 
of agricultural products (as of industrial ones, as well as services) 
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will similarly have to improve if the agricultural organisations 
are to have the means of planning production starting from 
calculations as to likely consumption. This may well require 
a radical alteration of both priorities and planning techniquies 
in the Soviet Union~ 
II Industry 
It is not very easy to separate agriculture from industry, 
as the preceeding discussion probably shows. Not only do 
agriculture and industry produce means of production for each 
other, but they share' common problems in many ways with regard 
to retail distribution, and with regard to relations between the units 
of production and the ministerial authorities and planning authorities 
themselves. However, the greater importance attached to industry 
in the U.S.S.R., and the organisational differences between industrial 
and agricultural economic units, make it easier to discuss them 
separately. 
Sta te Enterpri se s 
As with agriculture, I propose to start with the units of 
production before discussing other economic units. Retail trading 
units will only be mentioned in passing in view of the discussion 
of them in relation to agriculture. Whereas in the case of agricul-
ture the main works referred to were those of economists, it is 
pos sible to begin by discus sing an explicitly sociological account of 
enterprises, or at least of the social location of their directors, 
16 
namely Andrle (1976). The theoretical mode of analysis used 
by Andrle is role theory and, although no attempt is made by him 
137. 
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to defend his use of role theory, the defects of this mode of 
analysis are limited to some extent by a distinction which is made 
between theoretical and empirical work. Wliile Andrle argues 
(page 158) that tlit is taken to be axiomatic that a theoretical choice 
has consequences for the questions asked and answered in the 
subsequent enquirytl, the distinction between theoretical and 
empirical work, which even appears explicitly at times in the book 
(for example, in the conclusion), means that much that appears 
in the text is heavily influenced by his reading of primary Soviet 
sources. These do noOt use role theory as a mode of analysis. 
Fortunately for those who have little time for role theory, Andrle 
has not systematically transmuted the discourses of the Soviet 
sources into role theory, which means that much of the empirical 
material is of use to those who espouse different theoretical 
positions. 
Andrle begins his analysis of the position of the manager in 
the relations of production (conceived of as primarily interpersonal 
relations) by positing two basic types of state intervention in the 
economy - regulative and directive planning, or put another way, 
market regulation versus administrative planning. The history of 
this conception can be traced back to debates in Germany and 
Austria in the late 19th century, thlO ugh Weber (and von Mises) 
up ~o Granick's distinction between the khozraschet and formal 
18 
models. The problem with administrative or directive planning 
is according to Andrle (page 9) "the Weberian one •.• of the 
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precipice between 'extensively and intensively infinite reality' on 
the one hand and the conceptualising activities of the human mind 
on the other. II Thus it is the inadequacy of concepts to' the real 
which requires the supplementation of directive planning by 
regulative planning, since the gap between concepts and the real 
leads to a proliferation of central checks on managerial activity 
which must nevertheless be effective and which hence coexist 
with a certain amount of managerial autonomy if the system is to 
work. The main arguments which I would raise about this concep-
tion of the ,'dialectic' ~as Andrle calls it) between managerial 
initiative and plan discipline are as follows: firstly, that it does 
not stem from any gap between the conceptual and the real, but 
from differences between different discourses; 19 secondly, that 
the problems of Soviet planning should not be analysed in terms 
of the mutual interactbn of two or ganising principles which define 
the range of variation of the structure. Andrle (page 8) quite 
explicitly does the latter by positing regulative and directive plann:-
ing as two polar opposites defining the 'gravitational field' within 
which all proposals to set individual interests in harmony with a 
specific notion of 'general interest' would have to fall. 
Yet, despite what I consider to be the weaknesses of Andrle's 
mode of analysis of planning,he is able to give a reasonable 
(if by no means original) account of the basic problems facing 
Soviet planning: "the centralised planning of complex diversified 
industrial production is based on inadequate knowledge of the 
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minutiae of specific conditions under which decision makers at the 
production level have to operate. Centrally formulated prescrip-
tions tend to become ambiguous or inconsistent (depending on how 
specific they are) by the time they arrive on a factory manager's 
desk. FroITl the central planner's point of view, the response of 
managers - and by chain reaction of all those affected by ITlanagerial 
decisions - is insufficiently determinate, with consequences which 
may contradict ·some of the planner's objectives. 
Therefore, the administrative structure of directive planning 
must be such as to offer the central planner some way of salvaging 
at least SOITle of the objectives which appear to be denied in the 
process of implementation. In the Soviet Union, the central organs 
of the state, with the central organs of the ComITlunist Party play-
ing the crucial coordinative and policy formulating role, fight for 
control over the productive process by continuous issue of corrective 
directives, multiple checks on their fulfilment, and periodical, 
large scale campaigns against whichever managerial policies are 
brought to the attention of the central authorities as detrimental 
to the national goals. The efficiency of these efforts of course 
requires that no managerial decision making is protected by 
autonomously enfor ci b>le legal status. However, as a consequence 
of the inadequacy of centralised inforITlation, the whole system 
would siITlply grind to a halt if" factory managers did not have the 
initiative to arbitrate between conflicting directives and cut corners 
by officially unblessed practices in their pursuit of the chosen goals. II 
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Of course I it is not simply factory directors who mu st have 
such initiative - it is necessarily open to agreater or lesser extent 
to all economic agents. The closest Andrle gets to saying thi s is 
his remark (page 10) that "each official is something of a 
policy maker in his own right" I a position which implies that only 
human beings can be economic agents. He also gets close to analysing 
the conditions of the partial autonomy of enterprise directors in a brief 
discussion of what Ka ser and Zielinsky call' state-parametric' planning I 
in which enterprise performance parameters are set by the state (not 
the market) in such a way as to increase enterprise autonomy as to 
the manner in which the success indicators are met. Andrle rightly 
points to one of the problems of such' synthetic' success indicators 
(ones which' cover' 0 wide range of economic events): "Parametric 
planning offers the central planner better control over the aggregated 
results at the expense of surrendering his administrative power of 
involvement in the concrete processes of production: in other words 
there might be a well-regulated' producti on for synthetic criteria' I 
but a less well regulated 'production for use' I a circumstance which 
presumably does not escape the attention of these concerned." 
Largely because of this difficulty with the theory of 'state-parametric' 
planning Andrle decides to stick to his dichotomy of market 
regulative versus directive administrative forms of state 
intervention in the economy. The point of the attempt to develop a 
concept of 'state-parametric' planning I of course I is to theorise forms 
of planning in a way that escapes from such dichotomies a s state versus 
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market and takes account of the or ganisational exigencies of 
aggregating information to coordinate the activities of a multi-
plicity of agents while at the same time allowing for a necessary 
measure of autonomy being available to those agents for dealing 
with the" inevit3.ble inconsistencies in the plans. The difficulty 
which Andrle in effect raises is the well-known one of deciding 
on the most appropriate indicators. Whatever the deficiencies of 
the 1 state-parametric· attempt to theorise the se problems, the 
problems must be analysed, and this can only be done by analysing 
the criteria used to measure plan fulfilment in relation to the 1 
organisational exigencies (and means of calculating action with 
respect to them) which face enterprises (or other economic agents, 
as the case may be). The conceptual couple of 1regulative1 versus 
1administrative1 planning, which is supposed to define the terrain 
of economic decision-making, actually precludes such an analysis, 
as Andrle 1s text makes clear, by denying the possible effectivity 
of 
of other modes 1state intervention1 which do not conform to the 
features of the 1pure ideal types 1 of the couple. Since the two 
parts of the conceptual couple are thought of as organising principles 
which define the 1 gravitational field' of economic decision making, 
forms of planning other than these two cannot be admitted without 
undermining the analysis. According to Andrle 1 s mode of analysis, 
within this field, decisions will either gravitate towards the 
regulative pole (market, catering for self- calculated individual 
interest) or the directive pole (administrative, catering for some 
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conception of the general interest). Howeve r, he doe s not rule 
out the feasibility of a sucoessful compromise, whereas followers 
of Granick (such as R.C. Stuart) tend to argue that one' or other 
'model' will tend to predominate, the 'winner' so far being the 
'fundamental model', analogous to Andrle's 'directive planningl. 
Andrle then analyses the relations between state enterprises 
and the higher organs of state economic planning and management 
in terms of the directive and regulative principles of control over 
the economy, but his close adherence to the empirical source s 
enables him neverthel.ess to make a series of useful points. The 
1965 Enterprise Statute did not provide for the legal enforcement 
of enterprise rights vis-a-vis the higher organs, a problem which 
IS exacerbated by the difficulty of distinguishing between a law 
and an administrative directive, which means that complaints 
against higher authorities' 'unlawful decisions' are rare. Reversal 
of higher decisions is more likely to be successful on the grounds 
that they were made on a.n lunscientific basis', that is, without 
due regard to, say, the calculated or reported productive capacity 
of the enterprise. There is no system of accounting whereby the 
damage caused to an enterprise by its higher organ can be assessed. 
Despite the pressures to interfere at enterprise level, it is in the 
interest of officials of the higher organ that the enterprises under their 
jurisdiction appear to work well. Relations with superior organs are 
likely to be better if the industry is high on the priority scale and 
thus gets scarce supplies, if there is a direct link between,the 
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enterprise and its ministry, if the primary production of the 
enterprise is central to the brief of the ministry, and if the 
higher organ has a broad scope and is wealthy. These latter 
points, of course, all relate to the problems of supply. Despite 
the importance of Gossnap (which is of the same order of 
importance as Gosplan), some of the Ministries have managed to 
or ganise their own supply offices. External control of the supply 
of raw materials and instruments of production is of course an 
important limitation on enterprises, but the partial ministerial 
control of supplies clearly enhances the Ministries' own autonomy 
In plan implementation vis-a-vis the central planning agencies such 
as Gosplan. With regard to financial autonomy of enterprises, 
Andrle makes the interesting point that the enterprise accountants 
are often better qualified than the Ministry of Finance inspector s. 
(This is in sharp contrast to the position in agriculture). The State 
Bank inspectors are probably more effective, and have a wider 
range of sanctions, 
20 
but Andrle makes the same point as Lavigne 
that extreLD.e financial sanctions against enterprises are exceptional. 
Some powerful enterprises even keep State Bank inspectors off the 
premises~ Finally Andrle makes the important point that "the 
structural circumstances of directive planning based on imperfect 
knowledge make mutual trust a scarce and highly valued commodity 
which can be obtained through, the exchange of personal favours 
extended at personal risks (sic), Thus there emerge cliques 
whose members use the resources to which they have access through 
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office for preferential treatment of each other's interests. Woe 
to the director who does not manage to develop personal bonds 
across institutional boundaries." Leaving aside criticisms of the 
use of the concepts of 'directive planning' and 'imperfect knowledge', 
Andrle is right to stress the importance of informal inter-personal 
relations, but apart from indicating that these are related to supply 
difficulties and success indicators, his analysis is of little help in 
analysing the determinants of the formation of these cliques. 
What Andrle does say, as I indicated above, is that factory 
managers do not have legal autonomy as regards the discharge of 
their managerial function: this is necessary if they are to be at 
all responsive to directives and campaigns. 
. \ 
Yet managers do 
enjoy a good measure of factual autonomy because operative mana-
gement cannot easily be supervised, and because it is recognised 
by all interested parties that in the last analysis it is the manager's 
pragmatic initiative that gives some recognisable results to the 
plans. "Since this autonomy is non-legal, a director has to secure 
immunity from law enforcement and party crusades, and conditions 
for continuous success, by striking personal bar gains with individual 
party and ministerial officials. Thus there emerge interlocking 
cliques whose members flexibly dispose of their respective bur.eau-
cratic powers to mutual advantage. It is through these cliques 
that plans - and political control over the productive process _ are 
administered and modified." Now it is not my intention to deny 
such 
that relations are political. On the contrary I would argue that 
• 
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not only can enterprises constitute arenas of struggle, but that, 
for example, enterprise - luinistry _relations can also constitute 
such arenas, with alliances being sought and formed •. However, 
the problem with An.drle's analysis is that the determinants of 
such political relations are. not really analysed beyond what 
has already been indicate~: with supply problems and pressure 
from 
to increase production superiors who cannot supervise:in detail, 
there is scope for informal alliance.$ which may be illegal, 
particularly when the legal autonomy of the enterprise is restricted. 
This is reminiscent 'of the traditional distinction in organisation 
theory between the formal organisational blueprint and the 
informal organisation which it generates. Yet usually in such 
analyses there is an attempt to specify the mechanisms by which 
the informal organisation is produced in tenus of the pressures 
or exigencies of the formal organisation, leading in this sort of 
analysis to such features as 'go·al displacement' or conflicts 
between 'bureaucrats' and 'profes sionals!. Apart from what has 
already been indicated, the only such organisational exigencies 
analysed by Andrle are those within the enterprise, not those 
between enterprises or between enterprises and other agencies. 
The effect of this is to make the formation of alliances to 
which Andrle refers a matter of the subjective decision of the 
managers themselves: it is a matter of role playing with the 
choice as to how to play the role being detenuined by the 'symbolic 
environment' and by melTIbership and reference groups, which help 
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to create their own symbolic environment or sul:culture and which 
may not fit in with the official or dominant culture. The four 
membership or reference groups to which Andrle refers are 
the narrow occupational group of plant directors, the wide r 
occupational group of economic managers, the specialist intelJtgen-
tsia. and the local power elites. The first two and the fourth 
are potential membership groups, while the third is a normative 
reference group, according to Andrle. The determinants of the 
formation of such groups are either cultural (such as a common 
educational background) or interactional, in this kind of analysis. 
These groups are formed as membership groups to the extent 
that they are self- conscious: consciou snes s is their main condition 
of existence. On the basis of the evidence, Andrle concludes 
that plant directors are a self-conscious group, the broader manageri-
al groL1jJ mayor may not be self- cons ciouq, the specialist inteLligent-
sia has become an important normative reference group (in forming 
the managerial self- image of a rational professional), and local 
power elites do indeed exist. The primacy of self-consciousness 
(partly determined by the 'symbolic environment' which mayor 
may not be reinforced by interpersonal interaction in these groups) 
is an important point when it come s to appraising Andrle 1 s concept 
of local power elite. Andrle argues in his 'Conclusion' that the 
local power elites are "concrete social formations which serve to 
integrate, and thus transcend, the two incipient structures of 
(market) class and (planning) officialdom. II This purports to be an 
• 
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improvement on Bauman's ax:gument (derived from Weber, which 
is why it is so readily compatible with Andrle I s own position) 
that "the Soviet social structure is based on two contradictory 
though coe~istent principles of surplus control - the plan and 
the market; it therefore consists of two contradictory though 
coexistent structures - the 'officialdom' which administers the 
'construction of communism' and the 'classes' which emerge from 
the operations of the market." Andrle argues that this theory 
doe s not offer any account of how the rival structure s of 
officialdom and market manage to coexist; positing a need - the 
need for the market by the planners - as the cause of the duality 
constitutes a functionalist answer to the question. The local power 
elites are offered by Andr1e as the concrete mechanism which integrates 
and thu s tran scend s the two structure s. 
Andrle does not seem to realise that this too is a functionalist 
answer to the question: in his position the regulative and directive 
principles are not two separate structures but define the range of 
variation of the elements of the actual planning structure. Since 
they are not readily compatible, these elements need to be reconciled 
somehow (as already mentioned he does not rule out the feasibility 
of a successful compromise), and this need is met by the local 
power elite, which is a self-concious group that reconciles the 
two kinds of elements, thereby enabling the system to continue 
functioning. This is the classical form of functionalist analysis: 
a structural need call~ forth an integrating structure which meets 
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that need, presumably. by operating through the 1 symbolic 
environment I on the consciousness of the actors in the system. 
One can only comment that Parsons constructed this kind of 
argument in a much more explicit and rigcrous manner. 
Despite the occasional reference to Parsons, Andrle's analysis 
is noticeably lacking in any detailed specification of the 
consciousness of the local power elites, nor does he specify 
the structural determinants which give them (as opposed to some 
other agency) their apparently pivotal role in sustaining enter-
prise autonomy while inte grating it with directive planning. 
Consequently one is forced to turn elsewhere for an analysis 
of the relations between enterprise s and other economic units. 
• 
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However, before doing so, it is worth mentioning that 
Andrle's analysis of relations within the enterprise is 
much more adequate in terms of its specification of the 
determinants of the kinds of struggles which take place 
there. While the principle of one-man management was 
reaffirmed in the September 1965 Enterprise Statute, there 
are a number of well-known formal and informal limitations 
on the capacities of enterprise directors. These 
limitations stem in various ways from the Party, the Trade 
Unions, labour legislation and the rank and file workforce. 
The Party attempts to retain political control over 
production by various means: mobilisation of the masses; 
and supervision by higher party organs, both of which tend 
to be formalistic and inadequate; Party Commissions and 
Commissi~ns of P~ople's Control, both of which make it hard 
for the rank and file to criticise superiors in ways which 
are not called for. However, there is effective Party 
control of recruitment and selection of managers, but 
in-service training seems to be very ineffective - indeed 
in municipal, light and food processing industries, managers 
seem to get by with no effort to raise their qualifications, 
which seems to be (at least nominally) a worse situation 
than in agriculture, where at least token attempts are 
made, as described by R.C. Stuart. The main form of Party 
control of enterprises is through the co-ordination of and 
arbitration between managerial interests: in re-allocating 
resources in ways not envisaged in the plans, and in 
arbitrating between managers, the Party retains some control 
over production. This political reconciliation of the 
disparate planned objectives is clearly important, but in 
my view precisely because it is not clear how or to what 
end these objectives should be reconciled, and because local 
• 
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Party officials are judged by their ability to help 
enterprises meet their plan, even this form of Rarty 
"supervision" of enterprise directors is limited in its 
effects. Andr~e reports that the secret~ries of enterprise 
Party organisations rarely fallout with the directors, even 
when the latter are criticised from above. Similarly, there 
are generally good relations between directors and the 
secretaries of regional and district Parties. 
The trade unions are in some respects quite a good 
defensive organisation (from the viewpoint of the manual 
workforce), although they can be lax on safety and legal 
standards, and the~ tend to take a softer line in the bigger 
enterprises. However, more than half the cases referred to 
the Commissions for Labour Disputes are won by workers. 
Similarly the labour legislation provides a reasonable 
defensive support, but that is not the same thing as 
participation in management. Only a few sacked employees 
seek redress in court when dismissed(but this could well be 
because they are genuinely in breach of factory discipline, 
which is poor). Of these who do go to court, more than 
half are reinstated . Of the 'agencies of mass participation', 
the Production Conferences, whose acts are judicial or 
quasi-judicial, do limit the directors' autonomy to some 
extent, but the Production-Technical Councils do not constitute 
a serious limit on one-man management. The poor discipline, 
poor motivation and high labour turnover are serious limits 
on the capacities of directors and can only be effectively 
countered by official and unofficial incentive schemes, for 
example, when management takes over the basically trade union 
function of allocating flats. There is little that is 
surprising in this picture painted by Andrle, but it is the 
kind of evidence which must be borne in mind in the analysis 
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of relations between economic agents. 
Production Associations and Ministries 
In a 'Post-script' written in November 1975 Andrle 
briefly describes the changes in industrial organisation 
which took plac~ starting at the beginning of 1973. Since 
there are further comments on these changes in Nove (1977) 
and Lavigne (1979), I propose to use these works as well. 
The original intention, as described by Andrle, was to set 
up a syptem in which the basic production unit would no 
longer be the industrial enterprise, but the 'production 
association"or 'union' (proizvodstvennoe ob'yedinenive) 
or 'combine' (kombinat). This was to consist of a number of 
factories plus a research and development institute or 
similar functional organisation. The 'centre' or 'top' of 
each state-management hierarchy was to be the sectoral 
ministry, as befo~e, but with the departments (glavki) 
abolished. The higher organ of the production association 
or union was to be an 'industrial association' or the 
ministry itself. The industrial associations were to work 
on a khozraschet basis but with strict centralised discipline 
in price formation. Thus, despite the organisational diversity 
to which Nove draws attention in his later analysis of these 
associations or unions, it was possible for Nove to divide 
them into production associations, and administrative 
associations. Nove pointed out that this new system could 
alter 'the distribution of economic power' between 
ministerial departments, managers and party officials and 
that the reform was being obstructed, delayed and resisted, 
so that the old system might survive. Although the transition 
to the new system was supposed to be completed by the end of 
1975, according to Andrle, Nove pointed out that little had 
changed by February 1976 when associations of all types 
produced less than one quarter of total industrial output. 
4 
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Among the various reasons given for the attempted introduction 
of this system (for example, administrative economies, 
economies of scale, shortening the hierarchical chain, 
and facilitat~ng technical progress) one is particularly 
striking to me: to wipe out the small enterprise. It seems 
that 'gigantomania' is not yet dead, and the benefits of 
small units in an economy with a changing technical division 
of labour and division of social production are not 
appreciated. 
This partial reform (which was only partially 
implemented) occurred in the context of 1965 Reform and its 
implementation. As is well known, the 1965 Reform attempted 
among other things to tackle the 'success indicator' problem, 
a problem which could be characterised as an effect of the 
dispari~y between planning on the basis of aggregated 
information and implementation on the basis of disaggregated 
information. The aggregated planning information is 
discursively distinct from the information necessary to 
operate an enterprise (or other sub-unit) of the agencies 
of plan implementation (the Ministries). Crudely, the 
disparity could be overcome by (a) laying down only a few 
targets whose pertinence to the operation of the sub-units 
is problematic but which allow substantial autonomy to the 
enterprises in calculating how to meet those targets (a 
procedure which may lead to the serious 'subversion' or 
failure of the overall economic plan) or (b) laying down a 
whole series of detailed targets or norms which ensure 
greater subordination of enterprises to the Ministries 
(a procedure which, since the detailed norms are likely to be 
mutually inconsistent and ambiguously related to the overall 
plan, usually leads to 'subversion' or failure by a different 
route). The danger is that if the first option is taken, 
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enterprises may meet targets in a way which ignores or even 
endangers other objectives of the overall plan which are not specified 
in the targets laid down, whereas if the second option is taken, the 
enterprises losethe very decision makimcapacity necessary to flexibly 
operate the plant under changing conditions, S) that some targets are 
met at the expense of what might for the time being be more irilportant 
targets in the priorities of the overall plan. The 1965 Reform attempted 
to re solve the problem of the most appropriate form of success 
indicators by redUCing the number of compul sory indicators. Ba sically , 
these were to be: output sold, total profits, profitability, contributions 
to and receipts from the state budget, the size of wages fund, norms 
establishing the size of centralised investment and the introduction of 
new productive capacity, the fulfilment of ba sic ta sks for the 
introduction of new techniques and supply of raw materials and 
21 
equipment. However, the Reform also attempted to retain 
Mini sterial control of the enterpri ses, despite the increa se in 
enterprise autonomy apparently implied in the reduction of the number of 
success indicators. 
The result of the reform wa s that the Mini.stries effectively won the 
struggle to retain a substantial degree of control over the enterprises. 
Lavigne (1979) traces the development of the reform between 1966 and 
1970 in terms of four headings: (a) a contradiction between law and 
fact (b) a contradiction between conservatism and the reform spirit 
(c) a contradiction between freedom of enterprise management and the 
maintenance of regulation (d) the paralysiS of the incentive system. 
Without recounting the details of her di scu ssion here, it is worth noting 
some of the points which she makes under the headings: (a) Ministries 
illegally changed the plan during the year, and imposed extra indicators 
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(especially the supposedly discarded index of gross output), 
but there was nowhere to arbitrate disputes between enterprises 
and Ministries. The State Bank and Investment Bank also 
behaved illegallY, for example, the former did not always 
release socio-cultural funds.(b} Enterprises which in the 
spirit of the reform proposed taut plans and mobilised 
reserves discovered after the first year that they were 
effectively being penalised for it. All enterprises were 
subjected to almost daily Ministerial interference in 
various ways (c) Ministerial regulation of enterprises 
reproduced the same old problems: for example, 
metallurgical factories delivered goods which dllinot 
conform to specifications, so making the appropriate metal 
inputs in the factory took up half the workers in mechanical 
construction! ( d ) 
\ 
Ministries took most of the profits, 
around 60-70 per cent. Workers received bonuses anyway, of 
around 8-10 per cent. Enterprise funds varied annually in a 
way which did not correspond to the efforts or results of 
enterprises. The 'material stimulants' (economic incentives) 
worked in such a way as to lead to pressure to increase 
expenditure on wages, but the bonuses themselves could not 
be spent in any very useful way, because of the way in which 
consumption is planned, so they were not a great incentive. 
Ministries controlled enterprise finances for investment and 
enterprise socio-cul tural funds I which were used for such purposes 
a s building recreational facilities. 
The partial reform of 1973-1975 must consequently be 
analysed in the context of this re-establishment of Ministerial 
capacity to regulate enterprise activitiesdespite the 1965 
enterprise reform. From 1970 the extra success indicators 
which had been imposed began to be imposed officially. The 
development of the 'production associations' and the so-called 
'industrial associations' (that is, administrative associations 
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within Ministries) must be seen as yet another attempt to 
enhance enterprise autonomy in relation to the Ministries, 
and the gathering of enterprises into associations was 
certainly oppo~ed by the Ministries, doubtless with the 
collusion of some of the enterprises protected by them. 
The enterprises were not supposed to be subordinated to 
their associations as they otherwise were to their Ministries. 
Rather there was supposed to be a division of labour, with 
the association centralising certain communal services while 
the enterprises had room for manoeuvre in daily management. 
However, with the development of a variety of forms of 
association, the industrial associations remained an 
administrative relay, federating juridically autonomous 
enterprises, while the production associations ran their 
componen~ e5tabl~shments in a variety of ways, even within 
the same Ministry, sometimes interfering in the plans of 
constituent enterprises. The net result, according to 
Lavigne, was that there was less enterprise autonomy in 
1977 than in 1965, despite the partial industrial 
restructuring from 1973 to 1975. 
This raises the issue of why the Ministries struggle to 
retain control of the enterprises, and the means by which 
they regularly succeed. In analysing this issue it may be 
possible to show what the determinants are of the informal 
connections mentioned by Nove and emphasised (at local 
level) by Andrle. Nove analyses the Ministerial system of 
plan implementation in terms of 'centralised pluralism', by 
which he means that the central decision-making of the 
planning agencies such as Gosplan, Gossnab and Gosstroi 1S 
modified by the disparate decisions taken by the Ministrjes, 
even though the latter are operating within state plans which 
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they must enforce on their subordinates. Nove argues 
(1977, page 63): "In practice the sheer volume of work 
and of decisions in Gosplan places very considerable powers 
in the hands ~f the ministries. They are more likely than 
the planning agencies to have information about the existing 
situation and future possibilities. Their proposals, and 
their reaction to proposals made by 'their' enterprises, 
affect the plans and instructions which they receive. 
Those with experience of these matters speak of a constant 
tug-of-war between the ministries and Gosplan". While this 
indicates that the Ministries are not simply passive 
instruments of plan implementation (a feature which would 
only surprise adherents of a rationalist conception of 
planning 22 ), Nove's concept of 'centralised pluralism' is 
couched in terms of empire-building by Ministerjal interest 
groups. However familiar this may appear as a 'motive' for 
certain kinds of action in large-scale organisations, Soviet 
Ministerial struggles with the planning agencies, with other 
Ministries and with 'their own' enterprises still need to be 
explained. The much-cited supply problem is certainly part 
of that explanation, but it is generally agreed that problems 
over supplies are also an effect of these struggles. Why 
have attempts to modify Ministerial control over enterprises 
failed? 
One answer to this problem,considered by W. Andrei f23, 
is that the Ministries (and secondarily, production 
associations) are 'autonomous centres of appropriation', 
that is, effectively private properties in the sense used 
by Bettelheim. 24 Ministries in this kind of argument would 
be like monopoly capitalist properties with subordinate 
production enterprises. However, Andr~f points out that 
such an argument, to be sustainable, would entail the 
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relegation of the central state agencies to the role of 
supporting the decentralised accumulation of capital, by 
collecting savings whichwerere-distributed to the monopolies, 
in a manner analogous to the role of the state in certain 
analyses of 'state monopoly capitalism'. Such an analogy 
would appear to be supported by the de-specialisation of 
Ministries, which do not restrict themselves to a single 
branch of industry, but appear ~o have moved into the 
production of more 'profitable' and highly demanded goods, 
such as consumer durables. However, Andre~f rejects such an 
analysis, even for Western economies, on the grounds that 
(a) it assimilates capitalist relations of production to 
property and distribution relations, which leads to the 
lack of an analysis of the foundations of the relations of 
production, wage-labour 
\ 
(b) there is no demonstration that 
production, including monopolist production, is production 
of surplus value (c) consequently, an ambiguous status is 
given to profit, which is not treated as transformed surplus-
value, and hence there is no study of that transformation. 
Even if one does not accept the labour theory of value, one 
must agree with Andreef that the capitalist nature of this 
'monopolism' is simply presumed or postUlated in such an 
argument, due to an inadequate theorisation of capitalist 
relations. In addition to Andreff's criticisms, one could 
add that it would be difficult in such a conception of 
Ministries as independent capitalist properties to explain 
their resistance to the development of production associations, 
since their development would simply be an indication of the 
concentration of capital: in the usual Marxist conceptions 
of capitalism, this would be quite compatible with the 
centralisation of capital in monopolistic properties 
controlling a series of large-scale production units. 
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Clearly the resistance of the Ministries to production 
associations and administrative associations is related to 
the latter's potential as an organisational mechanism for 
an alternativa mode of intervention in plan implementation 
by the central planning agencies. The development of such 
organisational alternatives by the central planning agencies 
would reduce their dependence on the Ministries for accounting 
information on past performance and would provide a certain 
flexibility in plan implementation, since it would be 
possible for certain purposes for the central planning 
agencies to by-pass the Ministries in laying down targets 
or norms, and enterprise autonomy from the Ministries would 
be enhanced to a certain extent. Precisely because the 
Ministries are not capitalist properties able to control a 
'de-centralised' series of production units by means of 
financial accounting procedures, Ministerial control of 
'their' enterprises must take the form of administrative 
regulation by setting detailed targets and norms. If such 
control is lost or reduced, Ministries would be in the 
position of being nonlinally responsible for the performance 
of a particular sector of the economy while losing some of 
the armoury of weapons which are used to secure 'adequate' 
performance of that sector: crudely, they would have 
responsibility without power. This approach to the reaction 
of Ministries to attempts to provide alternative or 
supplementary modes of intervention in the economy implies 
that it is precisely because they are effectively subordinated 
to the central planning agencies in certain respects that 
they evade or resist attempts at control or at by-passing 
of their functioning in other respects. It is the fact that 
they are effectively responsible for the performance of a 
certain sector in an uncertain supply situation that accounts 
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for the 'interference' in enterprise management, and for the 
Ministerial hoarding of supplies, while it is the combination 
of taut planning with inevitably inadequate indices of plan 
fulfilment which helps create the uncertain supply situation. 
To investigate this issue further, it is necessary to examine 
firstly the organisation of material-technical supply and 
secondly the forms of regulation of plan implementation. 
Material Technical Supply 
The problems of organising adequate supplies for 
production have in a sense increased as the most basic 
shortages have been overcome and the economy has diversified. 
Since 1965, the bulk of the supply of intermediate goods has 
been organised by Gossnab, the State Committee on Material 
Technical Supplies. Its decisions on the distribution of 
production goods are based on calculations by the 'material 
balance"method, ~ form of double entry table specifying 
needs and resources for items of output. The functioning 
of Gossnab itself exacerbates the supply problems related 
to taut planning (that is, planning based on full use of 
known production capacity). This is, according to Lavigne 
(1979), because it functions ponderously (with poor 
co-ordination between its various sub-agencies) and because 
of the incoherence and lack of precision in its supply plans 
(related to the difficulties of measuring 'adequate' plan 
fulfillment). Lavigne argues (1979, page 143) that the 
ponderous nature of the Gossnab system is related to the 
superimposition of two processes: the planning of supply 
and the concrete distribution of goods among users. However, 
it is not clear to me how the system would be improved by 
separating planning of supply from actual distribution. 
The two processes would still have to be co-ordjnated, and 
it is not clear how introducing yet another institutional 
boundary would improve that co-ordination. Rather it might 
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be argued that improved co-ordination and speed of 
implementation of supply plans within Gossnab would ease 
supply problems. Yet perhaps it is the current lack of 
co-ordination to which Lavigne is referring, since she 
points out that at the moment actual distribution is in 
the hands of over 280 juridical persons (such as Ministries, 
Federal Republics, the State Bank) which are the 'principal 
arrangers of supplies'. The incoherence is accentoated by 
this admixture of Ministries in the pr~cess of distribution: 
although they are only supposed to collect information on 
supply needs, aggregate it and present it to the central 
planning agencies(and later provide enterprises with papers 
authorising supply ~urchases), certain Ministries have 
preserved their own supply services, while others specialise 
in supplying particular products. The lack of precision 
wasincr~ased by'the 1965 reform which reduced the number 
of products covered by Gosplan's material balances from 
18,000 to around 2,000 (of which 277 have to approved by 
the Council of; Ministers). These features of the supply 
system - slowness, incoherence and lack of precision (in 
the specification of what is to be supplied) - generate a 
'seller's market' where supplies are the main condition of 
a sub-agency (such as a Ministry or enterprise) fulfilling 
the plan. The failures of the supply system in a planning 
system which prioritises physical production determine both 
the scope and the need for inter-enterprise arra~ements, 
and for other forms of politicking to secure supplies. 
These then are the conditions for Andrle's 'local power 
elites' and for Ministerial resistance to alternative modes 
of intervention in the economy, but these conditions can 
only be fully understood in terms of the forms of regulation 
of plan implementation which ensure that the priorities 
established by the central planning agencies and the upper 
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levels of the Party are indeed effective to some extent. 
The Regulation of Plan Implementation 
The problems of· central regulation of plan implementation 
are raised in ,Tartarin (1980).25 Tartarin is responsible for 
the final version of what is in many ways a groupeffort,26 
and the paper represents an attempt to escape from the 
formal oppositions and abstract dichotomies which characerise 
much work on the Soviet Union. For example, the oppositions 
between rationality and irrationality, plan and market, 
centralisation and decentralisation,27 official economy and 
parallel economy are common. It also attempts to avoid 
overall structural characterisations such as command 
economy, state capitalism or bureaucratic socialism, and 
concentrates instead on organisational forms and their mode 
of functioning, in a way which attempts to break with the 
idea of a unity or homogenous totality which many earlier 
analyses have retained. This seems to me to be an entirely 
laudable project, and a particularly promising one since the 
approach to the regulation of the economy is in terms of the 
modalities of measuring results without denying structural 
constraints delimiting individual behaviours (or, as I would 
prefer to put it, determining the capacities of action of 
agents). 
The regulation of the economy is conducted by the 
setting of norms for sub-agents within a sphere of 
supervisory competence of an agent. These norms (using the 
term in a broad sense) are of a variety of kinds: ratios, 
norms (normativy), standards, assortments, indices, scales, 
legal rules, instructions, organisational models to be 
followed, and so on. They relate to diverse domains, yet 
there is a strong unity between statistics, planning indices 
and accounting data, a unity which is ensured by their 
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subordination to planning objectives. There are various 
organisational means of ensuring this unity, but the effect 
of the unity is that accounting norms are the means of 
controlling the execution of the plan. Relations between 
agents consist of the exchange of orders or informEtion 
relating to the norms. The reconciliation of conflicts is 
achi~ved by the modification of norms. Reforms consist in 
the suppression of some norms and their replacement by other~ 
which are thought to lead to better behaviour by decentralised 
units (or, as I prefer to call them, sub-agents or sub-units). 
If an economy defines its functioning by a system of norms, 
this is not just a matter of relations between particular 
levels of the administrative hierarchy, nor of optimal. 
calculation. The increase in the number of norms in 1979 was 
not just about economic celculation, but about control. 
There a~e often too many norms for them all to be usable by 
a higher level for calculating purposes. 
Tartarin introduces the concept of 'accounting value' 
(valeur comptable) to refer to the abstract properties of the 
rules, and statistical and accounting practices, in so far as 
they serve as a basis for the functioning of Soviet type 
socialist economies. Norms establish external control over 
hierarchically organised units. In this sense, it is not 
like use-value or exchange-value, because of the subordination 
of units, the nature of the signals transmitted (norms and 
reports of their execution), and the unified direction which 
is supposed to define choices between production and consumption. 
There is a hierarchisation of units of decision-making and a 
'normalisation' of orders and controls. ('Control' is used 
here in the sense of supervision or inspection). What 1S 
produced is not commodities but items on a list. This requirffi 
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a classificatory system, a system of accounting and recording. 
Accounting values vary according to the characteristics and 
quantities of articles, but also according to the system of 
accounting and recording. (This statement implies a 
distinction between the real and the conceptual, a point to 
which I shall return). The attribution of accounting values 
to.items is by no means an automatic process. Calculation 
does not proceed by means of a universal equivalent, as in 
exchange value, or by direct reference to needs, as in 
use-value. Despite the impossibility of aggregating the 
norms into a unique significatory index, the norms are 
supposed to be the same at each hierarchical level and to 
be integrated betw~en the levels of the hierarchy. The 
concepts of use-value and exchange value are established ln 
Tartarin's paper by reference to the concepts of a domestic 
economy and a maIket economy, respectively, a point to which 
I shall return. The relations between agents in these 
economies are supposedly unitary in a domestic economy (the 
user is the producer) or binary in a market economy 
(enterprises as producers are distinct from consumers). In 
a socialist economy, they are ternary, with the Centre, 
enterprises and users being differentiated as agents. All 
administrative levels are 'provisionally' considered as 
merged with their summit,so the 'Centre' refers to 
administrative as opposed to productive or distribution 
agents. 
The relations between these agents are assymetric, with 
the Centre in a dominant position. The relation between 
enterprise and user is never direct, unless the Centre itself 
is the user: enterprise-user relations are mediated by 
Centre-enterprise relations. For the enterprises, norms are 
constraints which delimit the possible behaviour, since they 
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must produce accounting values corresponding to the imposed 
norms. So a part of total production is only produced as 
the real condition of producing accounting values. For the 
Centre, norms 'are obj ectives which must be respected by 
enterprises. However, these objectives concern both the 
results and the means of achieving them, so often accounting 
values are parameters. They are also to some degree use~v~lues 
for the Centre (for example, military production), while other 
norms are only a result of a choice by the Centre (for example, 
I 
fixed payments into certain funds). 
Norms are 'hierarchised' according to the priorities of 
the Centre: those ,which are use-values for the Centre have 
an essential role, and quality is easier to monitor by the 
Centre if the Centre is the consumer. There is no menns for 
the judgement of'the pertinence of norms, unless the Centre 
is the consumer. The influence of final consumers at best 
affects the fulfilment of planned indices of distribution 
enterprises, but this implies no effect on the producers 
unless the Centre decides to revise both the indices of 
distribution and those of production. 28 The Centre, in 
establishing norms, determines the demand of the population, 
which is paternalist and imprecise. Paternalist, because it 
depends on the sensitivity of the Centre to the well-being 
of the population, or on the importance of this well-being 
for the Centre's own objectives. Imprecise, because these 
norms are of lower priority than the Centre's own objectives, 
and because numerous characteristics of consumption articles 
are not registered by the norms. This leads to a seller's 
market, to disequilibria and so on. The commodity distribution 
of consumption goods is 'beside the point' in a system of 
management by norms of production. The system of accounting 
value requires the 'normalisation' of consumption to ensure 
165. 
the coherence of the relation between production and 
consumption. The reserved shops, the privileges related to 
function, the access to goods on the basis of place of work, 
features which are often considered as accessory or contingent 
traits of distribution, mark in reality the permanence of 
accounting forms of rationing, if not their pre-eminence over 
commodity forms, in Tartarin's view. Significantly, the 
socially differentiated criteria of rationing have more 
importance in the formation of the revenues of individuals 
if the latter are closer to the Centre and to political power. 
Use-values for the Centre comprise both state consumption and 
the private consumption of members of the apparatus. 
Apart from the satisfaction of the use-values of the 
Centre, results are measured by norms (on paper). The 
conformity with norms is not absolute; it depends on the 
quality of inspections used by the supervisory agents 
(organes de tutelle). These inspections are rare, superficial 
and conducted by services of little compe~ence whose interests 
are not independent of the 'decentralised units' and whose 
sanctions are excessively weak. There is a large margin of 
interpretation of norm fulfilment even without fortuitous 
error and deliberate fraud. This process of inspection occurs 
at each level of the hierarchy for information going 'up' and 
'down' . So in addition to accounting in terms of planned 
tasks by an accounting chief, there is economic accounting 
for internal goals by an economic chief. But the latter is 
effectively a palliative since the accounting validation of 
task performance leads to a formal execution of tasks, a form 
which admits of a certain play in relation to reality. The 
outcome of attempts to overcome this play is a perpetual 
oscillation between a paralysing overcentralisation for both 
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the controlled and the controller, and a reduction on controls 
destined to give enough room for manoeuvre for the controlled 
and an effective focus for the controller on the really high 
priority objectives. The cyclical movement is an effect of 
the universal character of any modification which leads to a 
different bias, to different organisational costs and so on. 
It is not just an effect of the limits of language: the 
interdependence of high~r and lower levels leads to negotiations 
and informal conflicts over the fixing of tasks and their 
evaluation and over the reciprocal rules which superiors and 
subordinates should respect. 
such as mutual exoneration. 29 
This leads to informal solutions 
Autonomy also occurs when norms which are interdependent 
in ways unknown to the Centre are fixed in a mutually 
contradictory fashion, imposing partially unrealisable 
results. (It is at this point that a manager might claim, as 
Andrle indicates, that a plan is 'unscientific'). The more 
the network of norms attempts to be comprehensive, the more 
the superiors must tolerate (partial and local) violations. 
Periodic reforms of indices clarify and reaffirm the 
fundamental criteria of the actions of decentralised units. 
Contrary to some arguments, the enterprise is not the real 
foundation of the plan which is imposed upon it; rather the 
norms 'concretise' a relation of subordination. (Nove, 1977, 
also mentions the argument that 'orders are made by those who 
receive them' because he considers there is a grain of truth 
in it). The norms are the result of negotiations by the 
forces present, but they are a process of adjustment of 
superior and inferior agents. In the last resort they are 
imposed by the Centre, but this does not signify that the 
Centre decides in a completely independent way, or that the 
Centre disposes of the organisational and informational 
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capacities to fix the levels as a consequence of choosing the 
best variant in relation to clearly enunciated objectives. 
The norms coming from above coexist with 'metanorms' which 
are a redefinition of the injunctions as an effect of practical 
necessities. In their turn, these 'metanorms' directly 
influence the information transmitted by the decentralised 
units and the c·onflicts between levels aim particularly at 
reducing the gaps between the norms, imposed externally, and 
the 'metanorms', which are historical products of the 
'endogenisation' of past norms. 
These leads to a circular causality in which the norms 
lead to an artific~al reality created to satisfy the 
fulfilment of norms: it has a conservative effect because 
the sole guarantee of the coherence of norms is past reality. 
This is ~he esse~tial justification for planning from the 
level achieved. On the other hand, it also explains the 
downward revision of plans on the basis of actual performance, 
as a way of obtaining 100 per cent plan fulfilment. 3D The 
formal and informal Espects of 'accounting value' are thus 
intrinsically related. There is not a 'second' economy, but 
a series of economic activities at each level between which 
(activities) the law traces the limit of the legal and the 
illegal, the permitted and the forbidden. But for various 
reasons, the disjunction between these aspects cannot be 
retained because of the ideology of accounting value where 
the real is retraced as a series of gaps in relation to the 
norms. The legality to be set in motion is incoherent and 
practically inapplicable. Almost all economic activity 
necessarily entails an infraction, so the execution of orders 
can only be illegal. This is scarcely surprising: incoherence 
and lack of precision mean that legality gives way to 
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arbitrariness, or rather to the sovereignty of the superior 
level which goes with all administrative subordination. 
Since each level is not a passive agent in the hands of the 
superior level, objectives are pursued which are added on to 
the goals whose execution the system of norms is supposed to 
ensure. The importance of these individual objectives is 
all the greater since the organisation considers itself 
impersonal and only the Centre is supposed to know which 
objectives need to be sought. 
At each level, not just the Centre, use-values are 
pursued. The possibility of this is due to (a) the existence 
of particular pref~rences among the agents concerned 
(b) the impossibility of the superior level to control all 
their actions (c) the eventual incoherence of the norms 
imposed, (d) the, disposition of means of action permitting 
not only the execution of norms but other uses. Concerning 
the last point, it is clear that the 6tatisation of the 
means of production which is a condition of existence of the 
system of value accounting does not establish a social 
property or a unique collective property, but rather a series 
of enclosed 'privative' powers which are divided according to 
the variable modalities of use, 'fruitfulness' and abuse. 
That the superior level can impose its conceptions if it 
wishes to does not exclude the fact that the lower level also 
disposes of a large autonomy from the moment when it is in 
possession of particular assets. 50 each agent arbitrates 
permanently between the ensemble of possibilities of action 
open to it, taking account of the use-values which it searches 
for, the system of norms to which it is subjected, and the 
means (material or otherwise) which have been delegated to it. 
The real functioning of the system of accounting value is 
thus defined by the interaction of real decisions of agents 
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and not by the production of accounting values which define 
31 
only what has value for the Centre. The system produces 
specific effects of opacity in so far as it permits the 
Centre to dissimulate its own use-values, (yet) not to 
discount either 'negative' phenomena or the real activities 
of agents according to dimensions which are essential for 
them (the agents). 
This gap between reality and 'normativity' is not 
constant. If the Centre tries to reduce it, the adaptive 
behaviours of all levels, taking account of the relative 
stability of the system of norms, tend to augment it. When 
a new system of norms is set up, it takes a certain time for 
agents to discover all the potentialities of autonomy which 
it conceals. It also requires a certain time for the necessary 
compromises to be reached with superior levels, to regulate' 
litiginous interpretations, and to establish the exact 
significance of diverse measures. The efficiency of a new 
system relates less to its specific content and more to its 
novelty in so far as it authorises a readjustment and 
clarification of all the controls, benefits which disappear 
little by little in the long term. In so far as deviations 
are recorded at the Centre, ad ho~ norms are introduced. 
This 'rampant centralisation' is accompanied by a progressive 
jumbling of commands which presses little by little towards 
a new general reform. 
The specific character of crises in Soviet type economies 
is thus related to accounting value. With exchange-value, 
there is a crisis of overproduction. With accounting value, 
there is an a priori valorisation of 'normed' tasks, and 
workers are paid for a rate of success of over 100 per cent. 
Products do not exchange against products or money, but at 
hpc::+ ("'/it.h Fl rnhpT'pnt. nllt.cnme) the rates of realisation of 
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Inorms condition each other, the reciprocal accomplishment of 
tasks being the condition of realisation of the plan. But it 
is a formal accomplishment, even though the neglected 
characteristics are essential for the fulfilment of tasks by 
other units. If the latter have enough autonomy, they can 
still present satisfactory indices of success. There is a 
systematic over-valuing of real results in the reported and 
~ompiled numbers. This is evident in the a priori valorisation 
of all results 'exceeding the imposed norms, in the tendency 
(if norms are not fulfilled) to redefine the expected result 
starting from the achieved result, and in the independence of 
the calculation of the rates of realisation of norms from the 
final effect (fina~ consumption). 
At the limit a decline in production may not be translated 
into a decline in indices. Is it possible to say a crisis 
does not exist? No, but in the forms adequate to accounting 
value, the crisis dissimulated by the stability of the 
indices develops slowly as a progressive paralysis. Units 
have greater and greater difficulty in getting the real means 
necessary to their functioning. When the indices do register 
a halt in growth and then a reduction, the Centre only reacts 
when the physical indices decline and the use-values of the 
Centre are directly threatened. But the crisis concerns all 
levels of the hierarchy in the same way. However, from the 
viewpoint of the Centre the crisis is probably worse than 
the accounting data let it suppose. For the rest of society, 
the greater the possibilities of substitution between activities 
entering into accounting value and those not entering, the 
more the effects of the crisis can be limited. 32 In attempting 
to resolve the crisis once it is revealed by the accounting 
values despite the specific dissimulation which they engender, 
the Centre has the choice of abandoning or reinforcing the 
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rules which constitute the system. Solutions are conceived of 
either as a partial or total abandoning of the system of norms 
or as a profound reorganisation of the system (to reinforce 
their effectiveness). 
The decree of July 1979 is an example of the latter kind 
of solution - a return to directive methods, reinforcing 
massively the oontrol of execution, in seeking to eliminate 
the reducible incoherences. It shows that the way followed 
by the authorities, despite its intrinsic faults, is that of 
the amelioration of the system of norms in a way which increases 
the ability to foresee the results and increases the conformity 
of the results (with the plans). It confirms, just in the 
crisis, the importance of this system with respect to the 
fundamental structure of Soviet type economies. 
Leaving aside an appraisal of the 1979 reform for the 
moment, there are several comments which I should like to 
make on this interesting paper by Tartarin. It is not clear 
to me why the terminology of 'accounting value' is used to 
analyse these relations. It seems to be so that a type of 
economy can be treated as a system based on a particular 
principle which organises economic relations within the 
system: a domestic economy is a system based on use-value, a 
market economy is based on exchange value and a Soviet type 
planned economy is based on accounting value. A comparative 
table of the features of these systems is presented in the 
paper, presumably dealing with what are thought to be the 
most salient features of economic systems. Does this mean 
that all economies have to be conceived in terms of the 
predominance or fundamental role played by a particular kind 
of value? Earlier in this chapter I have argued against 
conceiving of structures in terms of principles which are 
thought to organise them, but even if one accepted such an 
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essentialist conception of value, what is distinct about 
accounting value? This may seem a strange question after a 
lengthy exposition of a paper devoted to answering precisely 
that question, but consider the two other concepts of value, 
which are clearly derived from Marxist discourse. 'Exchange 
value refers to a common substance which is the precondition 
of exchange and whose presence in the commodities enables the 
ratio in which they exchange to be calculated: abstiact labour, 
measured in terms of socially necessary labour-time.' Use-value 
refers to the known physical properties of a product (or the 
physical nature of a service) and to the demand or need for 
it. Use-values exist (for Marx) where there is no commodity 
exchange, but they ~lso exist where there is commodity 
exchange: without a use-value, a product has no value. 
According to Tartarin, they also exist where there is accounting 
value, b~t what is the difference between use-value and 
accounting value? In both cases there is conceptualisation 
of the physical properties of the product (or service) and a 
calculation of the need or demand for it. The means of 
calculation of need or demand of course vary - for example, 
they differ between non-commodity and commodity production, 
according to most Marxist analyses. For Tartarin, use-values 
are calculated in kind, and exchange-values are calculated in 
terms of money, the universal equivalemt. But of course 
consumers and enterprises in capitalist societies calculate 
needs or wants, even if they do so partly in monetary terms, 
and the calculation of these needs or wants depends on how 
they are conceptualised. For example, capitalist enterprises 
for Marx will calculate the use-value of means of production 
in terms of their effect on the rate of profit. The 
conceptualisation of needs or wants varies even between 
'pre-capitalist' non-monetary economies, and the problem of 
how to analyse the different forms of calculating needs or 
, 
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wants in different 'pre-capitalist' economies is not helped 
much by saying that the calculation is in kind (en nature). 
Ecological or kinship considerations, for example, can be 
'in kind' in the sense that they enter into non-monetary 
economic calculations, but these considerations can be 
conceptualised in radically diverse ways. The calculation 
of needs is determined by the means of calculation socially 
available and by the organisational exigencies of production 
and consumption (intermediate and final). 
Tartarin's concept of 'domestic economy', like many 
conceptions of the 'natural economy',avoids the problem of 
the potential varieties of ways of calculating needs or wants, 
by treating this form of calculation as a natural quality or 
attribute of the single agent in the fictional 'domestic 
\ 
economy' : an agent who can calculate the relation of 
production to consumption because they are both co-present in 
the household, and can be directly experienced. The concept 
of use-value for Tartarin refers tofue experienced needs or 
wants of individuals. Tartarin ignores the treatment by 
Marx of the calculation of use-values in a market-economy 
(for example, the use-value of the commodity labour-power 
to the capitalist), and deals with them in a Soviet type 
economy in terms of individuals calculating in kind, although 
the relation between production and consumption is not directly 
experienced by them. The individuals experience these needs 
or wants without being able to relate them to production or 
the plan, and simply use resources for the satisfaction of 
these needs where the range of autonomy available to them 
allows scope for such non-planned useS. The only exception 
to this treatment of use-values is the discussion of use-values 
such as military equipment for the Centre. Here the Centre is 
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treated as a supra-individual economic agent able to calculate 
its own needs. 
However, the Centre is for the most part treated as a 
series of ind~vidual agents engaged in administration who 
informally pursue their own needs or wants. In the latter 
case it is possible to retain the concept of use-value as 
defined in terms of directly experienced needs, but it is not 
possible to retain such a concept where a supra-individual 
a gent is conc ern ed (unless one is go ing to posi t someth ing 
akin to a group mind). The ambiguity in the use of the term 
'Centre' (both a series of individuals not engaged in 
production or distribution and the summit of the administrative 
. 
hierarchy)prevents this difficulty with the treatment of the 
concept of use-value from becoming too readily apparent. 
However, the Centre in the second sense, the summit which 
regulates the relation between production and consumption and 
which has a use for military equipment, can only calculate 
its needs in terms of norms. 'Accounting value' is the means 
by which a particular kind of agent (or series of supra-
individual agents at the Centre) calculates its own needs 
and the needs of the overall economy. 
To say that this differs from the use-values of 
individuals is only to say that different agents have different 
means and criteria of calculating use-values. If the concept 
of use-value is to be retained (as opposed to some other 
theoretical approach to the conceptualisation of needs and 
wants, such as marginal utility) then the idea that use-value 
is related to 'direct experience' must be questioned. One 
could do so, as already indicated, by pointing to the 
variability of non-monetary forms of calculating need, or by 
pointing to the use of monetary categories in calculating 
intermediate consumption by capitalist enterprises. 
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Alternatively, one could question the epistemological 
character of the notion of 'direct experience', but this line 
of criticism will not be pursued here. If such criticisms 
are accepted, ~hen the distinction between 'accounting value' 
and luse-value' is impossible to sustain, because any 
calculation of needs involves the use of concepts, and in an 
economy with an advanced division of labour giving rise to 
both human and non-human agents (loci of decision-making and 
loci of means of action), the calculation of needs will not 
be conducted by a single means. A variety of forms of 
discourse will necessarily be used by different agents, and 
discursive forms of regulation and co-ordination of the 
. 
activities of these diverse agents need not be identical to 
the forms of discourse used for internal purposes within 
such agents. 33 Nor can there be a single form of regUlation 
of the various agents, precisely because of the varying 
relations of the agents to the overall plan. The same agent 
will simultaneously have a variety of relations to the 
objectives of the plan, even if these objectives are consistent 
with each other. Much of the value of Tartarin's paper consists 
in its drawing attention, not to the problems of 'accounting 
value', but to problems of regulating the economy in any 
conceivable form of socialist planning. The discursive 
incommensurability between, on the one hand, the means by 
which agents calculate their own objectives and regulate their 
own practices more or less according to these objectives and, 
on the other hand, the means by which various relations between 
agents are handled is a disjunction which is endemic in any 
advanced (and changing) division of labour, whether capitalist 
or socialist. 
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Economic Calculation and Central Planning 
Whereas the rationalist conception of planning implies 
a single means of calculation, for example in te~ms of 'time' 
in many conceptions of socialism, the position just outlined 
by way of a critique of Tartarin's concept of use-value implies 
a variety of means of calculation, each with its own conditions 
and effects. The calculation of needs or wants (or, if this 
terminology is preferred, of socially useful effects) must 
take account of the needs of the agencies which implement the 
planned objectives, that is, various administrative exigencies 
and exigencies of production and distribution (including 
intermediate or 'productive' consumption). Even within, say, 
a productive enterprise, these needs are not directly 
experienced, so it .is impossible to counterpose the 'real' 
characteristics of production against their measurement in 
terms of norms or indices. The 'real' characteristics of a 
mechanical spare'part are defined in terms of engineering 
discourse which specifies those characteristics by means of 
concepts and measurements within certain ranges of tolerance. 
The latter are no less parameters than the parameters of 
performance specified for a productive enterprise by another 
agency. It is for this reason that discursive disjunctions 
rather than a real/conceptual disjunction has been stressed 
at various points in this chapter. 
The collapse of the real/conceptual distinction (which is 
related to the conceptualisation of use-value in terms of 
experience) may appear to undermine much of the force of 
Tartarin's critique of the use of norms. in Soviet type 
economies. However, problems such as the non-registration 
of salient characteristics of products by the centrally 
determined norms, or the development of 'metanorms' {which do 
not provide means of adjudication between norms in Tartarin's 
analysis, but are the results of the redefinition of the norms 
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in terms of 'practical necessities') can be explained in terms 
of the different discourses operative in the various arenas of 
plan construction and implementation. The decision that 
certain characteristics not registered by the norms are 
salient, or that certain 'practical necessities' must be taken 
into account, can only be made in terms of an alternative mode 
of calculating. Such alternative calculations could either be 
made by agencies other than the ones which established the 
official norm, or they could in principle be made by the same' 
agencies. The official deployment of alternative modes of 
calculation would certainly make possible a greater disjunction 
between monitoring and regulating the performance of the 
economy on the one,hand and the provision of economic 
incentives to sub-~gents on the other hand, which could ease 
the 'success indicator' problem as analysed by Nove, Lavigne 
or Tartarin. It'would certainly make it easier to estimate 
the extent to which the 'official' regulating measures were 
effective. For example, to take Tartarin's analysis of 
economic crisis in such economies as a form of creeping 
paralysis which takes time to register on official norms 
because of practices designed to conceal non-fulfilment or 
'formal' fulfilment of the plan, such a crisis could in 
principle be registered earlier by other means of measuring 
performance. This is not a case of the real imposing itself 
on the theoretical, but of the deployment of means of 
calculating the effectiveness of measures to regulate the 
implementation of economic plans. A good example of this 
be found in Seurot (1980).34 Seurot shows that by using 
can 
an 
alternative measure of productivity (a measure, as he is aware, 
with problems of its own) rather than the official index of 
productivity, a much lower rate of growth of productivity is 
registered, and for the 1970s it is lower than the rate of 
growth of average monthly wages. The divergence is particularly 
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acute in the years 1978 and 1979, at the end of the five year 
plan period, which is when most of the five year plan is 
usually fulfilled. The official index shows productivity 
rising faster than wages for these two years, although it does 
show ~creeping paralysis' and non-fulfilment of the plan. The 
decision that all is not well or that there is a crisis is 
possible on the basis of both the official and unofficial 
measures, although the problem of stagnating productivity seems 
more acute on the unofficial index. The decision that a 
particular measure is inadequate can only be made by a critique 
of the way the measure is constructed which determines its 
mode of calculation of the effects which it registers. Such 
a critique is more ,readily mounted and accepted if alternative 
modes of calculation are also available and are deployed. The 
measurement problems involved in regulating the economy are 
not a matter of the inadequacy of the conceptual to the real, 
but of the disjunction or dislocations between the various 
discourses which are inevitably present in an economy with an 
advanced division of labour. 
To say that such problems are inevitable is not to say 
that Soviet indices or norms are adequate or acceptable. 
Most of the work cited in this chapter implies a criticism 
of them in one way or another. In addition, even if many of 
these problems were minimised, the problems of regulating the 
Soviet economy are not merely discursive, but political. The 
implementation of plans is not a matter of neutral instruments 
realising ideas, as the earlier remarks treating intermediate 
consumption as needs in their own right have already indicated. 
The means of action, of plan implementation, clearly have their 
own effectivity. As mentioned earlier, this is related not 
only to the discourses deployed by them but also to their own 
organisational exigencies. Relations between agencies of plan 
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construction and plan implementation, and between various 
kinds of agencies within each category (for example, between 
Ministries, production associations and enterprises - all 
agencies of implementation) constitute arenas of struggle. 
The outcomes of these struggles determine the capacities of 
the various agencies for the time being - hence the diversity 
of relations betwEen production associations and enterprises 
even within the same Ministry, as mentioned by Lavigne. The 
fact that the struggles by the agencies of implementation take 
place over reporting productive capacity, reporting results of 
the last plan period, and over supplies indicates their 
effective subordination (despite their struggles) to the 
central agencies of plan construction which construct plans in 
a very 'productionist' manner, using material balances. 35 Thus 
both the means of economic' calculation and the related struggles 
are conditions of the capacities of the various agents. This 
is important in appraising the 'norms' established, since 
otherwise there is a danger of treating them in a manrier 
similar to many kinds of sociological theory which sees them 
as an effect of a Vcentral value system' (to use Parsons' 
phrase). This sort of theory implies a unified centre with 
norms as a neutral means of realising its aims; failure by 
subjects to conform to the norms amounts to 'deviance'. At 
times Tartarin approximates to this position, with the informal 
individual pursuit of use-values being the 'deviance' in his 
analysis. 36 Yet Tartarin also begins to show how such action 
is an effect of inconsistent norms, and argues that the 
distinction between formal and informal cannot be sustained 
even by the higher level agencies of implementation - hence the 
mutual exoneration, of superiors and subordinates. The analysis 
of the relations between the various economic agents in terms 
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of arenas of struggle takes one further away from the 
traditional sociological account which treats social structure 
in terms of norms and treats actors in terms of conformity to 
or deviance from the norms. 
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Tartarin is right to say that the problems of regulation 
of the economy do not only stern from language, but are problems 
of relations of superiors and subordinates. Unfortunately, his 
treatment of 'the Centre' either as a single unit or as a series 
of individuals leads him to ignore the problems of the political 
relations between agencies at 'the Centre'. The potential and 
, 
actual arenas of struggle constituted by relations between Gosplan, 
Gossnab, the other State Committees, the Council of Ministers, 
the individual Ministries and so on mean that 'the Centre' cannot 
be treated as a unity laying down norms: its non-unity is precisely 
the source of some of the incoherence in the phns. However, 
the discursive sources of plan incoherence must also be taken 
seriously: To say'that commodity relations do not 'fit in' with 
the regulation of the economy by means of norms is somewhat 
mi sleading. In the presence of commodity relations, some of the 
norms must be specified in monetary terms. The problems of 
final consumption are not nece s sarily the effect of planning by 
norms, or if they are then the prospects for the socialist planning of 
final consumption are poor indeed. As I have tried to indicate, 
many of the problems of retail distribution stern from its low 
priority, poor organisation, inadequate resources, and the form 
(not the fact) of intervention by the central planning agencies. 
It is the form of planning which prioritises production and which 
does not adeq1ately coordinate monetary policy with material 
balance calculations that generates many of the problems of final 
consumption. No serious attempt has been made to plan from 
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" d f" 1 "37 a proJecte Ina consumpbon, but in the broad sense used 
by Tartarin this would still entail the use of norms of consump-
tion. Before I am accused of paternalism, let me ask what the 
alternative is: it is not 'consumer sovereignty', since even In 
the West demand is partly generated by the placing of new 
products on the ma"rket, that is, by supply. There was no 
market for products using the microchip until such products 
were launched. Capitalist firms have to establish production 
norms, particularly for new products, although of course they 
are on the whole m,ich more flexible than Soviet enterprises in 
responding to changes· in demand. However, ar guing for flexible 
norms is not the same as arguing for their abolition. 
\ 
In addition, 
norms of consumption have to be established (however democratic 
or otherwise the process of establishment) for sOClal consumption 
in the form of social security, health care, education, and certain 
kinds of leisure. Finally, there have to be norms fur intermediate 
consumption to define criteria of 'disproportionate' use of resources 
in this manner. Much of Tartarin's critique of norms refers to 
rigid norms, established centnally (although as Nove, 1977, points 
out, some norms must be centrally determined), and which give 
primacy to production. One cannot object to these criticisms, 
but norms per se will only disappear in the utopian world here 
socialist planning is conducted with reference to the directly 
experienced needs of the freely as sociated producers. 
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If forms of regulation of the capacities and activities of 
agents are inevitable for their effective coordination in implement-
ing a plan, this is not to say that such norms need be rigid. 
~ 
Flexible norms, however, require flexible forms of organisation 
and the co- existence of alternative means of calculation of, say, 
productivity, to facilitate the monitoring of the effectiveness of 
particular forms of regulation. The effectiveness of a particular 
form of regulation can never be taken for granted precisely 
because of the struggles for autonomy by sub-agents whose 
performance is being monitored. 
The 19 79 Reform 
Considering the 1979 reform in the light of the above 
remarks, it must be seen as an attempt to improve both planning 
and the regulation of the economy by increasing the number of 
calculations conducted by the central planning agencies, by 
reorganising the system of norms, and by reinforcing the control 
of plan implementation. If Tartariri's analysis were correct, 
the benefits 01 this reform, like others; will disappear little by 
little in the long run, but in my view the norms used are not 
neutral. Tp.ey affect the capacities of sub-agents and thus the 
scope for evasion of supervision and regulation. This is precisely 
why reforms are resisted by some agents, such as the Ministries. 
The ability of sub-agents to evade regulation depends partly on the 
form of regulation. The simultaneous deployment by the central 
planning agencies of alternative modes of supervision (ac counting 
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indices) would certainly enhance their capacity to regulate the 
plan implementation,and help combat the progressive dissipation 
of effective regulation. However, as Tartarin points out, each 
form of calculation has its organisational costs and this limits 
the capacity of the planning .agencies in this respect. This 
limitation is exacerbated by the chronic delays in deploying 
computer capacity. The reinforcement of control over implementa-
tion following the July 1979 reform has, according to Tartarin, led 
some economists to renounce the distinction between administrative 
management and economic management, but such a position implies 
that administrative regulation of the production and distribution 
agencies will be wholly effective. Certainly, the reform seems to 
aim at such control of enterprises, effectively attempting to over-
coming the successful resistance in the 1970s by Ministries to 
attemp1s to make enterprises more responsive to central objectives 
(as opposed to Ministerial ones). 
The law of 10th November, 1978 could be seen perhaps as 
a precursor of the July 1979 reform. The 1978 law concer:qed the 
Council of Ministers and reinforced the coordinating role of the 
first vice-presidents and the vice-presidents of the Council of 
Mini3ters, to whom are attributed the control of the Ministries. 
The law also insisted on the role of Gosplan and the need to 
or ganise the administration of groups of homogenous branche s. 
According to Lavigne (1979, page 44) this is one of the three 
ways used to try to control the Ministries from above, from below 
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and from inside. We have already seen that attempts to control 
Ministrie s from below using production associations and industrial 
associations as intermediaries between enterprises and Ministries 
ran into trouble. In 1976 the completion of this restructuring, 
supposed to be accomplished by 1975, was put back to 1980. The 
control of Ministries from inside has been attempted by putting 
some of them on khozraschet, but this has raised the prospect 
of the los s of control of investment by the central authorities. 
The July 1979 decree attempted to amalgamate these forms of 
control. In the first place, the predominance of Gosplan over 
the Ministries was confirmed through closer supervision of 
their plan preparation and of their management of their enterprises: 
. \ 
plans cannot now be lowered during the year in order to make 
plan fulfilment appear better. In the second place, the completion 
of the restructuring of industry in terms 01 production associations 
has been retained as an aim to be achieved Ilin two or three years ll 
that is by 1982, or later. In the third place, the use of khozraschet 
is to be extended among Ministries from 1981,11 in so far as 
Ministries are prepared for it. II 
This reform of the position of Ministries, which are sectoral 
agencies of plan implementation, has been supplemented by enhanc~d 
territorial regulation of plan implementation, although the latter is 
still subordinated to the central plan. The powers of loca 1 Soviets 
have been enhanced, sectoral Ministry plans must be broken down 
by territorial divisions and examined jointly with the republican 
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Councils of Ministers,. and the 'terri torial production cOlTIplexes' 
of Siberia and the Far East lTIust be planned in an integrated way, 
regardless of the adlTIinistrative attachlTIent of the activities 
planned (Lavigne, 1979, page 57). Consequently, the reforlTI 
places a lot ot weight on. the central planning agencies, tl:at is, 
the eighteen State COlTIn?-ittees, the State Bank and the Central 
Statistical AdlTIinistration. The lTIost ilTIportant si~gle State 
COlTIlTIittee is Gosplan, particularly since the July 1979 decree. 
The application of the lTIeasures envisaged by the decree are 
its responsibility. However, Lavigne (1979, page 58) points out 
that this gain in authority is not accolTIpanied by a reinforcing 
of its powers. Gosplan cannot give orders, either to the Ministries 
nor to other functional adlTIinistrations (which I call central 
planning agencies) notably Gossnab which has so often held Gosplan 
in check Gosplan is thus in a situation of being responsible for 
failure without necessarily being credited with success. 
The effect of the reforlTI at enterprise level has been to 
lilTIit its autonomy Iwhile increasing the technological autonolTIY of 
the workshop or brigade, "in a distinctly productivist vision." 
(Lavigne, 1979, page 78). The 1979 reforlTI has also given a 
certain degree of organisational autonolTIY to brigades, follo~ing 
on the Shchekino and more especially the Zlobin experilTIents. The 
Zlobin lTIethod is silTIple the brigade voluntarily undertakes to 
cOlTIplete its target at a certain date before the officialfy planned 
date, with a higher quality of worklTIanship and without any 
187. 
increased costs. The administration of (in this case) the 
building site contracts to supply the brigade, according to the 
plan of work, with all the necessary materials. The brigade 
gets a bonus of up to 40 per cent of wages when the work is 
completed (Lavigne, 1979, page 105). The 1979 decree has tried 
to improve productivity in this way by giving workers gre,ater 
control of the production process, and also by insisting on the 
demand for consumption, notably for new products and for better 
quality. The enterprise as a whole, however, is subordinated 
to a plan defined stric;:tly in terms of physical units. The 
enterprise, or production association or kombinat, will function 
from 1981 on the basis of a five year plan, broken down annually. 
Its participation in plan construction will be limited. The Ministries 
themselves will have to operate on the basis of the control figures 
of Gosplan to preseyttheir own plan proposals, and it will be 
difficult for enterprises or Ministries to hide reserves, since 
each enterprise will be on file, having a 'passport' giving the 
details of the state of its productive capacity, its use, and a 
certain amount of technical- economic data. The effectiveness of 
the passport is related to the industrial restructuring, since the 
passports will only be operational when all enterprises are in 
production as sociations. 
The five year plans will operate using 14 indices, which 
according to Lavigne (1979, page 106) are rational and sOphisticated, 
although it raises the question of how the statistical services will 
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cope. Most of the indices are in kind; output sold and 
profitability, the characteristic indices of the 1965 reform, 
have been abandoned. The prerogatives of enterprises. have 
been reduced, despite the rather deceptive "counter-plans" 
which can be proposed by enterprises. These can only increase 
the plan, not reduce it. The annual plans and the five year 
plans are to be tied together, so that enterprises cannot impose 
their own plans and there is less scope for collusion between 
enterprises and Ministries to get advantageous plans. This means 
that annual plans will not predominate over five year ones, and 
Gosplan has more time to construct a coherent and 'scientifically 
founded' five year phn (because of the enterprise 'passports'). 
\ 
The positIve gap between the counter-plan and the annual 'slice' 
of the five year plan determines the size of the enterprise incentive 
funds. The 1979 decree re-establishes the value of direct 
commercial contracts, backed this time with judicial sanctions, 
even against Gossnab. Enterprises will not be able to consent 
to Ijmutual amnesties' for delivery failures as in the past. 
The use of long-term five year contracts between enterprises 
or pruduction associations is to be generalised. Lavigne rightly 
asks how it will be possible to control the application of these 
measures. 
i 
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This raises the general issue of the appraisal of this reform. 
There are now a series of plans whose relation to each other is 
more coherent than in the past. There is a 20 year plan ·of technical 
progress; a ten year plan, broken down into two five-year plans 
(the first . with annual details); a five year plan, broken down by 
year, which is the linch-pin of the planning process; an annual 
plan using the enterprise counter-plans for correcting the 
corresponding 'slice' of the five-year plan (now with the same 
indices as the five year plan); and a series of finalised 
programmes which ~an be special, sectoral or regional. This 
rationalisation of the plan structure using a refounded system 
of indices implies a rapid unification of the 'nomenclatures' 
, \ 
(classificatory lists) used by different agencies. Lavigne points 
out (page 240) that this is no easy task for the Central Statistical 
Administration. Regional and sectoral planning are more strictly 
coordinated. While the decree gives great importance to plans 
of social development (working conditions, professional training, 
general education, culture, housing, living conditions, public health) 
it also gives great importance to ':labour resources. The latter phn 
must develop extra resources of labour-power, increase 'rational' 
labour mobility in relation to the needs of the economy and reduce 
I spontaneous '/ mobility, and allow for the regrading of qualified 
workers in case of rationalisation of productive processes. These 
measures clearly indicate that the July 1979 decree is a serious 
attempt to improve Soviet economic performance by improving 
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both plan construction (particularly in terms of coherence and 
of lengthening the time- scale of the planning horizon) and the 
regulation of plan implementation. 
The potential problems with plan construction are clear: 
the increasedcoherence in terms of indices used in various 
plans is highly desirable, but there are b'ound to be difficulties 
in unifying the 'nomenclatures' (which describe the specifications 
of items) and still retaining manageable lists of items to plan. 
Aggregation leads to imprecision, but even partial disaggregation 
will require substantial and sophisticated computing capacity, 
together with some means of monitoring the appropriatene s s of the 
agreed specifications of items. There will, in other words, 
continue to be liaison problems within and between the central 
planning agencies. The problems of coordination will also continue 
at ,an unnecessarily high level if Gosplan cannot give certain 
'technical' orders to GossPab, even though both would continue 
to be subject to supervision by the Party or Council of Ministers. 
However, the most important problem for plan construction is 
the dependence on 'pas sports' of enterprises. The independence 
of Gosplan from the Ministries as regards information on 
ent-erprise capacity is thus postponed until the restructuring of 
industry, a restructuring whose completion has already been 
postponed twice since it was started. 
In addition, there does not seem to be much prospect of 
an agency such as Gosplan going in for the simultaneous 
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deployment of a variety of indices measuring the same norm. 
The organisational costs of this must be prohibitive at the 
moment, so it is unlikely that this will occur on any scale In 
the ne ar future. Finally, while the reform would be a substantial 
improvement if it were carried out as envisaged, it would still 
give primacy to planning of productlOn and intermediate con sump-
tion. The insistence on the importance of final consumption (partly 
for the effects of this as an economic incentive, that is, wIth a 
view to increasing overall production) and the increased role for 
local Soviets, do not confront the is sue of the organisational forms 
and forms of calculation which would give final consumption of 
goods and services higher priority than production. 
With regard to the regulatlon of plan implementation, there 
are also evident problems: far example, the problems of ensuring 
that direct commercial contracts finally are effective, which 
entails an ability to have recourse to civil litigatlon, as Lavigne 
realises. The more important problems are firstly, those of 
limiting Ministerial intervention in enterprises, which means 
completing the transition to production associations, and secondly, 
using the increased brigade autonomy and other measures to 
increase labour productivity. It is impossible on the basis of 
the information available to predict the outcome of the struggle 
to bring all enterprises into production as sociations. It is 
possible that the improved information at the disposal of Gosplan, 
even without effective 'passport' files on enterprises, will make 
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it is ea sier to counter certain practices by Mini stries, but much 
, 
depends on the political support behind such restrictions on Ministries. 
However, the mea sures ba sed on the reform of the brigade are likely 
to improve productivity, a Ithough their impact on one-man management 
is no' 00 clear, nor is their relation to the 1977 Constitution's 
recoc ion of worker's collectives. The Zlobin method has been 
in us . ince 1970. For the five-year period 1976-1980, the 
propo: don of brigades in the construction industry on the Zlobin 
method was expected to rise from one quarter to 70-80 per cent. 
According to M. Drach 38, productivity among such brigades overall 
has risen faster than average and faster than wages. For example, 
. 
in a factory rna king metallurgical equipment, productivity rose 
by 13.6 per cent and wages by 7.1 per cent. Other examples are 
more spec;tacular I bllt the proportion of workers in such brigades varies 
in different sectors, so it may only work in some sectors of indu stry. 
Such brigades may also I with their stress on quality a s well a s quantity, 
lead to pressure to modify machinery, and to improve the quality of 
inputs. While this may be a good thing, it may not fit in with 
the central plan s. Some tension between a degree of self-management 
and centraI"planning of resource allocation is inevitable. Brigades 
have attempted various kinds of wage-bargaining I but this ha s not 
worked because it blocked the role of the Party in the enterprise I 
according to Drach. 
In any ca se, brigade bargaining over wages would tend to 
conflict with the 1979 reform of wages, which sets wages in terms 
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of norms per rouble of production. These norms are supposed 
to operate for the whole of the five year plan, according to 
39 
Seurot and there are few grounds for changes in the norms. 
Although the wages reform is an attempt to exert greater control 
over the macroeconom~c relation between wages and production, 
Seurot argues that the success of these norms is very problematic. 
If there is an increase in capital costs, the price of the product 
(calculated on a 'cost plus I basis) will rise, so the value of 
production and hence wages will rise even without an increase In 
labour productivity.' In addition, to be calculable, these norms 
require an index of net production, which has not yet been 
constructed, which is perhaps why the norms have not yet been 
applied, according to Seurot. Rather than raising productivity 
or economic growth, the result of the wages reform is likely to be a 
better policing of wages and a reduction in repressed inflation. 
Too rapid an increase in productivity could well lead to too much 
unemployment. One of the interesting implications of Seurot's 
paper sterns from his remark that part of the apparent reduction 
in labour productivity is the result of the spread of production 
associations, since such hrger units reduce the extent of double 
counting of production. 1£ this is true, the successful spread of 
production asscciations could well make productivity appear to fall 
further, or rise more slowly than it otherwise would. Thi s might, 
by making the current economic problems more apparent, either 
lead to still greater attempts at central direction of the economy 
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and at increased labour discipline, or it might be used by 
Ministries to 'demonstrate' that production associations are bad 
for productivity, thereby undermining the basis of increased central 
control. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to analyse the relations of 
production as relations between agents whose capacities are 
determined partly by the means of calculation available to them, 
partly by their organisatIOnal forms and partly by the various 
struggles in which they are or have been engaged. Relations 
of production are 'thus not only economic but political. For this 
reason, various human and non-human economic agents have been 
analysed in terms of these main determinants of their capacities. 
One of the interesting effects of this approach has been 
that differences in terms of j u·rdidical property have been less 
important in the analysis than might have been imagined. This 
IS partly because of the policy of assimilating kolkhozy to sovkhozy 
in various respects, but also because minor juridical distinctions in 
the status of different personal plots seem to be of little importance 
in comparison with the economic relation between kolkhoz personal 
plots and the collective output from the kolkhozy. The differences 
between the three types of property in the Soviet Union (state, 
collective and personal plots) are no longer one of the major 
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features of the economy, although they are still important, and 
will continue to be un til the situation in agriculture is much 
improved. The juridical determinants of organisational forms 
in agriculture have been much less important than state policy 
towards the various kinds of agents or economic units in agricul-
ture over the last fifteen years. The same is clearly the case 
for industry, and for this reason the analysis has concentrated 
on the discrepancies in the means of calculahon employed by 
various agents and on the role of struggle in dete:mining the 
current relations of production. Consequently, the system of 
regulating the implem.entation of plans has received a lot of 
attention, since sub-agents struggle to resist or amend the plan 
implementation as centrally envisaged. 
The 1979 reform is thus particularly interesting as an 
attempt to modify the relations of production in favour of the 
central planning agencies in an attempt to improve economic 
peformance. However, even if it were entirely succes sful, it 
would do little to solve the problems of planning from final 
consumption, which would not only imply perhaps changes in social 
policy norms for the delivery of health, educahon, welfare and 
leisure services, but also imply a capacity to respond to changing 
demands for consumer durables and retail services. It is not 
clear how far the 1979 reform will curb excessive intermediate 
produchon, since some of the 'exce s sive' intermediate production 
may simply result from the priority given'to physical production 
of manufactured goods. It is arguable that I structural shortages I 
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result partly from the pressure to increase such production (as 
well as from organisational difficulties over supply), and the 
pressure to increase such production may be related to military 
insecurity. 
Since some of the low productivity in industry is due to 
1 spontaneous 1. labour mobility as sociated with a search for 
,housing" according to Seurot (1980), the1979 decree may raise 
productivity indirectly by its measures to improve housing and 
working conditions. An additional obstacle to raising productivity 
In industry could be removed by creating more lunproductive 1 jobs 
in retail trade, services and transport, which would make 
easier for industrial enterprises to reduce their labour force, 
especially the unskilled ancillary labourers, as they took measures 
to improve productivity. Paradoxically a higher priority given 
to final consumption could thus perhaps ease the supply problems 
of indus try. However, in the absence of a radical change in 
economic strategy and forms of calculation in favour of final 
consumption, the 1979 reform does at least hold out the promise of 
improved performance by rationalising the structure of industry, 
curbing the power of the Ministries, increasing the cmerence of 
the overall economic plans, and giving greater au1nnomy to workshops 
and production brigades. 
to be seen. 
Whether it will turn out that way remains 
i 
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Notes to Chapter Two 
1. See, for example, N. Jasny (1949) The Socialised 
Agriculture of the U.S.S.R.: Plans and Performance, 
Stanford, and A. Nove (1969) An Economic History 
of the U . S. S. R . , Allen Lane, London. For a detailed 
discussion of developments between 1953 and 1964, see 
K. E. W~dekin, (1973), 
The Private Sector in Soviet Agriculture, chapters 8 and 9, 
University of California Press, Berekely, Los Angeles, 
London. 
2. R. C. Stuart (1972) The Collective Farm in Soviet Agriculture, 
Lexington Books, D. C. Heath and Co., Lexington, Mass., 
chapter 4 'Structural Change in the Kolkhoz Sector' . 
3. ibid., pa ge 47. This is from official sources. 
4. Lavigne, using different sources from R. C. Stuart, gives a figure 
of 123,700 for 1950, as can be seen from this table taken from page 
155 of M. Lavigne, (1979) Les Economies Socialistes: sovietique 
, 
et europeennes Armand Colin, Paris. This figure for 1950 
given by Lavigne is confirmed by Narodnoe Khozyaistro SSSR v 1970 9 
The 1979 figures for Table 2 are from Narodnoe Khozyaistro SSSR 1979, 
page 215 (private communication from M. Lavigne). 
5. This is the Soviet term for what in the English language literature 
are usually termed 'private plots'. W~dekin (1973) op.cit., devotes 
a small chapter to this issue before effectively deciding to call them 
'private'. Lavigne also calls them' private' at time s. The issue 
of the form of property which these plots constitute will be discussed 
later, but for the moment the term' personal plots' can be 
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retained a s at lea st indicating the ir scale of operation. 
The figure of 1.2 per cent given by Lavigne for 1977 (it is 
1. 4 per cent for 1979) refers to the percentage of total 
exploited area I including pa sture and so on. This should 
not be confused with sown area. Personal plots in 1979 
comprised 2. 7 per cent of sown area (private communication 
from M. Lavigne). 
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6. Stuart, Ope cit., page 64. I shall refer to both complex and 
tractor - complex brigades as 1complex brigades 1• 
7. Stuart, ibid., page 66. 
8. See Stuart, ibid., pages 177-186. Agricultural specialisation 
is usually discussed in geographical terms, but such 
regIonal specialisation in terms of, say, crops, could 
affect the need for complex brigades. 
9. The word 1 chairmen 1 is used advisedly, since probably 
around 1 per cent of kolkhoz chairs are held by Women. 
This was certainly the case for the late 1950s, according 
to Stuart, ibid" page 164. He says that in 1959, the U.S.S.R. 
percentages of women in 1middle leve1 1 kolkhoz management 
positions were as follows: field brigadier - 8.3 per cent, 
animal brigadier - 12. 7 per cent; ferma leader - 15. (j per 
cent, link leader 87.3 per cent. Interestingly, the role of 
the link (zveno, the lowest rung on the hierarchy) is 
apparently the subject of a certain amount of controversy 
these days, despite some high level support for the idea 
of an autonomous zveno, described by Nove (1977)" The 
Soviet Economic System, George Allen and Unwin, London, 
pages 140-142. A. Heitlinger (1979) Women and State 
Socialism: Sex Ineguality in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, 
Macmil1i:m, London, cites evidence on page 103 from the 
1970s which suggests that in Latvia just over 1 per cent of 
sovkhoz chairs were held by women. She says this typical. 
10. Lavigne, op. cit., page 161. 
200. 
11. A. Nove (1977) The Soviet Economic System, op. cit, 
pages 137~142. 
12. Stuart's discussion of the allocation of labour within the 
kolkhoz is unfortunately of little help on this issue. In 
the mid-1960s, labour accounted for roughly 40 per cent 
of the costs of gros s agricultural production (page 116). 
He begins by. a 'formal analysis' of labour allocation 
within the kolkhoz in the traditional, and lar gely futile, 
manner of exposition of economics textbooks. Thus he 
as sumes that the peasants (as he calls the kolkhozniki) are 
striking an income - leisure balanc,e, although it is well-
known that they have very little free time because of work 
on the 'personal plots'. This is determined for the 
kolkhozniki, as W::tdekin (1973), op. cit., sJ:ows~ because 
of the division of labour between the kolkhoz and the 
'private sector' in terms of crops which means that unless 
one is going to sacrifice an adequate diet and accept a very 
low - monetary income, there is little 'balancing' to be 
done between income and leisure. In addition, in starting 
his analysis, Stuart relies· to some extent on analyses which 
formally treat the kolkhoz as a producer cooperative, even 
though he himself has rejected this notion. All this, of 
course, is to endow the peasant with the capacity of choice, 
the precondition for 'rational economic decision-making'. 
In making the 'model' a little more 'realistic', these 
assumptions are effectively abandoned, without. Stuart 
raising any questions about the appropriateness of the 
concepts which required such as sumptions. It is because 
I find such a mode of analysis unacceptable that I have 
concentrated on organisatIonal determinants of the labour 
supply within the kolkhoz. One can only discuss economic 
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calculation in an adequate way by relating it to the 
available means of calculation and to the structures to 
which the calculation refers. There are also, of course, 
demographic and migratorial determinants of the labour 
supply. 
13. Lavigne (1979), op. cit., page 164, says that the proportion 
of total investment going to agriculture was 15 per cent 
between 1950 and 1960, 18 per cent between 1961 and 1970 
and 26 per cent between 1971 and 1980. According to The 
Guardian, October 24th 1980, Brezhnev1s proposed remedy 
for the exp~:cted 20 per cent shortfall in the 1980 ,grain 
Increase 
harvest is toLinvestment still further and to boost efficiency. 
How will the latter be achieved? 
14. This is described in detail in Chapter 7 of W~dekin (1973) 
15. 
op. cit., 'The Interdependence of Private and Socialised 
Production' . 
(Private communication). On page 164, she mentions a 
figure of 1. 4 per cent of cultivated surface area, an increa se 
over the figure of 1. 2 for 1977. 
16. V. Andrle (1976) Managerial power in the Soviet Union, 
Saxon House/Lexington Books, D.C. Heath Ltd., Westmead 
and Lexington. 
17 . There are of course various kinds of role theory, but all 
of them are compatible with a theatrical metaphor which 
treats social structure in tel'lTIS of actors playing roles. 
The most wen-known differences within role theory are 
probably those between the social phenomenologists, the 
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ethnomethodologists, the symbolic interacti onists and 
the attempts to integrate role theory with structural-
functionalism, of which the most sophisticated exponent 
was Parsons. Judging by the references in Andrle, he 
tends (but not exclusively) towards the symbolic 
interactionist approach to role thoery. This is precisely 
the kind of role theory which has come in for the least 
criticism, not because it is the most sophisticated, but 
for precisely the opposite reason: it constitutes the least 
worthy opponent. This is not the place to remedy this 
'gap' in the critical literature: many of the criticisms of 
the more rigourous and philosophically sophisticated 
'founding father s' of action theory, such as Weber and 
Schutz, also apply to the symbolic interactionists: see, 
f0l:h~xample, B. Hindess (1977), Philosophy and Methodology 
in ;Social Sciences, Harvester Press, Hassocks. Another 
aspect of Andrle.' s use of role theory which is not defended 
is its relation to his proposal in Appendix A that "a social 
structure constitutes a mechanism by which the surplus 
product of a society is created, appropriated and controlled." 
This proposal amounts to a virtual equation of the inter-
person al conception of social structure espoused by role 
theory with the Mandst conception of a 'mode of production I. 
No attempt is made to explain or defend this conflation of 
two concepts which are usually considered to be related to 
two quite distinct theoretical positions. 
18. R.C. Stuart (1972, op. cit.) uses Granick's distinction 
between the khozraschet model and the fundamental model 
in his 'Conclusion' to analyse trends in the maragement of 
collective farms. Stuart describes the two models as 
follows (ibid, page 190, footnote 1): "The fundamental model 
in simplistic form can be equated with the traditional 
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command model - a high degree of centralisation, 
planning lar gely in physical terms with multiple 
objectives, formal and informal managerial response 
to a rigid incentive structure and so on. The 
khozraschet model, on the other hand, is a prototype 
of a market model - a measure of decentralisation 
of decision-making, greater reliance upon a cost-
profit calculus etc." 
19. See G. Littlejohn (1980) 'Economic Calculation in the 
I 
Soviet Union' in Economy and Society, Volume 9, Number 4, 
November, 1980, for an elaboration of this argument. 
20. See M. Lavigne. 'The Creation of Money by the State 
Bank in the U.S.S.R.' Economy and Society, Volume 7, 
No.1, February 1978. 
21. For discussion of the 1965 reform, see A. Nove (1977) 
Ope cit., pages 87-92, and M. Lavigne (1979) Ope cit., 
pages 85-98. 
22. For a discus sion of the rationalist coneeption of planning, 
see G. Littlejohn (1980) 'Economic Calculation in the 
Soviet Union' in Economy and Society, Volume 9, No.4, 
November 1980. The concept of 'the rationalist conception 
of planning' is based on the analysis of the rationalist 
conception of action provided by B. Hindess in 'Humanism 
and Teleology in Sociological Theory' in B. Hindess (ed.) 
(1977) Sociological Theories of the Economy, Macmillan 
London. It could be argued that recent claims in the journal 
Soviet Studie s that the Soviet, economy is not planned are 
the product of just such a rationalist conception of planning. 
The controversy appears in Soviet Studies in April 1978, 
April 1979 and January 1980. There is an intervention by 
NoVe in January 1980 
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23. W. Andreff (1978) 'Capitalism d'Etat ou monopolisme d'Etat? 
Propos d' etape' in M. Lavigne (1978) (ed.) Economie politique de 
la planification en systeme socialiste, Economica, Paris. 
24. C. Bettelheim (1976) Economic Calculation and Forms of 
Property, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and Henley. 
Bettelheim in this work considered the enterprises, rather than 
Ministries, as separate properties. 
25. R. Tartarin (1981) 'Planification et Regulation dans les Economies 
Socialistes: Pour une Theorie de la Valeur Comptable' , in 
Revue d'Etudes Est-Ouest, Number 2, 1981. 
26. Tartarin is a member of the Research group on the Theory of the 
Socialist Economy which meets at the Centre d' Economie 
Internationale des Pays Socialistes I Universite Paris I Pantheon-
Sorbonne. While I attend this group about twice a year, I did 
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not participate in the discussions around the paper, unfortunately. 
Because it is published in French, the exposition of the arguments 
of thi s paper will be extensive. 
The di stinction between centrali sation and decentralisation ha s 
already been criticised by Lavigne 1979 I op cit. I page 47, who 
points out that it stems from the influence on American' Sovietologists' 
of American juridical discourse. One could add that a similar 
discursive presence is eVident in sociological organisation theory 
for similar reasons: see, for example, A. Etzioni Modern Organisation 
Prentice Hall, 1964, Chapter 3. Lavigne argues that another notion I 
derived from French law, is more appropriate for the analysis of the 
socialist countries of Europe: 'deconcentration', which is a 
"technique of organisation which consists in remitting important 
powers of decision to agents of central power placed at the head 
___ _ .t: _1~ _______ .... .....- ... .: _,..... ..... II 
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The formal/khozraschet distinction used by Granick., Andrre 
and others, could be considered as constructed by overlaying 
the centralisation/ decentralisation dichotomy with a plan/ market 
dichotomy. 
" 28. See the resume of Lavigne's account of retail distribution 
at the end of the first section of this Chapter. 
29. There is a footnote referring to M. Crozier, The Bureaucratic 
Phenomenon at this point, and the reference to a cyclical process 
of what could be described as centralisation and decentralisation 
IS also reminiscent of some writings in sociological organisation 
theory. 
30. I assume the argument here is that granting such a downward 
revision shows the 'real' conditions for achieving coherence 
which can guide plan formulation for the next period. If this 
is what is being argued here, then it must be remembered 
that downward revision of the plan is also allowed because 
Ministries wish to report the sucCess of their enterprises. 
31. This sentence is difficult to reconcile with the earlier claim 
that the formal and informal aspects are intrinsically related. 
Why are the informal aspects suddenly given discursive priority 
as 'real' at this point in the argument? The equally real 
norms are a condition of the informal actions of agents. 
32. I completely agree with this, and it would for example 
partly explain why the reduction in kolkhoz 'private plots' 
would be related to the apparently deteri orating position 
of Soviet agriculture: products of informal economic activi,ty 
could no, longer be reported as resvlts of the fonnal activities 
of the kolkhozy and sovkhozy, since the scale of informal 
or unreported economic activity would be reduced with the 
reduction of kolkhoz and sovkhoz 'private plots'. 
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33. Tartarin mentions the impos sibility of using a single 
signifying (or significat ory) index of economic activity, 
and this is a point which is becoming increasingly widely 
appreciated among students of the Soviet economy. For 
example, quite independently of my remarks on this issue 
in 'Economic Calculation in the Soviet Union', Ope cit., 
Nove draws attention to the growing appreciation of this 
point among Soviet economists themselves. See A. Nove (1980) 
'Soviet Economics and Soviet Economists: Some random 
observations', paper given to the Panel on The Theory of 
Economic Planning and Regulation in the Socialist System, 
Second World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies, 
Garmisch. 
34. Francois Seurot (1980) 'Salaires et Productivit~, en URSS: 
La Reforme de 1979' paper given on 24th October 1980 to 
the Groupe de Recherche sur la Theorie de 1 'Economi8 
Socialiste, Centre d'Economie Internationale des Pays 
Socialistes, Universite de Paris I, Pantheon - Sorbonne. 
35. The role of material balances in relation to other forms of 
calculation used by the central planning agencies such as 
Gosplan is discussed in G. Littlejohn (1980). 'Economic 
Calculation in the Soviet Union,' op. cit. 
36. Indeed, the second part of his paper is entitled 'Deviancie s 
in the System of Value Accounting'. 
37. However, there is a discussion of this issue in the October 1980 
issue of Planovoe Khozyaistw, . 
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38. M. Drach, 'La Brigade sous Contrat dans L'Industrie 
Sovietique et 1a Refonne de juillet 1979', paper read on 
24th October 1980 to the Groupe de Recherche sur 1a 
Theorie de l'Economic Socialiste, Centre d'Economie 
Internationa1e des Pays Socialistes, Universite de Pari s I, 
Pantheon-Sorbonne. 
39. F. Seurot (1980), OPe cit. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LAW, STATE AND POLITICS 
Introduction 
The analy sis of the relations of production a s relations between 
economic agents (both individual and collective) has raised various 
issues whose implications require further exploration. The analysis 
of the relations of production a s affecting the rela tive capacities of 
economic agents, capacities which can change a s a result of struggle 
between agents, has raised the issue of the political deteriminants of 
the relations of production. These political conditions are important 
if one treats the relations between agents a s being them selves partly 
political. In addition, the inclusion of collective agents in the 
analysis of the relations of production has raised the issue of the 
legal conditions of s l1ch agencies, an issue which is particularly 
relevant in the ca se of the Soviet Union, where most of such agencies 
(ire state agencies. Even those agencies which are not legally state 
agencies, such as collective farms and trade unions, have a legal 
specification of their role in the economy. Furthermore, the legal 
conditions of agents are relevant to the appraisal of the official 
theory of the cIa ss structure of the Soviet Union, which implies tha t 
forms of property d8terrnine class boundaries. In other words, the 
official theory of class implies that the distinction between state and 
non- state prop8rty, and within the la tter th8 di stinction between 
collective farm sand' personal' plots, are crucial determinants of 
class relations. The 'personal' plots are crucial because legal 
restrictions on their size and economic activities prevent them 
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developing from what might be called household or family property 
(and in that sense, perhaps private property) into private property 
in the sen se of ca pita li st property. They are re stricted to being 
a supplement to other form s of personal or family income, rather 
than being the main source of income, deriving from private 
ownership of sufficient mean s of producti on. 
As w~ s indicated in Chapter Two, the legal definition of 
collective farm s and even of personal plots ha s some impact on 
their economic capacities f but it does not seem to be a s impor~ant 
as one might have expected. State policy seem s to be a more, 
important condition of such agents' capacities than is their legal 
specification. Similarly, the discussion of the regulation of plan 
implementation implied that legal constraints have only a limited 
effectivity, in comparison with political struggles between state agencies, 
such as enterpri ses, Mini stries and the central planning agencies. 
Thus the relation between legal and political determinants on the one 
hand, and the economic capacities of agents on the other, requires 
further investigation. To do this, an analysis of law and politics, 
and hence of the Soviet state, must be undertaken. For reasons of 
space, the discussion will be restricted (where possible) to only those 
aspects of the law, the state and politics which appear most relevant 
to the relation s of production. However, since a discussion of law 
almost hevitably requires a reference to the sta te, and since in the Soviet 
Union the most important political relations are probably thOf;~ between 
state and party agencie s, the di scussion of law will be partly concerned 
with the issue of how to theorise the state and law in a socialist society. 
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It will thus deal with the issue of the 'withering away of the state' 
in the conditions where private ownership of the means of production 
is on the decline or ha s been eliminated. In addition, the relation 
of the law to the economy will be of particular concern, since legal 
regulation of the economy is a potentially important determinant of the 
relations of production, whatever may be the state of affairs in the 
Soviet Union today. 
In analysing Soviet politics, the most important aspects of 
which are intimately connected with relations between state and 
party agencies, it has proved necessary to discuss various theories 
of Soviet politics which have some currency in the West. This will 
be done mainly to remove variou s mi sconception s (a s I see them) which 
present obstacl es to an adequate analysis of the effects of the law, 
state and politics on the relation s of production, which in the ca se of 
the Soviet Union are in a sense more politic'ised than in the West. 
The main approaches which will be dealt with are totalitarian theory, 
elite theory, and Hough's approach to Soviet politics, which 
eclectically combines the' directed SOCiety' approach, the' conflict 
I 
school' approach, and the interest group appr03ch with an attempt 
to analyse Soviet politics in terms of 'institutional pluralism' . 
Thus Hough's approach is useful to the purposes of this Chapter because 
it combines a wide range of approaches (which can thus be quickly 
discussed) and because it includes a serious empirical discussion 
of various state and party agencies which are heavily involved in 
economic policy or supervising its implementation. Consequently, 
prior to using hi s more empirical analysis, the more theoretical aspects 
of his position are di scussed to avoid the danger of simply accepting 
Hough's empirical analysis at face value, useful though it is. Hence 
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following the discussion of Hough's theoretical position, and prior to 
the discussion of the role of various state and party agencies in the 
formation and implementation of economic policy, an alternative 
approach to the analysis of Soviet politics is presented and discussed. 
The aim of this section of the Chapter is to integrate the empirical 
discussion of state and party agencies more fully into the analysis 
of the relations of production presented in Chapter Two, and what 
might be called the analysis of the relations of distribution 
presented in Chapter Four. Both relations of production and 
relations of distribution (of income) are profoundly affected by state 
pol icy in the Soviet Union, so the relation s between the state and 
party agencies most heavily involved in state policy formation 
cannot be ignored. 
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I Law 
The previous chapter on economic units and economic 
calculation has raised the issue of the regulation of plan 
implementation, and has indicated that the effects of legal 
forms of regulation are limited. This is because legal norms 
appear to be mutually inconsistent, because the pl~n itself, 
which is a legally enforceable order for each enterprise, lS 
in many ways inconsistent, and because various kinds of de facto 
autonomy of economic units or agents are not legally recognised. 
Consequently, it seems necessary to investigate certain aspects 
of Soviet law in order both to understand better the nature of 
legal regulation of the economy and to begin an analysis of the 
Soviet state and politics. 
Law and Sociali 8m 
Beginning the analysis of the state with a discussion of 
law does not amount to treating the state as emanating from 
law. Discussing the law in the context of legal regulation of 
the economy does not entail accepting the traditional Marxist 
conception of the law as a reflection of the relations of 
production, that is, law as defining property rights. The 
latter conception, which implies that the law is an effect of 
ontologically prior economic relations yet is a condition of 
the effective functioning of those relations, has been subjected 
to very serious criticism by P. Hirst (1979).1 As Hirst points 
out (page 96): "Law as analysed in Marxist theory is divided 
into two distinct social functions which it performs: the 
function of regulation of possession and the function of 
regulation of the struggle between classes." Consequently, 
Hirst argues, the Marxist theory of law has tended to divide 
into relatively distinct bodies of theory - the theory of 
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property and the theory of the state. Hirst concentrates 
his criticism on the theory of property in the text cited, 
but one of the issues raised by his critique, particularly 
his critique of Pashukanis2, is the adequacy of a discussion 
of law which is relatively distinct from a discussion of the 
state. Hirst argues against the "conception of property 
right as an 'expression' of social relations borne by an 
individual subject and necessary to h~s (socially determined) 
practice ..... ,,3 and consequently against Pashukanis' 
treatment of public law as formed by analogy with private 
law. The avoidance of treating law as a proprietal right of 
individual subjects which makes possible their (intersubjective) 
economic and social relations, avoidance of this position 
implies taking public law and the state seriously even in 
the analysis of private law. The argument is further 
extended in Hirst's more recent essay 'Law, Socialism and 
Rights,4 where the role of law in socialist states is 
considered. 
Among the problems considered by this later work lS 
the question of "whether the elimination of a certain 
legally sanctioned class of agents - 'private' owners of 
the ~eans of production - problematises the existence of 
the institution of 'law' itself." Contrary to Pashukanis, 
whose position is that socialists must work for the 
progressive deconstruction of law, the facilitation of its 
'withering away', Hirst argues that in a realm of differentiated 
agents (whether human individuals or not), the scope and 
limits of these agents' actions must be defined and limited: 
this is a condition of their having a determinate capacity 
for decision. Regulation is definitive of agents and imposes 
requirements of action on them: it also establishes a 
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a relation between agents and the 'public power', not merely 
a relation between agents with the public power as adjudicator. 
In contrast to Pashukanis, who conceives of law as recognising 
prior realities and regulating an already given realm of 
relations between agents, Hirst is arguing that regulation of 
relations between agents is a condition of their existence 
and their capacities for action. Regulation concerns the 
form of definition of agents as agents. "This necessarily 
arises whenever a realm of differentiated agencies of 
decision must be constituted (my emphasis), whether or not 
these agents are directly concerned with production, and 
whether or not the relations between those agents take a 
commodity form." (Hirst's emphasis). While I have no reason 
to disagree with Hirst's critique of Pashukanis, nor indeed 
with his critiques of various other legal theorists, Hirst to 
my mind does not make it sufficiently clear why regulation of 
social relations should take the form of legal relations. 
Pashukanis distinguishes between legal and technical 
regulation, but his conception of 'the legal form' as 
intimately linked with commodity exchange has been effectively 
demolished by Hirst. Consequently the relation between legal 
and non-legal or technical regulation must be analysed. 
Hirst argues: "Law (as an institutionally differentiated 
instance) cannot be the sole means of construction of agents. 
Various forms of administrative rules, practices and policies 
(state and semi-state ...... ) also serve in this direction .... . 
These agencies are not, however, 'outside' the law: th ey are 
in turn differentiated agencies of decision constituted in a 
particular way in public law." This is a position which 
concedes the importance of non-legal regulation, yet insists 
that the agencies engaged in administrative regulation, or 
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In providing means of co-operation, reconciliation and control 
are themselves defined in public law. 
There are two possible objections to this position: 
firstly, that agencies engage in forms of regulation which 
are illegal, and some of the agents themselves may not be 
legally defined; secondly, that the various forms of 
regulation could exist without a state Or the form of law. 
The latter objection might be considered as an attempt to 
revive Pashukanis or the 'classical' Marxist view on the 
withering away of the state in a new form or it could stem 
from a non-Marxist form of socialism. It is a much more 
serious objection than the first. The first could be dealt 
with by arguing that if the public law existed and did 
define certain agents, the existence and capacities of the 
agents which were not legally defined could be explained in 
terms of the malfunctioning of the legally defined agencies, 
or In terms of successful struggles to escape or avoid legal 
or administrative regulation. However, the constitution of 
such agencies would then be a very indirect effect of the 
law, and their relation to the law would be indeterminate, 
especially where the law was poorly enforced. The second 
objection is more difficult to deal with, despite the force 
of Hirst's critique of Pashukanis and other Marxist approaches 
to the state. 5 Hirst argues with good reason that regulation 
requires a specific agency which is not at par with those to 
be regulated, but that there is no reason why for any given 
activity this regulatory instance should take the form of a 
state, a single dominant public power. In that case it is 
legitimate to ask, if the state is not required to regulate 
any given activity, why it is required to regulate any 
activity at all? The effective answer seems to be to give 
a certain degree of coherence to the activities of the 
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various regulatory agencies. While there is no doubt that a 
certain degree of coherence is given to the various state 
apparatuses and practices by public law (particularly 
constitutional law), the 'requirement' of coherence of forms 
of regulation cannot explain the law and the state. Hirst is 
well aware of the problems of general explanations of social 
institutions in terms' of the requirements or needs generated 
by other social relations. 6 However, despite the extremely 
rigorous analysis of a variety of issues in this essay, and 
despite the presence of arguments which undermine such a form 
of explanation, at one or two points the analysis does appear 
to fall into explaining the state and law by reference to the 
requirement to co-ordinate various agencies of regulation and 
to limit their action. 
This point can be elaborated by examining his discussion 
of G.D.H. Cole's conception of guild socialism, where Hirst 
argues that "Cole's merely ad hoc and consultative conception 
of the co-ordination of the activities of a complex of 
interacting associations is inadequate." It is inadequate 
for two reasons: "Firstly, there are requirements of 
information and division of labour which necessitate continual 
co-ordination not a constant process of ad hoc adjustment. 
But these are no better handled by the notion of a single 
centre rather than a centreless plurality~ There can be no 
general solution to the questions of information collection 
and relay, of techniques of control, etc. Secondly, what all 
questions of organisation involving a plurality of associations 
or agencies generate are the problems of the definition of 
their form and the regUlation of their action in the form of 
limits. Associations cannot be co-ordinated if no limits are 
placed on their competencies and actions: the absence of such 
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limits generates a plurality of agencies of decision limited 
only by their own objectives, dependent on each other's 
compliance and goodwill as to the areas in which the respective 
decisions of each pertain. The absence of imposed limits 
inhibits organisations' calculation and the performance of 
definite tasks: competition for resources in the absence of 
imposed conditions for interaction and multiple performance of 
functions would be the result." It is not my intention to 
defend Cole's concept of guild socialism, but merely to ralse 
the question of why law and the state are necessary to 
co-ordinate the activities of diverse agents. Only if 
co-ordination took the form of regulation by a superior agent 
would the law be necessary as a means of 'regulating the 
regulators'. Yet Hirst's own analysis points to the problems 
of such a position: neither is the state a unified agency, 
nor lS the law a consistent form of discourse or a consistent 
series of practices. As Hirst says, the problems of the 
requirements of information and division of labour are no 
better handled by the notion of a single centre rather than a 
centreless plurality. In that case, even conceding the 
necessity of continual co-ordination, rather than ad hoc 
adjustment, why need such co-ordination take the form of 
regulation by a superior agency or instance? 
Co-ordination certainly implies the regular supply of 
information so that different agencies can calculate their 
actions with respect to each other, but it does not necessarily 
imply 'external' control. As Hirst points out earlier in the 
essay (when discussing the implications of the concept of a 
realm of differentiated agencies of decision), "the agent's 
actions, however much circumscribed by conditioning factors, 
are determined in their form by calculation and not given to 
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them by some other agent." While co-ordination may be more 
likely to work well if it takes the form of regulation, it 
need not do so. Hirst certainly indicates the probable costs 
of a lack of regulation: a plurality of agencies of decision, 
dependent on each other's compliance and goodwill, competition 
for resources and multiple performance of functions. They 
would thus not only be limited by their own objectives, but 
by the means at their disposal and their various (limited) 
forms of calculation. However, these costs of a lack of 
overall regulation of the different agencies do not impose a 
requirement of a regulatory instance. Hirst argues (on page 
34) that a realm of differentiated agencies of decision 
requires a regulatory instance which imposes limits by 
defining the forms of existence and norms of conduct of these 
agencies. The regulatory instance makes such a realm possible. 
"This differentiation/limitation of agencies must have a 
general support, a regulatory instance .... ... . This general 
support can only have the form of a 'public power': a 
specific instance of regulation advancing claims in this 
regard." 
It is extremely hard to distinguish between this latter 
argument and a general theory of the state and law as a 
condition of the existence of a realm of diverse agencies. 7 
Indeed Hirst argues that the need for the state in socialist 
societies is enhanced by the increased scope and diversity of 
agencies of decision. Yet it is possible to conceive of a 
series of agencies working by administrative regulation of 
their own sub-agents and co-ordinating their activities at 
the level of the overall society by means of an admixture of 
ad hoc adjustment, regular flows of information and struggle 
over resources. Admittedly, the co-ordination would be much 
poorer without legal regulation, but there would be non-legal 
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limits on their forms of existence and their capacities for 
action. It does not require the positing of an ontologically 
prior realm of diverse agents to construct such an argument, 
since it does not deny the necessary existence of some 
regulation in the society; it merely denies the necessity 
of an overarching regulatory instance successfully making 
general claims as to its own stope as a public power. 
Of course, if there is no ontologically prior realm of 
agents, then the state and the law cannot be considered as 
necessarily oppressive. This latter conclusion underlines 
one of the main themes of Hirst's essay, which I support, 
namely that if the state and the law are not necessarily 
oppressive, there is no necessity to abolish them. Even if 
one does not accept that a general regulatory instance is a 
necessary condition of a realm of differentiated agencies of 
decision (that is, of an advanced division of labour), the 
probable costs indicated by Hirst of the absence of a body 
which makes general claims to regulate other agencies could 
be considerable. While the state cannot resolve all the 
problems of regulation and co-ordination, its capacity to 
resolve at least some of these problems provides a forceful 
political argument in favour of retaining the state and law 
in socialist societies. As Hirst makes clear in a section on 
'Pashukanis and Socialist Social Policy', Pashukanis' concept 
of 'social defence' could only be realised (by replacing legal 
regulation of social policy) at the cost of lower standards of 
control of administration than are accepted in the West. This 
is not the same thing as supporting the current forms of law 
and state organisation in the Soviet Union, as Hirst makes 
clear. Indeed one of his arguments in favour of legal 
regulation imposing limits on state agencies is that this can 
prevent such institutions from serving as means of suppression 
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of political opposition. He is not arguing for a restoration 
of 'socialist legality' but for changes in the law, and more 
importantly for the provision of effective means of limiting 
certain capacities of state agencies. While I accept such 
arguments, there is no need to posit the state as a necessary 
condition of existence of a realm of differentiated agencies, 
as Hirst seems at times to do. 
Nevertheless, Hirst's work on law makes it difficult to 
ignore the role of public law in analysing the Soviet Union, 
particularly since, as Hirst among others points out, the 
Soviet Union has an ineffective legal framework of control. 
Perhaps the most striking recent example of this is the 
provision made in the 1977 Constitution for workers' collectives, 
although the organisational form for implementing them is not 
made clear. This means that it is conceivable that the 1979 
decree enhancing the role of production brigades in the 
enterprises could be considered as related to the implementation 
of this provision of the Constitution, even t hough, as the 
Lavignes point out,S some juridical interpretations treat the 
workers' collectives as extensions of the trade unions in the 
t . 9 en erprlses. If the production brigades were to be able to 
legally function as workers' collectives, their relation to 
the Party and to the trade unions' factory committees would 
have to be legally specified. Until some such legal enactment 
is made, the Constitutional provision for workers' collectives 
will remain ineffective. 
Legal Re9ulation of the Soviet Econol!!Y 
The Constitutional position on the agencies for regulating 
the economy is clear10 : the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers -
the Government of the U.S.S.R. - is the highest executive and 
administrative agency of state power of the ~.S.S.R., subject 
to the control of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet. The various 
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state committees, chief administrations and other departments 
are attached to the Council of Ministers. However, the legal 
commentary on 'The Directing and Planning Agencies' provided 
by Hazard, Butler and Maggs (1977)11 is not very enlightening, 
since it is concerned with historical swings between 
centralisation and decentralisation, and has no analysis of 
the contemporary effectivity of the law in the relations 
between the various central agencies. However, its citation 
of cases of disputes over plan enforcement and production 
quality control is helpful. The role of the law in regulating 
relations between 'The Operating Agencies' of various kinds 
such as Ministries, production associations (which Hazard 
et al,translate as 'production combines') and enterprises is 
clearer. There is legal specification of organisational forms 
of these relations for separate branches of industry, of 
enterprise powers, of measures for checking against fraud and 
mismanagement, and of legal successors in the event of 
liquidation of an enterprise. Perhaps the most interesting 
chapter for the purposes of the present discussion is the one 
on 'Law as an Instrument of Administrative Order'. 
This chapter discusses the inauguration of the concept 
of the plan as law and the use in the 1930s of 'contracts of 
supply' and 'State Arbitration' of disputes over these contracts. 
Since ~he plan designated the suppliers and customers of an 
enterprise, the contracts were not entered into voluntarily, but 
the 'contract of supply' proved necessary to specify with 
sufficient precision the terms of the planned relationship, 
so that disputes over performance could be resolved. 'State 
Arbitration' was a system of administrative courts, apparently 
distinct from civil law courts. Certainly this interpretation 
was the position of those who argued that civil law was 
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distinct from 'economic law'. 12 The grounds for the distinction 
was that civil law concerned the relations between private 
individuals, whereas 'economic law' concerned the relations 
between public corporations. However, the arbitrators did in 
fact have recourse to civil law in reaching their decisions 
even prior to 1937, when the proponents of the distinction 
were purged. After Stalin's death, with the drafting of a 
new set of fundamental principles for civil codes, the 
question was raised again of separating rules relating to 
public corporations from the civil code. Many influential 
professors and administrators argued for it, but when the 
legislative drafting committee of the Council of Ministers 
published a draft in 1960, it combined the law of public 
enterprise with that of private individuals. According to 
Hazard et al, "Opponents of the combination have not only 
not been silenced, but they have published for a discussion 
of a draft economic code. They think the Fundamental 
Principles of Civil Legislation adopted in 1961 to be an 
absurd document, and they have not hesitated to say so. They 
agree that is is self-evident that the relations of the public 
corporations have a special character. For example, a private 
individual cannot go to court to require another individual 
to sell him something. The public corporation may do so, 
and pre-contract disputes are a significant part of the 
practice of arbitration tribunals, for they bear relationship 
to performance of the plan." 
In this argument, civil law is linked to commodity 
exchange between individuals, _ but in a different way from 
Pashukanis. Hazard et al.supply extracts of fairly recent 
Soviet arguments for and against a separate 'economic law', 
which are worth discussing. Eratus' who is against such a 
distinction argues that the Fundamental Principles of Civil 
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Legislation proceeds from the principle of the unity of the 
regulation of socialist property relations independent of 
the nature of th eir partic ipants. "Th is un i ty is d et ermined 
by the unityof the socialist economy, its planned character, 
by the interconnection of all the elements of Soviet economic 
circulation, the combination of the interests of society and 
of the individual." Bratus' also argues that it is wrong to 
combine under 'economic law' civil legal relations whose 
participants are socialist organisations as subjects with 
equal rights (on the basis of economic contracts, etc.) with 
relations arising from the activity of agencies for management 
of the economy. Partisans of an Economic Code of the U.S.S.R. 
are according to Bratus' proceeding from the incorrect 
assumption that it is possible to combine different types of 
social relations (civil, based on equality of the parties, 
and authoritative-organisational) as one subject of regulation. 
Similarly they thought it possible to separate civil relations 
between citizens from civil relations arising between 
socialist organisations. Bratus' argues that "this separation 
of like andjoining of different relations contradicts the 
natural principles of legal regulation of these relations .. •..•. 
Every branch of law regulates not different types but one 
type of social relations." Hirst has argued (convincingly, 
in my view) in 'Law, Socialism and Rights' that legal 
regulation does not require the positing of subjects with 
rights, and that the law does not 'recognise' prior social 
relations which it then proceeds to regulate, so if one accepts 
Hirst's views then much of the argument of Bratus' collapses. 
The nature of the participants does affect the nature of the 
legal relationship. That is why, as Hazard et al.point out, 
it is possible to have contractual disputes between state 
corporations (where one compels the other to sell) which are 
not possible between private individuals. The involuntary 
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nature of the contract between state agencies is related to 
the fact that in constituting them as state agencies, the law 
obliges them to carry out the plan (a legal order). The other 
problem with the position of Bratus' is that it posits a one 
to one relationship between the law and social relations, 
whereas, as is clear from Hirst's discussion of Renner (1979), 
there need be no such correspondence. 
This is not to say that the arguments of proponents of 
an Economic Code are acceptable, merely that a particular 
defence of the status quo is inadequate. Nevertheless, 
Laptev, the proponent of an Economic Code cited by Hazard 
et al., does have some interesting criticisms to make of 
the economic legislation as it existed after the 1965 
Kosygin Reform. Hazard et ale clearly consider that the 
situation has changed little since then. Laptev argues that 
the rapid development of economic legislation is being 
conducted mainly by the issuance of normative acts of the 
government on the critical questions of the building-up of 
the economy. "However, the issuance of numerous normative 
acts on economic matters will lead to a very intensive 
increase in the volume of economic legislation. The number 
of legal acts on economic matters now numbers in the tens and 
even hundreds of thousands. Besides unwieldiness, another 
shortcoming of the economic legislation is the fact that 
different normative acts enacted at different times are 
poorly co-ordinated with one another. All this greatly 
complicates economic practice. Even for the experienced 
lawyer it is difficult at times to figure out which normative 
act is in force and which is not. Particular difficulties 
arise from this fact in the work of enterprises which do not 
have the possibility to undertake an exact accounting of 
normative acts in force. In the circumstances which have 
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developed it is rather difficult to put the economic 
legislation in order. Up till now, we have been using a 
method of organisation of economic legislation, by which 
when a new decree was enacted it was usually accompanied by 
an assignment to work out a list of normative acts repealed 
and amended in connection with its enactment. However, the 
absence of a defined core around which the acts of economic 
legislation could be placed leads to the situation that such 
lists are compiled extremely slowly ...... . The economic 
legislation can be put in order only by a radical change in 
the methods of its codification and systematisation." 
Clearly then, the existence of public law need not give 
coherence or very great coherence to the activities of the 
various agencies regulating the implementation of the plan. 
However, the demand for greater coherence does not by itself 
entail a single Economic Code, as Laptev realises. Laptev 
accordingly argues for an Economic Code on grounds other than 
those indicated by the commentary of Hazard et al., which in 
effect posited a simple distinction between public and civil 
law related to a realm of freedom of the private individual 
(based among other things upon commodity exchange and the 
associated freedom to undertake contracts, in this view). 
Laptev differs from the account by Hazard et al. of proponents 
of an Economic Code, and he differs from the 1930s school 
which advocated 'economic law' and administrative courts as 
a step towards the withering away of law. Instead Laptev 
argues for a single Economic Code because a series of codes 
for each branch of the economy would still require co-ordination 
between, say, the Construction Code and the Banking Code. He 
argues against three objections to economic law. These 
objections are: 1. the recognition of economic law as a 
branch of law destroys the unity of the regulation of civil 
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legal relations, 2. it violates economic accountability13 
and the economic independence of 
ensured by civil legislation14 , 
the ente~prise which are 
3. the legal relations of 
parties who are equals and authoritative-organisation 
relations may not be joined. 
In response to the first argument, Laptev argues that 
there is not and cannot be uniform regulation of civil legal 
relations by one branch of law, because the different types 
of these legal relations have their peculiarities which are 
taken account of in the norms of the different branches of 
law (civil, collective farm, land, administrative, financial, 
family and labour). On the second argument, he points out 
that economic accountability is usually violated by superior 
agencies and the relations of these agencies with the 
enterprise are not regulated by civil legislation. Therefore 
the treatment of economic accountability as a purely civil 
law category does not strengthen but destroys the economc 
independence of the enterprise and leaves them without legal 
protection in their relations with superior agencies. Economic 
law, regulating these relations as well as others, guarantees 
the economic accountability of enterprises against violations 
which have taken place in the past just because civil law 
illusions were substituted for real guarantees of economic 
accountability. His reply to the third argument is much 
weaker, because it rests on the assumption that in the 
aftermath of the 1965 Kosygin reform relations of authority 
and subordination would tend to be replaced by mutual rights 
and duties in the rejection of administrative methods in the 
economy. We have seen in the previous chapter that this lS 
not how the 1965 reform turned out. Laptev argues that, In 
both horizontal and vertical economic relations there are 
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combined at the present civil-law and planning-organisational 
elements, and this shows the uniw in principle of these 
relations and the incorrectness of separating them in legal 
regulation. "The unity of the management of the economy and 
the conduct of economic activity is the basis of the economic 
reform. From this must proceed also the development of 
economic legislation regulating all details of the single 
process of socialist economic operations." 
Thus Laptev's ultimate argument in favour of a single 
Economic Code rests on positing a unity in principle to all 
socialist economic operations which the law must then 
recognise and regulate. In this, he differs little from 
Eratus' who simply posited a differently conceived unity as 
the basis for his different propositions for the organisation 
of law. While Laptev's criticisms seem to be substantial, 
and while his responses to some criticisms of his position 
seem acceptable, both sides in this debate are subject to 
Hirst's strictures against conceiving of the law as recognising 
a prior realm of relations between agents which it then sets 
out to regulate. Since the law partly defines the relations 
between' agents, coherence is a worthwhile objective, and 
codification is one useful means of achieving this. However, 
such conclusions cannot automatically enable one to decide 
what range of laws (or governmental normative acts) need to 
be codified under one rubric, or what the relations should be 
between the various branches of law. Laptev's argument that, 
say, a Construction Code and Banking Code would need to be 
co-ordinated could equally well be applied to relations 
between the proposed Economic Code and other branches of law. 
The differentiation of law into various branches occurs because 
of the problems of unification, and arguments for a single 
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Economic Code of the U.S.S.R. will need to be conducted on 
some other basis than the supposed unitary nature of the 
economy. The broader the span or range of a legal code, 
the greater the danger of internal inconsistency within the 
domain which it purports to regulate; the corollary of this 
is that there is a greater danger of avoidance or evasion of 
the law by various means, including simple confusion as to 
which laws are applicable. It would seem then that to be 
effective the law must, like the technical aspects of an 
economic plan, be capable of specifying agents and relations 
between them with reasonable precision and be capable of 
enforcing those relations (or enforcing the conditions for 
negotiating those relations), while at the same time 
maintaining a reasonable degree of coherence with other 
domains being legally regulated and with other forms of 
non-legal regulation. This is a problem to which there is 
no final or optimum solution; acceptable solutions will 
depend on the theorisation of existing social relations and 
on current political objectives. 
Even within the relatively narrow sphere considered 
here of administrative law and civil law concerned with the 
regulation of the economy, there is a substantial diversity 
of legal relations. For example, in the area of establishing 
and fulfilling contracts, the State Arbitration of the U.S.S.R. 
is still the main agency for adjudicating in contract disputes, 
including pre-contract disputes. Although it is attached to 
the Council of Ministers, it cannot adjudicate a contract 
dispute between enterprises within the same Ministry. It 
can establish fault and assess damages, but it requires the 
consent of both parties before exacting sanctions which have 
not been legislated for, or before setting the amount of the 
sanctions above the legislated requirement, if this is to be 
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written into the contract. Unplanned contracts (for example, 
within the collective farm sector) are also actionable 
in the courts. There are various model contracts between 
state enterprises and private citizens. Thus, the possibilities 
for codification depend partly on the diversity of relations 
which are already legally specified. 
This diversity, and the legal inconsistency which often 
accompanies it, should lead to caution in analysing the 
effectivity of the law in social relations. It is partly 
for this reason that the Soviet state cannot be treated as 
emanating from law. Even though legal definitions of 
institutions partly determine its structure, political 
determinants of the state structure (forms of struggle 
between agencies, as well as forms of co-operation) do not 
simply take place in legally defined arenas according to 
legally defined norms of conduct. For this reason, the 
Soviet state and thff forms of politics associated with it 
will be analysed together. 
II State and Politics 
One need look no further than Hough and Fainsod 15 for 
an adequate institutional account of the Soviet state 
(The Supreme Soviet, its Praesidium, its Standing Committees, 
the Council of Ministers, the Ministries and State 
Committees and so on). It is not proposed to repeat this 
account here, although Hough's analysis of both state and 
party institutions will be discussed, since the effectivity 
of institutions cannot be ignored. The Soviet state and 
politics will be appraised from the viewpoint of what such 
an analysis contributes to an understanding of the formation 
of economic and social policies affecting the relations of 
production. This approach diverges from those which analyse 
the state in terms of the representation of class interests16 , 
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since the impact of state policy on the relations of 
production is not going to be treated as an outcome of 
the successful representation of class interests, but 
rather as an outcome of struggle between various (state 
and non-state) agencies, whose objectives or interests 
need not coincide with those of any particular class, 
however defined. As already indicated in the preceding 
section on law, the state is not going to be analysed in 
terms of the developing conditions under which it could 
wither away, since the concept of a social totality 
compos ed of a unitary agency (for example, 'the people' 
on which such a conception rests has been abandoned. Even 
in the absence of class relations, the classical Marxist 
conception of a unitary property at the disposal of the 
free, associated producers is impossible to sustain, since 
the diversity of uses to which the property could be put 
will entail a diversity of agencies disposing of parts of 
the total social property and a diversity of means of 
calculating the various objectives and means of securing 
them: in other words, some division of labour is inevitable. 
Thus without arguing for a structural necessity of the 
state, the Soviet state will not be criticised for refusing 
to wither away or to conform to Lenin's conception of a 
'semi-state' . However, such a position does not amount to 
a refusal to consider whether the Soviet state is repressive, 
authoritarian or in some sense undemocratic. The classical 
Marxist approach has tended to criticise 'bourgeois' or 
Parliamentary democracy for retaining an institutional 
separation between the decision-making agencies of the state 
and the working class or the people, and has proposed that 
true democracy will overcome this separation. 17 The current 
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Soviet theory of the state, which according to Hough is 
closely associated with Fedor Burlatskii, attempts to treat 
the Soviet state in the stage of 'developed socialism' or 
'advanced socialist society' as an 'all-people's state' .18 
Even ignoring the problematic relationship between this 
position and the classical Marxist position, the current 
official Soviet theory of the state, effectively enshrined 
in the 1977 Constitution, faces the problem that 'the 
Soviet people' is a 'fictiona~ entity in the sense that it lS 
not a homogenous unity. Even officially sanctioned 
discourses such as the Constitution divide the population up 
in terms of workers, peasants and employees, and in terms 
of nationalities. To take only the latter form of 
differentiation (national distinctiveness), it is by no 
means clear that Soviet nationalities policy is "reducing 
national self-consciousness", as White (1979) puts it. 19 
After reviewing various tendencies which seem to support the 
official view of the developing 'complete unity' of the 
Soviet people, White shows that the situation is by no 
means clear-cut, and argues that the national-territorial 
framework, "far from providing for the peaceful solution of 
the nationalities question which was originally envisaged, 
may in fact have led to precisely the opposite result by 
establishing a system in which sectional interests, denied 
any other form of expression, can in practice take only the 
form of 'nationalism' .,,20 White argues that "it may be 
significant that recent pronouncements have placed more 
emphasis upon the 'harmonious relations' which exist between 
the nationalities in the U.S.S.R. than upon their ultimate 
disappearance.,,21 
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In the face of such divergences within the Soviet 
population, any theory of democracy which criticises the 
Soviet state for failing to represent 'the whole people' 1S 
bound to be an effective means of attack on the Soviet state, 
just as the current official theory of the state is bound 
to provide an inadequate means of defence. A theory which 
attempts to legitimise the state as representing the 
interests of 'the whole people' yet recognises sig~ificant 
forms of differentiation among 'the people' is wide open 
to a critique which identifies an officially recognised 
sub-unit of 'the people' as a constituency whose democratic 
interests are not being represented. 22 This weakness in 
the official theory is not too important if only a few sub-
divisions of 'the people' are officially recognised and if 
the state has the means to prevent the articulation of 
objectives which are not officially sanctioned, as is the 
case in the Soviet Union to some extent. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that conflicts of interest are 
extremely restricted in the Soviet Union: it simply means 
that the scope for legitimate conflicts is very narrow. 
This follows from the aim of a unitary agency (the people) 
which is enshrined in the Soviet Constitution, and which 
renders illegitimate any critique of Soviet democrary as 
not representing the interests of an important (perhaps 
even officially recognised) section of the population. 
Nevertheless, the discursive play between the official 
aim of the unity of the people (which recognises that this 
unity has not yet been achieved) and the official designation 
of sub-units within the population (workers, nationalities 
and so on) means that even official discourses can 'recognise' 
specific means of representation of the interests of those 
sub-units (as in the alreadv cited case of workers' 
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collectives, whose legal and organisational form is by no 
means clear). Consequently, even the official discourse on 
the Soviet state is ambiguous about the uni~of the people, 
although the implicit possibility of legitimate conflicts 
of interest is not acknowledged. The occasional remarks on 
'harmonious relations' which appear in official statements 
seem to both refer to actual or potential conflicts yet 
designate them as illegitimate. Yet in another sense some 
conflicts of interest (conflicts arising from diverse 
objectives) are regarded as 'legitimate' if not in official 
public discourse, at least de facto because they do not 
threaten the institutional structure of the Soviet state. 
These are conflicts between and within state agencies, and 
while they are not the only form of political struggle in 
the Soviet Union (for example, there are also the activities 
of the dissidents and the feminists) these struggles are 
probably the most important form of conflict, apart from 
intra-party conflict, in so far as the latter is separate. 
Politics and the Relatio ns of Production 
It seems appropriate to concentrate on struggles 
between state agencies over economic policy, and to discuss 
the related differences within the party in conjunction with 
them, because according to White, one of the main sources of 
support for the current political set-up in the Soviet Union 
lS its economic 23 performance. It also focuses the discussion 
on the political conditions of the relations of production, 
which is the main reason for analysing the law, state and 
politics in 'this thesis. This approach may seem to have 
much in common with Brown's brief discussion of Soviet 
politics in terms of 'bureaucratic pluralism,24 or the 
apparently independent and lengthier analysis of 
'institutional pluralism' by Hough. 25 Yet, as will be seen, 
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while the analysis here will rely heavily on the work of 
Hough, the theoretical basis of the analysis will be 
somewhat different. Furthermore Hough's analysis is by no 
means confined to an analysis of the upper levels of party 
and state, which is what forms the main focus of concern 
here. Such an approach may appear strange to those 
unfamiliar with fairly recent developments in the study of 
Soviet politics, and indeed Hough spends a considerable 
amount of space discussing alternative approaches, as does 
Brown. 26 Consequently, it is impossible to proceed in 
this contentious area without at least briefly discussing 
the main alternative approaches. 
Totali tariani 8m 
Probably the best known approach, at least in popular 
discussions, is analysis of Soviet politics in terms of 
totalitarianism. This approach has, as Brown indicates, 
become increasingly difficult to sustain in view of the 
widely acknowledged changes in Soviet politics since the 
fall 0 f Khr u s h c h e v . The major element in Brown's defence 
of the concept27 is that it can be used as an ideal type, 
which by accentuating certain elements of Soviet reality, 
can provide a classificatory framework for the periodisation 
of Soviet history. Thus the years 1934 to 1953 would be 
the period most closely approximating to the ideal type of 
totalitarianism. However, the use of ideal types, for 
which Hough also displays a weakness, is by no means as 
unproblematic as Brown seems to imagine. 28 In addition, 
the content of the ideal type of totalitarianism itself 
poses further problems, for there is little to distinguish 
it from the concept of autocracy as deployed by Friedrich 
and Brzezinski29 , except the additional use of modern 
technology (the mass media and modern forms of effective 
armed combat) and bureaucratic co-ordination of the whole 
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economy. This concept of a (modernised) autocracy performs 
many of the same theoretical and political functions as the 
concept of "Oriental Despotism" which has been popular from 
the time of the Enlightenment to Wittfogel as a means of 
casting 'the West' in a favourable light, but which 
collapses under detailed scrutiny of the societies which are 
supposed to form the basis of the analysis in question. 3D 
The main paradox of the 'totalitarian' approach to the 
study of Soviet politics is that it emphasises tight 
central control, yet assigns to the mass party and the mass 
media the functions of mobilisation of the population for 
mass participation in politics, while denying that this 
mass participation has any significant effects on the form 
and scope of central control. Such a position can only be 
sustained on the assumption of almost literally total 
control of the population, so that 'participation' is of the 
most passive and formalistic kind. Quite apart from th~ 
rationalism of such a position (the implicit claim that 
the means of control are fully adequate to the imputed ends 
of the political 
31 Hough 
leadership), the evidence produced by 
33 
and even by White~ on contemporary political 
participation and political beliefs is difficult to reconcile 
with such a view. Even in discussing the ,Stalin period, one 
need hardly claim that the society was under totalitarian 
control in ord~r to demonstrate that politics were in many 
respects conducted in a repressive and autocratic manner. 
As Hough points out 33 , "for all its popularity as a 
description of the Stalin era, the totalitarian model 
always had certain shortcomings. The drive to transform 
society, to remake man, and to keep the administrators 
from becoming a privileged elite implies the continuing 
use of radical reformers against established authority. 
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In practice, it requires the toleration of a considerable 
amount of disorder ••..••• The drive to achieve total 
political control, on the other hand, suggests restraints 
on the wild radicals, for such persons may well be 
disrespectful of all authority. This aspect of the model 
implies ........ the re-establishment of authority and 
authority figures, even many of a traditional nature. It 
suggests rigidity in structure rather than a constant 
transformation. The totalitarian model gained plausibility 
as a depiction of the Stalin regime because the policies of 
the First Five-Year Plan period could be cited as evidence 
of a determination to transform society while the rigid 
controls in the late Stalin period could be cited as evidence 
of the authoritarian features. In the process, however, 
the conservative nature of most of the Stalin period - the 
immobilism of the Stalin regime in the dictator's last 
years - was obscured from view. " 
It could perhaps be argued that Brown's use of the 
ideal type of totalitarianism (which he explicitly 
distinguishes from a model of totalitarianism) and his 
restriction of i ts applicability to the period from after 
the First Five-Year Plan to Stalin's death mean that Brown's 
use of totalitarianism escapes from the above criticism by 
Hough. Certainly Brown distances himself from Friedrich 
and Brzezinski, but he retains the elements of an all-embracing 
ideology, police terror on a mass scale, which atbmises 
society, and the technological means to impose central 
control over an entire country. Brown thus probably does 
escape the above criticism by Hough, in restricting the 
use of 'totalitarianism' to the period of 'immobilism', but 
Brown's position must then be subject to Hough's other 
criticism that "the totalitarian model was especially weak 
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in gliding over the implications of the succession," namely 
that the experience of the terror placed limits on the post-
Stalin conduct of politics. In contrast to Brown's use of 
the ideal type of totalitarianism to draw attention to 
factors inhibiting more radical political change, Hough's 
argument implies that 'the totalitarian model' is weak on 
the "long-term dynamics of the system" and precludes a.n 
analysis of certain sources of change. Nor can Brown 
escape criticism by claiming that totalitarianism is an 
ideal type and that consequently the absence of some of 
its elements from the real situation being analysed does 
not invalidate its use as a heuristic device. Certainly 
ideal types are intended as heuristic devices, and unlike 
other forms of model, the aim is not to construct an ideal 
type as similar to the real as possible, but ideal types 
nevertheless are a form of model. As such they purport to 
give knowledge because of the relation between the model 
and the real: ideal types are simply thought to do so by 
registering the discrepancies, rather than the similarities, 
between the model and the real. However, like other models, 
they are thought to embody a set of relationships between 
their elements which are in principle capable of being 
manifested in the real. It is this correspondence (and 
partial non-correspondence) between model and reality which 
is thought to make knowledge of the model also knowledge of 
the reality it is supposed to help explain. Consequently, 
if one of the elements of the ideal type is not present in 
reality, this epistemological position implies that a case 
must be made out that the relations between the other 
elements are not thereby significantly changed. No such 
case is made out by Brown; it is simply assumed. So even 
if one accepted in general the use of ideal types, Brown's 
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defence of this particular one is inadequate. It would be 
difficult to claim now, for example, that police terror 
operates on a mass scale in the Soviet Union or that police 
activity results in an atomised society. Sucb a conclusion 
would be at serious odds with Hough's work, or White's 
somewhat different form of analysis. There is simply no 
need to·conceptualise the current forms of suppression of 
opposi~ion, of policy formation or of political mobilisation 
in totalitarian terms. 
Eli te Theory 
Another approach to the analysis of Soviet politics 
relies heavily on the use of the concept of an elite, or 
oligarchy. This approach is only briefly discussed in 
Hough and Fainsod 34 , perhaps because Hough retains the use 
of the term elite, albeit used in a very loose sense, and is 
consequently not too critical of it. The notion of an elite 
refers to a relativ~ly small, self-conscious group which lS 
differentiated from the rest of society by its social 
location and by its access to esoteric knowledge. 3S It is 
the common access to knowledge not widely available which 
constitutes it as a group, and the resulting cohesion is 
in some sense {perhaps indirectly, depending on the theory 
in question} related to the successful seizure or retention 
of power {which is conceived of in a zero-sum sense}. Hough 
at points deviates from this position by arguing that the 
elite need not be unified. 36 He also deviates from the 
zero-sum conception of power in his criticism of Dahl's 
definition of power {which, although Hough does not mention 
it, is identical to Weber's conception}: "A has power over 
B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B 
would not otherwise do.,,37 Hough argues against this by 
pointing to the difficulties of analysing power in terms of 
a counter factual {what B would otherwise have done}. Since 
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B is presumably subject to various influences, the attribution 
of B's action to the power of A (as opposed to C, D or any 
other source of influence) is problematic. 38 More importantly, 
Hough points out that "power is clearly situational and 
relational in nature. In the words of V.O. Key, power is 
not 'a substance that could be poured into a keg, stored and 
drawn upon as the need arises. It varies with the issue at 
stake and the circumstances existing at the moment.,,39 
These two modifications by Hough (allowing for disunity 
in the elite, and effectively abandoning the zero-sum 
conception of power) seriously compromise his (or indeed 
any other) use of the concept of elite. This is an issue 
which has been clouded by the common use, particularly in 
American political science, of the concept of 'competing 
elites' in such notions as 'polyarchy'. This treatment of 
elites makes it possible to retain the concept of elite, 
with its connotation of power concentrated in the hands of 
a small group, while avoiding the problems of arguing that 
there are no serious divisions among the 'holders' of power. 
However, this latter approach still requires that there be 
no serious disunity within each elite, whereas Hough allows 
for disunity within 'the' elite. Even if one argued that 
this puts Hough close to the 'polyarchy' position, Hough's 
criticism of the zero-sum conception of power means that the 
kind of pluralism implied by the 'competing elites' approach 
must be abandoned in favour of a pluralism that has more in 
common with the so-called 'interest group' approach. (Of 
course, one could abandon the conception of pluralism 
altogether, but Hough does not take up this option). If 
power is not something that can be held (and this is the 
implication of Hough's reference to Key), then it cannot be 
seized or distributed unequally in the manner of a physical 
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thing like gunpowder. Such a metaphor must be rejected if 
one accepts Hough's view that power is situational and 
relational in character. 
The focussing of the analysis on the situational and 
relational character of power means that the theorisation 
of the social location of people or groups thought to be part 
of the elite must be taken more seriously. The common 
Weberian approach treating the elite as constituted by the 
chiefs of bureaucracies 40 shows some of the difficulties 
of the use of any concept of an elite. At first sight it 
does seem to specify the social location of the elite, but 
it is extremely difficult to specify where the elite ends 
and the mass begins when dealing with a bureaucracy with 
(in most conceptions) a hierarchical chain of command. It 
is difficult to restrict the elite simply to the titular 
heads of the various bureaucracies while denying that their 
immediate subordinates are also comparatively powerful in 
relation to the mass, and once this is acknowledged it is 
not clear where the line should be drawn. 41 It is not 
drawn in terms of the social location of the elite, but in 
terms of its self-consciousness as a group. The elite lS 
thus treated as a collective subject and the esoteric 
knowledge to which it has access (which may be as mundane as 
simply the knowledge of the unpublicisedactivities of the 
other members of the elite) then becomes the main defining 
feature of the elite: the apparent definition in terms of 
social location has collapsed into an almost tautological 
definition of the elite as a collective subject. Such a 
conception is simply not compatible with a situational and 
relational conception of power since the concept of power 
entailed by such a definition of an elite is of power 
deriving from its unity as a group and its capacity for 
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collective action to realise the collective ends of the group, 
thus wielding power over the mass. In other words, the 
concept of elite implies a unity of purpose within the 
elite, and a zero-sum conception of power, which are 
precisely the two aspects of the concept which Hough 
questions. His attempted eclectic retention of the concept 
under these circumstances is pointless. 
Hough's Approach to Soviet Politics 
Hough also tries to retain other explanations of Soviet· 
politics, namely the 'directed society' approach, the 
'conflict school' and the interest group approach, Slnce 
they each focus attention on aspects of Soviet politics 
which he wishes to discu~s. For example, the directed 
society approach is for him clearly useful "in pointing to the 
unquestioned authority of the top political officials in 
the Soviet Union over all spheres of life, the placing of the 
most important posts in all institutions within the 
nomenklatura of the party Central Committee, and the highly 
centralised nature of the formal politic2l and administrative 
structure.,,42 However, in fairness to Hough, it must be 
said that he does argue that the totalitarian approach, the 
elite-domination approach and the directed society approach 
all suffer from a lack of serious attention to the complex 
process of policy formation. It is to Hough's credit that 
he does pay serious attention to this aspect of Soviet 
politics, without denying the repressive and authoritarian 
aspects of contemporary Soviet politics. This is the basis 
of his discussion of Soviet politics in terms of 'institutional 
pluralism' • He claims that the 'directed society models" are 
really models of the administrative side of the political 
system and argues (1~979, page 528): "While the directed 
society and elite-domination models focus on the manner in 
which the Soviet Union is controlled, the interest group 
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and conflict approaches really are more concerned with 
another aspect of the political process: the way in which 
decisions are reached." Consequently there is for Hough 
no reason why these approaches cannot be 'wedded together' 
to give a more complete picture. While this eclectic 
approach at times avoids the problem of what Tartarin 
(discussed in the previous Chapter of this thesis) called 
'global definitions', and enables Hough to treat Soviet 
politics as a complex combination of struggle and 
bureaucratic regulation, it leaves open the question of .the 
adequacy of current conceptualisatiornof Soviet politics. 
Admittedly there are some apparent grounds for this ln 
the lack of available information, but Hough does seem to 
recognise that the current concepts being used in 'political 
science' leave something to be desired, and in view of that 
his failure to attempt some form of reconceptualisation is 
1 . 43 pUZZ lng. One could begin the process of attempting a 
new approach to Soviet politics by examining Hough's 
remark that much of the literature of the conflict school 
has tended towards an image of the Soviet political system 
in which the content of poli~y is determined by a struggle 
of Politburo factions that are largely independent of major 
societal interests. It is by no means clear what Hough or 
the conflict school would consider as major societal 
interests, yet this relation to major societal interests 
seems to be a criterion of the extent to which the Soviet 
Uniorr could be described as democratic. Democracy, it seems 
for Hough, is closely related to the responsiveness of 
policy formation to major societal interests. The expression 
of these interests depends on a plurality of interest groups, 
which contend with each other in attempting to influence 
the process of policy formation. If such interest groups are 
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absent or ineffective (because ignored or suppressed), then 
struggles over policy formation take place between factions 
within the 'ruling group' or elite and the political system 
is undemocratic, as the conflict school argues. 
What are the grounds for distinguishing between this 
position of the conflict school and the interest group 
approach? For many purposes, Hough puts the two schools 
in the same category, yet the concept of a faction implies 
a division within a group or organisation, while the 
reference to 'interest groups' implies divisions between 
groups or organisations. The 'interest groups' approach 
thus implies that struggles over policy formation are 
wider in scope and reflect wider (if not major) societal 
interests, and are accordingly more democratic. In other 
words, the two theoretical positions on the Soviet Union 
appear to have much in common conceptually, while differing 
over the extent of political struggle and over the social 
forces contending in the struggles. 
It is difficult to be more precise, since various 
assertions are made by Hough which are inconsistent with 
the positions as I have outlined them, but these seem to 
me to be an effect of the vagueness of the positions 
themselves. Both positions seem to conceive of democracy 
as a mechanism for reflecting or responding to the 
underlying interests of the population (in contrast to the 
position of Hindess outlined above in note 22). This 
implies that these interests exist regardless of whether 
they are articUlated or not, which entails all the problems 
of designating the appropriate counterfactual to the current 
situation: which sections of the population are distinct 
from other ones, and which interests ought they to pursue? 
In other words, the conception of the underlying interests 
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of the population (as opposed to interests or objectives 
which are articulated) raises all the problems of the 
attempted derivation of political objectives from social 
locations, the main problem being that the social locations 
of agents are by no means necessarily structurally static or 
unambiguous. Yet, whatever the problems of this view of 
democracy which seems to be shared by both positions, Hough 
(1979, page 529) also cites "the classic western definition" 
of interest groups which defines them in terms of shared 
attitudes that form the basis for claims upon other groups 
in society. In this definition then, the only interests or 
objectives to be considered are those explicitly formulated 
by self-conscious groups. While this avoids the problems 
of designating the appropriate counterfactual, it does mean 
that 'meaningful conflict' occurs between the groups, not 
within and across them. This must be so if the groups 
advance claims on the basis of shared attitudes, as opposed 
to other bases, despite what Hough refers to (1979, page 529) 
as "the original theorists' repeated contentions to the 
contrary". 
There appears to be genuine confusion in Hough's work 
over whether interest groups should be considered as 
constituted by shared attitudes, or on some other basis. 
Only a few pages before the definition of interest groups 
in terms of shared attitudes, Hough argues that interest 
group theorists focus far more upon bureaucratic or 
occupational groups, and that some theorists, while in the 
broadest terms still working within the interest group 
framework, have abandoned the word 'group' with its 
connotations of unity. Instead of 'groups' these authors 
use the words 'tendencies', 'whirlpools' or 'complexes'. 
This is close to Hough's own position, and forms part of 
his conceptualisation of 'institutional pluralism' 
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(1979, page 526); as such it will be discussed later. It 
lS probably better not to use 'the interest group framework' 
in its broadest sense, which as indicated is confusing as 
to the basis of group formation, but rather to distinguish 
between a 'complexes' approach, and an interest group approach 
(which defines groups in terms of shared attitudes). 
However, Hough does not consistently distinguish between the 
two approaches, and if one follows Hough and distinguishes 
between a broadly defined interest group approach and a 
conflict approach (which tends to concentrate on struggles 
between "factions based on personalistic ties to important 
Politburo leaders" ,1979, page 524), then one is effectively 
forced to choose between an analysis which allows a 
potentially wide scope for struggles of various kinds and 
one which really allows only for a rather confined struggle 
on a personalistic basis. The only way to avoid this choice 
is to combine the two positions, but this means conceding 
that the struggles between the Politburo factions are 
related in some fashion to the other struggles, rather 
than arguing that they are "independent of major societal 
interests" (as the conflict school usually argues). 
Once the possibility of a relation between factional 
struggles within the Politburo and other struggles lS 
conceded it is only possible to retain the conflict approach 
by claiming that interest groups pursuing their own objectives 
and bargaining with each other have little effect unless the 
leaders of the interest groups associate themselves with one 
of the leading Politburo figures and his faction, as Hough 
points out (1979, page 534). This argument implies that 
interest groups only have the effectivity they are allowed 
by the state of play in factional struggles. There is no 
reason why this should be the case for any length of time, 
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since the outcomes of struggles are unpredictable. Hough 
reviews the evidence of factional activity, but concludes 
that although it clearly does go on, its relation to the 
policy formation process is unclear (1979, page 541). 
Despite the meagre evidence, Hough concludes that factional 
struggles within the top leadership are not of paramount 
importance in forming policy, and by implication the 
factional struggles among the leadership are not of paramount 
importance in Soviet politics. Hough is thus opting for an 
interest group approach, in the broadest sense. 
However, if one compares the interest groups approach 
in the narrower sense, defined in terms of shared attitudes, 
with the conflict or factional approach, both these positions 
leave one in the awkward situation of analysing politics 
primarily in terms of the actors' perceptions, fuat is, in 
terms of individual or collective subjects. Consequently, 
they make it difficult to analyse the conditions of struggle 
in terms other than the concepts thought to be deployed by 
the contending forces themselves. 
In contrast to these two positions (which like the 
totalitarian, elite and directed society positions, Hough 
does not completely reject) what I call Hough's 'own' 
position seems to be an improvement. This position of 
'institutional pluralism' conceives of Soviet politics as 
a series of 'complexes', that is complexes of agencies. 
Relations within and between complexes are affected by 
'tendencies' whose interaction with other tendencies form 
'whirlpools' on particular policy areas. A 'tendency' 
consists of an expression of views by a loose coalition 
of actors, operating at different levels of the political 
structure, whose articulations of views tend in t he same 
direction, but who are unlikely to be fully aware of the 
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common thrust and consequences of their activity. Hough 
follows this approach to some extent, which has the merit 
of avoiding the need to assume that the articulation of 
objectives requires either self-consciousness as a group or 
explic it g~I'DUp organisation. However, in conceiving of the 
interaction of tendencies in whirlpools, he adds the assumption 
that political conflicts in the Soviet Union, as in the U.S.A., 
tend to be compartmentalised, with the debate in such policy 
areas being largely limited to those whose careers are 
associated with it, those most directly affected by the 
decision, and a few who have developed a special interest 
in it. 
Hough does not advocate this position very strongly. 
He says (1979, page 526): "If such an analysis were applied 
to the Soviet system, the scholar would focus on analogous 
policy areas, predict a number of 'tendencies' within each 
area, but suspect that they would largely be limited to the 
confines of the complex." Later on the same page, he adds, 
in an equally diffident manner: "If the analysis were pushed 
to the extreme, it might be suggested that the Soviet Union 
has moved toward the model of 'institutional pluralism.' 
In a system ~ marked by institutional pluralism one can 
speak of 'complexes' ••••. and of 'whirlpools' ••.• of 
specialised party, state, 'public' and scientific personnel 
I 
working within the respective policy areas. The definition 
of goals formally remains the responsibility of the party 
leadership, but except for ensuring that the Marxist goals 
in social policy are pursued, the leadership is not to act 
with 'voluntarism' - that is, it generally should follow the 
advice of the specialised 'complexes' or 'whirlpools' in 
their respective policy areas, limiting itself to a mediation 
of the conflicts that arise among them. In practice, policy-
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making power informally comes to be delegated to these 
complexes." 
Such an approach both attempts to conceptualise 
struggles without positing a necessary group cohesiveness 
to the contending forces (which would imply that personnel 
always formed into the same groups on different policy 
issues) and attempts to relate these struggles to the 
existing structure of political institutions in the Soviet 
Union. Consequently, it seems to be the most promising 
line of analysis among what might be termed conventional 
Western political science work on the Soviet Union, despite 
the apparent diffidence of Hough in advocating it and his 
refusal to give up other modes of analysis. It is worth 
seeing what use Hough is able to make of it, given his 
command of the empirical material available on Soviet 
politics. 
In discussing policy initiatives (that is, the beginning 
of struggles to change policy or develop policy in a 
previously neglected area), Hough argues (1979, page 531) 
that the initiation process surely must include the stream 
of proposals and pressures impinging upon the leadership and 
the apparatus coming from a variety of directions, particularly 
from individual specialists writing in specialised journals 
who do not necessarily represent any 'interest group's' 
perspective. However, while such specialists may (in my 
terminology) make available new means of political calculation, 
Hough makes some interesting points about what he calls 
'agenda-setting and the building of support'. Since there 
is a vast range of potential alternative objectives, Hough 
asks (1979, page 532): "How is attention narrowed to a 
manageable range of alternatives? How is support built for 
the different alternatives? What types of alliances tend to 
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be formed most often in the struggle to achieve policy 
goals? The answers to these questions will depend in large 
part on the level of our analysis. The setting of the 
agenda and the building of support extends from the first 
substantial efforts to focus public or governmental attention 
on a proposal ....•. to the movement of that proposal toward 
a final vote in Congress or the Politburo or a final decision 
by the General Secretary or President. Obviously these 
processes are going to be very different in character." 
Hough argues (and no one would disagree, I imagine) that 
the most important questions in the Soviet Union are decided 
by the General Secretary and the Politburo (the party leadership). 
He goes on (1979, page 533): "This agenda must basically be 
set by top Politburo leaders and Central Committee secretaries 
(and perhaps their personal assistants) on the basis of 
suggestions made by Central Committee departments, the 
governmental agencies, the top regional leaders, and leading 
scholars. The alliances within the Politburo must be based 
on a number of factors ••••• but similarity in philosophical 
orientation and/or in the basic interests of the branch 
being supervised by the respective members must be of 
fundamental importance. Such a level of analysis, however, 
is rather formalistic What really interests us is 
how the key political decision-makers become convinced that 
a proposal should be on the agenda, and how they come to 
support this alternative rather than another. Are these 
decisions made autonomously on the basis of the ideology 
and values of the decision-makers, or do they reflect 
societal pressures of various types?" 
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Despite the attempts by the leadership to define the 
agenda, vigourously using the secret police and censorship 
to enforce its definition, Hough argues (1979, page 534) that 
the leadership's "decision to permit debates implies a 
willingness to let others try to organise support for their 
ideas, at least in a verbal way. Its desire to be exposed 
to information about societal shortcomings and to proposals 
for improvement implies a willingness to let others influence 
the setting of the agenda, at least as long as the proposals 
do not become too threatening. And regardless of the regime's 
desires, nothing could prevent some of those affected by a 
policy from attempting to influence it in whatever manner 
they can". This then is the basis for Hough's concept of 
institutional pluralism: outside the Politburo there is 
scope for formulating objectives and struggling for them, 
but since factional victories and defeats do not coincide 
with policy decisions (on the evidence presented by Hough) 
the institutions, such as ministries, trade unions, regional 
party and governmental units, and scientific institutes, must 
be the most important agencies in defining which problems 
are most important and which solutions are the reasonable 
policy alternatives. Hough justifies his 'institutional 
pluralism' (as opposed to some other basis for the 
development of a plurality of contending agencies) by 
arguing (1979, page 543) that "the antifaction rule is 
fairly effective in curbing the formation of any substantial 
network of alliances along philosophical lines among 
regional and other middle-level political officials. The 
nature of censorship - especially the restriction of the 
more sensitive debates to specialised journals - strengthens 
the tendency for the policy relevant alliances to remain 
compartmentalised within specialised 'whirlpools' even more 
fully than occurs in the West, with the sel~Qtive censorship 
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making it difficult to appeal through the press for outside 
allies." 
The concept of 'institutional pluralism' as used by 
Hough, then, is an attempt to deal with what he calls the 
informal distribution of power. He argues (1979, page 547) 
that there has been a major diffusion of power in the Soviet 
Union in recent decades, especially since the removal of 
Khrushchev. The word 'pluralism' is used to denote this, 
and the word 'institutional' is intended to indicate that 
it is different from Western pluralism, not that institutions 
are the only actors in the political process. Thus Hough 
argues (1979, page 547): "Institutional pluralism means 
only that the legitimate political process must take place 
within an institutional framework and perhaps the phrase 
'institutionalized pluralism' would convey the meaning 
better. Our discussion of policy processes ...•..•. shows 
the Soviet system as a highly participatory one for the 
individual as well as for the institution. The distinctive 
feature of individual participation in the Soviet Union is 
that people must work through official channels. They cannot 
picket, hand out leaflets, speak on the street corner, or 
the like: they cannot form interest groups around issues; 
they cannot organize competing political factions or 
parties." One could thus conclude from Hough's analysis 
that this limited diffusion of power and growth of 
participation has strengthened the hand of various state 
agencies in the process of policy formation. 
It is this aspect of his position which makes it 
relevant to the concern of this thesis with the analysis of 
struggles among state e.gencies (particularly over economic 
policy). Hough's analysis both shows that state agencies 
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are in a position to struggle for certain of their own 
objectives and that there are effective limits on the extent 
of such struggles, limits which are set bylthe regulatory 
capacities of other party and sta~e agencies. In other words, 
Hough begins to analyse the conditions (including the limits) 
of struggle between state and party agencies. Hough's 
analysis avoids most of the critical remarks on interest 
. 44 group theory made by Brown , but there are still problems 
with the concept of 'institutional pluralism', as Hough 
in a sense acknowledges (1979, page 548), when he asks 
what aspects of pluralism are associated with the 
consequences "that we associate with pluralism". The 
concept of instititutional pluralism (like 'Western' 
pluralism, or the concept of totalitarianism or the other 
conceptualisations of Soviet politics discussed so far in 
this chapter) designates what is considered to be an empirical 
set of relations which produces certain effects. Since the 
concept rp,fers to the complex of social relations as a whole 
(and this is a 'global definition' in the sense referred to 
by Tartarin in Chapter Two) the relevance of the definition 
becomes questionable as soon as part of that complex of 
social relations is no longer considered to be present. 
Once part of the complex of social relations has disappeared, 
can the former concept still be used? Which aspects of the 
complex are 'really' associated with the effects which it is 
thought to engender? As we have seen, the problem cannot be 
really avoided by designating the concept as an 'ideal' 
type. The insistence on attempting 'global definitions' 
creates this problem and gives rise to the explicit 
eclecticism that is by no means confined to Hough or Brown. 
Thus, for example, the 'elite-domination model' is perhaps 
combined with elements of the 'interest group model' to deal 
conceptually with, say, the relatively restricted access to 
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some struggles co-existing with wider access to other 
struggles. Apart from eclecticism, this kind of mode of 
conceptualising Soviet politics also gives rise to charges 
that a particular 'model' is 'outdated' (for example, 
totalitarianism). 
The combination of 'bureaucratic regulation' and struggle against 
it by sub-agents is what produces the pattern of access to some struggles 
(and thus access to policy formation) by certain state and party agencies. 
The varying degrees of openness of policy formation and implementation to 
proposals, initiatives or simply resistance from subordinate state agencies 
seem to be related to the priority attached to the policy in question by 
the most important central party and state agencies. In other words 
while the central agencies cannot completely determine the political 
agenda or determine which state agencies can have an impact on a 
particular policy, they do preponderate in structuring the access of other 
state and party agencies to the processes of policy formation and 
implementation, so that the degree of openness of such processes 
varies with the issue. This is largely managed by designating 
certain state and party agencies as the ones to be involved in 
particular policies. Hough's concept of 'institutional pluralism' 
is an attempt to deal with the greater openness of policy formation 
in some issues, while not denying that this is still largely restricted 
to specific state agencies. However, because the concept functions 
a s a descriptive designation of a historically specific complex of 
social relations (a global definition), it is vulnerable to historical changes 
in those social relations. 
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An Alternative Approach to Soviet Politics. 
What is needed is a mode of conceptualising politics in 
which concepts do not become redundant once it is conceded that 
fairly important social changes have taken place. Indeed the 
concepts must be usable to conceptualise the changes themselves. 
It is for this reason that the concept of 'arenas of struggle' is 
proposed here as a key element in the conc~ptualisation of Soviet 
politics, although it need not be restricted to the Soviet Union, and 
is by no means used for the first time here. 45 An 'arena of 
struggle' refers to the conditions under which agencies (or individuals) 
contend for the realisation of their objectives. The arena may be 
institutionally regulated, that is, legally, administratively or customarily 
regulated. The extent of the arena is defined by the range ·of issues, 
the scope of the various struggles and the nature of the contending 
agents; in addition, the extent of the arena may be determined by 
other conditions of its existence, such as the outcome of struggle 
in another arena. Precisely because some arenas are institutionally 
regulated and defined, and societies are institutionally differentiated 
into a variety of agencies of decision, struggles cannot all take place 
in the same arena. The articulation of arenas of struggle is thus 
an important area of analysis, since the relations between arenas 
may change, and arenas may appear and disappear. Thus arenas 
cannot be considered in complete isolation, although the extent to 
which the conditions of struggle are taken into acccurit in a particular 
analysis will vary in terms of what is pertinent to that analysis. 
Thus, outcomes of Parliamentary struggles in Britain may affect, 
say, trade union struggles with individual employers, but for some 
aspects of trade union struggles little reference may be nece§sary 
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to their legal conditions. 
This mode of analysis does not attribute in advance any 
particular set of qualities to any arena or to the agents engaged 
in struggle in it. Agents may be involved in more than one arena. 
The precise nature of the agents and the alignment of forces engaged 
in an arena is a matter for analysis in each particular situation. 
The outcome of the struggles could incluge a change in the nature 
of the agents engaged in the struggle, a change in the alignment of 
forces, a policy change, a change in the extent of the arena, its 
mode of operation or its relation to other arenas, and so on. 
The analysis of struggles taking place in an arena requires reference 
to the socially available means of calculation of political objectives 
and of ways _of achieving them. This aspect of the analysis implies 
recourse to at least some of the material used by Brown and White 
in their analyses of 'political culture'. 46 Without recourse to 
currently available means of calculation, the analysis of the forma-
tion and pursuit of objectives or 'interests' would be adversely 
affected by the common tendency to reduce 'interests' or politcal 
obj ectives to the social location of the agents pursuing them, whether 
it be class position, location in the bureaucracy, nationality or what-
ever. The available means of calOJ],ation may be fairly slow to 
change on some issues or in some arenas, but may change rapidly 
in others {where specialist policy debates may be taking place, 
where there are continual shifts in alliances or where the arena is 
in a 'subordinate' position making it very susceptible to the outcomes 
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of struggles in other arenas). One of the problems of the concept 
of 'political culture ' , even though it refers to relatively distinct 
sub-cultures of various kinds, is that it provides little means of 
analysing the conditions of such differential changes in the socially 
available means of political calcul'ation. although White I s work does 
indicate that some such changes may be taking place in the Soviet 
47 
Union. 
The legal or administrative regulation of the arena may well 
mean that the contending forces also have to cooperate as well as 
struggle with each other (for example, in British Parliamentary 
struggles over legislation). For this reason analyses of 'pGwer' 
which treat it as a quality or attribute which is inherent in a 
particular social location run into difficulties: such a conception 
implies that the agent occupying that social location excercises power 
ipso facto over other agents and tends to treat cooperation by other 
agents as compliance. However, if the capacities of agents in an 
arena are conditioned by the actions of other agents (that is, if as 
Hough points out power is always situational and relational), power 
cannot be considered as a capacity to act which inhere5" in the social 
location of a certain agent (or class of agents): that capacity to act 
must always be related to conditions within (and outside of) the arena 
of struggle. Cooperation need not be merely compliance, since it 
may create dependence on the 'less powerful ' agent. Consequently, 
the relative capacities of the contending agencies (perhaps even the 
same agencies) will vary in different arenas. 
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Hough provides ample evidence which could be used to support 
such an analysis of Soviet politics. For example, in the section 
on 'The Distribution of Power" in Chapter 14 of Hough and Fainsod 
(1979), Hough argues that the system is an authoritarian one in terms 
of political freedom (particularly for the individual), but points to 
the development of restraints on government that have developed in 
recent decades, including increased formal political controls over the 
police, and the development of inf.ormal constraints such as greater 
freedom of criticism. Hough argues that power in the Soviet Union 
varies with the policy area (1979, pages 550 and 551): "In the spheres 
of foreign and defense policy, one gains the impression of deep 
leadership involvement and of participation limited to specialists •..... 
In the transportation realm, on the other hand, one has the sense of 
little leadership involvement, fairly wide debate in the media, and 
domination by the major interest group, the railroads. In the realm 
of wages, it is unclear who is making policy, but one gains the sense 
of real responsiveness to workers and peasants." He regards this 
variation of power with the policy area as the safest generalisation 
about the distribution of power in the Soviet Union. He goes on to 
argue as a second generalisation that the strongest political actors 
below the leadership level are 'vertical' or branch, not regional, 
officials (page 551): "Whether one wants to emphasise the role of the 
ministries, the Secretariat and departments of the Central Committee, 
or a specialised complex cutting across these and other institutions, 
one is talking about a type of politics that is different from, say, 
Yugoslavia, where bargaining among republics seems to dominate." 
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His third generalisation is that among the specialised branch 
interests those associated with industrial growth have been in a 
position of special power. His fourth generalisation ('the most 
difficult judgement of all') is that the distribution of income, which 
has shifted in an egalitarian man,~er in favour of workers and peasants, 
may well be a response to the power of these occupational groups .. 
On the basis of such conclusions it seems that the concern of 
this thesis with the political conditions of the relations of production 
(that is, struggles between state and party agencies) touches on what 
are in any case the most important arenas of struggle in Soviet politics. 
However, the analysjs of such struggles, particularly struggles over 
attempts by the party leadership to regulate the M,inistries, will not 
be concerned with which agent 'has the power', since power is not a 
capacity to act which is inherent in an agent occupying a particular 
social location. Rather the analysis will simply be concerned to 
elucidate the politic,al relations operative between the top-level party 
and state agencies, since if power can be said to be located anywhere, 
it is located in the arenas of struggle, that is, in the political relations 
between agents, not in the agents themselves. This is not to deny 
that agencies can extend their capabilities by improving their internal 
?rganisation and their means of calculation, and increasing their 
resources, but such improvements themselves are conditioned by 
relations with other agents. 
State and Party Agencies and Economic Policy 
While constitutionally the Supreme Soviet, is the supreme authority 
of the state, with two chambers (the Council of the Union and the 
Council of Nationalities), Hough's analysis makes it clear that it is not 
the most important political arena in the Soviet Union. While not 
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treating the Supreme Soviet simply as an .ornamental figurehead, 
Hough (1979, page 368) argues that its role in the policy process 
is less than that of other major institutions. Its Standing Committees 
have increased their activity in recent years, which must have 
affected the proces s of policy formation to some extent, and its 
Praesidium does have legislative powers in between meetings of the 
Supreme Soviet itself. Nevertheless, a great deal more legislative 
work is done by the Council of Ministers, sometimes together with 
the Party Central Committee. Consequently, although the Supreme 
Soviet is a legislative body, and Soviet government is parliamentary 
in form, the parliament is not the only legislative body, and the 
legislative power of extraparliamentary organs such as the Central 
Committee constitutes a major restriction on the role of the Supreme 
Soviet. The Communist Party predominates over the state although 
as Hough points out (1979, page 449), this is not the same thing as 
party apparatus domination over the state apparatus. 
Apart from the Supreme Soviet, and its associated arenas of 
FTaesidium and Standing Committees, the Council of Ministers is as 
Hough says (1979, page 380) a vital institution in the Soviet political 
system, although its associated Praesidium is much more important 
since it is a smaller body composed of senior members of the Council, 
meeting more frequently, and is termed ··the working organ of the 
Council of Ministers··, empowered to decide ··urgent questions·· and to 
··speak in the name of the government of the U.S,S.R.", according to 
Hough (1979, page 381). The division of labour between the Praesidium 
of the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee Secretariat 
is obscure, according to Hough. (1979, pages 382-383). It appears to 
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handle economic questions just below the level of significance 
required for Politburo consideration. The function of the vanous 
interdepartmental committees or commissions attached to the Council 
of Ministers are a mystery, since they are rarely even mentioned in 
Soviet source s. A little more is known, according to Hough, about 
the departments of the apparatus attached to the Council of Ministers. 
For our purposes, the main point to remember is that the Council 
of Ministers must examine the economic plan as a whole, and confirm 
the material balance of the most important economic items worked 
out by Gosplan. 
Apart from the regulation of individual Ministries conducted 
by the Council of Ministers itself, or its associated agencies, the 
main regulatory agents are the top-level party agencies themselves 
the Central Committee, its Secretariat (with its own apparatus) and 
the Politburo of the Central Committee. Their inter - relationships 
and their relations to the Ministries are discussed in Hough and 
Fainsod, 1979, Chapter 11 and 12 (that is, effectively by Hough). 
This discussion will rely heavily on the material provided there. 
The predominance of party over government is most clearly shown 
by the formal obligation (which is adhered to in practice) on party 
members working in government agencies to carry out the decrees 
of the extraparliamentary party committees, particularly the Central 
C ommi tte e . The only decisions which are unconditionally obligatory 
on the government are those emanating from the collective party 
organs, and except for a period in the 1940s.;.and early 1950s, these 
have been the scene of the most crucial policymaking decisions. 
However, the relationship between party agencies and state agencies 
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is much more complicated than simply one apparatus subordinating 
the other, and it is in analysing these relationships that a concept 
like 'articulation of arenas of struggle' shows its uses. Many of 
the agencies themselves can be considered arenas of struggle, 
since the concept does not imply that the struggle need take a 
particular form or be conducted overtly or with a particular 
intensity. The arenas themselves must consequently be discussed 
in order to clarify the effectiveness with which activities within 
some agencies can be regulated by other agencies. 
Thus, for example, many Western analyses (such as elite 
or totalitarian ones) treat the Party Congress as effectively 
regulated by the Central Committee or the Politburo, despite the 
fact that party rules designate it as the ultimate authority within 
the part Yo Yet Hough argues quite effectively that de spite its tame 
appearance, speeches there are attempts to influence future policy, 
and that they may even affect current policy if a strong current of 
opinion is seen to be running among the delegates. Certainly, the 
speeches at the Twenty-Fifth Congress advocating that certain rivers 
be diverted to flow into Central Asia seem to have had an effect, 
since that is now official policy, despite lobbying to locate industry 
in Siberia (where the raw materials are), rather than Central Asia 
(where the population is rising quickly). 48 Certainly, however, the 
Congress does not have democratic control of the Central Committee 
in the sense of a free vote to elect the Central Committee. It is 
not clear how the 'slate' of candidates to be elected is complied, but 
it may be that the size of the 'slate' is manipulated so that the Central 
Committee generates a balance of forces inside the Politburo. If 
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Congress members crossed off the names of Central Committee 
nominees (which they have not apparently done in recent years) 
they could at least prevent some nominees from being elected to 
the Central Committee. As a remote possibility, this could affect 
the balance of forces inside the Politburo, since the long average 
tenure of Central Committee members following the removal of 
Khrushchev may enhance their position in relation to the General 
Secretary, so the balance of forces in the Central Committee may 
affect the line-up inside the Politburo. Pre-Congress meetings may 
indicate the balance of forces and this may affect the drawing up of 
the 'slate' for the Central Committee. 
However, election to the Central Committee seems to depend 
more on the post held than on personal characteristics and loyalties 
(which is an argument against the 'personalistic factions' approach of 
the conflict school discussed above). It is institutions rather than 
individuals who are represented, according to Hough, which suggests 
to me that the 'slate' is compiled partly as an administrative device 
to ensure adequate information flows, and is partly an attempt to 
create a unified agency of decision, which Hirst argues is a conception 
which has haunted Marxist political theory. 49 This is also suggested 
by the fact that 88 per cent of 1976 voting members of the Central 
Committee had already been selected as Supreme Soviet deputies, 
although the Central Committee has a narrower social base than the 
Supreme Soviet and has on average an older membership. Unfortunately 
there is little information on the work of the Central Committee, as 
opposed to its membership. It meets comparatively rarely; it does not 
feature the kind of debate between party leaders which it did in the 
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1920's. Judging by Brezhnev's published replies, many of the 
speeches seem to be requests for more resources. Thus it might 
seem that the Central Committee has played a relatively minor role 
in politics in the Brezhnev period. Yet both the low turnover of 
members since 1965 and the policies emerging suggest that the Central 
Committee may be an arena of institutional bargaining, and members 
do, it seems, receive Politburo pap ers on policy issues, which means 
they have a political role outside the actual Central Committee meeting. 
This provision of information suggests the possibility that the Politburo 
leadership makes a real effort to informally elicit Central Committee 
members' views and to respond to them. Even if Brezhnev simply 
gathers information in an informal fashion and avoids antagonising 
too much of the Central Committee, then, as Hough says (1979, page 
466): "the Central Committee still is a crucial body in the political 
system. Since the Central Committee encompasses representatives 
from all types of ministries and all regions of the country, a policy 
that is responsive to a consensus or to the centre of opinion in it is 
going to be responsive to a wide range of interests in the country. 
In addition, of course, the Central Committee's potential role in any 
succession crisis always makes it of even more crucial interest in 
the long run. 11 It seems to me that this point must be made a little 
more strongly than Hough does: the Central Committee, even when 
not in session, must be an arena of informal struggle between various 
state agencies, and only those struggles that cannot be resolved by 
informal accommodation must go on to the Politburo. 
This implies that the Politburo is run on the basis of 'consensus I 
committee politics, with Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Party, 
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operating in many respects as 'chairman of the board' On the 
Politburo, arbitrating between conflicting institutional objectives to 
reach a workable consensus. Certainly Hough's analysis (1979, 
pages 473-479) suggests such a conclusion: he argues (1979, page 
466) that the Politburo has been the real cabinet of the Soviet 
system. It meets once a week, usually on a Thursday, in sessions 
of three to six hours. The Politburo discusses the annual economic 
plan. In the past, different variants of the plan have been discussed 
and the plan has been returned to Gosplan for reworking. On 
another occasion, discussion was detailed enough to lead to an 
increase in the member of grain elevators. The Politburo discussions 
which are most frequently referred to are economic ones, although 
foreign policy questions occupy what is officially described as "a 
large place 1l in the work of the Politburo. Other issues are mentioned 
less frequently. The preparation of questions to be discussed is 
assigned to officials of the Central Committee Secretariat apparatus, 
although Ministries also prepare reports for it and the Minister may 
stay for that discussion. Apparently, (although this semi-official 
account should not be taken at face value) decisions are reached on 
the basis of arriving at a consensus, rather than votes, In a manner 
similar to many Western committees. Thus, although the Constitution 
designates the Council of Ministers as the supreme state executive 
body, the Politburo is effectively the most important executive body 
in the Soviet political system, and it is clear from what is known 
about the matters which it decides upon that it is the most important 
agency regulating the activities of the planning and plan implementing 
agencies (particularly the economic Ministries). 
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However, the detailed regulation of the Ministries by the party 
(as opposed to regulation by the Council of Ministers and its 
Praesidium) is left to the departments attached to the Secretariat 
of the Central Committee. Crudely, the Secretariat consists of 
politicians (such as the General Secretary) while the attached apparatus 
consists of officials. The various departments are formed along 
branch lines and supervise Ministries and other similar institutions 
such as State Committees. However, the complex and subtle relations 
between the Secretariat apparatus and the Ministries make it impossible 
to discuss this supervision and regulation in terms of the dominance 
of one apparatus over another (party over state). 
To understand this, it is necessary to review Hough's evidence 
on the structure of the Secretariat apparatus and the career patterns 
of its staff before going on to examine the relations operating between 
Secretariat and the Ministries. The Secretariat departments are 
formed along branch lines, that is, they supervise Ministries or 
other similar institutions. The se departments. are headed by the 
Secretariat itself, with most of the secretaries responsible for more 
than one department. These secretaries (Brezhnev , Kirilenko, Suslov 
and so on) have a general political background, but the officials In 
the departments have much more specialised backgrounds, which 
makes them highly qualified specialists in the policy area which they 
oversee. The career patterns of these Central Committee staff are 
as differentiated as the structure of the apparatus itself, which is to 
say, highly differentiated, with at least twenty-one departments, divided 
into a total of 150 to 175 sections. The basic staff members of 
departments are called 'instructors', but there are also a number of 
266. 
high-level 'inspectors' for special assignments, and a fairly large 
number of departments also have a 'group of consultants' attached 
to them. The latter seem to be involved in the task of preparing 
major decisions, on leading a year-long study on a problem, and 
so on. Hough argues (1979, page 423) that these departments and 
sections do not direct the activities of the Ministries which they 
oversee, but serve more as a 'White House staff' to the General 
Secretary and Politburo, so they do not require an enormous staff. 
The most formalised responsibility of the Secretariat apparatus 
is that of selection of personnel. As Hough puts it (1979, page 430) 
"The various political and administrative posts in the country are, 
of course, formally filled either through appointment by an administra-
tive superior or through election. However, personnel action regard-
ing the most important of these posts ..•.... must also be 'confirmed' 
by a party committee........ Each committee has a list (nomenklatura) 
\ 
of the posts for which it has the right of confirmation ••..••. The most 
important posts of all are in the nomenklatura of the Central Committee 
in Moscow." As is well-known, the existence of nomenklatura is one 
of the most important bases of western critiques of Soviet elections as 
undemocratic, and in my view it is certainly not a free vote when 
a single list of candidates is compiled by a superior party agency, 
although at times party confirmation may only be a formality. 
The second major responsibility of the Secretariat apparatus 
is the 'verification of fulfilhnent' of party and governmental decisions. 
This appears at first sight to give this apparatus a major regulatory 
role, but Hough points out that the back-up staff is too small to engage 
In comprehensive or systematic inspection of the performance of the 
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vast party-state hierarchy. What it seems to do is to organise 
investigations by other agencies, such as 'temporary commissions' 
or 'brigades' using outside experts set up for the purpose, or else 
using the staff of the various party newspapers. 
Its third responsibility is that of preparation of memoranda, 
and drafts of decisions, and preparation of questions for examination 
and decision by a plen~ry session of the Central Committee, the 
Politburo or the Secretariat. Hough concludes from its organisational 
structure that this seems to be its main role. Such decisions often 
seem to be the result of a periodic review of policy (hence the similar 
decrees issued periodically). The Secretariat apparatus is thus not 
necessarily a policy initiator: it seems to respond to the stream 
of appeals coming from lower level institutions, and interested 
institutions are always consulted on a decision (according to the evidence 
available to Hough). Rather than the Secretariat apparatus initiating 
policy, it is always the 'temporary commissions' that draft legislation 
or a major decision. The initial draft is often done by a major 
institution in that policy realm. The lower Secretariat apparatus 
officials must put together the commissions, organise the necessary 
meetings, help in the drafting of decisions and clear the various drafts 
of top party decisions with interested officials. As Hough puts it 
(1979, page 438), they frequently act more as the mid-wives for the 
ideas of others, but they must have some leeway 
what will survive and prosper. 
in determining 
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To sum up Hough's analysis so far, then, one has the 
picture of a Secretariat apparatus which confirms some important 
nomenklatura appointments and electioJ1s (although this is sometimes 
a formality), which supervises fulfilment of par~y and state decisions 
(but cannot on its own do so in a comprehensive or systematic way) 
and which prepares draft decisions for consideration by the most 
senior party agencie's (but does so with the help of and in consulta-
tion with other interested parties). This is hardly a picture of a 
very powerful regulatory body ensuring close party control over the 
state apparatus. It certainly does not support a conception of a 
totalitarian monolith or elite domination (unless the elite is defined 
as much wider than the Politburo and Central Committee). 
In trying to assess the relation between the Secretariat apparatus 
and the senior government agencies, one is forced to acknowledge 
that these relations are complicated by the fact that the Secretariat 
is structured like a mini- government, not only in its division into 
branche s, but in its hierarchy of offices. Relations between the 
apparatus and various state agencies are thus affected by the relative 
standing of the officials concerned. As indicated before there is very 
little evidence on relations between the Secretariat and the Praesidium 
of the Council of Ministers, but Hough argues on the basis of bio-
graphical details, including whether an individual is a full member. 
or a candidate member of the party Central Committee, that most 
Secretariat department heads are of a lower political standing (are 
in a lower 'status' positi<;m) than the Minister whom they oversee. 
Similarly, on the basis of biographical material he argues that deputy 
head of department ranks below a first deputy Minister but above a 
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deputy Minister in standing, and that a section head of a Secretariat 
depart:ment is below a deputy Minister. This clearly means that on 
an interpersonal level relations between the officials of the Secretariat 
and those of the Ministry they oversee can be ambiguous but it does 
not tell us about the relative strengths of these agencies in the case 
of conflicting objectives. 
As Hough says, this duplication of offices in the Secretariat 
apparatus and the Ministries is intendesl to give the leadership access 
to more than one source of advice and information, but the extent to 
which it does so is by no meaIl;s obvious, as will become apparent. 
Hough argues (1979, page 443) that what is important is not the precise 
rankings of each official, but that the differences are subtle ones, so 
the Secretariat and its apparatus cannct pre- empt the policy-making role, 
with the government simply executing poli<;y. At least short of the point 
of final decision, policy making must involve the sort of committee 
politics familiar in the West. It is in these ambig.UOUS re~ations that 
one finds the basic explanation of why the Ministries are effectively 
subordinated to the Party in certain respects, but manage to escape 
regulation in other respects, as became evident in Chapter Two. 
Hough analyses the apparatus - Ministry relationship (1979, page 
444) as a relationship which is not purely an adversary one. This 
dovetails very well with my remark above that arenas of struggle may 
well involve cooperation as well as conflict between the various 
agencies engaged in the arena. Central Committ.ee Secretariat officials, 
Hough argues, must. be pushed into representing the inte rests of those 
whom they are supervising. That is, at times they must convey the 
objectives of the various Ministries to the Central Committee, or 
Politburo (or 'temporary commission!) and support these objectives 
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themselves. In other words, the supervisory process at times 
leads to an advocacy role for the specialised Secretariat officials. 
The relevant department and the Ministry often seem to work together 
for 'their' branch in the appropriations process, according to Hough. 
He argues that the crucial question is whether to emphasise the 
conflict or the cooperation between the Ministries and the Secretariat 
departments. There is little information on this, but as he says, it 
obviously varies with the type of question involved. 
On questions involving the performance of that branch, relations 
depend on whether it is an intr..abranch or interbranch question. An 
intrabranch question will involve tension or struggle between the 
Secretariat department and the Ministry (usually I imagine the senior 
levels of the Ministry since they appear to protect their own sub-agents 
such as enterprises from outside supervision). Where it is an 
interbranch question (as in competition 'for, say, investment resources, 
in other words what Hough calls 'the appropriations process') there 
are likely to be alliances between the department and the Ministry. 
This is most evident in the budgetary and planning process. In such 
cases, apart from; anything else, the alliance is likely to be founded 
on the similar educational background of the very specialised department 
officials and the senior staff of the Ministry they are supervising. 
Although Hough does not put it this way, these personnel are likely to have 
similar means of calculation at th~ir disposal, so they are likely to 
reach similar conclusions as to the relative ·merits of their 'own' 
Ministry's case as against those of other Ministries. 
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If the department and Ministry are in agreement, then I 
presume that the struggle then moves on to the next arena, for 
example, where the Politburo considers the annual plan of the 
Council of Ministers (assuming the dispute has not been resolved 
in the Council of Ministers itself or in its Praesidtum). Quite what 
the lnext arena l is could of cou.rse itself be a matter of struggle, 
since one Ministry might feel it has a better chance of winning in 
the Council of Ministers, while another may prefer the matter to go 
straight to the Politburo. 
Hough argues that Western scholars have been absorbed with 
the regime's policy toward the intelli gentsia, and have access to liberal 
intellectuals who have formed a strong impression of the role of Central 
Committee officials in enforcing this policy. Thus these officials have 
become familiar in an intrabranch, adversary role (ensuring compliance 
by the relevant Ministries, with consequent losses by liberal intellectuals 
in various cultural and overtly political struggles). Consequently, 
Hough argues (1979, page 446) Western scholars "often have not been 
sensitive to the pos siblity that the Central Committee officials sometimes 
may be choosing or even mediating between conflicting cultural - literary 
groups and authorities as much as exercising a control function of 
their own. Despite the frequent conflict between the Central Committee 
officials and those they supervise, westerners clearly should be giving 
more attention to the cooperative side of the ambivalent relationship 
between supervisors and supervised." The cooperative side is particu-
larly evident in the budgetary process, including the way funds are 
acquired in the cultural rea.1m, in which according to Hough neither 
westerners nor liberal intellectuals are particularly interested. 
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To the extent that cooperation rather than overt conflict 
is operative in these relations, the supervisory or regulatory role 
of the Secretariat officials ITlay be ineffective, froITl the viewpoint 
of the leadership. Thus although, as Hough puts it (1979, page 447), 
"the leadership evidently hoped to obtain independent advisers with 
sufficient expertise to judge the ITlinisterial reports and proposals 
and hence to give theITlselves the ability to judge perforITlance 
accurately and to decide policy for each branch on the basis of a 
real freedoITl of choice", this need not be the case. Hough wonders 
whether the use of specialised personnel in this way has not ITlEant 
the penetration of the values of the specialised elite into thE' 
political leadership as ITluch as a,more than the enhanceITlent of control 
over the policy process, giving rise to the faITliliar pattern of the 
regulated cOITling to dOITlinate the regulators. Certainly, as was seen 
in Chapter Two, in the area of econoITlic policy, the Ministries have 
been able to escape regulation in important respects, at least prior 
to the 1979 reforITl. However, this is not to be explained in terITlS 
of the 'values' of the officials concerned, for this sociological concept 
of 'values' treats them as the primary deterITlinants of the 'goals' of 
the actors. Rather the forITlation of objectives by agents ITlust be 
seen, not in terITlS of values which are thought to be sOITlewhat passively 
internalised, but in terms of the available concepts which forITl the basis 
on which the agent calculates objectives in the light of current circuITl-
stances. This calculation involves both which objectives are to be 
pursued and the ways of achieving theITl. It is not a ITlatter of values 
'penetrating' an arena, that is being imported by agents who are 
carriers of a set of values which they have internalised like gerITls, 
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but rather of the means of calculation to which the agents have 
recourse. Often included in part of any struggle is an attempt 
to provide alternative means of calculating objectives, coupled 
with an attempt to win over the adversary to using the alternative 
means. As was clear, I hope, from Chapter Two, part of the 
reason why various aspects of economic performance in the Soviet 
Union are inadequately regulated is the fact ,that only one means of 
calculating and thus monitoring performance was being used. 
Regardless of the 'values' or desires of ,various agents, this 
has meant that the activities of various sub-agents have been 
inadequately regulated. In this case, the lack of a serious attempt 
by the Secretariat officials or the central planning agencies to improve 
the 'accounting indices' measuring plan implementation has made it 
relatively easy for the Ministries to escape regulation or struggle 
successfully against forms of regulation which were disagreeable to 
them. 
Conclusion 
Discussion of these issues in this way avoids the reduction 
of political analysis to a 'personalistic' level at which some analysts 
(but by no means all) seem content to leave it. The concern 'here 
with these central political institutions has been to appr3.ise them in 
terms of their capacity to regulate, despite struggles, the activities 
of the Ministries and thus to change the relations of production 
(including relations of distribution). This capacity is determined by 
the state of play in the various arenas of struggle, including the 
possibilities to have recourse to other arenas to affect the outcome In 
the initial arena. 
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One of the striking features to arise from the examination of 
the party machinery designed to help regulate the state agencies 
is the considerable specialisation of the Secretariat officials. 
Although Hough draws attention to this, and provides evidence of it, 
he does not appear to relate it to the problems of coordination of 
inter-Ministerial relations. It seems that only the most senior 
politicians (and perhaps those aspiring to senior posts) have acquired 
a broad range of experience and expertise. This lack of generalised 
expertise must be an additional factor in the difficulties of the 
Secretariat in supervising the Ministries (apart from the small size 
of the Secretariat apparatus in comparison with the rest of the party 
and state hierarchies). Any inter-Ministerial struggle will probably 
involve inter-departmental communication among the Secretariat 
officials who may have difficulty in resolVing their differences because 
of a lack of sufficiently common means of calculation. This may be 
part of the reason why the common complaint is heard that "too many 
qu·estions are dragged before the Central Committee. " 
Certainly such practices may be partly for the desired lobbying 
effect of taking the dispute into a more powerful arena with a wider 
audience, or may be due to a reluctance to take responsibility for 
the resolution of the dispute, but the relatively narrow expertise and 
experience of the officials may genuinely create difficulties in 
deciding the best way to resolve the disputes, whatever agreement 
there may be on 'values' (ultimate objectives). 
The major conclusion to be drawn from the political relations 
between party and state agencies, which is perhaps most clearly 
illu strated in the ca se of the relations between the Central Committee 
Secretariat and the Ministries, is that despite effective party control 
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over state agencies, such state agencies a s the Ministries do have a 
political basis for alliances with sections of the central party agencies. 
Individual Mini stries can at times use their relations with the section 
of the Central Committee Secretariat which supervises them to influence 
policy formation or policy implemen tation (the latter is probably 
easier to influence). This means that the capacities of Minist~ies 
and other subordinate state agencies to influence policy formation 
and implementation place definite political limits on the central 
agencies' regulation of the economy. Furthermore, the • supreme' 
party and state agencies suffer additional limitations on their capacities 
to regulate the economy and to form economic policy because of the 
inherent difficulties of overall coordination of relations between the 
state agencies. 
Such difficulties are not primarily the result of the narrow 
speCialisation of the Secretariat officials, which ha s just been mentioned, 
but rather of the sheer volume of information which ha s to be dealt 
with in forming policy. This is probably the main cause, for example, 
of the involvement of Ministries and other agencies in the working of 
Gossnab, which is supposed to plan and supervise material technical 
supplies, a s indicated in Chapter Two I but which functions ponderously 
preCisely because of the difficulties of centrally designating the allocation 
of supplies with sufficient preciSion. Hence the planning of supply 
becomes entangled in the actual process of distribution of supplies 
by Ministries, which allows the latter considerable scope to escape 
regulation in certain respects, but only on condition that they engage 
in the struggle and negotiation within Gossnab over supplies. This 
ensures that they are regulated to at least the minimal degree necessary 
to secure the broadly defined fulfilment of the overall plan. To ta ke 
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another example, Hough 50 points out that while the Politburo 
has the final say in determining wages or social policy (such as 
welfare measures), Gosplan has to balance the various concrete 
demands with the available resources. This involves the participation 
of the Ministry of Finance. However, the sheer volume of 
information which threatens to inundate Gosplan means that it is not 
the main state agency dealing with wages and SOCial policy. The 
process of policy formation in this respect devolves in large mea sure 
on to the State Committee for Labour and Social Questions, although 
it must coordinate its decisions with a non-state agency, the All-Union 
Central Council of Trade Unions, a s well a s various other state and 
party agencies. 
It is such difficulties (both of co-ordinating relations between 
various state and party agencies and of co-ordinating the inform:l tion 
necessary to form a policy which can be ef fectively implemented) 
which give the subordinate agencies the capacity to influence policy 
formation and implementation. Rather than a totalitarian party or 
an elite co-ordinating the overall diVision of labour, by means of 
the regulation of plan implementation, what we seem to be dealing with 
is a series of agencies whose activities are indeed regulated, but whose 
capacities partly derive from the very difficulties of effective regulation. 
This means that \6[ious aspects of the process of policy formation are 
delegated to the very agencies which are supposed to implement policy: 
this is apparently also the case with legal policy 51 , but our concern 
at the moment is with economic and social policy. 
The effects of such political relations between party and state 
agencies on the relations of production could be summed up by saying 
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that there is sufficiently effective central regulation of the economy 
to prevent the various subordinate state agencies (such as enterpri ses 
or Ministries) from pursuing entirely autonomous objectives. In other 
words, it is rea sonable to talk of a -co-ordination of the division of 
labour at the level of the overall social formation. Yet such regulation 
does not preclude the various subordinate state agencies from pursuing 
their 'own' objectives within this regulatory framework, both by 
influencing policy formation and by using their partial autonomy to 
influence policy implementation. Thus inter-Ministerial disputes 
over resources, adjustments and mutual accommodations between various 
agencies, and a mutual dependence on regular flows of information, 
are important features of Soviet politics. Legal regulation of the economy 
has only a limited effect, because legal specifications of relations between 
agents are secondary to political determinants of those relations. 
Rather than indicating that there is an elite or even a ruling cIa ss able 
to control the political conditions of access to the means of production, 
the analysis of the evidence presented in this Chapter suggests that 
party 'dominance' over the' state machine' largely takes the form of 
effective but limited co-ordination of relations between agencies and of 
adjudication of disputes between state, party and trade union agencies. 
While particular agencies may be excluded on particular issues, it seems 
that on 
to be the ca se / economic and social policy issues (rather than, say, 
defence or foreign policy) all the relevant agencies appear to have access 
of some kind to policy formation and implementation. In other words, all 
relevant agencies seem on the evidence available to have some effect on 
the co-ordination of the division of labour, which means that the proce sses 
of formation and implementation of economic policy give a multiplicity 
of agents access to the means of production, in a form which rna kes it 
difficult for a particular group of agents to set the terms of other agents' 
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access. Nevertheless, the central party agencies and the central 
planning agencies do predominate in determining other agents' access, 
but this Chapter has attempted to show that there are important limits 
on the central agencies' capacity to regulate the economy. 
It is for this reason that disputes and elaborate processes of 
consultation and negotiation between the various party and state 
agencies appear to be endemic features of Soviet politics. They 
are the corollary of what might be called 'multiple access to the 
means of production' , since if one set of agents does not very clearly 
predominate in regulating the economy and hence in fixing the 
terms of access to the means of production by other agents, 
then the terms of access must be an object of constant struggle and 
negotiation. In such a situation, regular flows of information are 
vital if the means of production are to be used effectively, but this 
raises the problem of the handling of that information, which will be 
qualitatively diverse and in some respects quite esoteric. The 
difficulties of co-ordinating and interpreting such information in 
the process of policy making are formidable, and this is one of the 
rea sons why subordinate agencies are involved in what at first sight 
seems a highly centralised mode of policy formation. The genuine 
difficulties of handling information may be related to the conservati sm 
whicf! is apparent both in plan construction and other policy areas: 
where the ramifications and inter-connections between decisions cannot 
be calcufited in advance, then past 'experience' becomes the best 
guide to the way to integrate diverse objective s into a rEa sonably 
coherent whole. 
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The conditions are thus present for what I called towards the 
beginning of this O1apter an 'admixture of adjustment, regular flows 
of information and struggles over resources'. This does indeed 
seem to be what much of Soviet politics is like. However, the 
apparent difficulty in resolving inter-Ministerial disputes can be 
guessed at from· what Hough calls the 'incrementalism' of the 
budgetary process, and other policy processes. The apparent 
atrophy which has developed in Soviet politics since the mid-1970s 
cannot be due solely to the ageing of the leadership. The continual 
pumping in of increased resources for the same objectives with 
apparently little change in the relative priorities as to the allocation 
of resources between Ministries suggests a stalemate. This apparent 
stalemate can hardly be a genuine consensus unless Ministries are 
willing to accept their budgEtcny alJocatimbecause they all feel sure it 
will be greater the next year. Yet it cannot be said that this apparent 
stalemate can be resolved by, say, broading the expertise of departmental 
and Ministerial officials, or by a better legal specification of relations 
between the top level state and party agencies, for not enough is known 
to be able to analyse these political struggles in such detail. On the 
face of it, it does seem unlikely that such changes by themselves would 
have a great impact on the conduct of Soviet politics. 
However, despite the lack of detailed evidence on the political 
struggle s which are the condition of the transformation of the relations 
of production, one need not despair of analysing the effects of such 
struggles on the class structure. This is because the outcomes of 
those struggles are observable in terms of the actual policies. Thus 
the 1979 economic reform may have broken the apparent stalemate 
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over economic priorities. The priorities which are of concern in 
this thesis are not simply economic ones in the narrow sense of 
the production and physical distribution of goods and services, but 
also social priorities in the sense of policies which affect the 
development of the relations of production. Of particular concern 
are the 'welfare' policies which affect the distribution of income, 
since this is an important component of any analysis of the class 
structure. For this reason, the next Chapter will be concerned 
with public policy in the area designated loosely by what are termed 
I social consumption funds'. These cover, for example, health, 
education, housing I pensions and various kinds of recreation, although 
not all aspects of the areas covered by the 'social consumption funds I 
will be dealt with. The examination of such policies may well further 
elucidate the state of play in and between the various arenas and 
agencies discussed in this chapter, but more importantly it should 
provide the means of analysing the forces <i.t work on the contemporary 
class structure of the Soviet Union. 
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Notes . .; to Chapter Three 
P. Hirst (1979) On Law and Ideology, Macmillan, London 
and Basingstoke, Chapter 5. 
E,. B. Pashukanis (1978) Law and Marxism: A General Theory. 
Ink Links, London. Hirst's critique of Pashukanis in Chapter 5 
extends to Appendix 1 of 1979, opo cito" but he also discusses 
the work of the Austro..;.Marxist Karl Renner in some detail in 
Chapter 5. 
P. Hirst (1979), ibid., page 101. This position is attributed 
by Hirst not only to Renner, but also to "an Althusserian 
theorist like Bernard Edelman." Edelman is a French lawyer 
whose book on French photographic copy: 'right law was translated 
by E. Kingdom with an introduction by P. Hirst: B. Edelman 
(1979) Ownership of the Image: Elements for a Marxist Theory 
of Law, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, Henley and Boston. 
This forms Chapter 4 of P. Carlen and M. Collinson (eds) 
(1980) Radical Issues in Criminology, Martin Robertson, Oxford 
He argues that Marxist political theory has been haunted by 
the notion of the elimination of distinct agencies of decision. 
Usually 'the people I are treated as a unity with a single or 
common interests, which implies that they are, Or. are 
ultimately capable of becoming, one agency of decision. 
Consequently, a state will be unnecessary when there are no 
diver gent interests. Hir st l s p03ition is that with distinct 
agencies of decision there will always be divergent objectives 
or interests whose interrelations will have to be regulated. 
See, for example, the critique of Althusser in Chapter 3 of 
On Law and Ideology, (1979) op. cit. 
It is important to point out that even if this is a reasonable 
interpretation of some parts of Hirstl·s essay, it by no means 
undermines other parts of the essay. It is only occasionally 
that Hirst appears to point a general, in effect functional, 
role for the law and the state: for example, on page 41, one 
finds "Legislative bodies are necessary to any instance of 
regulation, they are a condition for defining agents and limiting 
their action in the form of rules." While it is clear from the 
context that Hirst is not here seeking lIto impose a model of 
parliamentary or representative democracy on socialist social 
relations," such a remark could be taken to mean that 
law is a necessary precondition to administrative or technical 
regulation, rather than a means of substantially improving the 
amenability of such non-legal regulation to implementing. socialist 
policy objectives. Thus despite the statements to which I have 
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drawn attention, Hirst is not attempting to provide a general 
derivative. theory of law, but is arguing br the political 
necessity of law H certain objectives are supported. 
8. Pierre et Marie Lavigne (1979) Regards sur la Constitution 
Sovietigue de 1977, Economica, Paris. 
9. For a brief account of P. and M. Lavigne (1979), see 
G. Littlejohn (1980) 'The Soviet Constitution', in Economy 
and Society, Volume 9, Number 3, August 1980. 
10. For an English language version of both the draft and final. 
versions of the 1977 Constitution, see W. F. Butler, (1978) 
The Soviet Legal System: Selected Contemporary Legislation 
and Documents, Parker School of Foreign and Comparative 
Law, Columbia University, New York. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
WELFARE AND CONSUMPTION 
Introduction 
It is impossible in one chapter to cover all aspects of welfare 
and forms of income. The educational system, for example, will 
not be dealt with here, despite the fact that consumption of educational 
resources could be considered a part of the real income of the Soviet 
population, and certainly constitutes a part of the social consumption 
funds for the purposes of the Soviet state budget. The areas which 
will be covered here will be housing, health (including sport), and 
social security, all of which affect family budgets. These aspects of 
welfare and income are useful indications of living standards and 
show the effects of social policies. As indicated in the previous 
chapter, while there is very little direct evidence available on the 
course of political struggles, the operation of social policies can be 
treated as an outcome of struggle, indicating to some extent the 
1 state of play'. In addition, the operation of social policies can be 
considered as part of the process of struggle, since the implementation 
of policy can itself be thought of as a 'strategy of powert, a means of 
affecting the balance of forces within the social formation. 
Thus social policies on welfare and consumption illuminate the 
political process and, since they form an important component of 
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relations of distribution, they are also vital to any understanding of 
relations of production and hence the nature of class relations in the 
Soviet Union. Furthermore, social policies on welfare and the 
associated patterns of consumption are important because, if 
socialist planning is not a matter of direct consciousnes s by society 
of its own needs and the willing of the means to meet those needs, 
then a policy of lito each according to his needs" requires a 
'f' , f d I specl lcatlon 0 nee s. The expenditure patterns of social consumption 
funds can only be effectively appraised in terms of the specification 
of needs and of the adequacy of the means employed to satisfy those 
needs. The specification of needs could take the forms of measure-
ment of needs and/or the articulation of 'perceived' needs by the 
agents 'experiencing' the needs. Thus the specification of needs is 
partly a political process in the sense of a struggle by competing 
agencies to have their needs registered and hopefully statisfied 
(fully or partially). 
Any specifIcation of needs, and thus of socially defined standards, 
immediately runs into the problem of the diversity of criteria of need. 
This is a problem which is 1ikely to grow as both knowledge of social 
relations and the capacity to meet basic criteria grow. 2 The diver sity 
of criteria for the satisfaction of needs also generates the problem of 
the inter-relation between various social and economic policies. Thus, 
for example, in the Soviet Union improved housing may reduce the 
demand for certain kinds of health-care, particularly for hospitalisation 
of certain medical cases. Similarly, not only can good health 
(enhanced by comparatively high rates of sporting participation) 
improve industrial productivity, but the converse can also be true 
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certain kinds of investment which raise productivity can reduce 
fatigue and industrial accidents or industrial disease, and in a 
more indirect way, improved productivity can foster good health 
by generating higher living standards and greater leisure. 
Consequently, while the main aim of this chapter is to appraise 
the impact of the areas of social policy examined upon the real 
income of the Soviet population, and thus to provide a means of 
approaching the distribution of income and hence the issue of class 
relations in the next chapter, it is necessary to examine the way in 
which the implementation of the various social policies is organised, 
and to treat the process of implementation as itself a political process. 
Nowhere is this clearer, perhaps, than in the first policy area to 
be discussed, namely, housing. 
Housing 
The diversity of criteria which can be pertinent to the appraisal 
of an area of social policy is clearly apparent to George and Manning 
(1980)3: "the development of housing under socialism involves issues 
which touch on the very core of the new society: the nature of the 
city and the country, and the relationship between them; the nature 
of the family, property relations, architecture and the creative arts; 
and the pattern of economic investment." After a brief review of 
classical Marxist and early Bolshevik views on housing, they discuss 
historical developments, which show the enormous difficulties faced 
by Soviet housing policy from its inception to the present day. 
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The pre-revolutionary housing situation' was appalling: even 
in Moscow and St. Petersburg well over half the housing was 
wooden, and the average dwelling space for the urban population 
(around 7 square metres per capita) was so badly distributed that 
70 per cent of single workers and nearly 50 per cent of married 
workers 'had only a corner of a room. Such conditions may well 
have been a vital factor in the demise of the Tsarist empire. 4 
Much of this housing was burned for fuel during the Civil War, 
with the result that when the population started to return to the 
cities in the 1920s, overcrowding remained acute, since building 
was outstripped by migration to the cities. While by 1926 house 
building was taking 17 per cent of total investment in the economy 
(two thirds of it privately built), unplanned urbanisation between 
1926 and 1939 set a world record. "Rural to urban migration 
totalled 40 million equivalent to the total for Europe between 1800 
and 1940". 5 It is in this context that the Soviet internal passport 
system and the "infamously close liaison between house managers 
and police" 6 should be understood. 
To these difficulties should be added the damage caused by 
the 1941-45 war 1,710 cities and towns were destroyed, amounting 
to 6 million dwellings which had housed 25 million people. 7 
Reconstruction began where possible during the war, and the fourth 
Five Year Plan (1946-1950), while only 77 per cent fulfilled for 
housing, improved the average per capita space by half a metre 
over the 1940 level. Yet it must be remernl:ered that around 20 
million people had died in the war and that even then specifically 
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urban space at this time was scarcer than before the war. Housing 
construction was boosted during the 1950s, when it exceeded planned 
levels for the first and only time in Soviet history. This is partly 
because plans suddenly became more ambitious in 1957 when a decree 
ordered an immediate increase of 100 per cent in the volume of new 
housing to be built during the Five Year Plan period 1956-1960.
8 
This was more than fulfilled, as can be seen from the following Tabl~. 
Table 3 
New Housing Construction in the Soviet Union since the Second World Wllf ~­
(million m 2 of living space) b. 
1970- ! 1971 : I I 1946- 1951- 1956- 1961- 1966- 1972 i 1973 I 1974 1975 
I ! I (Plan) 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 
I (Plan) 
I : 
\ I I I I 
-- -
--I 
1 
I 
77.2 I 
, 
406
1 
74.7 i I 140.6 168.4 331.9 343.9 363.0 _ 75.3 I 76.8 74.9 
i I 
--
--~-.--.-- .. --
a. Urban and rural housing, from all sources. 
h. Calculated by multiplying total useful floor space hy a factor of 0.7. according to 50\ iet practice (~ee 
text below). 
Source E.M. Jacobs, ibid., page 65 
However, while this represented a substantial increase in the 
house building programme, housing has since steadily slipped 
back as a proportion of total investment. 
Table 4 
Capital Imestmcnb b JIuu.::.ing in the Soviet Union (all sources) 
19~6-1972 
(Comparable prices) 
! 1946-1 1951-1 1956- 1961- 1966- 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
; 1950 : 1955 I 1960 1965 1970 
______________ J ____ L__ _ I 
I I Housing Invt::~tments (billion rublc~): 9.2 17.9/39.6 45.4 60.0 10.6 11.5 12.1 12.4 13.4 
% of IOtal capital in-
vestments: I 19.2 19.6, 23.2 18.3 17.0 17.4 17.4 17.0 16.9 16.4 
I 
I 
I 
1971 1972 
14.1 14.6 
16.0 15.5 
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Furthermore, the quality of building workman ship has 
'often been shoddy, and the planning of housing has been poor. 
The inadequacies in planning, particularly the poor coordination 
of industrial and urban growth, were officially recognised as early 
9 
as 1960. "The basic dilemma was that industry favoured the 
economies of scale available in large cities, which overburdened 
the urban infrustructure, whi Ie small towns stagnated for lack 
of investment. However, since the majority of new housing 
construction was undertaken by industry, Khrushchev's rapid 
housing expansion was exacerbating this problem by undermining 
still further the control of the city soviets, notwithstanding the 
1957 decree in their favour. The declared intentions of lilniting 
lar ge city growth and the expansion of housing had proved incompatible." 
While housing construction levelled off at the rate of the early 
1960s and continued at these rates well into the 1970s, the charge 
that 'Khrushchev had sacrified quality for quantity' may to some 
extent still be true of the present housing programme. The main 
problems in housing still seem to stem from the fact that as 
George and Manning note, "planning and finance spring primarily 
from different sources," 10 in other words, financing housing through 
industrial ministries does not aid the local coordination of local 
services which the city soviet must attempt; in addition, as was 
noted in Chapter Two, it contributes to 3. rapid turnover in the 
labour force as people change jobs in order to get better housing. 
How far the latter problem will be alleviated by the measures 
(associated with the 1979 economic reform) to improve housing and 
reduce labour turnover remains to be seen. 
295. 
Political Aspects of Housing Provision 
Having briefly indicated the historical conditions and some of 
the problems of the contemporary Soviet housing situation, it seems 
appropriate to turn now to the issue of the politics of Soviet housing, 
before discus sing housing outcomes (the distribution of housing 
among the populatio~) and their implications. According to George 
and Manning, as a result of conflicts between economic and social 
criteria, the supply of and access to housing is determined by two 
. .. d d ..• 11 competlng crIterIa - nee an economIc Incenhve. Yet they 
structure their examination of the contemporary housing situation 
into three aspects ... demand, supply and finance, thus creating a 
distinction between need and demand. The distinction between 
(legitimate) need and demand seems to rest on a conception of need 
as emanating from the population, which is presumably structured 
in some way, giving rise to a variety of needs. Allocation on the 
basis of legitimate need would then amount to the self-recognition 
by society of these needs and the supplying of the means to satisfy 
theIn. Where this process is 'blocked in some way, for example 
by competing government economic priorities, then they argue that 
it is "more accurate to talk of demand rather than need as the 
general determinant of supply." 12 The reservation of 'need to a 
non- conflictual situation (as in a socialist utopia?) amounts to an 
effective denial of any relationship between a definition of need and 
a political process of struggle and accommodation between varIOUS 
agencies. Yet the analysis by George and Manning shows that demand 
and supply (of which finance is itself an aspect) are not purely 
technical or economic matters in the present day Soviet Union. 
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What they do not seem to appreciate is that neither can 'need 
be a purely technical or economic matter, but if that is so, then 
the distinction which they make between need and demand is 
pointles s. 
This can be seen from the way in which they treat demand, dividing 
factors into two types:" objective and sUbjective. "The first type 
includes demography and the current short-fall in housing provision 
in terms of space per capita, availabiln:y d self- contained units, 
provision of utilities and services and location. II 13 What distinction 
can be sustained between thl s ~objective' demand and the usual sort 
of conception of need?' The subjective demand factors which they 
refer to are ""particularly the relative strength of economic and 
social planners, unplanned industrial activity, and the impact of 
14 
popular expectations." While these might correspond to the 
usual sort of conception of demand, they can only be excluded from 
a concept of need by denying the salience to a conception of need 
of the expressed wants of the various agents themselves, in which 
case it would be difficult to call 'democratic' any planning which 
ignored such expressed needs. In other words, any conception of 
needs which attempted to develop both "objective" and subjective" 
criteria of need would be virtually indistinguishable from the concept 
of demand employed by George and Manning. Perhaps a distinction 
between the two could be maintained by referring to 'objective' 
factor s as !'needs' and . subjective factors' as 4 demand'. However, 
this approach would face the difficulty that . objective factors" are 
effectively defined in terms which are related to the discourses 
and administrative practices of state agencies (even if they may have 
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originally derived from elsewhere, say, in academic research) 
and thus bear a certain relation to struggles betwe'en state agencies, 
which appear to disqualify them as needs in George and Manning's 
usage. Yet even the classical Marxist concept of use-value (which 
tends to be closely as sociated with the concept of need) does not 
simply refer to 'objective factors' such as the physical properties 
of what is needed (as understood in the existing state of knowIE~dge) 
but also to ·subjective factors' namely the expressed wants of the 
population : if an object is not wanted it has no use-value and in 
the case of commodity exchange for Marx it has no exchange-value. 
Consequently, there seems to be no good reason for George and 
Manning (who_ aim to explore the Marxist view of social policy) to 
shift the appraisal of housing from the criterion of need to that of 
demand (or economic incentive). The reason for my insisting on 
denying that George and Manning make any effective distinction 
between the concepts of need and demand (which is a comparatively 
minor problem in their otherwise highly useful discussion) is to 
prevent "needs from being relegated to a non- conflictual (non-political) 
utopia and to subject the concept to a certain amount of critical 
scrutiny. Needs do not simply emanate from a population whose 
structure is transparent to observation, but are always discursively 
registered. Thus there are no unproblematic 'objective needs' since 
the 'recognition' of needs is a theoretical and political process. This 
has implications for the socialist debate over the relative weight to 
be given to 'moral' and 'material' incentives'. We have already seen 
that George and Manning juxtapose need' and economic incentive as 
two quite distinct criteria. However J the registration of need by a 
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state agency depends not only on the expressed wants of other 
agents and on the discursive specification of need (for example, 
so many square metres of housing space per capita) but on the 
aims of the registering state agency or of some • superordinate r 
agency. Thus what is registered as a need will be the outcome 
of a struggle in which various technical and overtly political 
arguments will be deployed. The decision to register an expressed 
want as a 'legitimate' need to some extent excludes other expressed 
wants, and the reason for selecting one rather than another may 
well be the aims of the registering agency. A decision to emphasise 
'moral incentives' rather than tmaterial incentives' is among other 
things a different specification of the needs of the social formation 
in question. It is for this reason that the criterion of 'need' cannot 
be completely separated from that of 'economic incentive', as George 
and Manning attempt to do. A political decision to rely on housing 
provision as a form of economic incentive amounts a registration of a 
certain need to be met, and therefore implies a radically different 
product mix in the economic plan to that where 'moral incentives! 
are the main ones relied upon. Where house building has been 
kept down, as seemed to be the case prior to 1957, George and Manning 
argue that access to housing was used as a form of social control by 
. M" . 15 varIous lnlstrles. The policy of keeping housebuilding down 
and leaving it mostly to the Ministries, where Ministries and factories 
tore cities apart, each trying to build' its" houses, produced a 
different product mix for the overall economic plan and a different 
housing outcome in terms of its distribution among the population, 
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compared to the post-1957 policy, which attempted much more 
seriously to hold out the prospect of better housing for all. 
Nevertheless both policies were a form of economic incentive, 
and implied different specifications of the needs of the Soviet 
Union, taking more or less account of the expressed wants of 
certain agencies or sections of the population. The same is 
true of a decision to rely on 'moral incent'ives' once again 
there is a different specification of needs, but one which attempts 
to influence downwards the very expression of wants (or articulation 
of demands) by certain sections of the population. Thus, rather 
than juxtapose incentives (whether material or moral) and need as 
distinct and competing criteria determining the supply of a social 
service such as housing, the analysis of the provision of social 
services should concentrate on the inter-relation of need and 
incentive. That is, the analysis of need should not be conducted 
In terms of a de-politicised expression of the inherent characteristics 
of the population, but as the outcome of a process of reconciliation 
(however achieved) of diverse aims of various agencies, including 
the use of incentives to mobilise either the population at large or 
various agencies within the social formation towards the achievement 
of 'national' objectives. 
With these considerations in mind, it is possible to return to 
George and Manning?s discussion of "demand, supply and finance" 
of housing for information on the political processes involved in 
housing provision. In addition, the work of Sternheimer 16 will be 
examined, since· it is a contrasting analysis to the socialist approach 
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of George and Manning and thus at times concentrates on different 
aspects of housing. Beginning then, with George and Manning, 
in their discussion of 'demand' they argue 17 that "ever sirlce 
housing owned by industries was nationalised rather than municipalised 
after the Revolution, there has been conflict between industries and 
Soviets over the provision and control of housing and as sociated 
service s. " The sources of this conflict are illustrated in the 
following diagram which they provide: 
Figure 2 
The admillisrrati)le structure of housing services in the USSR. 
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The reasons for this conflict, they argue are as follows: 
"First, city and non-city enterprises are only coordinated 
\ 
at a very high level. Second, at that level state planning responsible 
for city affairs continues to be divided between the State Planning 
Commis sion (Gosplan) for industrial production and the State 
Construction Committee (Gosstroi) for housing construction. Third, 
since industrial growth has been a major aim, this arrangement 
has enabled industrial ministries to dominate urban development, 
particularly in newer industrial or smaller cities where soviets 
are dependent on one industry, or are administratively remote 
from the Republic level where major deCi,sions can be made. In 
effect the demand for housing space where industries need workers 
tends to be met by industries themselve s. However, the proper 
standard of such housing in terms of adequate space, services, 
location (particularly with respect to pollution) and maintenance 
cannot be easily enforced by the Soviets. They are by comparison 
to industry financially weak, do not own the, houses, and are 
politically weak with respect to controlling location. II 
While preoccupied with different theoretical concerns than 
Geor ge and Manning, Sternheirner provides evidence to support 
the argument of George and Manning at many points. For example, 
in discussing the control by Gosplan and the Ministries over decisions 
made at local level, he points to examples such as that of Volgograd, 
where 39 new enterprises were constructed in violation of the city's 
genplan (general municipal plan for a city's physical and economic 
development), a state of affairs directly attributable to Ministerial 
18 As both George and Manning and Sternheimer make clear, pressure. 
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the most significant result of this preponderance of Ministerial 
power has been for the pattern of location of housing and in 
particular the growth of large cities. In matters of budgetary 
allocations, the rich and powerful are consistently the most well-
rewarded. 19 The reasons probably concern external economies 
of scale; as George and Manning point out, in larger cities the 
infrastructure already exists, labour is more skilled, supply routes 
are shorter, and so on. "Indeed it has been estimated that in 
cities of more than a million, production per inhabitant is 20 per 
cent above the urban average, production per worker 38 per cent 
above, and return on investment III per cent above. These advantages, 
together with weak controls on industry have combined to upset all 
attempts to control and predict the growth of large cities begun in 
the 19 30s, re - emphasised by Khrushchev, and still official policy 
20 today. II 
cr early then, the provision of housing involves political 
proces ses which at least partially undercut official housing policy 
aims, and it is worth examining some of these proces~es In more 
detail, the better to understand the outcome s in terms of actual 
housing provision. Leaving aside the private and cooperative 
housing sectors, which will be dealt with later, state housing is 
allocated on the basis of a waiting list, rather like British council 
housing. According to George and Manning, 21 "an applicant to get 
on the waiting list must demonstrate sufficient need in terms of 
existing space, amenities, state of health and so on. Subsequently, 
people are actually housed from the waiting list in order of original 
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acceptance. However, this systf'm is modified in several 
important ways. First, the waiting list can be circumvented 
either by someone being housed directly, or by being placed at the 
top of the waiting list, or by being given preference 'other things 
being equ~.1.' Second, extra space may be allocated to cf:rtain 
preferred groups. Third, rents are low for certain favoured groups, 
but higher for others (such as the 'Tree profes sions1 ). In general 
these advantaged groups include either those with exceptional needs 
(the ill, large families, and so on) or those politically favoured 
(specialists, the military, those who do 'socially useful activity') ..... II 
Yet George and Manning accept the argument that too much should 
not be made of these housing privileges, which are in mRny cases 
small. However, what is important to note from their dis cus sion is 
the conclusion that one can draw~ that the political distribution of 
means of consumption can and usually does leave scope for those 
with greater political influence to affect the distribution proce ss. 
For this reason, rationing is not necessarily better than a market 
distribution of means of consumption in terms of its economic and 
political effects, unless, say, the distribution is subject to public 
participation which closes off or diminishes such scope for political 
influence. It should be borne in mind, however, that such public 
participation may be as technically easy to effect in the case of 
supervised (planned and monitored) market distribution of the means of 
22 
consumption. If, as I have argued in the past the conditions of 
commodity exchange have an important influence on its social effects, 
then there is no a priori reason to treat 'the commodity form' as 
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having certain essential effects and in certain circumstances it 
may well be politically preferable to rationing or some other 
administrative means of 'distribution according to need'. 
The specific administrative framework for' distribution 
a.ccording to needs t (as modified by criteria of economic incentive) 
has important effects on the outcome of the various conflicting 
pressures, although these effects are not unitary throughout the 
social formation, precisely because the housing decisions are the 
outcome of struggle, and the vprious agencies involved in this arena 
have diverse relations with each other in different localities. This 
is a point noted by Sternheirrr..er in his rejection of Brzezinski's 
'bureaucratic degeneration model' because it overstresses the 
standardisation of administrative procedures and posits a high degree 
of uniformity among all local-level administrative units. 23 It is 
also noted by George and Marning, who like Sternheimer point to the 
willingness of the leadership to engage in organisationa.l 'experiments" 
and to the lack of clear specification of the relationships between 
vanous agencies.
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The result is "that their relative strength 
varies considerably from one area to another and confused jurisdiction 
is common: a recision may have to meet the interests of the local 
soviet, the housing office, the house committee, the party, a trade 
union and so on. There is 'widespread dependence on personal 
relations' and in many respects the outcome is the same as for 
higher level conflicts between soviets and enterprises - political ideals 
are compromised." George and Manning provide the following diagram to 
illustrate the administrative structure of local housing services in the 
USSR. 
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Figure 3 
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Source: V. George and N. Manning (1980), page 179. 
These housing agencies include the ones which are not subject 
25 
to dual subordination . and therefore the ones lTIost likely to 
enhance local control and public participation in the ilTIplelTIenta tion 
of housing policy. However, their effectiveness is seriously 
diminished for a variety of - reasons. The key body in the local 
housing arena, as can be seen from the diagralTI, is the housing 
office, within which the technical inspector is the lTIost ilTIportant 
single agent, who is broadly responsible for managing the housing 
stock, access and so on. However, the general level of training and 
efficiency at this level is poor, according to George and Manning, 
and since Khrushchev1 s tilTIe voluntary administrative bodies have 
been encouraged both to ilTIprove housing lTIanagelTIent and to 
generate greater public participation in government. "In the event 
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they came to be used f"'r more as free labour than as a form. of 
26 
political representation." Attempts have been made to get the 
House Committee (Domkom) to control the housing office, but like 
attempts to strengthen the city soviet itself, they have made little 
headway. 
The weak position of the city soviets and of public participation 
is clear from the following points drawn from Sternheimer, and 
from George and Manning. There is no local fiscal control, SInce 
city and county budgets combined are only a small proportion of 
the total state budget (around 14 per cent in 1970, at a time when 
the urban population was around 56 per cent), and local taxes cannot 
be levied (since 1959 when the enterprise building tax was abolished). 
The mechanisms for ensuring local responsiveness do not work very 
well: there is a high turnover of deputies on local soviets, which 
milita tes against the development of expertise in dealing with the 
various agencies; the duties of local administrators exceed their powers; 
the attitudes of local administrators can be seen from the finding 
that 82 per cent of them believed that they took account of public 
opinion in reaching their decisions (and surprisingly in view of 
complaints about housing, 62 per cent of the population agreed with 
them); the administrative mechanisms for ensuring accountability of 
officials work poorly. These are the otchet, a periodic report by 
an agency head to ?n elected soviet or its executive committee, and 
the zapros, a legislative inquiry by the city council into an agency's 
operations or policies. The same is even more true of the nakazy. 
instructions to deputies and administrators from the electorate at 
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lar ge, which occur at best on a biennial basis, usually after the 
relevant budgetary and planning decisions have been made.
27 
In view 
of this ~t is extremely difficult to see what George and Manning mean 
when they say (page 155) that "housing is entirely controlled locally". 
This contradicts their own analysis, unless they simply mean that 
the distribution of housing is the outcome of struggle between local 
agencies, even if some of the latter are subject to dual subordination. 
If housing were really controlled locally, then it would be difficult to 
explain the chronic underinvestment in services associated with 
housing, particularly sewerage. Yet there is a degree of local 
coordination, as Sternheimer points out, with the party playing a 
fairly rational urban management role 28 without which Soviet urban 
administration would not work as well as it has through what has been 
and will continue to be a very rapid process of urbanisation. However, 
to say that there is some local coordination of decisions which has 
mitiga ted the effects of some of the ministerial agencies' pursuit of 
their own specific aims is not to say that the current situation of 
the city soviets is satisfactory. There is a clear need in my VIew 
to incorporate cities in a more politically effective way than hitherto. 
Some cities, such as Magnitogorsk, according to George and Manning 29 , 
have not been incorporated at all by the Ministry of Municipal Services; 
that is they have not been officially designated as a city, which means 
there is no legal means of enforcing adequate heating, water and 
sewerage systems. Even where cities are legally incorporated, 
it needs to be done with more local fiscal control, and with the 
direct control of housing taken away from enterprises. We have 
308. 
already seen the effect of enterprise control On job turnover, 
and the problems of coordinating enterprise housing decisions 
with an overall city genplan, but there is the additional problem 
of the obstacles to closing down enterprises or reducing their labour 
force because of rising productivity or a changing technical division 
of labour or division of social production. Enterprise control of 
housing makes it more difficult to plan the overa.ll economy in 
terms of such considerations, and provides enterprises and Ministries 
with allies in the form of city soviet§ or local party agencies who 
are willing to reach accommodations with the enterprises and 
Ministrie s to encourage them to build more housing. The removal 
of housing from the control of Ministries and enterprises would make 
public p;;rticipation in the implementation of housing policy a much 
more effective affair. As it is, George and Manning are prob?bly 
correct when they <,_rgue (page l57) that "the existence of a private 
sector in housing including individual, collective farm ~nd cooperative 
building, and a small market in subletting, hp-s provided the most 
direct form of 'p articipa tion' in housing for many Soviet citizens". 
It seems appropriate, therefore, to turn to these sectors of housing 
provision. 
Bearing in mind earlier rem::>rks about the effects of 
administrative and commodity distribution of me?ns of consumption, 
it should be pointed out that current forms of non- state housing 
provisions are varied. "Housing in the Soviet Union stands apart 
from the other social services in thctt around 50 per cent of existing 
stock is privately owned (including a small proportion of cooperative 
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flats which are effectively owned on mortgage from the state}, 
and one-third of new housing built is private or cooperative" 
30 
according to George and Manning. However, the privR.te rI.nd 
cooperative· sectors should not be treated exclusively as 'bastions 
of pri vile g~ , .• It is certa.inly true that in the early 1970 t S a 
cooperative flat cost about six times the average wage to buy, and 
a 40 per cent deposit was required. However, this is not the most 
privi leged sector of housing provision, since official provision of 
, 
housing at low rent for the politically privi leged is the most 
favourable form of access to housing, and as we shall see later, 
the cooperative sector faces considerable planning obstacles which 
reduce its attractiveness as an option. Furthermore, with regard to 
other private forms of housing, rural private housing is often the only 
form available and frequently lacks basic amenities. State housing is 
is generally of better quality and is heavily subsidised. 
The existence of the private and cooperative sectors is due to 
the fact that the state cannot by itself provide enough housing 
construction. It needs to rely on rural inhabitants to provide much 
of their own housing using traditional materials, although in recent 
years the reI evant skills among the population have become somewhat 
rarer. But the cooperative sector does not merely fill a gap in state 
provision, it also acts as a channel diverting funds from higher 
income groups which would otherwise create additional demand for 
consumer goods. Another function fulfilled by the non- state sector, 
in urban areas at least, is that it does register the short-fall in 
supply: the unofficial but legal subletting rates are a price mechanism 
which registers 'perceived need' without recourse to state agencies. 
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The extent of underprovision by the state can be assessed from 
the following Table, which estimates current ownership of new and 
existing housing stock in urban and rural areas~ 
Table 3 
Estimated currenrownership of new and existing housing stock 
in urban and rural areas (%) 
State 
URBAN Private 
Industry 
Soviet 
Co-operative 
State 
RURAL Private 
New construction 
35 
45 
9 
11 
100 (75% of all 
construction) 
60 
40 
100 (25% of all 
construction) 
Existing stock 
30 
35 
30 
5 
100 (66% of all 
stock) 
10 
90 
100 (33% of all 
stock) 
Source: V. George and N. Manning ibid, page 151. 
Thus the inadequacies in housing provision are to some extent 
made good by the private and cooperative se.ctors. It is perhaps 
easy to argue that it would be preferable if these inadequacies were 
rather eradicated by increased investment, better planning and by 
the dissociation of housing from industrial Ministries, so that city 
soviets were directly responsible for urban housing. However, 
this is easier said than done, since, as George and Manning point 
out, "the determinants of the supply of housing are divided amongst 
different (and in some respects competing) bodies. In general, there 
has been a close shaping of housing policy by economic policy, 
although the detailed realisation of this is in fact a quite complex 
political process. Consequently, political initiatives to affect the 
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organisation and supply of housing have often been frustr2.ted, or 
at least distorted in their implementation,,3l Thus the political 
processes involved in providing .access to a major means of 
consumption (that is, the political processes involved in some of 
the relations of distribution) have their own effectivity which among 
other things reduces their amenability to any democratic pressure for 
greater public participation. This raises the question which will be 
the main concern of the next section, namely, what are the effects 
of these processes in terms of actual housing outcomes and their 
social consequences. 
The Social Distribution of Housing 
Perhaps the most striking outcome of the competition between 
Ministries to build their town I housing, and their consequent refusal 
to be constrained by the existing plans of city soviets, ha s been the 
inordinately high proportion of housing inve stment (around half the 
annual housing investment) which is "spent on repairing old buildings 
and constructing new buildings to replace habitable space demolished 
. 32 ln redevelopment schemes" Elsewhere, . Jacobs gives an idea of 
the 
both/scale of the repair and replacement problem, and of some of the 
reasons for it. From 1960 to 1972 roughly 15 per cent of the new 
33 housing built each year was replacement of demolished housing, 
and by no means all the demolition is warranted, since some of the 
housing is quite new. A major consequence of this demolition is that, 
since those whose apartments and houses have been pulled down must 
be rehoused free of charge, the destruction of housing stock has 
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slowed down the Soviet housing programlue, particularly when 
it is remembered how heavily subsidised state housing is. The 
34 
scale of repairs is even more astonishing. As much as 30 per 
cent of the labour in construction is spent on repairs to bring 
housing up to minimum standards, and repairs are often necessary 
on brand new buildings, with as much as 60 per cent of new housing 
being classified as defective. Moreover, structures do not last as long 
as they should, with in the case of one study 64 per cent of apartment 
roofs built in the 1960s needing repair within four years, and all 
of them within ten years {on a roof designed to last 30 years}. The 
quality of repair is often substandard, and the cost is excessive, 
offsetting the la bour- sa ving benefits of industrial pre- fa brication 
construction techniques. While Jacobs does not mention it, the repair 
problems (and internal decoration problems) lead to a flourishing 
black market, or rather I. grey • market to use KatseneIinboi gen's 
terms.
35 
Jacobs gives an excellent account of the reasons for the 
poor state of repair of Soviet housing: 36 "The emphasis on quantity 
of housing and the planner IS obse s sion with cutting produ ction costs 
are partially responsible for the low quality of Soviet housing. By 
trying to cut costs on capital repairs (during the period 1966 to 1969, 
115 million roubles allocated for capital repairs was not used); the 
local o.uthorities are actually shortening the life of their housing. 
Poor construction, followed by poor maintenance and repair, leads to 
premature decay of the buildings and might help explain the high 
rate of attrition of Soviet urban housing." The effects on quality 
of j storming' at the end of the annual plan period, so well known 
in industry, are also noted by Jacobs and by George and Manning. 
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In the light of these phenomena, one can appraise the quality 
of Soviet housing. Since the late 1950s, there have been some 
remarkable improvements in conditions, and per capita living space in 
new apartments reached the 1922 sanitary norm of 9 square metres 
per capita during the 1971-1975 Five Year Plan. Overall in the 
Soviet Union living space is now approaching the average of 9 square 
metres per capita. New apartments have been much smaller than old 
ones, presumably because the trend has been away from communal 
apartments (which were cheaper to build because they had a lower 
per capita provision of amenities). The quality in terms of amenities 
has also improved, although by Western standards it remains poor 
to abysmal. Thus, between 1961 and 1971,10 per cent of the living 
area constructed lacked the three basic amenities 6f running water, 
sewerage and ce n tral heating. ,\ In 1970, only 77 per cent of Soviet 
urban dwellings in the public sector had running water, while only 
. 37 74 per cent had sewerage and 72 per cent had central heatmg." 
These figures take no account of privately -owned housing, which m 
1970 accounted for about 30 per cent of the urban housing stock, 
and in which standards of amenities fall very far below public- sector 
standards. The expense of installing the amenities is probably the 
limiting factor here, since most of this housing is on a city:s 
outskirts, which anyway tend to be less well provided with amenities. 
In small towns, the standard of amenitie s in public housing is 
appreciably worse than in larger cities, and since there is proportionately 
more private housing in small towns, presumably the standard of 
amenities there is abysmally low. Jacobs claims that in the public 
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sector, the list of building and design faults, and problems of 
planning and management, resulting in the poor quality of Soviet 
housing and the low standards of amenities, could go on for pages.
38 
Thus while recent improvements in design and construction have 
substantially improved the quality of Soviet housing, particularly 
compared to the 1.ate 1950s, there is in Jacobs! view no other 
industrial country with housing conditions as bad as in the USSR. 
If one puts together the fact that the largest cities have received 
the most investment with the fact that the largest cities are 
concentra ted in European Russia, it comes as no surprise to learn 
that the massive overall development of housing has not decreased 
geographical inequalities in per capita living space. Rather it is 
surprising to find how little the regional inequalities have increased. 39 
However, rural-urban differences in housing remain considerable. 
While urbanisation has substantially improved the overall level of 
accommodation of the Soviet population, the resulting rural-urban 
migration of currently around two million a year has not simply 
left behind the old, the female and the unskilled, and the poor, 
it ha~ left them in accommodation which to- day seems rudimentary. 
Those who have not yet achieved residence in cities frequently 
commute since they are able to find jobs if not housing. 
Apart from regional and rural-urban differences in housing, the 
major difference in the social distribution of housing is between the 
state, private and cooperative sectors. It has already been argued 
that the private and cooperative sectors are not necessarily 'bastions 
of privilege' and it should be clear from the above discussion on 
quality of housing why this is the case with most private housing, 
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which is either rural, located in small towns or located on the 
outskirts of larger cities. However, the cooperative sector is 
clearly an option for higher income groups, and while amenities 
are clearly better than Inuch private housing, various obstacles 
are placed in the way of prospective cooperative ~mbers, "seemingly 
in an attempt to avoid a scramble for places on waiting lists, which 
can sometimes have backlogs of six years or morel140 . There are 
residence requirements (defined in terms of number of years in a 
city or place on the state waiting list), and the decision to build is 
subject to approval by the local soviet executive committee, which 
also supervises design. Construction is by state agencies at state 
prices, and completion is even slower than on state housing (since 
there are no economic incentives for the construction workers 
involved) . Apartments in such a building cannot be sold, since they 
are all public cooperative property. When the rules are followed, 
the sites for cooperative housing are often on the outskirts of a 
city, far away from public services, transportation and members' 
places of work, thus causing a lot of complaints from cooperative 
members. In terms of various indices (absolute space or the per-
centage of public sector construction) cooperative construction has 
gone down since the mid-1960s to the early 1970s. 
Thus official enthusiasm for cooperatives seems to be waning, 
according to Jacobs, which is in contrast to the impression given 
by George and Manning. One reason may be that some housing 
cooperatives are fairly privileged, and in catering for middle and 
upper income groups, housing cooperatives threaten the homogeneity 
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of Soviet society. Certainly planners seem to have been at pains to 
mix the cooperatives in with state housing and to limit the extent of 
cooperative housing, and while the personal expenditure involved did 
limit the purchasing power of the upper income groups, Jacobs 
suggests that "it may be that the availability of cars has now been 
able to do the same thing, at less cost in effort and materials of 
41 
the state." 
Pri vate house building in cities is discouraged, and in the 
capitals of the various constituent Republics and in most major cities, 
no land or credits have been granted since 1962. Just as in the state 
and cooperative sectors there are relatively privi leged housing groups, 
so there are such groups in the private sector, mostly in the case of 
dachas owned by city-dwellers, but the general picture is that shortages 
of material and finance, coupled with a lack of official sympathy for 
private housebuilding, account for the poor condition of private housing 
which was indicated earlier. Despite the fact that private urban 
housing is a ,declining proportion of the urban housing stock, people 
resort to illegal private house construction, which is often jerry- built. 
This is a clear indic8.tion that the Soviet housing situation still falls 
far short of peoples' expecations (which are probably still rising as 
a result of improved provision). Soviet standards in housing are still 
well behind West European or American ones. Jacobs sets more 
limited goals for Soviet housing:a universal sanitary norm of 14 to 15 
square metres of living space, with hot and cold water, sewerage 
and central heating. In his view, it is still open to doubt whether 
such standards will be achieved by 1990 or even 200042 . 
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The more immediate social implications of the distribution 
of Soviet housing must now be considered. The two most 
pertinent for the purposes of this thesis are the effects of housing 
policy on the distribution of income and on family structure 
(the latter because the family in the USSR as elsewhere is often 
an integral component of the s.)cial policies of state agencies, either 
as locus of various policy objectives or as an agency for the 
implementation of policy). To deal first with the distribution of 
income, it is clear that rent is only a very s mall deduction from 
the disposable income of families, despite the complex rules 
concerning rent which could in principle lead to greater variation 
in the proportion of disposable income which goes on rent. The three 
basic elements of a tenant's rent a re basic scale rent, apartment 
tax and sliding scale rent. However, Jacobs argues that increases 
in the minimum wage have meant that since 1968 all tenants have 
paid the full maximal standard rate of rent for their accommodation, 
although if there is no comlllon kitchen, the total rent paid for the 
apartment is reduced by one- quarter. 43 There are preferential 
rates of rent for pensioners, military, KGB and militia personnel, 
and holders of various decorations. In addition, health workers, 
educators and certain other categories of workers living and working 
in rural areas have a free apartment (including heating and lighting) 
for themselves and their families. Extra rent can be char ged for 
above- standard living space, or for being a member of the "free' 
professions, handicraftsmen and 'ministers of religion. Tenants must 
also pay for central heating and various communal services (although 
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pensioner s pay only half-price for these). The complexities of the 
procedures for assessing charges on these services lead to 
disputes about rent charges, but the overall situation is fairly clear, 
despite the complexities of the system of charging rent. The average 
Soviet family (as opposed to the poorer than average family) spends 
four or five per cent of tot al family income on rent alone, compared 
with around 11 per cent in the USA or seven per cent in the UK. 
While it is possible to sub-let in the USSR, this cannot be done 
systematically in a way which creates a source of unearne,d income. 
Consequently, the subsidised nature of Soviet state housing, which 
is paid for from taxation (mostly turnover tax, that is, in the form 
of higher prices for consumer goods and services), means th~.t the 
eff ect of Soviet housing policy on the distri bution of income is 
probably on the whole fairly egditc.rian. 44 
The move away from communal apartments to private apartments 
means that there is now 'architectural support' in the Soviet Union 
for the nuclear family. To the extent that this trend continues, it 
will mean that whatever the legalities of various kinds of family structure 
and whatever the divorce rates, something like the present day family 
will be difficult to avoid because of the implicit co-habitation patterns 
of private flats. One could take a variety of positions with respect 
to the relation between architectural exigencies and family structure. 
Although the trend towards making self- contained state - owned flats 
45 
availabl.e to all is far from realised, George and Manning point out 
that in terms of design of housing this precludes any wide- scale 
development of communalism in domestic life. As more domestic 
facilities become available the focus on the nuclear domestic household 
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could intensify. However, they argue that this is not necessarily 
a retreat from socialism, and that eastern and western Marxists alike 
tend to over-emphasise the institutional economy and under- emphasise 
the domestic economy. They thus argue for investment in and 
design of housing as productive investment, that is, in favour of a 
"garden city' type of socialism, presumably with massive domestic 
production of vegetables. While it is true that flats do increase the 
demand for vegetables as a commodity, a demand which the Soviet 
Union currently finds difficulty in satisfying, what George and Manning 
call the Ioerror' of the Soviet planners in treating only the institutional 
economy as productive sterns from the classical Marxist conce ption 
of productive labour. While I would agree that this conception is 
problematic, pointing out that the dome stic household is capable of 
producing means of consumption (a point in any case made some 
years ago during the tdomestic labour debate') does not eo ipso 
enable one to resolve the problem of the most appropriate units of 
production and family structure in a socialist social formation. 
Before advocating an increase in domestic household production, the 
relation of the nuclear famil y to the contemporary relatively poor 
housing and poor system of retail distribution need to be taken into 
consideration. 
The .most immediately striking aspect of the Soviet nuclear 
family in the contemporary housing and retail distribution situation is 
the burdensome nature of domestic housework and shopping. This is 
well documented by both Heitlinger and Dodge. 46 Such work is 
overwhelmingly carried out by women, although they constitute over 
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50 per cent of the waged labour force. Admittedly, the situation 
has improved very slightly in recent years, but given the role of 
women in rural households (in terms of work On the private plots), 
there is no reason to suppose that an emphasis on the 'garden-city' 
type of domestic household production would do anything but reinforce 
the current sexist practices within the Soviet nuclear family. This 
is not to say that any social or economic policy directed at the 
nuclear family is necessarily sexist. I H · 47 For examp e, 1rst argues 
that "It is precisely by supporting and extending ordinary women's 
aspirations and actions in the family that modern feminism can have 
most effect on the family". This is not an argument for the support 
of the existing family structure and the subordinate position of women 
in it, since as Hirst makes clear elsewhere in this argument, liberal 
capitalist state policies of intervention in the fami ly have historically 
entailed an attempt at partial transform8.tion of the family. 48 The 
implication is that the same would be even more true of feminist 
interventions, and I would as sume that under the appropriate 
circumstances, state socialist interventions in the nuclear family could 
substantially transform the family in a direction promoting the 
equalisation of the position of men and women. 
The point here is not to specu1.a te on what the appropriate 
circumstances would be, or what other effects policies intervening 1n 
the nuclear family could have (such as promoting social consumption 
or the acquisition of the complex cultural skills necessary for mass 
public participation in politics), but rather to point out that disagreement 
with George and Manning's proposals for dome stic arrangements does 
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not mean a rejection of such issues as a matter of serious concern 
for social policy. Furthermore, disagreement with George and 
Manning's proposals does not necessarily mean a rejection of ·the' 
nuclear family as an important component of strategies aiming at 
socialist social policy objectives. In the case of the Soviet Union I 
the nu clear family has for a long time been implicated in the 
"1 "f" 1 1" 49 lmp ementabon 0 SOCla po lCY. This continues to be the case 
today, not only in housing as we have just seen, but also in health 
and social security. These areas of social policy will now be 
examined, before turning to the effect of such welfare policies on 
consumption as reflected in family budgets. 
Health 
As in the case· of housing, it is difficult to understand the Soviet 
health service without an appreciation of its historical development, 
and this will be briefly discussed here. 50 In July 1918, the world's 
first health ministry was established, preceding the UK Ministry of 
Health (established in 1919): this was the People's Commissariat of 
He alth of the RSFSR. Apart from the major problems of epidemics, 
starvation and war casualties, the medical profession itself posed an 
immediate problem in the form of the anti- socialist Pirogov Society 
which under the Provisional Government had been rapidly strengthening 
the position of the medical profession in the health service. It was 
dis solved in 1918, and a Medical Workers: Union (for all medical 
workers including doctors) was set up in 1919. For rural health 
services, despite initial unwillingness to use "second class doctors", 
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the Bolsheviks relied to some extent on 'feldshers' (from the German 
for 'army surgeon') who were (and are) not a s highly qualified as 
doctors. However I even to-day feldshers do not 'fill the gaps' 
generated by lack of doctors. While there are still considerable 
problems in persuading doctors to live in rural area s I the feldshers 
do not predomina te in area s where doctors are lacking. Rather there 
is a 'positive association' between the distribution of rural coctors 
and feldshers I suggesting that the latter at times function a s medical 
auxiliaries to the doctors. 
Once the epidemics a ssociated with the Civil War were overcome I 
51 prophylaxis (preventive medicine) re-emerged a s a key concern in 1924. 
With the introduction of the NEP, there wa s a limited resurgence of 
private practice, doctors havi ng to choose complete public or private 
work. Despite 'penal' taxation of private practice I there are still a few 
private polyclinics in the Soviet Union I but no private hospitals and no 
system of 'pay-beds~ R elated to the first Five Year Plan, the health 
services were explicitly directed (in a party resolution of 18th December 
1929, nine days before Stalin"s famous intervention in the Agrarian 
Marxi st debate) to give priority to the industrial health service. The 
use of health posts in industrial enterprises now became the first 
priority, and with the increa se in women at work a special health service 
section wa s developed for women and children. There wa s also a branch 
set up to plan and organise the sanitation of the rapidly growing urban 
area s I and medical training wa s ta ken out of the Universities I with the 
number of years of study reduced to four I in conjunction with which 
the rapid growth of medical research institutes wa s started (resulting 
in 223 institutes in 1941). 
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Collective farms were made largely responsible for their own 
health care, although there were medical 'flying squads' to deal wi th 
epidemics, and the number of rural hospital beds doubled during the 
first Five Year Plan. However, the general result of the emphasis on 
indu stry wa s the neglect of rural health, there being 750 patients per 
doctor in towns in 1933, compared to 14,200 per doctor iri the countryside. 
The priority given to industrial health wa s obviously to aid production, 
and the effects of this can still be seen to-day in the design of the 
52 
medical certificate which is still related to work-obligations. This 
reorientation of medicine from need to labour disCipline wa s related 
to the political subordination of and a decline in the prestige of the 
medical profeSSion, whose real wages were cut to 58 per cent of their 
1928 level by the Second World War. At the same time, women were 
encouraged to become doctors, and 75 per cent of doctors were women 
by 1934. The 1936 Constitution included the right to free health care 
and established an All-Union Ministry of Health. This completed the 
development of central administration of medicine and the process of 
poli tical subordination of the medical profession. The result of the 
tripartite division into industrial health, women and children, and urban 
sanitation, coupled with the absence of effective worker or public 
participation, wa s that the way wa s opened to increa sing academic and 
technical dominance, and the influence of the hospital. According tcr 
George and Manning 53 this trend wa s confirmed when in 1947 
polycliniCS and in 1956 sanitary-epidemiological (public health) stations 
came under hospital control. One might add that related to this 
academic and technical predominance, as in the West, is the absence 
of women doctors from senior administrative and research posts. It is 
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noticeable that now, a s the prestige and pay of the medical profession 
is being increased, half of those studying to become doctors are men, 
although this ha s not yet worked its way through into the profession 
itself, where women still form 70 per cent of practising doctors. 
The rapid pre-war expansion and moderni sation of the health 
services made a substantial contribution to the war effort and in many 
ways this seemed to confirm the general Soviet approach to health, 
but despite this the first post-war Minister attacked the' industrial principle'. 
The 1947 combination of hospitals and polyclinics wa s part of the 
a ssociated changes which included improved local access to health 
care (with greater utilisation of the urban 'block' or uchastok, the 
lowest administrative unit in the health service). From around 1954, however j 
the industrial orientation was restored, with factory health posts being 
reopened and priority being given to industrial workers in terms of access 
to hospital, but for the first time since collectivisation the farmer 
benefited from occupational priority. 54 Khrushchev's' sovnarkhoz reform' 
of 1957 to some extent reduced the empha si s on the 'indu strial principle' 
by enhancing territorial forms of administration, including Union-Republican 
Ministries of Health. Since then the trends have been towards greater 
rural-urban equality in provision (to the point where rural areas have more 
pharmacies per head than urban areas), greater emphasis on hospitals 
(especially bigger ones where economies of scale and greater medical 
specialisation are possible) and a deliberate emphasis on 'professionalising' 
the medical profession. The latter includes a professional oath on graduation 
and limitations on the practice of medicine by those without special 
training. 
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The general effect of these developments and the expansion of the 
Soviet health service ha s been to alter the patterns of morbidity to 
those more typical of high-income countries with low infant mortality, 
with the empha sis shifting towardsd isea ses of middle and old age, 
particularly lung cancer, cardio-vascular disease and mental ill-health. 55 
The demographic trends are towards an ageing population, with the size 
of the cohorts entering old age rising rapidly after 1980. While exact 
figures on morbidity and mortality are rather· scarce, it does seem as 
if there is a greater problem than in Britain with some infectious diseases, 
particularly in the warmer southern parts of the USSR. There also seems 
to be greater provi sion for the treatment of tuberculosis than is the ca se 
in Britain. 
Health Politics: Administration, Finance and Policy 
As Ka ser points out 56, II The absence of extensive morbidity serie s 
precludes judgement on the appropriate ness of the Soviet medical service 
to meet the demands on it. II The development of medical personnel 
differs markedly from that in the We st and, being labour intensive, may 
appear wa steful, but this may not be the ca se given Soviet standards 
of nutrition and housing. The process of planning the deployment of 
personnel and equipment is related to the medical statistics coming in 
to the Ministry of Health from hospitals, dispensaries and mass screening, 
with the latter giving an indication of the extent of otherwise undiagnosed 
illness. Thus registered needs are partly generated by the administrative 
practices of the health service. 57 For this rea son it is important to 
understand the administrative structure of the health service. While 
the Soviet health service is often described as highly centralised, it is 
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less so than it might at first appear. Certainly in December 1969, a 
new Public Health Act wa s pa ssed by the Supreme Soviet, aiming at 
eliminating variations in medical practice and in the interpretation of 
regulations 58, but it did not eliminate the departmental structure of 
the health service. Other Ministries and corresponding organisations 
can run their 'own' health services, with permission. from the USSR 
Council of Ministers, the most substantial being provided by the 
Ministries of Transport, Civil Aviation, Defence and Internal Affairs. 59 
The USSR Ministry of Health is given the function of co-ordinating 
their service s. With the above qualification in mind, the following 
figure gives an idea of the administrative structure of the health service, 
although it does not show all the bodies involved in the preparation 
and approval of the national health plan. 60 
Figure 4 
The administrative structure of the Soviet health service 
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At the bottom two levels of Figure 4, one is dealing with 
institutions directly responsible for the delivery of health care. As 
indicated earlier, such institutions are divided into three sectors, 
namely, general clinical and indu stria 1 medicine; rna ternity and child 
care, and public health. Despite the reduced empha sis on 'the industrial 
principle' since 1957, such a diVision of labour seemes clearly 
designed to meet indu strial needs: the first sector for maintaining a 
productive labour force, the second for reproducing the labour force 
efficiently, and the third to prevent illness from reducing the labour 
supply. Thu s there is still scope for strong conflicting pre s sure s on 
the doctor to meet both the needs of the patient and those of industry. 
A high degree of specialisation, so frequently reported in discussions 
of the divi sion of labour in the Soviet Union, seem s eVident in the 
health services as well. Thus there is a variety of health institutions 
whose activities overlap with poor co-ordination. 
Within the first sector are general cure and prophylaxis hospitals 
(bolnitsy), in some ca ses united with polyclinics; polycliniCS on their 
own; panel surgeries (ambulatorii); dispensaries (for follow up treatment 
with record linkage to other institutions, the active partiCipation of the 
patient, and survey of the local social circumstances causing the 
condition in question, a s well a s for screening and monitoring certain 
age groups and illnesses notably tuberculosis, veneral disease and 
alcoholi sm); health po sts; military hospitals (gospitalii); sanatoria; 
pharmacies; an d factory health services. The second sector is comprised 
of maternity homes I with ante-natal and post-natal clinics; children's 
hospitals. children's polyclinics; creches; children's convalescent homes 
and medical services to camps I schools and other educational 
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establishments. The third sector is composed of sanitary epidemiological 
stat ions and health education units. In addition to these three sectors, 
there are medical services for rural 'areas - raion hospitals and rural 
. ( ) 61 phY9cians, feldsher and midwife 'blocks' ucha stki • 
At the di strict level, the chief physician, a s head of the district 
hospital, co-ordinates polyclinics, dispensaries and public and industrial 
health services. At the regional level, the chief medical officer is 
responsible for all medical services. The ,result is often that many 
primary-level physicians feel that they are merely referral agents for a 
hospital dominated set of institutions, at the district level. At the 
regional level, the dominance of academic medicine continues, with a 
proliferation of specialities that promote an excessively compartmentalised 
activity and a blinkered perception of the patient. These complaints are 
also familiar in Britain. Thus "the articulation and impact of popular 
demand has been weak in the face of political constraints on resource 
allocation and the planning process". 62 It therefore seems appropriate to 
examine, firstly, the planning proce S8 and, secondly, the methods of 
financing the health service. 
While the agencies involved in the process of elaborating the 
annual health plan (and integrating it to the annual economic plan) are 
clear from Popor's account 63 it is not clear which techniques or 
methods of planning predominate. Among the techniques referred to are 
expert evaluation, cost-benefit analysis, the balance method, the method 
of ratios and proportions, and the establishment of morms and standards. 
Judging by later chapters in POPOl, it seems that the balance method, the 
method of ratios and proportions, and the establishment of norms and 
standard s are the main planning methods. That is, the material and 
i 
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labour balance methods are used as in the rest of the economic plan, 
while ratios and proportions,and norms and standards are used to establish 
targets for the plan. Thus "a standard ratio of medical facilities to 
population size is of great importance in planning the development of the 
health services." 64 Presumably thi s technique of ratios and proportions 
is u sed to relate the growth of facilitie s to demographic trend s, and in 
that sense, to fit services to expected medical need, but on the whole it 
seem s to be the 'supply side' which is empha si sed. In other word s, it 
seems to be the delivery of services which is the main criterion in the 
establishment of req uirements. For example, requirements for medical 
personnel are established in such a manner, despite the fact that the average 
work-load for physicians in the USSR appears to be the lowest in the world .• 
Thi s ha s led Popov a s well a s We stern observers to conclude that the 
increa se in medical specia ltie s may have been somewhat wa steful; or as 
Popovputs it: 65 "the conclusion may thus be drawn that insufficient attention 
has so far been paid to improving the organisational forms of medical care 
and the utilisation of the material and technical basis of public health, (and) 
the more rational distribution and utilisation of medical personnel, whether 
physiCians or members of the paramedical profe ssions " 
However, while there may be a certain amount of over-empha sis in the 
planning process on increa sing the delivery of health care, in the form of 
medical personnel, pharmaceuticals, hospital beds and so on, it would be 
misleading to imply that there wa s no attempt to relate health care prOVision 
66 
to need. 'Popovdistinguishes between 'health norms' and 'health standards'. 
He defines the former as" SCientifically established indices of environmental 
conditions and of the medical care required by the community or by various 
population groups, as well as of the utilisation of facilities," whereas the 
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latter are defined a s II indices relating to the resources required to 
meet the needs specified by the norms I i. e. indices relating to the 
public health facilities and the availability of medical care. II To 
put it crudely I 'norm s' refer to needs (including needs a s indica ted by 
use of existing facilities) whereas' standards' refer to the resources 
required to meet those needs. There are 300 such indices I and a 
substantial proportion of them could be counted as' norms'. This 
sophistication of the Ministry of· Health's definition and registering of 
need cannot be discounted in any serious appraisal of the soci al effects 
of the hea Ith service. 
The implementation of the health plans is of course dependent 
on adequate finance I which comes mainly from the social consumption 
funds I of which they form nearly 20 per cent (or 4 per cent of the 
net material product). In addition I a further 1 per cent of the net 
material product (NMP) is spent by state enterprises I trade unions and 
collective farms I with a small contribution from social insurance funds 
and priva te payments. Soviet data on the composition of hea lth finance 
are scarce I according to Ka ser I 6 7 so the following table which he 
compiled for 1968 is invaluable. 
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Table b 
Finance of health servic'esin the USSR: official data and estimates 
for 1968 
Millions of roubles 
Million roubles Per cent 
1. Government 
On health and physical culture 8138 
(al of which paid through: 
1.1 AII·Union and Union-Republican 
agencies 1069 
1.2 Provincial (oblastnye) authorities 1194 
1.3 City 190rodskie) authorities 3367 
1.4 Rayon (raionnye) authorities 2056 
1.5 Settlement (poselkovye) councils 142 
1.6 Village (sel.'skie) councils 310 
(bl 1.7 less outlay on physical culture -49 8089 77.1 
(cl of which on health-care products 
1.1 Supplied in hospitals 542 
1.9 Supplied free to outpatients 385 
2. Social Insurance 
2.1 Contribution to prosthetic costs 90 
2.2 Resort cures and dietetic needs 490 580 5.5 
3. Other social ized enterprises 
3.1 State and cooperative enterprises, trade 
unions, collective farms 2013 
3.2 less social insu rance -580 1433 13.7 
4. Direct payment (by persons I 
4.1 Purchase of health-care products 288 
4.2 Payments in polyclinics 98 386 3.7 
5. Total 'of officially-sanctioned payments 10488 100.0 
Source: M. Ka ser (1976), ibid., page 88. 
I 
A s can be seen from the above table, a variety of agencie s are 
involved in the prOVision of health care. Government finance is 
predominantly channelled through the Ministry of Health, and apart 
from social insurance, the other main source of finance is from the 
socialised ente,rprises operating budgets or profits. In the ca se of 
collective farm hospitals, for example, the collective farm provides 
the building, heating, cleaning and so on, while the Ministry of Health 
supplies the mediCally qualified personnel. Roughly one-sixth of 
health care is provided in this way profits can be used for resort stays 
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at spa s, or in holiday area s, with an enterprise or trade union 
sometimes building its· own facilities in such area s. Such practices 
resulted partly from the ta ke-over of spa s after the Revolution, and 
partly from the housing problems of the cities. Sometimes their 
therapeutic or prophylactic effect is unclear 68 but in the ca se of, 
say, fishing enterpri se s in side the Arctic circle which have facilitie s 
on the Black Sea, there is clearly a health gain from such facilities. 
At the level of regional health faCilities, salaries take over 50 
per cent of the budget, food about 10 per cent and medicines about 
8 per cent. Medicines are charged for, except when provided in 
hospital. Free medicines constitute around 70 per cent of all medicine, 
but there is no sign of implementing the official policy of pha sing out 
such charges. In addition, a s indicated earlier, there is private payment 
for care (both legal and illegal payment). There are a few 'paying 
polyclinics', and those which exist are administered and financed by the 
local authority like any free facility. Payments of 1 to 2 roubles mean that 
they are in any ca se 'semi-free', a s far a s the income s of the pa tients 
likely to use them are concerned. The payments which are not legally 
sanctioned are the unoffiCial fees for 'tipping' ordinary medical staff, 
but this is so general that a scale of rates has been set out by various 
commentators on Soviet health. 69 
One result of the forms of organisation and finance of the Soviet 
health serviceha s been that it ha s been provided in a remarkably 
inexpensive manner. This ha s continued to be the ca se despite the fact that 
the number of doctors increa sed by 85 per cent between 1960 and 1974, 
so that the Soviet Union provides over twice a s many doctors. per head 
of the population a s Britain, and despite the fact that, administratively 
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speaking, hospitals predominate. One reason for this is that since 
the late 1920' s real incomes in general have doubled, whereas the 
incomes of health staff have only increased by half. In addition, 
there ha s been a 'sparing use of capital' 70 both in terms of ancillary 
equipment and in terms of hospital construction; part of the saving in 
terms of hospital construction has been achieved by standardising 
hospital building s over very long periods, so that those built recently 
are generally indistinguishable from those which are much older. 
Furthermore, careful planning seems to have inc rea sed the occupancy 
rates for hospital beds, that is, ha s decrea sed the time during which 
beds are empty, thereby making further use of available facilities. 
This may partly account for the increase in treatment of rural patients 
in urban hospitals. Finally, some 80 per cent of patients receive their 
71 
entire treatment in out-patient establishments. Such considerations 
should not be forgotten when claims are made that Soviet health care 
is wa steful. 
Following this discussion of the administration and finance of 
Soviet health, it is now possible to assess the priorities of Soviet 
health provision and their relation to need, despite the lack of evidence 
on patterns of morbidity. In other words, it is now possible to assess 
Soviet health policy. While it is clear that in the pa st indu strial 
provision took precedence over other aspects, and urban provision took 
precedence over rural provision, this now happens despite rather than 
because of official policy. The attempts to reduce overlap in provision 
by different institutions (especially primary care institutions as opposed 
to hospitals) and the attempts to equalise urban-rural provision have 
had the effect of redUCing such stark differences in priority a s existed 
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in the pa st. Priorities are now of course partly related to demographic 
and morbidity trends. While the USSR ha s had a low dependency ratio 
(the ratio of (a) those too young or old to work to (b) the economically 
active population) this is now disappearing. As indicated earlier, the 
morbidity patterns are similar to Western Europe or the USA, with a 
residual problem of infectious disease. However, these determinants of 
medical priority are affected by others: the provision of doctors ha s 
genera ted a demand for home visits (despite the official preference for 
hospitalisation) , the provision of polyclinics and dispensaries has 
generated a demand for specialist hospital services, and the provision 
of rna ss screening ha s generated need in the form of otherwise undetected 
72 illness. It is intended to extend this screening to the entire popula tion. 
One effect of this would be to equalise to some extent the relative 
empha si s on prevention and on cure. Despite the official aim of keeping 
prevention a s a high priority, it ha s tended to ta ke second place to cure 
a s a form of health care. 
However, one area of what could be regarded a s preventive medicine 
is sport (although it is also related to defence and to promoting industrial 
production, and is normally considered in the West simply a s a form of 
consumption) . The encouragement of rna ss participation in sport is 
not merely lip-service, although the extent of that participation is 
probably less than offiCially claimed. 73 Nevertheless, despite the fact 
that three times a s many men a s women partiCipate in sport, and despite 
the fairly low priority of sports expenditure in the state budget, it must 
make a contribution to improving the level of health of the population. 
The encouragement of sport a s a form of preventive medicine illustrate s 
a point made by George and Manning, 74 namely that the notion of 
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prevention can be II stretched to include substantial a spects of the 
environment I such a s housing and diet; and a s far a s mental illness 
is concerned, family life, social and occupational mobility, and so on. 
It is difficult for this rea son to mea sure investment in preventive health 
care except by such narrow definitions a s screening and health check-ups. II 
Yet it is only in terms of such narrow definitions that they are able to 
conclude that prevention ha s not been extensively translated into practice. 
The production of better housing ahd more food I while still inadequate 
by West European standards I represents a rna ssive investment which does 
have health side-effects I which are recognised in the planning indices 
used by the Ministry of Health. In view of this and of the aim of 
increa sing rna ss screening to cover the whole population I the principle 
of prevention does seem to be well- established in Soviet medicine I 
even if it does not take precedence over cure. 
Apart from prevention I the other early Bol shevik ideals for the 
health service were that it should be comprehensive, involving workers' 
participation, universal, free, and state-provided. 75 These form 
convenient heading s for the discussion of contemporary Soviet health policy. 
A s George and Manning point out, the notion of comprehen sive hea lth 
care is difficult to circumscribe I since it depends on the current state of 
knowledge. For that rea son it tends to be left to professional judgement, 
which is powerfully influenced by economic and p::>litical constraints. The 
encouragement by the Ministry of Health of autonomous specialisation and 
technical development, and the increasing 'professionalisation' of the 
medical personnel (despite the lack of independent political status of 
the medical profession) have led to an empha sis on high-technology 
medicine concerned with acute life-threatening disorders such a s cancer 
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and heart disease. 
Although these disea ses are of growing importance in an ageing 
popula tion, this empha sis may not correspond very closely to the main patterns 
of morbidity (mental illness, bronchitis, influenza and back injuries) which 
suggests that the impact of workers' partiCipation, or indeed any of public 
partiCipation, is wea k .. The mechanisms of participa tion ar e, firstly, the 
public health commissions which exist at all levels from the Supreme SOViet 
to the district .soviets. These offer participation through the normal channels 
of 'democratic centralism' but judging from the patterns of. expenditure which 
indicate policy implementation, they seem no more effective than area health 
board consultative committees in the UK, that is, they seem to defer to 
technical expertise. Secondly, trade unions monitor industrial safety, but 
the effectiveness of this varies with the enterprise. They do, however, 
encourage physical exercise and the use of health resorts. Thirdly, patients 
and the party can use the press for quite severe criticisms of aspects of 
health care or even individual doctors. 76 Fourthly, there are popular 
movements, as well as Olganisations such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
societies, with 80 million members. Despite these mechanisms of participation, 
George and Manning argue that they are outweighed by the speciali sation 
of medicine and the centralisation of management, which is difficult to 
reconcile with real popular and rna ss participa tion. 
What they seem to have in mind is greater experimentation in methods of 
health care, with greater public partiCipation in prevention and an exploration 
of less 'high technology' forms of cure, perhaps involving folk medicine, and 
a 'chinese' involvement of lay personnel or else perhaps a 'California' style 
of do-it-yourself medicine. Without wishing to totally contradict arguments 
for a de-empha sis of professionalism and expertise, such arguments in 
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favour of a more democratic health service need to be made very carefully. 
It is by no means ea sy to democratise a largely state-provided health 
service and prevent the individual from becoming a passive recipient and 
consumer of health care. The reason is the obvious one that state provision of 
health care requires the establishment of standards of health care for the 
population if there is to be any attempt at uniformity and universality of 
provision. Among other things this requires the certification of various kinds 
of medical personnel a scompetent to deploy certain health care skills, since 
otherwi se there would be no way of a scertaining whether provi sion wa s uniform 
or universal, or how far short of these aims the health service wa s. In the 
absence of market pressure by the consumers on the medical practitioners 
(although as we have seen this is by no means completely absent in the 
Soviet Union), democratic pressure by the laity on those certified as 
competent requires a considerable cultural improvement (acquisition of skills) 
by the population at large and the dissemination of knowledge about the 
changing social distribution of health needs and health provision. It must be 
remembered that the very knowledge about the social distribution of health 
needs and provision largely depends on the collection of statistics by the 
very medical personnel or agencies who are going to be subject to democratic 
scrutiny. While there doe s appear to be an over-empha si s on high pre stige, 
high technology medicine in some parts of the Soviet health service, the 
de-empha sis of professional expertise cannot be carried to the point where 
treatment cannot be competently undertaken or where adequate statistics 
cannot be compiled. Soviet doctors currently spend a great deal of time on 
paper work, but presumably at least some of this is necessary for adequate 
health planning. Such arguments carry greater weight in the light of Hirst's 
remarks on the role of the law in securing adequate and uniform standards of 
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treatment (legal, medical or whatever) for relevant categories of the 
77 
population. Consequently, democratisation would probably involve 
changing medical training to promote the encouragement by medical personnel 
of the active involvement of lay personnel, a greater dissemination of 
medical knowledge among the population, and a greater emphasis on prevention. 
To return to the discussion of the early Bolshevik ideals for the health 
service, three ideals have not yet been mentioned, namely, that it should be 
universal, state-provided and free. The concern with universal coverage of 
the population clearly concerns the problem of the distribution of services 
and of access to health care (access to an important means of consumption). 
There are various different categories of the population which could form the 
basis of differential criteria of access. Those discussed by George and 
Manning 78 are social cla ss, geographical location, age, sex and illness 
type. With regard to social cIa ss, the' closed access' facilitie s available 
to personnel in certain Ministries, certain occupational groups or to certain 
party members could be regarded a s a ssociated with the process of cIa ss 
formation. More clearly, the small private market and the much more 
widespread practice of 'tipping' must disadvantage the poor, although 
George and Manning do not point out that most of this' tipping' is connected 
to hospital, home, dental or other speCialist treatment, whereas 80 per cent 
of patients are treated entirely a s outpatients. However, this merely enables 
one to gauge the extent of the advantage a ssociated with monetary payments, 
it does not eliminate the fact of such advantage. To some extent, this may 
be offset by the additional health care which workers (including women 
workers) receive at their place of work - a service which is sometimes 
markedly superior to general medicine. As indicated earlier, geographical 
inequality is a more serious matter, and is not helped by the distribution 
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of feldshers, but is mitigated by urban treatment of rural patients. With 
regard to age, all children are regularly screened and are dealt with under 
the specialist maternity and child-care services, whereas the old lose 
access to industrial polyclinics, so they are disadvantaged. This disadvantage 
of the old is partly offset by mea sures to re-employ pensioners 79 which 
both maintains their eligibility for industrial health care and reduces the 
incidence of ill-hea lth a mong pen sioners • It will be further offset, probably, 
~ 
by the increa sed attention to geriatric care a s the proportion of the population 
beyond normal retirement age increases. The relative advantage of children 
is partly offset by the higher birth-rate in rural area s, where health care 
faCilities are scarcer. The influence of sex is less likely to disadvantage 
SOViet women, since so many doctors (especially in primary care) are 
themselves women. The influence of type of illness on access to health care 
is hard to determine. George and Manning argue that its assessment requires 
some mea sure of equivalence between qualitatively different needs such that 
one can deCide tha t, for example, mental illness needs are as well- served as 
heart-disease needs. This example is interesting since, in their criticism 
of excessive technical and academic orientations in the Soviet health service 
policy, they appeared to be arguing a s if they had some such measure of 
equivalence. At lea st some such claim is implicit in their arguments a s to 
what kind of medical care to develop, although to be fair to them, they realise 
that this is not an ea sy issue, and they are merely advocating a change in 
err,phasisamong the various priorities (a change which I support, despite my 
remarks about the need for great care in this area). The priorities which they 
regard a s compromising the ideal of universal coverage ar e those in favour 
of certain' elite,' members, workers, the young, and acute life-threatening 
illne s se s, suc has hea rt di sea se or cancer. 
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The ideal that the service should be uniform and state-provided ha s 
effectively been discussed when discussing democratisation and participation. 
The main limitations on this ideal are almost the same as those on the ideal 
that the service should be free, namely the formal and informal private sectors, 
which have also already been discussed. The fact that the health service is 
predominantly state-provided and free guarantees a minimum level of professional 
care, on which minimum level the lower income groups are more dependent 
than the higher ones 80, so the overall effect of the Soviet health service on 
the distribution of income is probably to redistribute it to the lower income 
groups of the population, despite the privileged sectors of the health service. 
To conclude this discussion of the Soviet health service, one could say 
that the early Bolshevik ideals have only been partially realised, and that 
there are various grounds for critiCism, such a s the provision of private 
health care or • closed access' facilities for the priv j leged, and the political 
use of psychiatric hospitals. Whether one critiCises the academic production 
of high technology medicine with little public participation in policy decisions 81 
or praises the strategic role of the physician in directing and administering 
the health service 82 must remain a matter of continuing debate. Other 
shortcoming s include lack of choice of "polyclinic facilities, bureaucratic 
rigidities I overlapping of services and their fragmentation for the care of 
different members of a family I and the time wa stage by physicians on routine 
clerical duties which could be performed by others ... 83 These must be 
balanced against such positive features as general availabili ty and 
accessibility of the health services, "planning towards definite goals, very 
high ratios of medical personnel and hospital beds per 10,000 of the 
population, the provision of an educational ladder from para-medical to 
84 
medical education, refresher courses for doctors (and) excellent mid-wifery". 
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Overall, one must agree with George and Manning 85, that the Soviet health 
service is one of the most technically adequate in the world (from what they 
consider to be a narrow perspective) and one of the most justly organised. 
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Social Security 
In the case of health, it is clear that whatever the problems 
of lack of participation, health care does work to some extent on 
a basis of need (admittedly, defined in a way which reflects the 
concerns of the medical profession itself, as well as the party 
and Ministry pressures which are responsible for a small privileged 
health care sector). It is thus possible to appraise health 
planning in terms of health outcomes (patterns of morbidi~y) 
despite the limitations· due to the scarcity of published morbidity 
data. The use of mass screening, polyclinics, dispensaries and 
health posts means that, despite an emphasis on the quantitative 
'supply side' in medical services (so many hospital beds and so 
on), the provision of health care is related to need. It is not 
so clear that this is the case with social security, because, 
as we shall see, for some forms of social security, there 1S no 
set of mechanisms for the registration of need equivalent to the 
health screening and recording procedures just mentioned. Rather 
it seems to be assumed that the workings of other policies in the 
Soviet Union simply eradicate certain kinds of social security 
need (for example, the need for unemployment benefits). 
To see why this is the case, a brief historical review of 
social security in the Soviet Union is necessary. Because they 
had used the inadequate social security provision before the 
Revolution as a major target for their criticisms of Tsarism, 
the Bolsheviks had little alternative but to attempt a 
comprehensive system of social insurance after the Revolution. 
However, despite various modifications, the policy was too 
ambitious to be properly implemented until economic conditions 
improved under the N.E.P.~6 State insurance coverage for wage-
earners increased from 5.5 million people in 1924 to 10.8 million 
in 1928. Old age pensions were also intrdduced in 1928, for men 
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aged 60 and women aged 55. Life expectancy in 1928 was 44, 
whereas it is 70 today, but retirement ages remain the same. 
The result is that old age and disability pensions combined were 
around 73 per cent of all social security expenditures from 
1960-1972. 87 
Following the first Five Year Plan, social insurance benefits 
became subservient to the drive towards industrialisation. Social 
insurance was consequently designed, firstly, to increase the 
supply of labour; secondly, to increase labour discipline and, 
thirdly, to give more favourable treatment to workers in high 
priority industries. Included in the measures to increase the 
labour supply was the abolition of unemployment benefit in 1930, 
but in 1938 the length of maternity benefits was reduced from 
16 weeks to 9 weeks~ Pensioners were encouraged to stay on at 
work, by allowing them to keep part (and from 1938, all) of their 
pension in addition to their earnings from work. Labour discipline 
was favoured by gradually making benefits dependent on length of 
uninterrupted employment. Industrial priorities were reinforced 
by ease of qualification for benefits, or by higher benefits and 
more generally favourable treatment for workers in industries 
central to plan fulfillment or in hazardous or underground 
employment. Such priorities were easier to implement when the 
administration ,of these funds was transferred in the early 1930s 
from government departments to the trade unions. Trade union 
members were paid higher sickness benefits than other workers. 
Apart from changes concerning maternity benefits and the employment 
of pensioners, the social security system has not changed a great 
deal since the 1930s, and its administrative structure has remained 
the same. 
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The main change in the 1930s was an increase in the number 
of people covered, from 10.8 million in 1928 to 31.2 million in 
1940, a small part of which was the provision of old age pensions 
for salaried workers, as well as manual workers. Collective 
farmers were still forced to rely on inadequate mutual aid 
societies, but the industrial social security system was now 
quite effective, in contrast to the early 1920s which saw a 
progressive ideology combined with a lack of resources to 
implement the progressive ideas. In the 1940s, the main change 
was the 1944 extension of family allowances, originally introduced 
in 1936. Family allowances have not changed much since then, and 
seem to set rather strict conditions of eligibility by contemporary 
Western standards, being designed to increase the birth rate yet 
not discourage women from working. 
Following the death of Stalin, there was a substantial 
improvement in social security provision with the State Pension 
Law of 1956. Although collective farmers and other self-employed 
people were still excluded, it meant that henceforth social 
security was less dominated by the demands of the labour market 
and the drive for industrialisation. The four main changes of 
the 1956 Act, which was promoted by Khrushchev, were, according to 
George and Manning 88 
"First,the coverage was extended to cover most workers and 
employees and their dependants. Second, the rates of 
benefits were substantially increased •••• Only family 
allowances were not increased •. Third, benefits were made 
more egalitarian as between the low paid and the highly 
paid. The minimum pension was raised far more than the 
maximum pension. Fourth, the regulations concerning 
the coverage of the various risks in the scheme were 
streamlined to reduce anomalies. Thus the new Soviet 
social security became comprehensive both in terms of 
people in the industrial sector and risks. Government 
funds were to be used to supplement contributions from 
pmn 1 n\/RT'~ _ " 
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The situation of the collective farmers was improved 
considerably under the legislation of 1964, which helped to 
stem rural migration to towns. Old age, sickness, disability 
and maternity benefits were provided to all collective farmers. 
The scheme was financed on a national basis by contributions from 
each farm which were to be supplemented by state grants (thereby 
presumably forcing the richer farms to pay more in contributions). 
The level of benefits was lower than for workers, partly because 
of lower wages and partly because of regUlations. 
It may be the case that the slowing down of the process of 
converting collective farms to state farms is partly related to 
the extra social security costs which would be incurred, although 
the differential will have been diminished since 1964 bec?use 
wage differentials between collective farmers and workers are 
now less, and because other social security provisions are now 
89 
equal between the two groups. 
There have been no major statutory reforms since 1964, but 
there have been a series of measures designed to improve the 
position of collective farmers and the low paid, as well as to 
emphasise -the welfare, rather than the economic aspects of social 
security. Thus, while the contemporary social security system 
still bears the marks of its effective origins in the 1930s, a 
series of measures during the 1970s show an increasing awareness 
that individuals and families are still falling through the 
social security net. Probably the biggest changes have been the 
successive improvements in the minimum amount of pension, the 
.1974 introduction of an income-tested family allowance scheme, 
designed to deal with poverty, and the improvements in the 
minimum wage in relation to the average wage, which affects 
pensions since they are earnings related. The lot of collective 
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farmers has also been improved: in 1967, their retirement age was 
reduced by 5 years, to make it the same as for workers; in 1970, 
the rules for payment of sickness benefit became almost the same 
as for workers; and in 1971, the same happened for rules regarding 
pension payments. With regard to the shift of emphasis from labour 
discipline to welfare, length of employment was abolished as a 
condition for maternity benefit in 1973, although there is only 
one sign of this being extended to other benefits: in 1975 there 
was a change in the qualifying conditions for sickness benefit, so 
that those with three or more children can now receive their full 
earnings regardless of length of employment. Following this brief 
historical sketch, which emphasises how recent is some of the 
social security provision, it is possible to proceed to an analysis 
of the present social security situation, and some of its effects. 
Social Security Administration, Finance and Policy 
The most striking features of the (a) finance and 
(b) administration of social security are (a) the absence of 
employees', workers' and collective farmers' contributions 
(instead the state enterprises, collective farms and social 
organisations contribute, supplemented by the state budget) and 
(b) the role of the trade unions in administering the social 
security provisions. To deal with the administration first, the 
involvement of the trade unions in social security could be seen 
as part of the development of non-state forms of administration 
(part of 'the withering away of the state'), and as fulfilling 
one of Lenin's objectives for the development of social security, 
namely that workers should playa full part in its management. 90 
However, although I have discussed the involvement of trade unions 
in the administration of this part of the social consumption funds 
in terms of non-state forms of administration in an earlier article 91 , 
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it should be clear from the discussion of law and the state in 
Chapter 3 that this is not necessarily the beginning of (or an 
aspect of) any process of 'the withering away of the state'. 
Such a conclusion is reinforced if one examines the precise 
nature of trade union involvement in social security. The 
following figure illustrates the main agencies involved in the 
administration of social security. 
Figure 5 
The administrative structure of social security in the U.S.S.R. 
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Source: v. George and N. Manning (1980), op •. cit., page 175 
Clearly the State Committee on Labour and Social Questions 
is the most important 'agency, in the sense of co-ordinating 
social security policy. As is indicated by the dotted lines 
placing the supreme trade union body hierarchically above Gosplan 
(here called the 'State Plan Committee of the USSR' and the other 
Ministries, the trade union control of the most important state 
agencies involved in administration and policy formation on social 
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security is more nominal than real. 92 While there is direct trade 
union involvement in the State Committee on Labour and Social 
Questions, most commentators feel that its greatest effect is on 
wages. 93 This has a subsequent effect on pensions and other 
benefits, but this situation suggests that the trade unions are 
placing social security as a poor second compared to wages. In 
any case, the State Committee on Labour and Social Questions 
seems to function largely'as an interpreter of decisions 
emanating elsewhere, rather than as a pblicy initiator. In 
\ 
interpreting and co-ordinating decisions, it issues directives 
to the fi fteen constituent Republican Ministries of Social 
Security, whicn in turn operate through regional, district and 
local offices. 94 The trade unions are particularly involved at 
the local level, with elected members doing unpaid work over and 
above their normal working hours to administer social security. 
Pensions for the old and disabled are determined and paid 
out by the Ministry of Social Welfare, with trade unions at the 
local level limited to producing the necessary documents and helping 
applicants to fill in the relevant forms. They also take part in 
decisions on eligibility for pensions. Howev~r, trade unions are 
entirely respon~ible for the administration of sickness and 
maternity benefits. As we saw'in the discussion of the health 
service, sickness benefits are related to attempts to maintain 
labour discipline. The aeparate system of social security for 
collective farmers is run on"similar lines. C6nsequently, George 
and Manning seem to have ample justification for their conclusion: 95 
"Clearly workers do not control the administration of the 
social security system. They only assist in its administration. 
Moreover, workers do not decide directly on the structure or 
provision of the social security system; they only elect 
representatives who decide on their behalf. It is a system 
of state managerialism similar to those in capitalist 
societies but with greater involvement of trade unions at 
the local level~" 
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To make the point a little more strongly, the involvement of trade 
unions lowers the costs of administering social security, and 
identifies the trade unions with measures which are at least 
partly designed to enhance labour discipline, while bringing very 
little return to the trade unions or their members in the form of 
capacity to exert democratic pressure on social security policy 
or its implementation (except decisions on individual eligibility). 
If this is taken to be the beginning of non-state democratic 
forms of administration, then it is not avery auspicious beginning. 
In the light of this picture of the predominance of state 
forms of administration of social security, administrative structures 
which at least have the merit of being fairly straightforward, 
it is difficult to understand the reasons for the budgetary 
organisation of the sources of finance for social security.~~ As 
mentioned earlier y social security is non-contributory in the 
Soviet Union, that is y the beneficiaries do not contribute directly 
to the building up of the funds from which they draw benefits. 
As H. Vogel puts it 97 : 
"The system is non-contributory; most gratis payments 
take place through the agency of the state social 
insurance or the centralised social security union 
fund of kolkhoz peasants, supplemented by expenditure 
from state and co-operative enterprises, social 
organisations, or directly from the state budget." 
Thus the principle propounded by Lenin that employers contribute 
to social insurance, rather than deducting the contributions from 
employees' wages (directly or through income tax) has been met. 
Yet while there might be some residual justification for separating 
the funding and administration of social security for kolkhoz 
workers, there seems little point in now insisting on separate 
contributions from state enterprises. 
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The fact that state enterprises contribute to the social 
security funds rests on the budgetary position of state enterprises 
which is supposedly distinct from that of other state agencies 
(including the Ministries to which they are subordinated). As 
M. Lavigne points out98 , this argument is weak and was in any 
case effectively ignored for budgetary purposes prior to the 
1965 economic reform. There was in fact a confusion between the 
finances of the state and those of staie enterprises, absolutely 
contrary to the principle of financial autonomy (khozraschet). 
In effect, the tax on enterprise 'profits'was a 'redistribution 
tax' which was planned for each budgetary year, and was used 
partly to subsidise loss-making enterprises. The 1965 reform 
which was supposed to change this had little effect. The main 
change introduced then, which did establish a more substantial 
budgetary distinction between state enterprise revenue and state 
revenue, was the establishment of duties paid by the state 
enterprise on its fixed and circulating production funds. However, 
by 1979 this had only risen to around 11 per cent of state 
budgetary receipts, instead of the 35 per cent envisaged in 1965, 
whereas one of the main components of budgetary receipts, turnover 
tax, had hardly decreased at allover this period (fro~ 37 to 
32 per cent). Furthermore, the 1979 reform tended to diminish 
again the distinction between state revenues and state enterprise 
revenues, since it envisaged a stable rate of taxation on 
enterprise 'profits', with the rates being differentiated by 
Ministries. Thus the economic distinctness of state enterprises 
from the state, and hence the fiscal nature (levy on an economically 
distinct agent) of these budgetary operations, is by no means 
clear. Consequently there seems to be no great merit in insisting 
on employers' contributions as distinct from state contributions 
(either directly or through the state social insurance scheme 
funds). The system of administration of social security is 
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complez in its procedures, but the organisational structure is 
fairly straightforward, Since the payment of these benefits 
is not related to t he 'profit' of the enterprise concerned (but 
is determined by other criteria such as length of employment), 
it seems pointless to retain a budgetary category which does not 
act as an economic incentive and does not (despite local trade 
union involvement) promote serious democratic involvement in the 
administration of social security. 
Having dealt with the administration and finance of social 
security y it is now possible to turn to policy. One of the 
classical Marxist criteria for the appraisal of an area of social 
policy such as social security is the extent to which it 
contributes to the transformation of 'bourgeois right,.99 In the 
case of social security, as with other aspects of social policy 
such as health and housing y the extent to which 'bourgeois right' 
has been transformed can be gauged in terms of extent to which 
criteria of 'need' predominate in the provision of benefits, 
rather than criteria related towages. Failing that, the extent 
to which income inequalities 'are mitigated by the provision 
indicates how far the social effects of wages are undercut or 
neutralised. It is therefore necessary to examine the criteria 
for eligibility for the various social security benefits, as well 
as the scale of resources devoted to them. 
It is best to begin with the largest component of social 
security expenditure, old age pensions, which probably comprise 
some 50 per cent of all social security outlays. As indicated 
earlier, the first general qualifying condition is that men must 
be at least 60 and women at least 55. The second condition is a 
work record of 25 years for men and 20 for women (for the maximum 
pension) or 5 years for both sexes (for the minimum pension). 
Intermediate pensions correspond to length of employment. The 
third condition is that the person must have retired, but as 
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indicated earlier, this is waived for many groups of workers over 
the retirement age. Those likely not to qualify are women who 
enter employment late in life (a rare phenomenon), those disabled 
who never enter the labour force, those who.work part-time (mainly 
women) and some ex-collective farmers who have not worked long 
enough in either the state or kolkhoz sector. Thus waged labour 
is a condition of access to these benefits, even though the 
proportion of the population which does not qualify is small. 
In addition, these general conditions are modified to encourage 
the taking up of certain types of employment (defined geographically 
or occupationally), to encourage large families 'or to permit some 
disabled groups to retire early {in which case it replaces the 
disability pension).100 So, the criteria of eligibility are 
structured to promote waged employment in general {even among 
those over retirement age)101 and certain specific employment 
objectives. Furthermore, retirement pensions are related to 
previous gross earnings, although pension inequalities are lower 
than income inequalities during working life. 102 Since those with 
dependants who are not employed or do not receive a pension of 
their own receive only 10 or 15 per cent extra on their pensions, 
it is clear that most pensioners who were in low-paid occupations 
must receive inadequate pensions. There may be considerable 
hardship suffered by very old pensioners whose final wage would 
be relatively low, unless of course they are supported by members 
of their family~ which is in fact a legal responsibility. Vogel 
suggests that much of the recent expansion in savings may be due 
to people saving up for their old age, a wise precaution given 
the probable growth of disguised inflation in the Soviet Union. 103 
To sum up, the minimum pension is too low in comparison with the 
average wage, allowances for dependants are too small~ and pensions 
are not raised automatically in line with prices or wages. 104 
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Consequently, the extent to which eligibility is dependent on need 
rather than work is limited, and, while basic consumption 
necessities are subsidised, thereby further reducing the inequalities 
of pension income compared to wage income, it is probable that many 
pensioners live below the officially defined subsistence level 
of 50 roubles per month per capita. 
Moving on to disability pensions, which for many statistical 
purposes are combined with old age pensions105 , it is immediately 
apparent that the encouragement of labour discipline again 
predominates. Disability pension rates are effectively calculated 
in relation to old age pensions~ the monetary value of the benefit 
being expressed as a percentage of the old age pension, depending 
on the degree of disability. There are three classes of disability, 
the partially disabled (class 3)~ the totally disabled (class 2) 
and the totally disabled requiring constant attendance (class 1), 
so this medically defined criterion of need is an important 
criterion of eligibility. However, previous earnings from work 
(weighted in favour of the low paid, as with old age penSions), 
the number of years of employment prior to the disability, the type 
of employment prior to disability and whether the disability was 
an industrial accident or occupational disease, as opposed to a 
general illness or accident - all these qualifying conditions show 
that benefits are provided much more according to work than to 
need, in the classical sense. This has the effect that the 
disabled are treated less favourably than the elderly.106 
Pensions for surviving dependants can be paid to children, 
bxothers, sisters~ grandchildren, spouses, parents and grandparents, 
depending on circumstances. Rates are calculated in a manner 
analOgous to disability pensions, but they are 10wer. 107 (The 
employment qualifying conditions are the same as for retirement 
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or disability pensionsJ There is an implicit assumption that 
surviving spouses shoUld go out to work as soon as possible, 
and since widows (except industrial widows) lose their pension 
when taking paid employment, there is clearly pressure to take 
up full-time employment. This is made somewhat easier by the 
provision of nursery facilities with means-tested fees. One-
parent families have to rely on family allowance. If they are 
the result' of a divorce, the husband has to pay. one quarter of 
his earnings to his wife. Such maintenance orders are easier to 
enforce in the Soviet Union since all partners are usually state 
employees, but sometimes (rarely) the husband avoids state 
employment withou being reported, and leaves no address, so 
avoiding maintenance payments. 
As indicated in the discussion of medical certificates for 
sick leave,sickness benefit requires a form of certification 
designed to reduce absenteeism from work. The strictness of the 
certification procedure reputedlY irritates both doctors and 
patients. Sickness benefit is earnings related and rates are 
calculated on the basis of four main criteria: whether the cause 
of the incapacity is occupational or not; the length of 
uninterrupted employment; family responsibilities; and whether 
or not the beneficiary is a trade union member (non-membership 
means one receives only half the benefit one would otherwise be 
entitled to). Not surprisingly, practically all workers are 
trade union members. Collective farm workers who are not union 
members do not lose half their benefits. In contrast to old age, 
disability and survivors' benefits, sickness benefits are quite 
generous: occupational sickness or accident is 100 per cent of 
previous wage, whereas the other three criteria come into operation 
for non-occupational sickness or accident. People with three years 
or less continuous employment receive 50 per cent of previous 
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earningsy and this rises to 100 per cent for people with B years 
or more continuous employment. Sickness periods off work are 
counted as a part of continuous employment. With three or more 
children under 16, sickness benefit is 100 per cent. Sickness 
benefits for collective farmers are 10 per cent lower {whereas 
for retirement and disability pensions, they are 15 per cent 
lower). Various other minor provisions also indicate the close 
connection between sickness b~nefit and employment ~tability 
and discipline. For example, persons dismissed for indiscipline 
must serve six months in their new employment before they can 
qualify for sickness benefit. 10B 
Turning now to maternity benefit, discrimination against 
non-union members (who formerly received a lower percentage of 
their wage) was abolished in December 1973. It now consists of 
a maternity allowance for workers and employees (of 100 per cent 
of wages) for eight weeks prior to and eight weeks after the 
birth (with a possible extension of two weeks in the case of 
difficult or multiple deliveries). Provided that the claimant's 
monthly income does not exceed 60 roubles, there is an additional 
allowance of 12 roubles for baby clothes and 1B roubles nursing 
allowance. There"is unpaid maternity leave until the child's 
first birthday, thereby facilitating the re-entry to paid 
employment. 
Despite official concern at the low birth rate in European 
Russia, child allowances continue to be meagre, although a small 
supplement of 12 roubles for families with an income of less than 
50 roubles a month per person was introduced in 1974. Child 
allowances consist of "a combination of grants and monthly 
allowances of very modest amounts heavily weighted in favour of 
large families. Even for such families, however, the allowances 
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are grossly inadequate and they are paid only during the child's 
first five years".109 
The social policy clearly implicit in all the criteria of 
eligibility for social security is quite evident: rather than 
promoting forms of income which are independent of wages (and in 
that sense defined in terms of the needs of the recipient) the 
social security system is on the whole defined in a way which 
sustains wage labour as a form of income. In other words~ social 
security can hardly be considered to be undercutting the wage 
formo This connection of social security payments with the 
labour market means that while the system is comprehensive, it 
definitely does leave a variety of groups either partially 
covered or not covered at all, and there is no comprehensive 
public assistance scheme to act as a tsafety net' against poverty 
in these circumstances. As mentioned earlier, families are legally 
required to support those of their members who are in financial 
need. There are forms of public assistance, but these are the 
responsibility of constituent republics or individual collective 
farms. Consequently, such public assistance is neither uniform 
nor comprehensive, and provides only residual amounts to meet 
exceptional cases. Of course, social security payments need not 
be the only means of 'transforming bourgeois right'7 that~is, 
undercutting the wage form of income and promoting social forms 
of consumption. Health and education within the state budgetary 
heading of 'social consumption funds' and state housing (which is 
technically outside the 'social consumption funds') are all 
potential means of doing so. Hence~ an appraisal of the soci~l 
policy implicit in social security must include a consideration 
of the scale of resources devoted to it, in comparison with other 
forms of social consumption. 
j';) I • 
The state budget represents over 60 per cent of national 
income in the Soviet Union, and within that budget, social and 
culture expenditures represent. about 35 per cent of the total. 
Of these expenditures, education constitu~es about half, while 
one sixth goes on public health and sports and the rest (about 
110 
one-third) goes on social security. Social security expenditure 
has been growing faster than health care, and the two of them 
combined have been rising generally faster than education withiri 
the social consumption funds. The result is that social security 
and health combined have been showing slowly rising percentages 
in relation to the state budget and national income (the net 
material product, which is calculated on a somewhat different 
basis from the Western index of gross national product).111 
As is fairly well-known, this pattern of expenditure has largely 
been determined by demographic patterns, that is, the growing 
number of old age pensioners. Consequently, since the dependency 
ratio is likely to worsen after 1980, due mainly to a fairly 
rapid increase in the population living beyond retirement age, 
the prospects seem remote for the further use of social consumption 
funds in order to undercut wages as a form of income. 
The Effects of Social Security 
To complete the assessment of social security, it is necessary 
to consider the likely effects of its organisation and its various 
provisions. The first social effect to be considered is that o~ 
its organisation and finance. The administrative structure of 
social security means that. it is a potentially readily accessible 
arena of popular participation in social administration, but this 
is hardly the case today, despite trade union involvement and the 
budgetary insistence on employers' contributions, which somewhat 
spuriously suggests workers' control of the profits of industry. 
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This certainly emphasises the point that workers and employees 
do not contribute, but since 90 per cent of state budgetary 
receipts come from the economy anyway (state enterprises and 
organisations), the additional 5 per cent coming directly from 
state enterprise funds (and calculated as a percentage of the 
wages bill for each enterprise) makes very little difference to 
the ~eal state of affairs. While direct state expenditure forms 
about 20 per cent 'of social security expenditure, the state also 
subsidises the social insurance fund which provides almost all 
the remaining social security expenditure; the net effect is 
that the state budget directly finances around half of all social 
security expenditures, a proportion which is likely to grow as the 
retired population grows more rapidly than the social insurance 
fund. Thus social security is a form of redistribution of the 
social product which is largely effected through the state budget; 
in other words, it is a transfer payment, one of whose sources of 
funds (in the form of employers' contributions) does not form a 
tax in the usual sense. Since there is no strong reason in the 
state sector for sources of finance to coincide with the agencies 
making expenditure decisions, there seems to be a clear case for 
simplifying the budgetary arrangements by abolishing emp~oyers' 
contributions. These contributions form part of the cost price 
of industrial profits, but this accounting problem could be 
overcome by increasing turnover tax by the amount of the 'lost' 
contribution from stat~ enterpr is es. 
The redistributional effects of social security are difficult 
to assess in the absence of systematic data. Since the social 
security system does not use many qualifying conditions which 
are unrelated to wage labour, thereby undercutting the wage form, 
it might at least be expected by socialists that it would mitigate 
the effects of wage-induced income inequalities. To some extent, 
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it may seem that this does happen, since as we have seen workers 
on low wages benefit relatively more from various forms of social 
security provision. In addition, workers on low wages are also 
exempted from paying income tax, and various basic consumption 
items (transport, some kinds of food) are subsidised to keep the 
price. down, which must help lower income groups more. On the 
other hand, income tax is not very onerous for any Soviet 
income group and these price subsidies were already taken into 
account in the calculation of the socially acceptable minimum 
subsistence level of 50 roubles per month per capita. It is 
evident that many pensioners and families with young children 
fall below this 'poverty line'. What is not clear is how many, 
but the findings of social scientists that many do fall through 
the social security net was probably largely responsible for the 
introduction in 1974 of child allowances (or family allowances, 
as they are sometimes called). This scheme, which has already 
been mentioned, provides a supplement of 112 roubles per month per 
child until the age of 8 for families with a per capita income 
below 50 roubles per month. George and Manning quote a source112 
which claimed that this scheme virtually doubled the number of 
children covered, which now became 37 per cent of all children 
under the age of 8, and involved a five-fold increase in total 
expenditure. Thus social security may now have some redistributional 
effect in favour of low income families with young children. The 
overall redistributional effect of social security is not easy to 
assess however (although there is a clear policy bias in favour 
of the young), and some commentators feel that the redistributive 
impact of such monetary transfers will be little. 11 3 This point 
will be returned to in the discussion of the overall effects of 
the social consumption funds and housing. 
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The main effects of the lack of unemployment benefit in the 
Soviet social security scheme may be to cause hardship to some 
of the unemployed, but more likely it is to force people to take 
up jobs they do not like. Voluntary leaving of jobs has increased 
considerably in the late 1970s, for reasons apparently connected 
with the search for better housing (see Chapter 2). However, the 
very fact that u~employment is so comparatively low mitigates the 
income distribution effects 01 the lack of unemployment benefit. 
The loss of industrial efficiency and possible disaffection of 
younger workers who are often educationally "over-qualified" for 
their industrial jobs are adverse effects of this system, but 
Soviet policy makers are probably right to consider these problems 
are preferable to 'those of large-scale unemployment. 
The attempt to reach completely full employment rather than 
provide unemployment benefit seems to be related to the lack of 
a systematic public assistance programme and the use of equalisation 
of wages as the main policy instrument to equalise benefits (and 
hence real income). Rather than a systematic monitoring of the 
conditions under which people are not adequately covered by 
social security (coupled with the provision of specific benefits 
to 'fill the gaps' in the system), the Soviet approach to these 
problems is simply to try to ensure that everyone has a wage and 
to regularly increase those wages in a manner which reduces wage 
inequality. While this approach is admirable in so far as it 
works, it has at least to the mid-1970s left many families in 
need of income maintenance. It has also generated inflationary 
pressures which could force price rises which reduce the purchasing 
power of the social security monetary transfers, thereby reducing 
any equalising effect which they may have. 
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Hence the effects of social security cannot be properly 
assessed without an appraisal of wages policy which is more the 
concern of the next chapter than this one. For the moment, it is 
sufficient to note that there has been a steady policy of reducing 
wage inequality which has had some effect. 114 Yet, it is difficult 
to see how an overall policy on wages will help the 10 per cent 
of Soviet families which are one-parent families, who presumably 
depend on only one wage plus either divorce maintenance paymenti, 
survivor's beneTits or an unmarried mother's allowance. This is 
precisely the sort of case where the issue of detecting gaps in 
the social security net becomes relevant. However, it must be 
admitted that there is no reason why the social security system 
alone should be expected to bear the burden of attempts to equalise 
real income in the Soviet Union. Apart from wages policy, the 
other aspects of social consumption need to be considered together 
with social security. 
Conclusion: An Assessment of Welfare and Consumption 
Without wishing to anticipate the analysis of the next 
chapter on the class structure, an analysis which it is hoped 
will be enriched by the discussion in this and preceding 'chapters 
of some of the determinants of the class structure, it is clearly 
impossible to consider some aspects of the relations of distribution 
(namely, some forms of consumption) in complete isolation from other 
aspects such as wages. Wages, housing and the various components 
of the social consumption fund all affect the distribution of 
income, and the connection is even closer than that because of 
the earnings related nature of many social security monetary 
transfers. Some estimate of the interrelation between these various 
aspects of the distribution of income needs to be made. 
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Evidently,. such considerations are already taken into account 
in Soviet social policy, although according to Rzhanitsyna115 , 
some accounting problems have still to be solved: the effects 
of .the social consumption funds on family incomes are at the· 
moment only assessed on the basis of aggregated estimates. 
According to these, payments and benefits from the social funds 
markedly reduce the differentials in living standards, averaging 
30-40 per cent of the families' aggregate income in the lower 
income groups, and 15-20 per cent among high income groups. 
Unfortunately, the year of these calculations and the definition 
of the income groups are not given. This is particularly 
tantalising in view of a table such as the following one: 
Table 7 
Groups of Working People by Wages and Incomes 
(per cent) 
Groups of working 
. Groups of working people by wages 
people by income I medium I I level low high total 
Low 40.6 51.2 8.2 100 
Medium 30.3 54.2 15.5 100 
High 15.0 56.2 28.8 100 
---
Source: L. Rzhanitsyna, ibid., page 130 
While one can say from this table that 30.3 per cent of 
medium income families have low wages, such a statment ~s 
difficult to interpret, if one is attempting to assess the 
redistributive effect of the social consumption funds. Similarly, 
one might think that one is clear what the cumUlative effect of 
policy is when Rzhanitsyna says that between 1966 and 1975 the 
number of inhabitants in families living below the 50 rouble 
minimum declined by almost 70 per cent. Yet it is not clear how 
far this is due to wage increases, and how far it is due to 
expenditures on social consumption funds. Since sh~ says that 
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an analysis shows that low-income familes are usually those 
which have many dependants, and that in 1974 wage earners in 
these families had two or three times more dependants than those 
in medium and high income families, it is a reasonable guess that 
the child allowances introduced in 1974 made a substantial 
contribution to reducing the number of inhabitants who are below 
the 50 rouble minimum. However, it can be no more than a guess, 
in the absence of detailed data. 
Even if some of this income equalisation is due to the social 
consumption funds and housing subsidies, rather than wages policy, 
is it redistributive in favour of the lower income groups when 
one takes account of the sources of such expenditure? In other 
words, is public finance generally redistributive in the U.S.S.R.? 
It has already been indicated that George and Manning and Vogel 
are doubtful about this. Wiles is equally doubtful. 116 However, 
he argues that the regressivity of public finance does not matter 
if the pre-tax distribution is 'right' and allows for regressivity, 
say by previous confiscation or an incomes policy. This is not 
good enough for present purposes, since it is clear that social 
consumption funds expenditure and housing expenditure is intended 
to have progressive effects in addition to wages policy (in other 
words, the pre-tax distribution is not considered by the Soviet 
authorities to be 'right'). Although Wiles is correct that only 
vast research could extract an answer to the question, progressive 
or regressive, we do have the aggregate estimates mentioned by 
Rzhanitsyna to go on. Furthermore, the argument put forward by 
George and Manning that the social security system is regressive 
or neutral has its weaknesses, particularly in their analysis of 
the state budget. They base their analysis of the state budget 
on 1965 figures provided in the English edition of M. Lavigne. 117 
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They say, "In 1965, only 7.5 per cent of government revenues were 
from direct taxation, which is not very progressive in nature; 
37.8 per cent were from indirect taxation, which is regressive; 
30.2 per cent from the profits of state enterprises which is 
progressive and the remaining 24.5 per cent from a variety of 
undifferentiated sources." The remark about indirect taxation 
being regressive is probably misleading, although as Bush points 
out118 , no comprehensive and systematic data are published on 
rates of turnover tax. Wiles is willing to hazard the opinion 
that it is slightly progressive. 119 Furthermore, it is clear 
that the composition of the state budget has changed since 
1965. 120 The 1979 state budget receipts were made up of the 
following components: income tax, 9 per cent; turnover tax, 
32 per cent; profits from state enterprises and state organisations, 
38 per cent (estimated); duties on fixed and circulating productive 
funds, 11.2 per cent; profits from the co-operative sector, 
1 per cent; national lottery, 0.3 per cent; state enterprise 
payments for social security, 5 per cent; other sources (including 
bachelor tax, tax on households without children and tax on 
royalties), 3.5 per cent (estimated). Thus, even if turnover tax 
were regressive, it only consitutes 32 per cent of budgetary 
receipts and is offset by the very mildly progressive income tax 
(9 per cent) and revenues of various kinds from state enterprises 
(54.2 per cent). The effect of the remaining 4.8 per cent which 
is mostly personal taxation is probablY progressive, While George 
and Manning point out that regressivity must also be judged in 
terms of benefits, and while they are arguing at this point only 
with respect to social security, it is likely that both health and 
housing have progressive redistributive effects. Thus Wiles 
puts a strong case for house rents being progressive121 
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"kolkhozniki build, own and inherit their own dwellings tax free, 
the urban poor enjoy a vast subsidy, the upper middle class must 
join co-operatives and pay full cost (but can resell for a capita.l 
gain)." Similarly, unless one is going to put a very high price 
on the privileged sector of health care (the so-calledtfourth 
directoratet)~ then health care benefits probably are progressive, 
with low income families benefitting disproportionately from the 
care of nbn-life threatening morbidity which i~ dealt with mainly 
through outpatient care. Thus the aggregate estimates referred 
to above which are mentioned by Rzhanitsyna do not seem to be 
inconsistent with what is known about the provision of housing, 
health and possibly even social security. 
In addition to the lack of systematic evidence on the effects 
of each of these forms of welfare, the effects of the inter-relation 
between them is even more obscure. Thus it is conceivable that 
good health care could in the future reduce the number of disability 
pensions (once those disabled in the war have died); or it could 
diminish the relationship between high income and longevity, so 
that the redistributive impact of the relatively egalitarian 
provisions of old age pensions would become greater. These kinds 
of complex inter-relation between the various aspects of social 
policy are virtually impossible to discuss seriously in the face 
of the lack of systematic evidence in the fields of housing, 
health and social security. While such evidence maybe available 
within the relevant Ministries, it is not at all clear how much 
of it is co-ordinated with a view to producing an overall set of 
inter-related social policies. Such collection of information 
as does take place within the State Committee on Labour and 
Social Questions seems to be largely concerned with the distribution 
of income, although as the example of Rzhanitsyna makes clear, it 
is never published in sufficiently detailed form for it to be 
subjected to serious scrutiny. 
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While it is clear that maintenance of production and of a 
stable, disciplined labour force are not the only concerns of 
social policy, they still remain the predominant concern to a 
degree which is more appropriate to an industrialising society 
than to one which has already largely succeeded in creating an 
industrial base. While other instruments of social policy are 
actually and potentially available, the adjustment of wages and 
the quantitative provision of facilities (in housing, health care 
and so on) seem to be the main instruments used. The development 
of a sophisticated system capable of registering diverse needs, 
making its information available to public scrutiny and allowing 
substantial public participation in both policy formation and 
the administration of social policy, these are features of Soviet 
welfare provision which must remain a hope for the future. 
Despite its rapid advance and considerable contemporary 
achievements, there is thus some justification for describing 
Soviet social policy as crude and heavy-handed, for while the 
thrust of the various policies is broadly egalitarian, many of 
the effects of these policies are opaque, even it seems to those 
concerned with implementing them and monitoring their effects. 
Are these the welfare provisions appropriate to an 'advanced 
socialist society'? Unfortunately such criticisms are easier to 
make than to rectify. It could well be that the rising proportion 
of old age pensioners, whose pensions will register the 'knock-on' 
effects of large wage increases during the 1970s, will generate 
its own inflationary pressures, as well as reducing the scope 
for expanding other forms of social consumption. The rising birth 
rate among comparatively low income (often rural) families of 
Central Asia will generate further demographic demands on social 
consumption, again further reducing the room for manoeuvre. This 
demographic 'squeeze' from both ends of the age-spectrum, producing 
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a deteriorating dependency ratio, can only be offset by rising 
productivity, which is an area where the Soviet economy was 
experiencing difficulties in the late 1970s. The criticism 
of social welfare for concentrating on encouraging production 
in various ways will therefore not have much appeal or relevance 
in the near future. 
However, although many social welfare provisions are 
evidently still designed to increase production, it is not at 
all clear that they do so. For example, the connection of some 
of the housing stock to particular Ministries and thus to 
particular state enterprises is now partly responsible for the 
loss of productivity due to high labour turnover, since people 
change jobs in order to improve their housing. That is why 
I argued in the section on housing for a dislocation of housing 
from industrial Ministries and for the politically more effective 
incorporation of city soviets. In addition, the combination of 
labour shortages in some sectors with poor productivity elsewhere 
suggests that there is room for considerable improvements in 
productivity if labour is moved and retrained. While there are 
retraining allowances, one of the other possible obstacles to 
the redeployment of labour in the economy is the fear of loss of 
housing, assuming it is reasonable housing. The redeployment 
would have to be negotiated with the trade unions whose defensive 
position on job security is well~entrenched, but such negotiations 
would be easier if the connection between housing(as well as access 
to health care)and place of employment could be broken. Redeployment 
could then be accomplished not only without unemployment, but 
without threatening the housing and health care provisions of a 
significant proportion of industrial workers and office employees. 
In other words, a complete dislocation of housing from place of 
work would stabilise that part of the labour force which moves 
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jobs voluntarily in order to secure better housing. This would 
bring the productivity returns which come from being in the job 
10ng enough to learn the appropriate skills; job turnover is 
now sufficiently high to prevent this in many cases. On the 
other hand, a dislocation of housing from place of work would 
also make it possible to persuade workers in good housing to 
agree to redeployment in situations where changes in work 
procedures or investment would make workers redundant (even if 
they kept their jobs). So it would make it easier to shed 
labour where this was appropriate and where alternative employment 
was available, thereby increasing productivity in a different 
manner. 
This suggestion is not proposed as a remedy to the problems 
of the Soviet economy, but merely to indicate that a more detailed 
analysis of the interrelation of various social and economic 
policies than is possible at the moment could well yield 
proposals which both meet the kind of criticisms made in this 
chapter and improve Soviet economic performance. Without some 
such analysis based on detailed evidence, the 'incrementalism' 
which various commentators have suggested has characterised 
policy formation during the Brezhnev era could come to look 
more and more like the 'ossification' which some critics 
already claim to discern. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE ANALYSIS OF THE CLASS STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET UNION 
It was argued in the Introduction to this thesis that one 
could not designate state socialist societies as 'transitional 
social formations' on the grounds that they exhibited certain 
features which approximated to an ideal state of affairs. 
Rather than adhere to such a teleologlcal definition of 
socialism, which would imply that a socialist society was 
tending in a certain direction, the argument in the Introduction 
implied that a society could be considered socialist if it could 
be demonstrated that class relations had been seriously weakened 
or were non-existent. The purpose of this Chapter is to 
investigate whether (and if so, to what extent) class relations 
are operative in the Soviet Union. It will be remembered that 
it was argued that the relations of production do not involve 
class relations if the variety of forms of access to the means 
of production are not sufficiently mutually exclusive to enable 
some agents to predominate in determining their own conditions 
of existence by acting on the division of labour and thereby 
securing for themselves a disproportionate share in'the 
distribution of income. It was argued that if class relations 
were weak or non-existent, such relatively open access would 
mean that the differential forms of access of various agents 
would be subject to constant challenge by other agents, and would 
thus be an object of struggle and negotiation. One could add 
now that such struggles might well be subject to adjudication 
by certain legal or political agencies. Such a situation would 
not preclude differentiation of economic agents; indeed this is 
inevitab~e in any division of labour, and would include a 
differentiated occupational structure for individuals, but 
such differentiation would not entail a fairly systematic 
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enhancement or restriction of agents' capacity for action 
deriving from differential access to the means of production. 
This does not mean that there could be no systematic differences 
in the capacities of agents deriving from some other determinants 
of the division of labour, such as demarcations between 
individuals on the grounds of gender, ethnic group or age. 
The Grounds for Demarcating Class Boundaries 
It might be argued that all determinants of the division 
of labour which give rise to systematic differences in the 
capacities of agents affect their relation to the means of 
production, and thus their class position. For example, the 
fact that Soviet women currently do most of the domestic work 
might be considered grounds for arguing that they are thereby 
systematically excluded from the economic locations most 
involved in co-ordinating the division of labour and are thus 
in a different class position from men. However, while it is 
true that there are comparatively few women in the Central 
Committee, or at senior levels in Gosplan, or the State 
Committee on Labour and Social Questions, and while it is true 
that this is partly due to the difficulties of engaging in 
public politics when one is heavily engaged in domestic work, 
the peculiar 'relation to the means of consumption' of Soviet 
women cannot be said to constitute them as a distinct class, 
for several reasons. Firstly, the agents in the Soviet ynion 
which are most predominant in co-ordinating the division of 
labour are non-human agencies (that is, collective agents). 
By their very predominance they exclude to some extent all 
human agents. The fact that the individuals who staff their 
senior positions are mostly men~ while deplorable, is an effect 
of the mechanisms distributing individual agents to economic 
locations, rather than of the mechanisms generating those 
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locations themielves. Thus the social distribution of women 
among economic locations does not in itself directly indicate 
whether relations between various economic agents are class 
relations. Secondly, even if one were to establish that 
certain collective agents, such as Gosplan and other important 
state and party agencies, did effectively 'possess' the means 
of production, the relative exclusion of women from senior 
positions in these agencies would not establish that women 
were in a different class from men. Women do occupy some 
positions in such agencies and also constitute quite a large 
proportion of the staff in agencies of plan implementation such 
as the State Bank. Thus while the mechanisms distributing 
wpmen to different economic locations do entail the gaining 
of various political and educational qualifications by evening 
work, which is difficult for women who are heavily engaged in 
domestic work, this restriction on women's capacities for 
action is not determined by an access to the means of production 
which is different from that of men. It might appear that the 
social position of women is determined by differential access 
to the means of production, because being 'tied to domestic 
consumption' does restrict women1s capacities for action, 
including their chances of obtaining senior appointments. 
Thus it might seem that women's 'relation to t~e means of 
consumption' systematically denies them certain forms of access 
to the means of production, and hence puts them in a distinct 
class from men. However, I shall argue that this is not the 
case. 
It is the social attribution of gender which determines 
both the differential domestic work-load of Soviet men and 
women (thereby affecting promotion prospects) and the different 
occupational distributions of men and women. Both of these 
aspects of the division of labour affect the distribution of 
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income between men and women, in a way which favours men. 
However, this situation does not derive from the fact that men 
predominate in co-ordinating the division of labour, deciding 
the uses to which the means of production will be put. It is 
perfectly true that the capacity to control forms of consumption 
(by controlling retail outlets or forms of welfare provision) 
can prov~de a form of access to the means of production 
(because consumption affects subsequent production, or because 
planning consumption has implications for planning production). 
However, this does not mean that the converse is true: that 
women's lack of control (in comparison to men) of the means 
and conditions of consumption stems from a lack of controi 
(in comparison to men) of the means and conditions of production. 
I have already indicated that collective agents (institutions) 
rather than individuals predominate in co-ordinating the 
division of labour in the Soviet Union. If this is the case 
(and this whole line of reasoning has yet to be empirically 
substantiated in this Chapter) then the differential 
distribution of men and women in the division of labour does not 
derive from their differential access to the means of production. 
Rather it is the social or cultural attribution of gender which, 
in tying women disproportionately to domestic labour, or in 
allocating women to 'suitable J occupations, results in a 
systematic restriction on their capacities for action in comparison 
to men. Although it is a demarcation line with fairly systematic 
effects, the gender boundary does not derive from differential 
access of men and women to the means of production~ A similar 
argument could be made with regard to the fairly systematic 
enhancement of the promotion prospects and political capacities 
of Russians, deriving partly from the use of Russian as the 
main administrative language. This does not mean that Russians 
are in a different class from the other nationalities. 
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What I shall loosely call these cultural determinants of 
the division of labour certainly affect the distribution of 
individuals to different economic locations (occupational 
positions), and they may even generate some of the locations 
themselves, but they do not directly determine whether class 
relations are present. They may also fairly systematically 
affect the capacities o~ various agents, but such effects do 
not derive from the access of different agents to the means 
of production. To put it another way, while cultural 
determinants do affect the capacities of agents and hence 
their relations with other agents, it is the capacities 
deriving from the economic locations themselves, with the 
differential access which they provide to the means of production, 
which determines whether the relations of production are class 
relations~ The capacity of an economic agent deriving from 
its economic location is of course never fixed or static. To 
refer to an agent 1 s economic location is to refer to its 
structural position, to the structural conditions of its action; 
but structure is not static and changes in accordance with the 
struggles between agents. Thus the capacity for action of an 
economic agent is a result partly of the resources available 
to it (deriving largely from its relation to the means of 
production), partly of its internal organisation (if it is a 
collective agent) and partly of its means of calculating courses 
of action with respect to other agents (which may be allied or 
struggling with it over some issue). Such struggles can change 
the position and/or capacity of an agent. It cannot be denied 
that culturally defined attributes such as gender or nationality 
may be 'used in such struggles, and by affecting their outcome~ 
may indirectly affect the position or capacity of an agent. 
However, this is not the same as the direct determination of an 
agent's capacity resultin~ from its position in relation to the 
mRRns of oroduction. Only this determination of capacity by 
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economic location (defined in terms of access to the means of 
production) can involve class relations between agents. 
The acceptance of the possibility of a change in location 
of economic agents, or of groups of agents, has led some 
theorists to define class boundaries in terms of the lack of 
movement of agents. Thus classes are sometimes said to 
coalesce or crystallize around some set of economic locations 
whose membership is fairly static. However, the specification 
of a class boundary should not be confused with the issue of 
whether an agent (or group of agents) can move across it. The 
concept of class does not refer to the openness or closure of 
the division of labour to the movement of agents between 
locations~ but to the differential capacities of agents 
deriving from their occupying different economic locations 
(having different forms of access to the means of production). 
Without such a specification of a class boundary, it is 
impossible to decide whether the movement of agents in question 
should be considered simply as occupational mobility of 
individuals, a change of class position by individuals or groups~ 
or a structural change in the relations of production. The 
difficulty of specifying the nature of boundaries, and the 
related difficulty of deciding on the nature of changes in the 
division of labour, have had important effects on the study of 
occupational or social mobility. It is in some ways fairly 
easy to study the occupational mobility of individuals, given 
that the payment of wages usually entails a specification of 
the tasks to be performed and the skills required. This is 
often already recorded or faily easily obtainable from an 
interview. However, the study of 'group mobility' is generally 
defined less clearly. It may refer to a group of individuals 
from a common origin crossing a boundary, or a group of 
individuals constituting a collective agent whose location is 
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changing (either by crossing a boundary, or because the structure 
of the division of labour is itself changing). The concept of 
'social mobility', as it is usually deployed~ does not readily 
distinguish between tre mechanisms generating economic locations 
(structural conditions of action of agents which are subject to 
alteration in the course of struggle) and the mechanisms 
distributing individuals or even collective agents to those 
locations. ConsequentlY it does not make it easy to analyse 
the changing occupational structure as recorded in official 
statistics or in social surveys, since the features of that 
structure or the mechanisms of its changes are not clearly 
based on a theory of the social relations giving rise to it. 
The most common donfusion which arises from this state of 
affairs is the identification or confusion of the occupational 
structure (which can only refer to the economic location of 
individuals) with the class structure. However, the class 
structure can also refer to the economic location of collective 
agents. If one refuses to identify the occupational structure 
with the class structure, this raises two separate problems. 
The first is how to decide on the class position of collective 
agents~ who do not appear directly in the occupational structure~ 
for example, joint stock companies or state enterprises. The 
second is that while individuals may be located in occupational 
positions within such collective agents (positions which cannot 
be equated with the positions of the collective agents themselves), 
individuals may also be simultaneously located in several other 
collective agents. For example, individuals may simultaneously 
be members of a state enterprise, a trade union, the Communist 
Party, a sports club and a nuclear family. All these agents have 
some impact on the division of labour, although their importance 
as determinants of the division of labour varies. Both these 
problems raise in a new form a question which has already come 
391. 
up, namely, which boundaries in the division of labour are to 
be considered as class boundaries? This time the question 
arises in the form: what is the unit of analysis of the class 
structure? The answer must be that there is no single unit, 
in the sense of an agent of a particular kind. In the past, 
various sociologists have attempted to treat individuals in 
occupational positions as the unit of analysis of the class 
structure, but this has tended to mean that other agents have 
been treated as identical to (or entirely derivative of) this 
'prime! unit of ana1ysis. 1 What the class structure refers to 
is the relations between economic agents of whatever kind~ 
whether individual or collective. Economic agents are agents 
whose capacity for action is primarily derived from their 
access to the means of production. Non-economic agents are 
ones whose capacity for action is largely structured by other 
determinants. While these other determinants (and indeed the 
non-economic agents themselves) may have important effects on 
the division Df 1abour~ this does not mean the agents whose 
capacities are largely an effect of these non-economic determinants 
must be also considered as economic agents, for this would be 
to confuse the determinants of the division of labour with the 
effects of the division of labour. To reiterate, economic 
agents are agents occupying economic locations, that is, 
locations whose structural conditions of action are primar1y 
derived from the relation to the means of production. Such 
agents do not occupy a different domain (or level or instance) 
from non-economic agents, but the main conditions of their 
action are determined by their differential access to the means 
of production. Of course, such economic agents themselves 
partly determine the division of labour, in so far as they are 
able to act upon the division of labour~ but what makes them 
economic agents is that such capacities themselves are mainly 
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determined by their relation to the means of production. Thus 
their capacity to act is itself an effect of the division of 
labour, and is not to be confused with other determinants 
deriving from non-economic agents and structural features. 
It is now possible to specify more clearly the relationship 
between the occupational structure and the class structure, 
assuming that class relations are a feature of the social 
formation in qUBstion. In a sense the occupational structure 
is both less than and more than the class structure. It is 
less than the class structure, because it does not coincide 
with collective economic agents which may be part of the class 
structure. It is more than the class structure~ because it is 
determined not only by the class structure, but by other 
non-economic determinants of the division of labour such as 
gender attribution, nationality, state and party policy, and 
even the organisation of the state itself. To put it another 
way~ the occupational structure does not directly register the 
presence of collective agents, although it does so indirectly 
because such agents have their own internal organisation and 
hence an associated occupational structure. On the other hand, 
the occupational structure may well register the effects of 
other, non-economic determinants of the division of labour. 
Consequently, the occupational structure is only a partial 
indicator of the effects of the relations of production, since 
it only shows the distribution of individuals within the division 
of labour. This distribution does not show directly the economic 
location of collective agents, or the relative capacities of any 
economic agents. Furthermore, it does not directly distinguish 
between mechanisms allocating individuals to economic locations 
(which may be affected by a variety of determinants) and 
mechanisms generating those locations themselves {which may be 
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affected by the same or other determinants). Finally, since it 
does not indicate the relative capacities of the different 
economic agents, it cannot show how far these capacities enable 
some agents to predominate in co-ordinating the division of 
labour, thereby to some extent determining their own conditions 
of existence, and securing for themselves a disproportionate 
share in the distribution of income. 2 In other words, it cannot 
directly show whether the relations of production involve class 
relations. 
Nevertheless, the occupational structure is a good starting 
point to try to elicit the presence or extent of class relations, 
since it should indicate some of the effects of class relations 
on the division of labour. It should indicate at least some of 
the effects of class relations on individual economic agents, 
who are frequently used as the unit of analysis in official 
statistics or social surveys. Consequently there may be 
empirical evidence of such effects, and bearing in mind the 
above reservations about the somewhat opaque relation between 
the occupational structure and the class structure, it should 
be possible to appraise this evidence in terms of the extent to 
which it indicates any systematic effects of differential access 
to the means of production, as opposed to other, non-economic 
determinants of the division of labour. 
The Soviet Occupational Structure 
One of the problems of analysing any occupational structure 
is that individuals have usually already been aggregated into 
groups, in the process of collecting official statistics or of 
conducting a social survey. The classification scheme for 
aggregating varied tasks and skills into discrete groups of 
individuals may not be fully evident in the published results. 
One partial solution to t~is would be to conduct one's own survey, 
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but this is not possible in the case of the Soviet Union, where 
one must rely on Soviet sociologists or other Soviet research. 
Thus the ability to rework the empirical material in terms of 
the researcher's own concerns is limited. As mentioned in the 
Introduction to this work, this need not be an insuperable 
problem, but the limitations which this state of affairs imposes 
should not be forgotten. Even in conducting one's own survey, 
without an encyclopaedic knowledge of the division of labour one 
is forced to rely to some extent either on respondents' own 
classifications (or designations) of their occupation or on some 
available classification scheme, although both can be evaluated 
and if necessary modified in the light of the theoretical concerns 
of the research~ 
As is fairly well known~ the official Soviet view of the 
class structure refers to the existence of two classes and one 
stratum, the workers, peasants and employees (some of the latter 
are sometimes called the intelligentsia),whose inter-relation 
is structured by non-antagonistic contradictions. 3 As Lane 
points out, "A non-antagonistic contradiction is one which may 
be resolved by quantitative change, whereas an antagonistic 
contr~diction can only be resolved by a qualitative one". 
Lane takes the view that the dialectical concept of contradiction 
entails antagonism and its resolution by qualitative change, so 
the term 'non-antagonistic contradiction' is in his view confusing 
and inappropriate. What the official theory seems to be 
attempting in using such a term is to distinguish contradictions 
which can be resolved "~ithin the parameters of a given social 
system,,4, rather than ones which can only be resolved by changing 
the social system itself. So a classless society can be achieved 
by a guided growing together of the classes~ Be that as it may, 
the point which concerns us is that this theoretical approach has 
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influenced the way that official statistics on the occupational 
structures are presented and discussed. (The influence of this 
approach on the conduct of social surveys is less clear.) A 
typical example of this sort of discussion is the work by 
A.A. Amvrosov 5 on the social structure of Soviet society, which 
uses all-Union and local statistical data, that is the censuses 
of 1939, 1959 and 1970, together with "concrete sociological 
research"6 to show the dynamics of the change in the social class 
structure. He provides the following table on the changes in the 
class composition of the Soviet population. 
Table 8 
The Dynamics of Change of the Class Composition 
of the Pogglation of the U.S.S.R. 
Workers and Employees 
of which 
Workers 
Intelligentsia and Employees 
Collective Farmers and 
Co-operative Artisans 
Non-Co-operative Peasants 
and Artisans 
Total 
Source: A.A. Amvrosov, ibid.~ page 20 
1939 
50.2 
33.5 
1 6. 7 
47.2 
2.6 
100.0 
1959 
68 .. 3 
49.5 
1 8.8 
31 .4 
0.3 
100.0 
1974 
82.2 
60.6 
21.6 
17.8 
0.0 
100.0 
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The problem is, then, how these two classes and one stratum 
are defined, and if this definition is unsatisfactory, how useful 
statistics on the Soviet occupational structure are for examining 
class relations. Amvrosov argues that the working class does not 
consist solely of those engaged in physical work in state enterprises. 
This sort of definition, based on the view that only they produce 
material values, ignores the effects of the scientific-technical 
revolution on th e charactE;lr of labour -of the worker. Yet the 
working class is not all those engaged in the sphere of material 
production, since some of them belong to the intelligentsia. 
The differences between workers and intelligentsia have not yet 
been overcome. These are differences in the character and content 
of work, in technical-cultural level and so on. 7 So Amvrosov 
defines the working class of socialist society as workers in 
state enterprises of town and country who are directly engaged 
in transforming the subject of labour in the process of creation 
of material values; it is the class having the high~ degree of 
organisation and socialist consciousness and playing the leading 
role in all spheres of life. Ignoring the problem that the 
degree of organisation and class consciousness might be better 
treated as possible effects of class position, rather than as 
part of the definition, Amvrosovts approach amounts to saying 
that the working class is defined by the form of property (state/ 
non-state) and by the division between mental and manual labour. 
Amvrosov says that it is not simply a matter of workers being 
engaged in physical work, but that their physical and mental work 
is directly connected with the transformation of the subject of 
labour, perhaps by means of a system of machinery. However,this 
does not amount to a significant modification of his approach, 
since all mental work implies manual operations and vice-versa: 
the distinction between the working class and the intelligentsia 
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is basically in terms of the qualitative content of their work. 
In other words, while claiming that the mental/manual labour 
distinction has been partly overcome, and while recognising B that 
the increasingly high cultural and intellectual level of the 
population creates difficulties for defining the intelligentsia, 
Amvrosov retains the mental/manual labour distinction to define 
the working class. 
Leaving asiDe the problems of this distinction for the time 
being, the problem of limiting the working class to the state 
sector also creates difficulties. Why is the working class 
different from what Amvrosov calls 'the kolkhoz peasantry'? 
Since it is claimed with some justice that the latter are 
approaching the working class, how are the latter different from 
the rural working class (on state farms)? Amvrosov appears to 
argue that the kolkhozniks have a different relation to the 
means of production, which is co-operatively owned, has a lower 
degree of socialisation, is economically independent and whose 
use is decided by'its members. Yet even Amvrosov admits that 
the Soviet state constitutes the leadership of the kolkhoz 
sector; however, he argues that legally the distribution of 
property and financial means belongs to the kolkhozy themselves. 
In so far as this legal determination is effective, it would 
imply a different relation to the means of production, but it 
would also mean that the Soviet occupational structure can only 
be analysed in class terms by reference to collective economic 
agents, such as collective farms or state enterprises. In that 
case, if the class location of individual agents is to be defined 
in terms of membership of a collective agent, and by the division 
between mental and manual labour, then two conclusions shOUld 
follow. Firstly, the rural intelligentsia employed on collective 
farms would be in a different class location compared to those on, 
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say, state farms. Secondly, the different types of collective 
agents within the state sector shOUld be examined, to see if they 
have a different relation to the means of production from state 
enterprises. Of course, Amvrosov does not do so, effectively 
regarding all state property as giving all collective agents of 
the state the same relation to the means of production. 
This sort of difficulty with drawing class boundaries is 
precisely the sort of problem discussed in the Iniroduction to 
this work and in the first section of this chapter. Separating 
out one stratum from a two-class structure on the grounds of 
the character and content of work leaves no grounds for keeping 
it at one stratum, especially when other class and non-class 
determinants of the division of labour are recognised, as they 
are by Amvrosov. In addition, defining the class boundary in 
terms of a legal determination of two types of socialist property 
(collective and state) places one in the position of either 
ignoring arguments that social relations are not simply an 
effect of legal determinants or of attempting to substantiate 
the importance of the state/non-state boundary in determining 
access to the means of production. To take the second alternative 
would require a careful examination of different kinds of economic 
agents, and of legal and political determinants of their capacities, 
as was attempted in Chapters Two to Four of this work. Amv.rosov 
apparently chooses the first alternative - to ignore the problem. 
However, this still leaves Amvrosov with the problem of the 
definition of employees and the intelligentsia. He admits the 
intelligentsia is not homogenous. Those working in state 
enterprises have much in common with workers,whereas the rural 
intelligentsia is not much different from other groups of 
kolkhozniks. (This ignores the fact that much of the rural 
intelligentsia work in state agencies, including state farms). 
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However, he argues that it is a special social group engaged in 
mental labour requiring a special secondary or a higher educational 
qUalification. 9 This definition immediately leads to a discrepancy 
between the category of employees and that of intelligentsia. 
Employees are not workers but they do not have a high enough 
qualification to be counted as members of the intelligentsia. 
Thus, while all non-workers in the state sector are employees, 
not all of them are members of the intelligentsia. This means 
that the distinction between mental and manual labour becomes 
even more problematic than Amvrosov admits, for it makes it 
difficult to define the distinction between highly qualified 
workers,and employees who do not have a very high level of 
educational qualification. Is one talking of a continuum rather 
than a division? What does one make of manual workers with a 
higher level of education and higher pay than some employees? 
However, if there is a difference between workers and employees 
in terms of the quality of the mental labour involved, why talk 
of only ~ stratum? This becomes particularly puzzling in view 
of the statement that the intelligentsia is divided into various 
socio-prof~ssional orders: managerial, engineering-technical, 
agricultural, scientific-cultural, military and so on, with the 
distinction between town and country intelligentsia being important. 
50 why one stratum? To admit a plurality of strata would not 
even threaten the official theory of class boundaries, since the 
classes are demarcated by the two forms of socialist property. 
These then are the sort of difficulties which the official 
theory of two classes and one stratum can run into, and while 
analyses of changes in the occupational structure based on this 
theory are not totally devoid of interest, they are unnecessarily 
problematic. Decisions as to the extent or even presence of class 
relations in the Soviet Union will thus have to be based on a 
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somewhat more detailed analysis of the occupational structure, 
which in conjunction with the analysis presented earlier in this 
work, should make it possible to resolve at least some of these 
problems. 
In contrast to the official Soviet position, Lane and O'Del110 
define the working class "to include in the Soviet Union all manual 
and non-manual labour occupied in publicly owned institutions 
concerned with production, distribution and exchange." They 
elaborate this a little later: 11 "In our view, non-manual workers 
in production enterprises are not, as assumed by Stalin and others, 
part of a separate stratum outside of the working class; they 
become an integral part of it. This is because in a Marxist sense 
their relationship to the means of production is the same as that 
of manual workers: all are wage-earners employed in state-owned 
enterprises; all contribute directly to production in the national 
economy; all to some degree share a similar political ideology." 
This is consistent with the view expressed elsewhere by Lane12 
that state socialist societies are not classless, but are not 
antagonistic class societies either: they are single class 
societies or workers' states. According to Lane, "the cultural 
formation and political arrangements characteristic of the 
superstructure of society are not yet at the socialist level." 
These superstructural determinants generate forms of inequality 
which are not epiphenomena, but are contradictions built into 
the system as long as the level of production leaves some socially 
determined wants unfulfilled; in other words, as long as the 
-level of productive forces is too low. This is not the place 
to rehearse arguments about the adequacy of the base-superstructure 
metaphor or the 'problematic of the productive forces'. Such 
arguments were referred to in the Introduction to this work. 13 
All that will be noted here is that Lane seems in these later 
works -to have dropped hi~ earlier objections to the 
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use of the concept of non-antagonistic contradictions, since he 
is arguing here that in the Soviet Union we face a non-antagonistic 
class .society which is a class society precisely because the low 
level of the productive forces produces superstructural features 
~ 
whose contradictions apparently give rise to forms of inequality. 
Without these forms of inequality, it is clearly implied that the 
Soviet Union would be a classless, rather than a single class 
society. For my own part, I cannot conceive of a single class 
~ociety, since as I have repeatedly stated,the concept of class 
relations refers to significantly differential access to the 
means of production. If all agents are in a tsingle class' then 
relations between them are classless. 
However, despite my not sharing this view on the difference 
between class and classless society, Lanets works (as well as 
that of Lane and OtDell) are of considerable interest to an 
investigation of the Soviet occupational structure, because of 
their recognition of forms of inequality within the 'single class' 
society. For example, Lane (1978)14 points out that the Soviet 
literature on the subject of the intelligentsia and employees is 
highly ambiguous 7 with different sociologists dividing non-manual 
workers into different numbers of groups, even within the categories 
of employee and intelligentsia. Similarly various numbers of 
strata are distinguished within the manual working class (although 
usually the three strata are considered to be unskilled, semi-
skilled and skilled manual workers), and within the 'peasantry' 
(although again three strata are often distingUished, namely, 
the unskilled, the mechanisers and the administrative personnel). 
Yet Lane is not content simply to note Soviet attempts to analyse 
these forms of inequality, as can most clearly be seen in Lane 
and O'Dell, where it is argued 15 that "the simple categorisation 
of manual and non-manual workers in terms of the quality of their 
labour input becomes increasingly less relevant ••••• (but that) 
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other distinctions between various strata of the working class 
have more salience." These distinctions are based on occupational 
differentiation (itself based on the character of work performed 
and the place a worker has in the system of social production), 
educational background, financial rewards and culture. Unfortunately, 
Lane and O'Dell do not explicitly theorise the concepts of character 
of work performed and place in the system of social production. 
However, they do provide a clear account of the historical changes 
in the occupational structure, both in terms of the distribution 
between agriculture and industry (manual and non-manual being 
defined to exclude collective farmers), and in terms of 
distribution among various branches of the economy. The changes 
in the distribution between agriculture and industry (and within 
industryy between manual and non-manual) can be summarised by 
the following table, constructed from the text of Lane and O'Dell. 
Table 9 
Percentage Changes in the Overall Soviet occuE§tional Structure 
1928 1 939 1977 
Manual 12.4 33.2 61.6 
Non-manual 5.2 17.0 22.7 
Industry sub-total 17.6 50.2 84.3 
Agriculture 82.4 49.8 15.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Lane and Of DeIly ibid., pages 7-8 (derived and corrected). 
It can be seen that the figures for 1939 are very similar to 
those provided by Amvrosov y so the earlier figures for 1928 and 
the later ones for 1977 confirm the trend indicated in Amvrosov. 
As Lane and O'Dell put ity "These facts serve to illustrate the 
rapid structural change that has taken place: a swift popUlation 
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growth, a movement of population from village towwn, the creation 
of an urban working class with a recent peasant background."16 
It also illustrates the fact.that the hope of being able to rework 
the official figures may be a pious one, since they may not be 
sufficiently detailed to be reworked. However, such a conclusion 
would be premature, as can be seen from the following table on 
occupational distribution by sectors of the economy • 
. Table 10 
Indus/rial distribution of /h .. labour fore .. ', RUHla and 'hI' Sovitt Union, ,t/trlrd yran 1897-"70 
Indus/ry 1897 1913 1926 1940 1950 1959 19M . 1970 1976 
(i) (ii) 
(1) Agriculture 64 77 75 71 54 48 41 33 27 23 
(2) Manufacturing and construction 18 10 9 14 23 27 32 35 37 38 
(3) Transport and communications 2 2 2 4 5 5 6 8 8 9 
(4) Trade 5+ 4 9 3 5 5 5 6 7 8 
(5) Public administration H. 1 •• 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 
(6) Education and health 1+ 1 1 4 6 8 10 13 15 16 
(7) Other services 7 5 4 2 4 4 3 3 4 4 
(8) A (row (1)) 64 77 75 71 54 48 41 33 27 23 
(9) M (rows (2) plus (3)) 20 12 11 18 28 32 38 43 45 47. 
(10) S (rows (4) to (7)) 16 11 14 11 18 20 21 24 28 30 
(11) Total civilian labour force (rows (8) 
to (10)) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(12) MIS ratio 1.2 1.1 0.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.56 
• 'The definitions and coverage of the data for the various years are not entirely consistent. Figures for 1897 (col. i) 
one worker per family business: 1926 excludes all family workers and 1959 excludes- workers on private plots, but 
both count all persons reported as workers in the censuses. At least for the later year~, there seems to be little 
difference between "family workers" and "workers on private plots" (d. 1959) .... 1897 (col. ii) is based on the 
distribution of the total population and thus "favours" agriculture to the extent that rural families are larger than 
urban. It appears to conform with the definitions of later years better than 1897 (i). The figures for 1913, 1940, 1950, 
1959, are based on annual full-time equivalents and include family workers also as full-\ime equivalents' (Ofer, 
1973:187) . 
•• Included in other services. 
Source: Lane and O'Dell, ibid., page 11 
Lane and O'Dell believe that this table and other evidence 
support the view "that the Soviet occupational pattern substantially 
follows that of Western capitalist countries ••• The more 
industrialised a society becomes, (i) the smaller the proportion 
of the labour force engaged in agriculture, and (ii) the higher 
the ratio of non-manual workers in the non-agricultural labour 
force."17 The pattern of growth in the service sector is 
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consistent with the growth in non-manual occupations shown in the 
previous table, but it is perhaps surprising that 'public 
administration' has declined as a percentage of the labour force 
since 1959. This is clearly related to the use of voluntary 
workers among the trade unions and social organisations, which 
is considered as enhancing popular participation in 'the 
administration of things'. We saw in Chapter Four that George 
and Manning did not consider that this was very effective as a 
form of participation, and from the arguments of Hirst discussed 
in Chapter Three we might expect that it may not be very effective 
as a form of administration either. Such a view is supported by 
Hough,18 who argues that both the State Committee for Labour and 
Social Questions and Gosplan face a real danger of inundation by 
the incredible level of detail on which they and the trade unions 
must work. The use of trade unions (in addition to stage agencies) 
must solve some of these problems by spreading the work load, but 
Hough argues19 that "the deep involvement of the trade unions in 
Soviet labour and wage policy creates a serious administrative 
problem for the Soviet system because trade unions are subordinated 
to no governmental agency." The party organs, as in so many 
s~milar situations, serve as the common superior which co-ordinates 
activities and adjudicates disputes. However, the Politburo has 
little time to deal with the details of wages policy~ so the 
co-ordination of policy in this area remains a troublesome problem. 
More important, however, from the point of view of policy 
implementation is the lack of training in administration and the 
high turnover of voluntary trade union workers involved in social 
security administration. It is this lack of expertise and the 
problems associated with it which support Hirst's argument to the 
effect that state administration can be preferable to voluntary 
forms of provision of various services, since it can secure certain 
defined minimal standards of performance. 20 For such reasons, the 
405. 
lack of growth of the 'public administration' sector of occupations 
indicated in the above table may be less desirable than proponents 
of democratic administration might imagine. 
With regard to manual occupations, the above table is not 
very enlightening~ but Lane and O'Dell argue 21 that the general 
level of skill has increased between 1961 and 1972. While this is 
doubtless true, they themselves point out that part of the r~corded 
increase in skill is due p~ssibly to the use of re-grading as a 
disguised form of wage increase. Furthermore, in Chapter Two 
attention was drawn to the heavy use of ancillary workers and of 
workers to supply raw materials from within the same factory., 
using artisan labour. Lane and O'Dell argue that the continuing 
demand for manual labour is due to the relatively lower 
technological level of the U.S.S.R., which means that intensive 
and extensive growth are taking place in parallel, rather than 
in seQuence. 22 This is almost certainly still correct, but they 
then argue that the actual structure of the labour force is 
largely determined by the kind and level of technology, and the 
socially accepted ways of manning (or staffing, as I prefer to 
call it). They then refer to Braverman in arguing that it is in 
the context of similarities in the division of labour that the 
organisation of the work process in the U.S.S.R. has parallels 
with the capitalist West. Yet it is not clear to me that the 
structure of the labour force is all that similar to the capitalist 
West (unless one is contrasting industrialised societies with 
agrarian ones or something). Certainly, in the U.S.S.R. there 
has been the familiar tendency within industry for the proportion 
of the workforce engaged in 'material production' to fall, from 
88.3 per cent in 1940 to 75.4 per cent in 1976. 23 It is also 
true that, using Western definitions of primary, secondary and 
tertiary sectors of the economy, the U.S.S.R. in 1976 resembled 
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Italy and Austria of 1960~ rather than the U.S.A. of 1960,24 so 
that it might be possible to attribute most of the differences 
within the secondary sector (manufacturing and construction) to 
a technological lag between the capitalist societies and the 
U.S.S.R. However, this would be courting the danger of 
attributing too great an effectivity to technological determinants 
in structuring the manual occupations in the labour force. 
Lane and O'Dell are quite will~ng, it seems, to concede that 
the non-manual labour force is not occupationally structured to 
neatly fit in with the needs of technology. rhus they note the 
growing numbers of engineering and technical employees (ITRs),25 
and the smaller share than in the West of the labour force 
constituted by lower-grade white collar workers. 26 They quote a 
Soviet source to the effect that this smaller share of 
'administrative' workers (office staff) is largely a consequence 
of the artificial limitation of the number of salaried workers 
when their functions were handed over to the ITRs (emphasis in 
, 
Lane and O'Dell). The Soviet'source argues that ITRs should be 
completely relieved of office work. 27 It is somewhat surprising 
that they do not seriously consider whether analogous 'artificial
' 
limitations are placed on the manual labour force o It would be 
hard to deny that changing levels of technology are an important 
determinant of the occupational structure of the labour force, 
but if both intensive and extensive growth are taking place, it 
is not immediately clear that changes in technology are the main 
determinant, rather than, say, another determinant which they 
mention, socially accepted ways of staffing. In any case, changes 
in technology are themselves partly determined by the central 
planning agencies and the socially accepted ways of staffing. 
The last point is illustrated by Lee wh~ argues 28 that 
'rationalisation' of technology by the workers themselves is 
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symbiotically related to engineering failures, to badly designed 
equipment which has to be accepted in a situation of supply 
difficulties. It is an activity which declines as any new 
technology introduced gets older (that is, as the problems of 
its introduction are overcome). So the labour force is not only 
being restructured by technology, but is itself constantly 
adapting technology to existing practices. While the introduction 
of automation does affect the educational profile of the worker 
and the content of labour, and consequently does lead to a 
'restructuring of the labour force in favour of more skilled 
manual occupations, the continuing difficulties of technological 
innovation should not be ignored. The 'parallels with the 
capitalist West' are mainly evident at the macro-social level 
(that is, with very broad classifications of the occupational 
structure, such as manual/non-manual) and over fairly long time 
periods which indicate trends which it is presumed will continue 
to eradicate the differences in Soviet and capitalist occupational 
structures. Lane and O'Dell argue29 that the small service sector 
and the low proportion of employees in clerical occupations shOUld 
not be allowed to obscure the similarities between the Soviet 
occupational structure and that of capitalist societies, but 
even if one accepts that in broad terms they are correct, then 
in a comparison between Soviet and capitalist occupational 
structures, surely the differences are at least as interesting. 
One can also quite accept their argument that greater attention 
should be paid to forms of socialisation and patterns of 
recruitment, and to the political context in which the Soviet 
worker is s~tuated,30 while still devoting greater attention than 
they seem to consider necessary to the occupational structure 
itself. 
The extent to which the Soviet occupational structure continues 
its past trend of increasing similarity to that of the West cannot 
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be simply taken for granted, when, as Feshbach 31 among others 
indicates, current practices may well slow down the rate of 
technological change which is supposed to bring about the 
restructuring of the labour force along lines similar to the 
capitalist countries. For example, to return to the issue of 
auxiliary workers, Feshbach points out that there are 85 of them 
for every 100 basic wageworkers in the U.S.S.R., compared to 
38 per 100 in the U.S.A. Furthermore, very little progress has 
been made in reducing their share of the workforce: in 1959 
they comprised 55 per cent of all industrial workers, and by 
1972 their proportion had only gone down to 49 per cent. 32 The 
result is that the proportion of workers performing work by hand 
only went down from 59.7 per cent in 1965 to 55.7 per cent in 
1972. These proportions include those who set and adjusted 
machines by hand. It must be admitted that Lane and O'Dell 
point out 33 that such work involves a decreasing proportion of 
time spent on manual labour, but even if such workers are 
excluded, Feshbach shows manual workers to have been 48.5 per 
cent of the labour force in 1965 and 43.1 per cent in 1972. 
Even if planned reductions have taken place by 1980 (which lS 
open to question) manual workers will still be almost half the 
Soviet industrial work force. 34 There are various obstacles to 
the redeployment of this section of the labour force, some of 
which were mentioned in Chapter Two or at the end of Chapter 
Four. Firstly, there is the difficulty of firing an incompetent 
worker. Secondly, much of the secondary output in a given plant 
consists of work done to compensate for the vagaries of the supply 
system. Thirdly, the size of the work-force in a given factory 
is of prime importance in determining the basic wage levels for 
the manager, his assistants and the enterprise workers, which is 
a clear disincentive to efficient use of labour. On top of this 
is the often noted problem of labour turnover, which has remained 
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at around 20 per cent from 1959 to 1974. This reported rate 
understates the actual rate of turnover, because it excludes 
by definition certain 'acceptable' reasons for departure such as 
being drafted into the armed forces, becoming disabled y retirement, 
or ending temporary work. Feshbach estimates that inclusion of 
these cases would raise the annual turnover rate in industry to 
30 per cent. Forty per cent of those who leave one job for 
another change their trade or speciality. In addition to problems 
of turn overy Feshbach raises doubts about the quality of education 
of the workforce, particularly engineers, the most highly 
publicised group. Around one-third to two-fifths of engineering 
graduates (depending on the definition of an engineer) graduating 
in 1975 had been trained on a correspondence or evening course, 
which Feshbach argues surely means lower levels of competence. 
Given these factors, Feshbach argues that it is no wonder that 
industrial labour productivity in the U.S.S.R. is about half that 
in the U.S.A. 35 He concludes thus: "In view of the inexorable 
decline in the size of new additions to the labour force y the 
projected 'reduction in capital investment in the current five-
year plan y and the limited prospects for sustaining high gains in 
productivity among Soviet workers, the impact of labour force 
structure and composition on economic growth in the U.S.S.R. is 
likely to be of major importance in the next two decades." If 
such a conclusion is accepted, then any argument about the 
technological determination of the occupational structure must be 
qualified by a recognition of the reciprocal effect of the Soviet 
occupational structure on technological change (within the current 
institutional context of economic planning). 
The issue of the similarity of the Soviet industrial 
occupational structure with that of the West can be further 
illuminated by examining the distrjbution of the industrial labour 
force among different branches of industry in 1960 and 1975 y 
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as Feshbach does in the following table. 
___ --=Branch of Industry 
Total 
Electric power 
Coal 
Table 11 
Chemical and petrochemical 
Ferrous metallurgy 
Machine-building and metalworking 
Construction materials 
Timber, woodworking, and p.ulp 
and paper 
Light industry 
Food industry 
1960 
22,620,000 
397,000 
1,196,000 
792,000 
1,047,000 
7,206,000 
1,575,000 
2.698,000 
3,860,000 
2,164,000 
Source: M. Feshbach, ibid. y page 17 
1975 
34,054,000 
686,000 
1,009,000 
1,753,000 
1,369,000 
13,816,000 
2,151,000 
2,795,000 
5,109,000 
3,015,000 
The most striking features of this table are the rapid 
growth in industrial employment between 1960 and 1975 36 and the 
'disproportionate' growth in the machine-building and metal 
working branch of industry. This is the most important branch 
in terms of numbers of workers, amount of investment and 
si~nificance for defence. It accounted in 1975 for more than 
40 per cent of the total employment in industry, being more than 
two and a half times as big as the next largest branch, the 
so-called 'light' industry sector. One-third of its output is 
reported by the C.I.A. to go on defence. 37 After the chemical 
and petrochemical branch, it is the fastest growing branch in 
industry. Can it really be said that this pre-eminence of one 
branch, with its associated skilled work-force, is similar to 
the occupational structure of a capitalist economy? It is clearly 
a result of the state economic policy, as are many other features 
of the Soviet occupational structure, whether directly or indirectly. 
This is evident from an analysis of mechanisms of allocation3B and 
from an examination of changes in the overall Soviet economy which 
affect the occupational structure in various ways. 
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It is proposed, therefore, to examine various aspect~ of the 
Soviet occupational structure in more detail, to discuss the 
extent to which they are affected by state policy on the economy 
in general, or by the policies or unintended mechanisms of 
allocation of personnel. Perhaps the most striking aspect of 
the occupational structure in this context is the occupational 
.distribution of women, which will be discussed first. This will 
be followed by an examination of the occupational position of 
collective farmers and of the intelligentsia. Following that~ 
the educational system will be discussed in terms of its supposed 
role in allocating personnel to occupational locations. Having 
then surveyed the major aspects of the occupational structure, it 
will then be possible to return to the issue of class relations. 
This will be done, firstly, by eXamining the extent to which 
different occupational positions affect their incumbents' capacity 
for action, particularly in terms of access to the means of 
production, the conditions of this, and the resulting capacity 
for action. Secondly, class relations will be examined by looking 
at the distribution of wages and income levels. Finally, the 
importance of various collective agents in generating or dissipating 
systematic effects as a consequence of differential access to the 
means of production will be considered, before deciding on the 
pertinence of the concept of a class structure to the Soviet Union. 
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The Occupational Structure of Soviet Women 
The position of women in Soviet society has already been 
briefly indicated in Chapter Four, and discussed as a problem 
for the definition of class boundaries in the first section of 
this Chapter. Given these earlier remarks about the relatively 
disadvantaged position of Soviet women, it may come as something 
of a surprise to find thatFeshbach notes that "the educational 
attainment of women, especially in the younger ages, is higher 
than that of men.,,39 This is stated with respect to industrial 
wage workers, rather than the whole population, a view which is 
corroborated by Lapidus. 40 Lane and 0'Del141 provide evidence to 
suggest that it may soon be true of the whole population. However, 
even if educational provision were perfectly dovetailed with the 
occupational structure, the improving educational position of 
women is something which would only show up in the future, since 
it is too recent a phenomenon to affect the current distribution 
of women in the occupational structure. 
If we tUrn to the current occupational structure, the most 
striking feature is that women constituted 51 per cent of the 
force 
labour/in 1978, and have done so since 1970. For historical 
reasons, women are over half the population, so that not all of 
them are yet employed in wage labour, but over 87 per cent of 
them are now either employed or studying fUll_time 42 • This 
participation rate is supported by official ideology, as well as 
by economic pressure (with aspirations probablY outrunning 
incomes), but it "has not obliterated many features which, in the 
U.S.S.R. as elsewhere, distinguish male and female employment. 
Indeed the sharpest line of differentiation among Soviet industrial 
workers today is that of sex. In the occupational structure as in 
the family, sex remains a significant basis for the allocation of 
social roles, with the result that male and female workers differ 
in the distribution of income, skill, status, power and even time.,,43 
413. 
Women are concentrated in particular sectors of the economy and in 
particular occupations. Of the roughly 68 million women employed 
in 1975, 20 million were in agriculture, 24 million were in 
services, 16 million in industry and roughly 7 million were in 
other sectors (construction, transport, forestry and communications). 
The distribution of women by sector can be seen from the following 
table. 
Source: 
Table 12 
Distribution of Women Workers and Employees 
by Economic Sector, 1960 and 1974 
Women as Percent Sector as Percent 
of Total Labor Force of Total Female 
Sector in Given Sector 
1960 1974 
All women workers and 
employees 
"Productive" sectors 
Industry 
Retail Trade and 
Public Catering 
Agriculture 
Construction 
Transport 
Communications 
F6r~stry I 
Other "production" 
47 
45 
66 
41 
30 
24 
64 
21 ~ -. 
sectors 45 
"Non-productive" sectors" 
Education services 
and culture 
Health, physi<;;al 
ed. and social 
services 
Municipal & 
personal 
services 
Research and 
auxiliary 
services _ 
Government & 
economic ad-
ministrative 
bodies, co-
operative, 
& civic 
organiza tions 
Banking & state 
insurance 
Entertainment 
70 
85 
53 
42 
51 
68 
36 
It 
51 
49 
76 
44 
29 
24 
68 
21 
19 
73 
85 
53 
49 
63 
81 
45 
Labor Force 
1960 1974 
100 
35~0 
- f 
"10.6 
:9.5 
6-;4 
5.1 
1.6 
'0.3 
0.7 
11.5 
10.1 
3.5 
2.5 
2.2 
0.6 
0.4 
100 
32.0 
12.7 
8.8 
5.8 
4.2 
2.0 
0.2 
1.1 
12.7 
9.4 
3.8 
3.6 -
2.6 
0.7 
0.4 
Source: S. Turchaninova, "Trends in Women's Employ-
ment in the USSR," International Labor Review, Vol. 112, Np. 
4, October 1975, p. 369. 
Lapidus, ibid., page 241 
c 
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Three industrial branches (machine building and metal working, 
textiles and food) account for 70 per cent of all female industrial 
employment. 44 "Moreover y in industrial employment y as in the 
professions, women are concentrated at lower levels of the pyramid, 
in low-level, unmechanised and unskilled jobs.,,45 In the 1960s, 
newly-mechanised and automated work went primarily to the males, 
and women still account for 80 per cent of the auxiliary workers 
in industry. This is an important point for any future attempts 
to raise productivity, because it will be difficult to retrain 
women by evening or correspondence courses if they continue to do 
most of the domestic labour. For similar reasons y women are less 
engaged in technical innovation by rationalisation,46 and have 
lower levels of socio-political participation than their male 
counterparts. 47 While women are better represented among technical 
specialists than among skilled workers in industry, they are 
largely absent from positions of managerial authority. Although 
the percentage of female enterprise directors has risen from 1 per 
cent in 1956 to 9 per cent in 1975, they have not moved into 
management to t he extent that their training, experience and 
proportion 48 Women of the relevant age cohort warrant. are 
frequently over-qualified for the job they hold, so their lower 
earnings are not exclusively the result of lower qualifications 
or productivity. The gap between male and female earnings is 
around 30 to 35 per cent. This is narrower than the 40 per cent 
gap in the U.S.A. and several West European countries, but wider 
than the 27 per cent gap in Scandinavia. 49 The uneven distribution 
of women across economic sectors and occupations, as well as the 
average earnings of these occupations, can be seen from the 
following table. 
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Table 13 
Distribution of Women Workers and Employees 
and Average Monthly Earnings by Economic Sector, 
1975 
Economic Sector 
Construction 
Transport. 
Industry (Production 
Personnel) 
Science and Scientific 
Services 
Nationwide Average 
Credit and State 
Insurance 
Apparatus of 
Government and 
Economic 
Administration 
Education 
Agriculture 
Communica tions 
Housing ana ": 
. Municipal Economy, 
Everyday Ser'ices 
Trade, Public \ 
Ca tering, Materials 
and Equipment, 
Supply ¥1d Sales 
Arts . 
" , 
Public Health, Physical 
Culture, and 
. Social Weifare 
Culture 
Total 
Number of 
Women 
Workers & 
Employees 
3,602,000 
2,211,000 
16,662,000 
2,015,000 
423,000 
1,457,000 
5,904,000' 
4,530,000 
\,042,000 
2, 010y 000 
6,763~000 
207~OaO 
4,851,000 
747,000 
52,539,000 
-1 
-. 
Women as 
% of Total Average 
Workers & Monthly 
Employees Earnings 
28· 
24 
49 
50 
51 
82 
65 
73 
44 
68 
53 
76 
47 
84 
73 
176.8 
173.5 
162.0 
155.4 
145.8 
133.8 
130.6 
126.9 
126.8 
123.6 
109.0 
108.7 
103.1 
102.3 
92.2 
Sources: Calculated from figures given in Tsentral'noe statis-
ticheskoe upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, Narodnoe 
khoziaistvo SSSR 1975 g. (Moscow: Statistika,1976), pp. 542-
543, 546 547. 
Source: G. Lapidus, ibid., page 246 
The reasons for these differences in wages do not simply lie 
in the distinctive characteristics of the female labour force 
(whose occupational and educational distribution is equally clearly 
recorded in Lane and O'Dell or in the sources referred to in 
Chapter Four), but in certain features of Soviet economic 
organisation and policy, which are highlighted in a particularly 
clear manner by Lapidus, who is well aware of the interconnections 
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between economic and social policy. Indeed, she points out that 
since the mid-1960s, the Soviet leadership has become increasingly 
sensitive to the unexpectedly complex interaction between social 
and economic problems, which is one of the reasons for the recent 
th . . l' h 50 grow 1n SOC1a SC1ence researc • The reasons which Lapidus 
adduces for the wage differences between men and women are, firstly, 
that those sectors which have high wage levels and high wage 
differentials are precisely the ones where women are under-
represented, and, secondly, that blue collar job~ are better paid, 
even ~hen white collar employees have a higher level of educational 
attainment. Finally, she argues that the possibility of direct 
wage discrimination cannot be ruled out. Thus "equality of economic 
opportunity for women has not followed automatically from higher 
level of educational attainment and labor-force participation.,,51 
Turning from differential wages to other aspects of the 
disadvantageous position of women, Lapidus argues that sex role 
socialisation and occupational choice are important, but that 
these choices are made in a socially structured context of 
opportunities and costs. In my view, this 'socially structured 
context' forms what I have called the mechanisms of allocation of 
individuals to economic locations. What she is referring to are 
three main features affecting the allocation of women to occupations: 
the sexual stereotyping of occupations (based on biological and 
psychological stereotypes), the continuing identification by both 
men and women of authority with men (which is now recognised as a 
problem in political circles), and the official treatment of 
household and family responsibilities as primarily and properly 
the domain of women, leading to a reinforcement of cultural norms 
by legislation. Only women are assigned dual roles in the 
occupational structure and the family. 
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While women do seem to be starting to reject this attribution 
of a primary role in the family combined with a high labour force 
participation rate (for example, there is an increasing tendency 
for women to initiate divorce, which used to be fairly unusual 
when men were demographically 'in short supply!) it is still the 
case that housewives have more children than working women, that 
time budget studies show that 75 per cent of domestic duties are 
done by women and that women effectively advanGe the occupational 
mobility of males by freeing them for study. Yet there is now a 
positive ,relationship between female employment outside the home 
and male help within it, so perhaps this link is now beginning to 
be broken. In the meantime, family roles continue to be assigned 
priority and so define the nature and rhvthmF of female employment. 
According to Lapidus,52 "Soviet family responsibilities intrude 
into the workplace to a degree unprecedented in contemporary 
industrial societies." Provisions which are officially made for 
pregnancy leave and so on are predicated on the view that child-
rearing and other family responsibilities must take a certain 
priority which work arrangements can only accommodate. This is 
why women are so under-represented in enterprise activities 
requiring additional time and energy, as well as in volunteer 
movements, sport and in public affairs generally. As Lapidus 
puts it, the boundaries between occupational and family systems 
are permeable, but in opposite directions for men and women. For 
women, home intrudes into work, while for men, work intrudes into 
the home. 
The sexual division of labour both on the job and at home, 
combined with the differential permeability of the work-family 
boundary for males and females, may have acted as buffers to 
cushion the strains created by changing female roles, as Lapidus 
argues. 53 Yet she is surely correct to point to the continuing 
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sources of strain. The first is that, since the massive 
participation of women in full-time paid employment has eroded 
the traditional rationale for a sexual division of labour within 
the family, it has increased the level of conflict between men 
and women over the division of domestic tasks. This is a source 
of marital instability. The second source of strain is the extreme 
tension which has been created between female work and family rol~s 
as currently defined. The pressure to reduce family commitments 
entails the deliberate limitation of family size. Lapidus considers 
this as the most threatening manifestation of female resistance to 
the combined pressures of work and family roles. By impinging on 
a wide range of economic, political and military concerns, it has 
compelled a fundamental reconsideration of the whole spectrum of 
policies involving female work and the family role. 
This brings us back to the point raised in Chapter Four, that 
the family is often treated both as an object and as an agent of 
implementation of social policy. Soviet policy has encouraged 
women to acquire new skills and aspirations that compete with 
their traditional domestic roles. As Lapidus points out, this 
sort of policy contradicts the high value attached to the family, 
the critical social roles attached to it and the large investments 
of time and energy needed to sustain it. It is for this reason, 
and because the resulting tensions may be exacerbated by economic 
and demographic trends, that there has been a growing urgency in 
attempts to confront the social conditions and consequences of 
female waged labour. Without reforms in the system of vocational 
training and placement, women are likely to find it increasingly 
difficult to get into highly-skilled technical employment. They 
will tend to be absorbed into routine white-collar and service 
occupations. If the remarks in Chapter Four on the low levelof 
office technology are borne in mind, the routine nature of such 
tasks are likely to be trying for the increasingly well-educated 
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women who come to fill them. 
Lapidus gives a succinct review of the debates in which 
attempts have been made to grapple with these issues. 54 One group 
of proposals aims at changing the labour market by reforming 
vocational education to give the highest priority to upgrading 
the skills of women workers, as well as increased incentives to 
enrol. in such programmes, which should be adapted to the schedules 
and responsibilitias of working mothers. A second group of 
proposals aims at improving working conditions, partly by including 
domestic responsibilities in the definition of work.. A third group 
of recommendations would increase the supply of consumer and 
everyday services to reduce the strain of women's dual roles. 
This group of recommendations is associated with studies which 
show the social and economic costs of inadequate services and 
child-care facilities~ and the slow progress in these spheres has 
encou~aged calls for a greater reliance on co-operative and even 
private arrangements (nannies .and governesses). As Lapidus points 
out, none of these proposals call for the eradication'of the 
distinction between 'men'sl and 'women's' work, with the associated 
changes in the structure of family or work. There are more 
controversial proposals, such as the pro-natalist ones. 55 The 
intention of such proposals is to transform maternity into 
professional, paid, social labour. Apart from the economic and 
social costs of such a programme, indicated by Lapidus, Soviet 
critics of such proposals view them as a 'step backwards', recreating 
a division of labour based on sex. A different approach treats the 
more effective use of female labour, rather than the stimulation of 
fertility, as the overriding priority. This approach treats the 
guality of the labour force as being of prime importance to 
economic progress (as well as to women's social status and personal 
development)~ and so its proponents urge the further expansion of 
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women's economic role on terms of greater equality with men, along 
with a reduction in the household burdens which inhibit it. This 
argument also implies an assignment of women to positions of 
authority, as its proponents make clear. However, in the more 
immediate future, the problem of working mothers with young 
children would in this view be better alleviated by part-time 
work than by extended maternity leaves (as the pro-natalists 
propose). However, Lapidus points out that such a proposal would 
in all likelihood increase the concentration of women in low-skilled 
and poorly paid jobs, while also forestalling a more equal division 
of household responsibilities between males and females. She 
argues that recent small-scale experiments with flextime are 
especiallY promising because of its potential for avoiding an 
intensification of the sexual division of labour. 
According to Lapidus, these issues now occupy a major place 
on the political agenda, as can be seen from the 1976 Party 
Congress, the 1977 Constitution, the reorganisation of the State 
Committee on Labour and Wages into the State Committee on Labour 
and Social Questions,56 and the setting up in October 1976 of 
standing commissions to address the problems of women workers and 
mothers. 50 far the present leadership has tried to strike a balance 
(in its policy towards working women) between a labour-extensive 
and a labour-intensive strategy. As Lapidus puts it,57 "On the 
one hand, it has sought to increase female participation rates 
to the demographic maximum by raising minimum wages, expanding the 
child-care network~ modifying the pension system, and exploring 
the possibilities for expansion of part-time work. At the same 
time, concern over declining birth rates is evident in the family 
allowance program of 1974. This provides extension of maternity 
leave benefits to kolkhoz women, the liberalisation of sick leave 
for parents of young children, and partially-paid, year-long 
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maternity leave. Moreover, Article 35 of the new Soviet Constitution 
foreshadows further measures to reduce the working time of mothers 
of small children." She argues that the most critical problems of 
the years ahead will centre on adapting both occupational and family 
patterns to a new array of social and human needs, rather than on 
removing formal obstacles to women's entry into a world of work 
designed for men. 
It is now clear that the social situation of women~ in 
particular their occupational distribution, is partly an effect 
of a series of state policies (whose effects are themselves 
not unitary) and partly an effect of what I prefer to call gender 
attribution (rather than sex role stereotyping). The official 
ideology favours the easing of the dual burden of home and 
production, and has led to policies whose implementation is 
leading to some improvement in the position of women vis-a-vis men. 
In addition to the measures mentioned above by Lapidus, most of 
which have been discussed in Chapter Four, the educational position 
of women is clearly improving~ male help in the household has 
improved to some extent, and general measures to improve housing~ 
the production of consumer durables and the retail trade network 
must have eased the burden of domestic work somewhat (thereby 
further removing grounds for male resistance to participating in 
it, which of course by itself will not end such resistance). 
Those state policies which maintain gender differences in the 
occupational structure are clearly being increasingly questioned 
(although equally clearly the debate is not over yet 58 ), and they 
are partially mitigated by the effects of other policies. 
The evidence examined in this section, then, does appear to 
support the view that the occupational distribution of women is 
an effect of mechanisms of allocation of individuals, rather than 
an effect of class relations between men and women. These 
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mechanisms have clearly themselves become an object of debate, with 
struggles over them beginning to take place in various arenas (not 
only individual families~ but trade unions and even the State 
Committee on Labour and Social Questions). Consequently, prospects 
for changes in these mechanisms are opening up, and although such 
prospects are by no means overwhelming, the fact that the current 
operation of these mechanisms places certain obstacles in the path 
of a strategy of intensive economic growth gives one hope that 
they may be changed in a way which furthers the equalisation of 
the social situation of men and women. 
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Collective Farm Workers 
According to Lane and O'Del159 , there is little sign of 
collective farms withering away at present, so it would seem that 
the class of collective farmers is presumably with us for some 
time to come. This view is consciously contrasted with the official 
Soviet view 60 that the "creation of the material and technical basis 
of communist society not only destroys the basis of hostile 
(antagonistic) ~lass relationships but also leads to the decline 
and eventual elimination of collective forms of ownership and the 
withering away of the class of collective farmers". The grounds 
for this Soviet view are set out in Lane (1978) where he points 
out that there are three main ways in which the countryside will 
be pUlled up to the level of the town. 61 Firstly~ the 'growing 
together' of the urban working class and the kolkhozniki is 
related to the mechanisation of agriculture which will increase 
the number of machine workers and operators in the countryside. 62 
This makes such workers similar to the agricultural working class. 
Secondly, the development of 'intra-collective relations' will 
mean that conditions of production and consumption will move much 
closer to those in the towns. This refers particularly to wages 
and social services. Thirdly, the structure of the collective 
farm will change through migratibn from the country to the triwn, 
and through the increased level of skill and productivity. 
This account ignores an important component of such Soviet 
views, namely, the so-called 'industrialisation of the countryside' 
and the associated development of inter-kolkhoz associations and 
agro-industrial complexes. 63 When one takes these developments 
into account, it is not so clear that there is no sign of the 
eventual elimination of collective ownership, and hence of 
collective farmers as a class. As the discussion in Chapter Two 
of the various forms of agricultural property (kolkhoz, sovkhoz 
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and personal plots) made clear, even the internal organisation of 
kolkhozy was becoming similar to that of sovkhozy. In addition, 
it is at least arguable that wage levels and social services are 
approaching urban levels. The continuing exceptions to this trend 
are housing and educational levels. Housing differences were 
discussed in Chapter Four, and the differences in educational level 
can be seen from the following table. 
Table 14 
Educational Level of Workers and Collective 
Farmers 
Social group 
Workers 
Both sexes 
Men 
Women 
Collective Farmers 
Both sexes 
Men 
Women 
Per ·1,000 persons of a given social 
group having the following education: 
Higher, incompleled 
higher and middle Middle 
specialist education 
22 94 
26 105 
18 83 
13 37 
20 50 
8 28 
Source: D. Lane (1978), Ope cit., page 395 
Despite such rural-urban differences in educational level, 
housing and to a lesser extent in health-care and social security, 
there does seem to be some justification for Soviet claims that 
the differences between collective and state property are being 
steadily eroded. These differences can be summarised as those 
relating to their respective juridical statuses, their interna~ 
organisation, their relation to external agencies and the forms 
and levels of distribution of income among their personnel. 
Dealing first with the juridical status of kolkhozy compared to 
sovkhozy, it is clear that this does have some effectivity, although 
this does not really stretch to election of kolkhoz chairman. 
The extent of this autonomy, and its effects on investment ~nd on 
the incomes of kolkhoz members (making both more dependent on 
financial results than in the case· of sovkhozy)y were discussed in 
. . 
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Chapter Two. The autonomy of kolkhozy is being eroded by state 
control of certain infrastructural investment, by 'directive 
planning' of kolkhoz sales, and by the inter-kolkhoz associations 
and the agro-industrial complexes. In other words, the juridical 
autonomy is being increasingly eroded by the relations with 
external economic agencies whose impact on the decisions of the 
kolkhozy is considerable. To this process of erosion of autonomy 
can be added the various bodies set.up by the state to encourage 
standardisation of practices, such as the federal council of 
kolkhozy. 
If one turns to the internal organisation of the kolkhozy, 
it is clear from Chapter Two that they have become increasingly 
complex and similar to sovkhozy, as they have grbwn in size. This 
has altered the occupational structure of the kolkhozy, although 
the precise changes are not clear from the evidence available. 
It was already mentioned earlier in this Chapter that the non-
manual rural labour must be around 7 per cent of the total Soviet 
popUlation in the mid-1970s. A figure of similar magnitude is 
given by Lane 64 for the mid-1960s for the kolkhoz popUlation. 
This suggests their occupational structure may be quite similar 
to that on state farms. However, he adds that mechanisers 
(tractor and machine-harvester drivers and operators) were around 
10-13 per cent of the kolkhoz labour force, which means that between 
78 and 84 per cent of the kolkhoz labour force was probablY fairly 
unskilled. This contrasts with sovkhozy where only 41 per cent of 
the labour was unskilled in the mid-1960s. However, the massive 
investment in agriculture since the mid-1960s must have affected 
the occupational structure of manual collective farmers, by 
creating more skilled manual occupations. This trend has probably 
continued with the 1979-80 reforms, which have also affected 
agriculture, giving further encouragement to agro-industrial units, 
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and to the personal plots {with their associated livestock}.65 
This recent encouragement of personal plots should perhaps 
not be taken as increasing the differences between the class 
position of the collective farmers and that of sovkhoz agricultural 
workers, who are counted as an agricultural working class and whose 
numbers grew from 1.6 million in 1948 to 8.4 million in 1973. 66 
As was indicated in Chapter Two, the personal plots within larger 
agricultural units such as kolkhozy and sovkhozy are very 
interdependent with these larger units (in contrast to urban 
personal plots). The difference in their economic function in 
the two sorts of farms is related to their different size, the 
greater size of pe~sonal plots on the kolkhozy serving to cushion 
th~ members against the effects of their lower {and somewhat more 
variable} level of income. The importance of 'private activity' 
(which is presumably largely concerned with the sale of produce 
from the personal plots) on the incomes of kolkhozniki and state 
employees can be seen from McAuley {1979}67, who compiled the 
following table. 
Table 15 
The Structun of Pusenallncome, 
State Employees and Kolkhomiki, USSR, 1960-74 (rubles per year) 
State Employees Kolkhozniki 
Source of Income 1960 1965 1970 1974 1960 1965 1970 1974 
Earnings from 
State 376.1 473.8 623.8 742.3 34.1 36.9 48.0 70.4 
Kolkhoz 110.3 204.0 310.3 398.2 
Private activity 24.2 29.8 41.4 41.3 171.7 194.6 227.2 239.8 
Transfers 90.6 111.1 152.5 ·187.0 4.9 16.2 66.0 69.6 
Other 8.8 9.6 16.2 13.7 7.9 8.3 7.6 13.5 
Personal income 499.7 624.3 833.9 984.3 328.9 460.0 659.1 791.5 
Source: A. McAuley, ibid., page 35 
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This table refers to all state employees, and so it does not 
give a clear indication of the relative importance of 'private 
activity' on state farms. What the table does show, however, is 
that the proportion of total income which the kolkhozniks derive 
from their personal plots declined from over half their income in 
1960 to less than one-third in 1974. This decline was a relative 
one~ not an absolute one. Judging by the statistics provided by 
Lavigne (and discussed 'in Chapter Two) on the trends in the 
proportion of all marketed food produce which is sold through the 
kolkhoz market, a proportion which rose from 4.5 per cent in 1969 
to 4.7 per cent in 1979, the absolute real income derived from 
personal plots has probably continued to go up, even though it has 
probably continued to decline relatively to total real income for 
kolkhozniks. 
Yet despite the relative decline in the proportion of income 
derived from the personal plots, and despite the increasing 
similarities between kolkhozniks and state employees, McAuley is 
right to point out that there are still significant differences 
between the two groups. These differences in the sources and 
levels of income may be maintained, if output from personal plots 
is increased substantially as a result of the decree of January 
1981. 68 In any case, the decree also applies to local authorities 
and may lead to a similar rise in the use of personal plots among 
state employees, both urban and rural. This decree will certainly 
increase the land available for use as personal plots, but it is 
too soon to say whether this encouragement of personal plots and 
private livestock will reverse the relative decline in the share of 
total kol~hozniks' income derived from 'private activity'. It may 
not do so, because improved transfer payments, such as the child 
allowance introduced in 1974, may offset any absolute increase in 
income from 'private activities', thereby reducing the differences 
in forms and levels of income between state employees and kolkhozniks. 
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The impact of transfer payments so far, however, has not been 
sufficient to equalise incomes betweenkolkhozniks and sovkhoz 
workers. Rzhanitsyna shows that while the trend has been towards 
equalising transfer payments, full equalisation has not yet taken 
place. 69 Firstlyy as the following table shows, kolkhozniks only 
received about three-quarters the wage in 1975 that state farm 
workers rece~ved (and only about two-thirds the ~verage wage for 
the whole economy). 
Source: 
Table 16 
Growth 01 Payment for Work in Agriculture 
(on state and Collective farms) 
11960 1196511970 1 1975 
Payment for work in abso-
lute terms (roubles a 
month) 
Industrial and office work-
ers in the economy 80.6 96.5 122.0 146 
including: 
industry 91.6 104.2 133.3 162 
state farms and sub-
sidiary agricultural 
enterprises 53.8 74.6 100.9 127 
Collect ive farmers 28.3 51.3 74.9 92 
Payment ratios (per cent) 
state farms to the 
whole economy 67 77 83 87 
state farms to industry 59 72 76 78 
collective farmers to 
industrial and office 
workers in the econ-
omy as a whole 35 53 61 63 
collect ive farmers to 
workers and office 
workers at state farms 52 69 74 73 
_ ..... _ .. __ ._ .._----
L. Rzhanitsy~a, ibid., page 165 
Secondly, the lower average wages are not offset by higher 
payments from the social consumption funds (SCF). The reverse is 
the case, as can be seen from the following table: 
Year 
1940 
1965 
1970 
1975 
"1£.:::1. 
Table 17 
The Share 01 SCF Payments and Benefits 
In the Aggregate Incomes 
01 Industrial Workers' and Collective 
Farmers' Families (per cent) 
Pen'lon~ aids. student 
Aigreglte Family iranh an other receipts from social funds (Including Income free education. medical 
~ 
assistance •. and 10 on) 
Industrial I Collective Industrial I Collective worker farmer worker farmer 
100 100 14.5 4.9 
100 . 100 22.8 14.2 
100 100 22.1 17.7 
100 ·100 22.5 21.1 
--
Source:L. Rzhanitsyna, ibid.~ page 166 
Thus the impression to be gained from the data provided by 
Rzhanitsyna confirms the stress laid by McAuley on the continuing 
differences in income level and composition between kolkhozniks 
and state farm workers. Consequently, while the juridical autonomy 
and internal organisation of kolkhozy may be changing~ with 
resulting changes in the~r internal occupational structure, it is 
not at all clear that such changes will result in an elimination 
of differences between state farm and collective farm workers' 
incomes. For example~ the 1975 establishment of a 70 rouble 
minimum wage for state employees may have made the kolkhozniks 
relatively worse off~70 Nevertheless, despite these continuing 
differences, the policies of converting kolkhozy into sovkhozy, 
of raising the productivity of kolkhozy, and of linking kolkhozy 
more closely to th~ rest of agriculture by means of the inter-
kolkhoz associations and agro-industrial complexes, these policies 
mean that the elimination of collective farms is still on the 
political agenda. Whether it will be completed without prior 
substantial improvements in agricultural performance remains to be 
seen. 
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The 'Intelligentsia' 
Some of the difficulties of defining the 'intelligentsia' 
as a single, separate stratum have already been indicated, but 
the issue can not be left there, since various analyses of the 
role of the 'intelligentsia' in the class structure need to be 
examined. The varying definitions of the intelligentsia make 
it somewhat difficult to examine these diverse ~nalyses within 
a brief space, however. For example, if we take Churchward's 
definition71, in which the intelligentsia consists of "persons 
with a tertiary education (whether employed or not), tertiary 
students, and persons lacking formal tertiary qualification but 
who are professionally employed in jobs which normally require 
a tertiary -qualification", then we are faced with a stipulative 
definition which by itself is quite compatible with the claim 
that the intelligentsia includes state and party functionaries. 
This contrasts with the position of Lampert 72 , who draws a 
distinction between the intelligentsia and the functionaries of 
the state or the political apparatus. A position which might be 
considered as somewhere between that of Churchward and that of 
Lampert is taken by Hirszowicz73 with respect to Poland. She 
argues 74 that the "nineteenth century concept of the intelligentsia 
has been revived, securing the preservation of a myth deeply 
embedded in the national tradition of many East European countries. 
The components of this old concept, though not included in 
sociological definitions, affect contemporary understanding of 
the concept and explain the disparity between purely structural 
distinctions and the cultural meanings attached to them." It is 
perhaps to avoid such ambiguities that Churchward puts forward his 
stipulative definition mentioned above, although his definition 
appears primarily to be a response -to the problems of'the Soviet 
definition'. 
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Returning to Hirszowicz, it is interesting to find that 
she treats the ambiguities in'the intelligentsia ethos' as having 
possible political implications, both expressing positive 
accommodation by professionals carrying out important social 
functions within the bureaucratic order and assigning an important 
place to political dissent. 75 Thus she treats the 'intelligentsia' 
as in a sense a myth, a part of the political culture, with its 
origins in the past, rather th~n as a distinct occupational 
group:76 "The three main components of the nineteenth-century 
intelligentsia were (1) social status marked by social conduct 
inculcated by breeding and training; (2) qualifications for 
carrying out certain professional activities; and (3) social 
functions, especially ideological and political leadership. 
The difficulties of dealing with the problem of the intelligentsia 
in modern East European societies stem from the dissDciation of 
these characteristics. The educated strata in Poland have lost 
their cohesiveness as a distinctive status group and are no 
longer characterised by common social and political aspirations, 
which accounted for their relative unity in the past. The 
dissociation of status characteristics makes of the educated 
strata a mixture of different occupational and professional 
groups with different norms, aspirations and attitudes. In 
political terms we are dealing primarily with a complex set of 
interest groups clustering around institutions, ranks, professional 
qualities, administrative divisions, etc. It follows that what 
could be regarded as broad generalisations about the intelligentsia 
have to be replaced with detailed studies of various institutions, 
professional groups and occupational communities including 
apparatchiki, technical intelligentsia, creative intelligentsia, 
higher and middle management, teachers and research workers." 
Without endorsing Weberian terms such as 'status groups', and 
without endorsing Hirszowics's general approach 77 , it seems to 
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me that her refusal to treat the intelligentsia as a single 
distinct occupational group (a stratum) is correct. 
However, if the intelligentsia is not defined as a single 
occupational group, then it can only be defined in terms of its 
educational level or of its political role. Defining it in 
terms of its educational level entails a stipulative definition, 
as already i~dicated in the" case of Churchward. 7B Such an 
approach certainly avoids many problems, since educational 
certification establishes fairly clear demarcation criteria, but 
it leaves open the theoretical question of what is the social 
significance of the group being demarcated. 79 As Churchward 
himself points out BO , such a group which on his definition 
numbers "almost eleven million is not likely to have any high 
degree of homogeneity." He goes on to argue that the intelligentsia 
is neither a 'ruling class' nor a 'managerial class'. In that 
case, the only basis for treating them as an object of analysis 
is their educational qualifications. To define them as distinct 
on educational grounds amounts either to confusing mechanisms 
of allocation with economic location, or to claiming that 
mechanisms of allocation are the main determinants of location, 
or else are very closely linked with the main determinants of 
economic location. That is to say, an educational definition of 
the intelligentsia amounts to saying that the process of 
allocation of individuals to occupations is (at least for the 
highlY educated) intimately connected with the process of creation 
of occupations. While I have indicated earlier that I am critical 
of such a position, such criticism will be left till later. 
Turning to a definition of the intelligentsia in terms of 
its political role or position, it must be clear that such a 
definition depends on one's analysis of Soviet politics. If 
the various central state and party agencies which are engaged 
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in the process of major national policy formulation are dependent 
on information which has to come either from enterprise managers, 
Ministry officials or technical experts of various kinds, then 
it is possible that one, or a combination, or all of such groups 
could act in concert to effectively control the decisions 
regarding the disposition and use of the means of production. 
In other words, their political position could be used to secure 
privileged access to the means of production, thereby securing 
a better income for themselves. This is quite a common sort of 
argument with regard to the Soviet Union, and would amount to 
grounds for treating them not simply as a single occupational 
group (a stratum) but as a class. However, while not denying 
that there is a substantial concentration of political power in 
the arenas of struggle constituted by relations between the 
central state and party agencies, the analysis in Chapter Three 
of this work suggested that no single group within the 
'intelligentsia', or combination of groups (associated with 
different agencies) would be able to act in concert at all times 
in a situation of institutional struggle over various issues. 
While the analysis provided by Andrle and more especially 
Tartarin (among others 81 ) indicated that it is entirely possible 
to use one's occupational position to illicitly divert some 
real income to oneself, due to the inability of the state to 
closely scrutinise many activities in a detailed way, the very 
fact that such practices are widespread, and by no means 
exclusively confined to white collar occupations, suggests that 
the 'intelligentsia' is not in a very privileged situation. It 
lS certainly not able to secure for itself a very high income, 
if one accepts Churchward's definition of intelligentsia. 82 
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A section of the intelligentsia could nevertheless conceivabLy 
use its politically privileged position to secure a much higher 
income for itself. However, if this were the case, then it 
would not be grounds for treating the intelligentsia as a whole 
as a distinct occupational group. Rather, the position would be 
that a section of the intelligentsia was in the position of an 
elite or a ruling class •. This is not the place to repeat the 
criticisms of the concept of an elite m.ade in Chapter Three. 
50, concentrating on the concept of a ruling class, a section 
of the intelligentsia could be considered a ruling class, if it 
was able to organise itself across institutional boundaries within 
a non-homogenous set of state and party agencies, thereby securing 
effective control of national policy formation, particularly in 
the area of economic planning, with the result that its members' 
access to the means of production (and consequent on that, their 
level of income) was substantially different from the rest of 
the population, including the rest of the intelligentsia. While 
I have criticised 'state capitalist' versions of a ruling class 
theory elsewhere,83 and while the analysis of Chapter Three of 
this work, if accepted, would make such a ruling class theory 
more difficult to sustain, the analysis of the concept of class 
developed in the Introduction did allow that the relation between 
various agents might be such as to enable them to effectively 
'dictate their own terms' for the access by other agents to the 
means of production. In other words, even if agents (including 
collective agents) did not by themselves possess the means of 
production, the relations between a group of different kinds 
of agents m~ght enable them collectively to establish favourable' 
terms of access to the means of production, in a manner similar 
to the relations between, say, a landowning company, a bank and 
an industrial company. However, it was clear from the argument 
there that, for this to happen, a non-egalitarian policy on the 
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distribution of income would have to be effectively pursued. 
Without wishing to anticipate the later section of this 
Chapter on the distribution of income, this issue can be briefly 
dealt with here. Perhaps M. Matthews is the most forceful 
proponent of the view that privilege and an associated highly 
unequal distribution of real income are important features of 
the social structure of the Soviet Union. In his 1975 article84 
'Top Incomes in the U.S.S.R.', Matthews distinguishes between 
party officials; state, Komsomol and trade union officials; 
the 'intelligentsia'; enterprise managers; and the military, 
police and diplomatic service. 85 He also estimates their 
salaries, or accepts respondents' reports on their salaries. 
This is followed by a discussion of their access to secondary 
benefits, such as a 'thirteenth month' salary payment, the 
'Kremlin ration', special access to consumer goods and holiday 
facilities, and so on. He correctly argues that the monetary 
incomes of these occupational groups should be notionally 
increased to take account of these secondary benefits. There 
are five thousand people in these occupational groups, by Matthews' 
estimate. By international standards, he concludes, the Soviet 
'elite' is poor and lacking in independence, although it is a 
long way from the egalitarian ideals proclaimed by the Soviet 
state. However, his claim that the differences between the 
extreme income percentiles may be no less than the U.S.A. is 
effectively undermined in a Note by Wiles 86 , who calculates that 
the U.K. (not the U.S.A.) has almost exactly the same ratio of 
top to average income as the U.S.S.R., if income is defined as 
wages plus fringe benefits including orthodox state social 
services. The ratio for both countries is 5.5 to 1. However, 
if all U.K. income (including 'capitalist' incomes) is taken 
into account, Wiles calculates that the U.K. is "considerably 
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more unequal than the U.S.S.R." There is no reason to suppose 
that the U.S.A. is more equal in this respect than the U.K. 
The case for a ruling class or elite able to secure a substantially 
unequal share of national income for itself thus seems weaker 
than Matthews would argue, even accepting Matthews' own evidence, 
which ignores the effect of the informal sector on the incomes 
of the rest of the population87 , and which probablY overestimates 
the real income effects of better housing, health care and 
holidays. 
Consequently~ if the personnel of the central party and 
state agencies are in a different class position from the rest 
of the 'intelligentsia', the income benefits accruing from their 
favourable access to the means of production seem to be less than 
is the case in capitalist societies. More important, however, 
is the conclusion that the rest of the 'intelligentsia'~ while 
perhaps having above average real income, cannot be considered 
as a single occupational group or stratum. No good reason has 
been provided in any of the analyses discussed for treating the 
'intelligentsia' as a single occupational group. It is for this 
reason that I agree with Hirszowicz that detailed studies are 
preferable to broad generalisations about groups in this part 
of the occupational structure. With the possible exception of 
the personnel of the central state and party agencies, the 
'intelligentsia' cannot be considered a distinct class from the 
manual working class 8S , and in this respect I agree with the 
position of Lane and O'Dell, although they do not address 
themselves directly to the other question of whether the 
'intelligentsia' are a separate stratum. They simply argue, 
as quoted earlier, that non-manual workers in production 
enterprises (my emphasis) are not a separate stratum, on the 
grounds that in a 'Marxist sense they are in the same class 
position and share a similar political ideology. This is a 
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rather oblique answer, since various Soviet and Western analyses 
quite happily treat the 'intelligentsia' as a distinct stratum 
within the class of those employed by the state, and since the 
'intelligentsia' is not usually considered as being confined 
to production enterprises. 
This critique of the usefulness of the concept of 
'intelligentsia' for analysing either the occupational structure 
or class relations has raised the question of the role of 
education as a ,supposed mechanism of allocation of individuals 
to ocriupational positions. It is to this question that we must 
now address ourselves. 
Education 
It has already been indicated with respect to women that 
educational level is not all that neatly dovetailed with 
occupational position in the Soviet Union. This is the case 
despite the existence of manpower (sic) planning and attempts 
at occupational placement. 89 Claims that education is functionally 
integrated with the occupational structure are common with 
respect to capitalist societies, M . t 90 even among arX1S s ~ so it 1S 
not surprising to find educational level used to define the 
'intelligentsia' in some cases, or to see Lane and O'Dell in 
effect adapting HOpper's functionalist analysis of educational 
systems to the Soviet Union. 91 Lane and'O'Dell 1 s analysis of 
the relation between education and occupation will therefore be 
treated as an example of this sort of analysis, which closely 
associates mechanisms of allocation of individuals with 
determinants of economic location. 
In analysing the educational system, Lane and O'Dell make 
use of Turner's concepts of 'sponsored' and 'contest l mobility~ 
as well as the concept of 'coolingout'~ which form the basis of 
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Hopper's work. 92 The Soviet Union is treated as a contest 
educational system93 in which high levels of occupational 
aspirations are 'cooled out' by the educational system to achieve 
a better match between ambition and the occupational structure. 
This system is modified by a degree of sponsorship in the case 
of women, who are channelled into lower status occupations. 94 
However, Lane and O'Dell do not argue that ambition or educational 
level are exactly matched to occupation. They point o~t that 
'dissatisfied' manual workers tend to have a higher level of 
education than 'satisfied' ones, and they agree with arguments 
that manual workers are paid higher wages to compensate for the 
monotony of the work, drawing attention to the disjunction 
between the 'pyramid of preferences' of schoolchildren and the 
'pyramid of requirements' of the nation. 95 However, this simply 
leads them to conclude that there will be further functional 
adjustment by the educational system.~ which will probablY further 
develop its 'cooling out' processes so that high morale and worka 
force stability will be promoted by the reduction of the aspirations 
, 96 
of school-leavers. 
The two mechanisms by which 'the 'cooling outl process is 
thought to be developing in the Soviet Union are "the provision 
of an infinite number of channels for advancement (the alternative 
route)" and "forms of tempering ambition in the school system" 
such as vocational guidance. 97 The main criticism of Hopper 
which appears is where they point out that his description of 
the Soviet educational system as one with centralised recruitment 
of pupils is only 'half true': the demand for occupations has 
not been centrally controlled, and the rate of change of the 
occupational structure (affecting the supply of occupations) has 
been only partly centrally determined. They point out how 
seriously vocational guidance is taken, and they analyse the 
extent to which alternative routes to' higher education are open, 
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if the main route through the general secondary school is closed 
off for some reason. Yet they recognise that many school-
leavers want, and many students receive, an education for 
reasons of personal satisfaction, rather than as training for 
a job. They also argue that despite overt socialisation and 
explicit vocational guidance, the authorities have not been able 
to develop a general desire for a career in manual as opposed 
to non-manual jobs. Furthermore, they also point out that 
people who end up as administrative workers receive their 
d t ·· . . d th l' d' 98 e uca 10n 1n eng1neer1ng an e app 1e SC1ences. These 
latter points suggest the following: that the 'alternative 
routes' have the effect of legitimating and perhaps even 
reinforcing educational aspirations, as much as cooling out 
these aspirations; that vocational guidance and other cooling 
out mechanisms have a limited effect; and that in any case 
the educational system does not have to fit all that closely 
with the occupational structure (even though it is intended 
that it should) because occupational positions are filled 
anyway, either by praktiki who have ~earned on the job as they 
have been promoted within the enterprise, or by people with an 
appropriate level of education, the content of which may not be 
very relevant to their occupational position. 
If the latter points are correct, then educational 
selection and certification are not as intrinsically important 
for occupational placement as Lane and O'Dell seem to believe. 
They are certainly correct to point to the rapid secular decline 
in the proportion of 'practical men' (praktiki}99, but this 
simply means that the expansion of educational provision 
provides a socially acceptable criterion for occupational 
selection, namely an educational certificate. It may mean that, 
as they argue,100 "Education in the Soviet Union is becoming the 
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major determinant of occupational position". However, this is 
only true in the sense that education is becoming the predominant 
mechanism of allocating individuals to occupations. As they 
apparently realise, it does not mean that determinants of change 
or stability in the occupational structure itself are unimportant, 
nor does it mean that the educational qualifications which are 
administratively used as a criterion of occupational selection 
bear any very close relationship to the tasks and skills of the 
various occupations, any more than it does in capitalist 
societies. Indeed,given the high degree of specialisation of 
educational courses, any mismatch between educational qualifications 
and subsequent occupation. could well mean that in those cases, 
Soviet educational level is less relevant to occupation than in 
capitalist societies. 
This is not to deny the relevance, in the Soviet Union as 
in capitalist societies, of parental occupation to their 
children's educational achievement. Lane and O'Dell document 
some of the Soviet evidence on this. However, it is to deny 
that there is necessarily a close fit between the skills learned 
in the educational system and the skills 'required' by the 
division of labour. It would be surprising if, in the Soviet 
Union as in other countries, the educational system did not 
have a 'life of its own' in the sense that pedagogical concerns 
have their own impact on curriculum content and teaching method$, 
and that these concerns, as well as the ambiguities in what 
Lane and O'Del1101 call "the different values that the elites 
seek to inculcate", have the effect of insulating the content 
of educational provision from the 'requirements' of the 
occupational structure which are in any case poorly understood 
by the central planning agencies. 
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To the extent that the content of education is insulated 
from the 'requirements' of the occupational structure, any 
argument that the educational system adapts to these requirements 
is weakened. It is by no means clear that any planning to 
establish a closer fit between education and occupation will be 
all that successful, partly because the skills of an occupation 
often change even if the ~ccupation itself retains the same 
designation, partly because the occupational structure itself 
changes (for various reasons including changes in state policy) 
and partly because the educational system is not amenable to 
rapid change, especially if the curriculum is specialised 
rather than general. Similarly, arguments that education 
determines the occupational structure, or even the occupational 
position of individuals, are weakened if one accepts that 
educational qualifications are often simply being used as a 
criterion of selection by non-educational agencies. Where this 
is the case, or where, as in the example of medical personnel, 
educational qualifications are quite closely related to 
occupational skills, then educational qualifications may well 
coincide with socially significant boundaries in the occupational 
structure. However, this coincidence is an effect of the use of 
educational qualifications to allocate personnel; it should 
not be confused with those determ~nants of the division of 
labour which structure occupations (for example, technological 
change, state policy, changes in the social division of 
production, the rise and fall of different collective agencies, 
and so on). For this reason, educational level is a poor basis 
for defining different occupational groups, such as the 
'intelligentsia', although it might be a Wseful research 
indicaton of occupational boundaries whose determinants would 
then have to be theorised. 
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The Occupational Structure and Class Relations 
While broad historical changes in the occupational structure 
have been noted in this Chapter, along with more recent evidence 
on the distribution of the labour force by economic sector 
(including the distribution of women), it 'was argued earlier 
that the occupational structure can only be analysed in terms 
of class relations if it can be shown that various occupations 
have substantially different capacities for action, deriving 
from differential access to the means of production. Such 
enhancement or restriction of their capacities for action, it 
was argued, would have to enable certain categories of agents 
to act on the division of labour, thereby substantially affecting 
their own conditions of existence, in particular by affecting 
the distribution of income in their own favour. In other words, 
it was argued earlier that class relations would be operative 
between categories of agents, if some agents, because of their 
predominant access to the means of production, were able to 
affect the division of labour in a manner which secured the 
economic conditions of their own existence. No category of agents 
can ever control a social formation sufficiently to completely 
secure its own conditions of existence (hence the critique of 
elite theory in Chapter Three). All that is entailed in a claim 
that class relations are present is that a certain category of 
agents, because of its relation to the means of production, has 
sufficient 'room for manoeuvre' to pursue an effective policy 
on the division of labour which substantially enhances the 
economic conditions of its own existence (including the 
distribution of income), making other agents' conditions of 
existence dependent on that category of agents. 
Consequently, the occupational structure in the Soviet 
Union must be examined to see whether class relations operate 
between occupational categories of agents. It was also argued, 
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however, that class relations may well be operative between 
collective agents and that, while the internal organisation of 
such agents would mean that they each had their own internal 
occupational structure, the class position of the individuals 
within such an agent should not necessarily be equated with 
the class position of the agent itself. Hence relations between 
occupations need not exhaust the possibilities for the existence 
of class relations in a social formation. As is now evident 
from the discussion of Amvrosov, Soviet theorists themselves 
take membership"of a collective agency, such as a kolkhoz or 
state enterprise, as an important index of the class position 
of an occupation, yet they weaken this by their treatment of 
the 'intelligentsia' as a stratum. So the rejection of the idea 
that the 'intelligentsia' can be treated as a stratum at least 
clears out of the wayan important obstacle to the analysis of 
class relations in the Soviet Union, since the treatment of 
the 'intelligentsia' as a stratum glosses over what may be 
important differences between colleotive agents within the state 
sector. 
Such collective economic agents were discussed in Chapter 
Two, and that discussion is relevant to the attempt to assess 
the relative capacities of different categories of agent, 
particularly if it is taken in conjunction with the discussion 
in this Chapter.of the Soviet occupational structure. The 
relative capacities of different economic agents are not 
immediately apparent from tables on the occupational structure. 
All that can be directly concluded from such evidence is that 
there have been rapid changes in the occupational structure 
which are now slowing down. Yet the discussion of the occupational 
structure has yielded more evidence than that on the relative 
capacities of agents, and this can be seen if we take broad 
occupational groupings one at a time. 
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Starting with industrial manual workers, the stagnation 
which is becoming increasingly evident in the proportion of 
auxiliary workers suggests that manual workers have very little 
capacity to influence even the technical division of labour, 
since it would clearly be in their interests to move into 
skilled manual occupations, thereby increasing their wages. 
Some manual workers manage to do this illicitly, since some 
of the movement into skilled grades or occupations is purely 
nominal, being a disguised form of wage increase. The gloomy 
evidence on technical 'rationalisation' and innovation in 
Soviet industry corroborates this inability to influence the 
technical division of labour. Many of these auxiliary workers 
are women, and as was indicated the chances of their obtaining 
further training while working are substantially reduced by 
their current domestic responsibilities. This picture of poor 
control by manual workers of the technical division of labour 
is corroborated by the evidence on relations within the 
enterprise discussed in Chapter Two or supplied by Lane and 
0'De11102 or Ruble. 103 It is certainly the case that trade 
unions are fairly good at safeguarding wages, job security and 
working conditions. For example, Ruble argues that it is 
usually lack of resources rather than negligence which is 
responsible for management non-compliance with health and 
safety regulations. However, it is clear that factory trade 
unions and party committees do not actively intervene in 
co-ordinating the technical division of labour (that is, in 
managing the enterprise). There may be a high rate of 
participation in factory trade union meetings, but the 
available evidence suggests that a large proportion of Soviet 
industrial workers do not believe that their opinions matter. 104 
Similarly with party supervision of management, Lane and O'Dell 
agree with Andrle's conclusion that in practice the party 
. I· . t d 105 secretary's power 1S 1m1 e • 
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This lack of control of the technical division of labour 
(the manner in which labour is combined with the means of 
production) could well be offset by manual workers, if they 
were able to substantially affect the division of social 
production or the social division of labour in a way which 
favoured themselves. However, it is clear from the case of 
the Ministry of Machine Building and Metal Working (cited by 
Feshbach and discussed above) that the division of social 
production must be determined at the level of the central state 
and party agencies. Its predominance as a Ministry amounts to 
a relative neglect by the central agencies of production of 
means of consumption, particularly consumer durables. The 
same phenomenon (an inability by manual industrial workers to 
determine the division of social production) should be evident 
from the discussion of housing in Chapter Four. In the case of 
the social division of labour, there is some evidence of 
possible indirect influence by the manual workers, mediated .by 
the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions and the State 
Committee on Labour and Social Questions. Thus the growth in 
the proportion of the popUlation engaged in education and health, 
and in trade~ could be considered as indicating a capacity by 
the manual workers to influence the distribution of real income 
in their own favour. However, this would have to be set against 
the reliance on trade union volunteers to administer social 
security, a form of participation which does not seem to enable 
them to have much influence on policy. Overall, then, one would 
have to conclude that the capacity of the manual industrial 
occupations to actively co-ordinate any of the three main 
aspects of the division of labour is not very great. National 
and local trade unions and local party bodies seem to act 
largely in a defensive capacity, if they pursue at all what might 
be considered as specifically manual industrial occupations' 
objectives. 
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This is perhaps not surprising, given the continued existence 
of a kind of labour market, and of extensive attempts at the 
political socialisation of the labour force. While some of the 
... 
sanctions of the labour market, such as danger of losing one's 
job, are much less acute than in capitalist economies, the tying 
of welfare benefits and housing to wages or work location still 
does pl~ce manual wage earners in industrial enterprises in a 
weaker bargainirig position than some other occupational groups. 
The political socialisation practices do seem to help secure 
support for the status quo, but the extent of this support, while 
substantial, does have its limits. 106 The knowledge in the 
central state and party agencies that these limits exist does 
enable manual workers to have some impact on major national 
economic decisions, such as wage levels. However, it is clear 
that manual industrial occupations do not predominate in 
co-ordinating the division of labour, thereby largely securing 
their own conditions of existence in a manner which makes other 
occupational groups' existence dependent on them and determining 
the distribution of income in their own favour. In other word!i>, 
they are nota predominant class in the Soviet Union. 
Yet if the economic capacities of the manual industrial 
occupations are limited, which is hardly surprising, it is even 
less surprising to find that the capacities of kolkhozniki are 
even more limited. As indicated in Chapter Two and in the 
earlier section in this Chapter on collective farmers, the 
juridical independence of the kolkhozy has not precluded state 
intervention in various aspects of their affairs. While some 
of this intervention has in recent years been quite beneficial 
in certain respects (for example, improved wages and social 
security provisions, the development of agro-industrial 
complexes), it has also enabled the state to continue to subordinate 
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collective farms by integrating their product mix into the overall 
national economic plan for agriculture, and by imposing a certain 
technical division of labour on them. At the same time, the 
juridical independence of kolkhozy has reduced their ability to 
secure state investment, compared to state farms. In addition 
to this, the organisational rigidity of collective farms which 
was discussed in Chapter Two, and the nominal nature of the 
election of collective farm chairmen, both indicate that the 
control by collective farm members over the technical division 
of labour is minimal. It is clear that their juridical 
independence from the state has reduced their capacity (and that 
of their members) to influence the division of social production 
and the social division of labour. Thus, while the situation of 
kolkhozniki has definitely improved considerably since the early 
1960s, their access to the means of production is clearly only 
on terms set for them by various state agencies. Consequently, 
despite their internal occupational differentiation, kolkhozniki 
must be considered to be in a separate, and worse, class position 
from that of all those employed by the state, with the possible 
exception of kolkhoz chairmen, who are de facto state appointees. 
Until the juridical and other conditions of the differences 
between kolkhozy and sovkhozy are eliminated, this element of 
class relations will remain a feature of the Soviet social 
formation. The effects (in terms of the distribution of income) 
of their restricted access to the means of production have already 
been made clear earlier in this Chapter. 
The occupational position of women has already been discussed 
at some length. While the evidence that women are fairly 
systematically disadvantaged is clear, it was argued that this 
has more to do with mechanisms allocating individuals to 
occupational locations than with a differential access of women 
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(in comparison with men) to the means of production. It was also 
noted that, in so far as class relations (which are always subject 
to struggle) are maintained by the policies of various agents, 
there are various policies (whose effects are admittedly ambiguous) 
designed to eliminate the occupational inequality of men and 
women, as well as the inequalities in their income. As in the 
case of elimination of cqllective farms, the presence of a policy 
of eliminating differences (even if that policy is fairly 
effective) does not mean that those inequalities are not the 
product of class relations. However, it was argued that occupational 
and income inequalities between men and women are primarily an 
effect of gender attribution on the workings of the mechanisms 
of allocating personnel, not the mechanisms generating occupational 
differentiation. 
This leaves the issue of non-manual occupations. Since it 
lS evident that the 'intelligentsia' cannot be regarded as a 
single occupational group, clearly the same is even more true of 
non-manual occupations as a whole. Some of them have better 
incomes than manual occupations, but some are paid less than 
skilled manual occupations. They usually have better working 
conditions than manual occupations, but the internal differentiation 
of'the non-manual group' means that they can hardly be treated 
(as a whole) as in a different class position to that of manual 
workers. Indeed the growth in the proportion of the labour force 
in occupations associated with health and education, and to a 
lesser extent trade, implies a growth in services provided to 
the population as a whole through the social consumption funds 
and retail trade, rather than as exacerbation of possible class 
differences. While it is quite evident that many non-manual 
occupations do not have significantly different access to the 
means of production from manual occupations, it is nevertheless 
the case that some non-manual occupations are particularly 
449. 
involved with the co-ordination of the division of labour. This 
lS the case with regard to enterprise directors and other members 
of the 'technical intelligentsia' (the engineering and technical 
personnel, the ITRs), who are concerned with the technical division 
of labour. It is also the case with senior Ministry officials, 
senior party officials and members of the central planning 
agencies who are concerned with the division of social production 
and/or the social division of labour. 
The enterprise director clearly predominates in co-ordinating 
the technical division of labour, despite the various institutional 
constraints on him in the form of the local trade unions, the 
factory party committee, the different organisations of 
rationalisers and innovators, labour law, the district party 
secretary and so on. However, the position of an agent such as 
the enterprise director is not static, and could be changed by 
the spread of brigade autonomy (as in the Shchekino or Zlobin 
experiments), or by the eventual success of the production 
association reform. Furthermore, even if these two changes do 
not extend throughout the economy, the capacity of enterprise 
directors to co-ordinate the technical division of labour is 
seriously constrained by the various central planning agencies 
concerned with plan implementation such as Gosstroi, the State 
Construction Committee, Gossnab, the State Committee on Material-
Technical Supply, and Gosbank, the State Bank. These agencies, 
as well as the Ministries themselves, establish the conditions 
under which enterprise directors have access to the means of 
production necessary to fulfill the plan. While the enterprise 
directors do have a certain autonomy in this respect, the 
supervision by these superior agencies effectively keeps this 
autonomy within certain limlts, This state of affairs would 
almost certainly continue to hold in the event of the successful 
spread of autonomous production brigades within enterprises, or 
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of production associations which combine enterprises. Enterprise 
directors could only become a capitalist class if they could 
extend their access to the means of production well beyond the 
co-ordination of the technical division of labour to the point 
where their autonomous decisions affected the division of social 
production and the social division of labour. As it is, the 
capacity to d~termine the division of social production does 
reside to some extent in inoividual Ministries (hence the high 
proportion of consumer durables coming from enterprises whose 
Ministries are in the 'heavy industry' sector). Yet this is 
only true to the extent that they are able to evade the 
supervision of (or get the agreement of) the central planning 
agencies, and it certainly is not true to any degree in the case 
of individual enterprises. Thus the capacities of enterprise 
directors, or of other ITRs working within enterprises, are 
effectively delimited to the co-ordination of the technical 
division of labour. They clearly do not predominate in determining 
their own conditions of existence, and could not do so unless they 
had greater access to the means of production, and hence a capacity 
to co-ordinate tnedivision of social production. 
Were this to happen, it could then 
lead to a limited capacity to co-ordinate the social division of 
labour, at least to the extent that" such agents could then largely 
secure their own conditions of existence, but changes in the social 
division of labour are frequently an unintended effect of changes 
in the other two main aspects of the division of labour, or else 
of changes in state policy or the structure of the state itself. 
The comparatively limited capacities of enterprise directors 
and other ITRs in production enterprises highlight the preconditions 
for the personnel in the central state and party agencies to 
constitute a 'ruling class'. These conditions have already been 
briefly indicated in the section on the 'intelligentsia' where 
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the possibility of a 'ruling class' was raised. However, all that 
was established in that discussion was that if such personnel do 
form a ruling class, then they have probably been less successful 
at securing a distribution of income favourable to themselves than 
is the case in capitalist societies. It did not establish that 
they have been unable to secure predominant access to the means 
of production, perhaps by controlling the political conditions 
of access to what is legally state property. For this to be the 
case, then the political interdiction of other agentsf access to 
the means of production would have to be supplemented by an ability 
to substantially enhance their own capacity for action in a manner 
which rendered other agents dependent on the central state and 
party agencies, while leaving the latter comparatively independent 
of other agencies. This would imply either that one or two 
agencies would have to be supreme (a sovereign body), or that 
collectively these various agencies (which are themselves each a 
collective agent) would have to be capable of using their access 
to the means of production to co-ordinate all aspects of the 
division of labour (restricting the capacity of other agents to 
do so) thereby securing their own conditions of existence. 
Furthermore, since these collective agents are not themselves 
agents of consumption, the class relations between these agents 
and other economic agents would have to be utilised by the 
personnel who staff those agencies to substantially alter the 
distribution of income in their own favour. Otherwise it would 
be comparatively easy for these personnel to subvert the policies 
of these collective agents. 
The concept of one or two agencies being capable of acting 
as a sovereign has already been rejected in the discussion of 
totalitarianism and elite theory in Chapter Three. Such bodies 
as the Politburo, the Central Committee and the Council of 
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Ministers are dependent on other central agencies both for 
information and for the implementation of decisions. Such 
other central agencies would presumably include the Central 
Committee secretariat and the various state committees attached 
to the Council of Ministers, particularly Gosplan, Gossnab, 
Gosstroi, Gosbank and the State Committee on Labour and Social 
Questions. -Ministries themselves would presumably be on the 
other side of the class boundary.107 If these other central 
agencies are therefore to be included as 'collective possessors I 
of the means of production, then it has to be demonstrated not 
only that they act in concert on all important decisions concerning 
the disposition of the means of production, but that they are 
actually capable of co-ordinating the division of labour in all 
its main aspects, because of their predominant access to the 
means of production. In other words, the central state and party 
agencies would have to be able to establish fairly exclusive 
control of the access by other agents to the means of production, 
so that they were able to set their own terms for the access by 
other agents to the means of_production. This would imply that 
these central agencies would be capable of exerting sufficient 
control not merely to establish overall co-ordination of the 
division of labour (preventing sub-agents from usurping such 
decisions as are necessary for effective national planning), 
but also to subordinate sub-agents to the point where they had 
little capacity of their own to affect the division of labour, 
and thus could not prevent the means of production from being 
used in a way which substantially altered the distribution of 
income in favour of the central agencies and their constituent 
personnel o 
It is by no means clear that this is the case. For example, 
~espite all the restrictions on the capacities of enterprise 
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directors, they are still the main agents capable of co-ordinating 
the technical division of labour. Similarly, the participation 
of the Ministries in the activities of Gossnab has indicated 
that Ministries still have a considerable impact on the division 
of social production, because of their capacity to secure supplies 
by a process of mutual accommodation with each other and with 
Gossnab. Because Gosplan cannot issue orders to Gossnab, there 
is little that it can do about this state of affairs, since it is 
quite likely that the Council of Ministers will reflect any 
mutual accommodations reached between Ministries in the process of 
Gossnab's decisions on material-technical supplies. The effects 
of this, such as the location of consumer durables production in 
'heavy industry' Ministries, have already been indicated. The 
'inordinate' size of the Ministry of Machine Building and Metal 
Working is surely a result of similar processes. The failure of 
the Kosygin Reform and the repeated attempts to push through the 
production association reform both demonstrate that the capacity 
of the central state and party agencies to co-ordinate the 
division of social production is seriously limited by the 
non-compliance of sub-agents, particularly Ministries. Similarly, 
with regard to decisions which directly affect the social division 
of labour, there have been no attempts to cut back on health and 
education personnel to increase the central agencies' room for 
\, 
manoeuvre either to create other kinds of occupations, or to 
alter the distribution of income in favour of the personnel of 
the central agencies. The use of voluntary workers in trade 
unions to administer social security might be considered as an 
example of an attempt to alter the social division of labour in 
a way which 'releases' real income for use by the central agencies, 
but the recent pension increases imply that this money has simply 
been spent on the general population rather than on professional 
administrators. 
454. 
Consequently, it is extremely difficult to argue that the 
undoubted predominance of the central state and party agencies 
in co-ordinating the overall division of labour in the social 
formation is sufficiently exclusive to seriously restrict the 
access of other state agencies to the means of production. In 
other words, the effect of the process of plan construction and 
implementation seems to be that ~ variety of agents (and sUb-agents) 
have overlapping forms of access to the means of production, so 
that the relations between the various agents in the state sector 
establish conditions in which none can substantially enhance their 
own capacity for action at the expense of other agents, and none 
can substantially alter the distribution of income in their own 
favour. 
This perhaps places in a new light the tincrementalism' in 
policy formation, remarked on by Hough and others. It may well 
be that the caution with which policy changes are introduced is 
an indication of successful struggle by sub-agents such as 
Ministries within the state sector, and that this capacity to 
struggle successfully is partly an effect of the 'multiple access' 
to the means of production which was described in the Introduction 
as an indication that class relations are weak or non-existent. 
However, there is a danger here of implying that classless 
societies are incapable of effective reform, or are doomed to 
paralysis and stagnation. Much of the 'incrementalism' in the 
Soviet Union seems to be simply due to a poor process of policy 
formulation, where, as in the case of housing or the de facto 
priority given to heavy industry, the effects of existing 
practices are not calculated in a very sophisticated manner. Yet, 
some of the difficulties of economic reform in the Soviet Union 
do appear to be the result of the access of sub-agents to the 
means of production, so that the sub-agents themselves are 
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capable to some extent of co-ordinating the division of labour, 
thereby avoiding too great a dependence on the central state and 
party agencies. 
In itself, the argument that sub-agents have access to the 
means of production which is sufficient to prevent too great a 
restriction on their capacity for action, this argument does 
not finally settle the issue of class relations within the state 
sector in the Soviet Union. It was argued in the Introduction 
that the central planning agencies could not be considered to 
have class relations with other state agencies if it could be 
demonstrated that they were only 'holding the ring' in the 
sense of following policies .which prevented all agents, including 
themselves (or one should add, their constituent personnel) 
from securing disproportionate benefits. The implication of 
this, it was argued, is that non-class societies would have a 
very egalitarian policy on the distribution of income and this 
policy would have to be fairly effectively pursued. This issue 
must now be dealt with. 
The Distribution of Wages and Income Levels 
All recent analyses of wage differentials and inequalities 
in the distribution of actual earnings concur in the view that 
since the mid-1950s there has been a substantial reduction in 
both. McAuley, in reviewing the distribution of earnings from 
1956 to 1972, and the growth of earnings from 1950-1974, is very 
clear on these effects. 108 Wiles presents a similar picture from 
1946 to 1970. 109 Similarly Chapman, who concentrates on the 
industrial wage structure, argues that earnings differentials 
have been narrowed since the mid-1950s, while average industrial 
money earnings have more than doubled. 110 Even if money earnings 
are reduced to estimated real earnings by taking account of 
Western estimates of disguised Soviet inflation, real earnings 
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111 have gone up by almost 63 per cent from 1955 to 1975. 
Nevertheless this still leaves Soviet real earnings at about 
80 per cent of those in the rest of Eastern Europe and about 
50 per cent of those in Au~t.ria.112 
However, while improvements in real earnings are important 
(and improvements in money earnings are also important from the 
point of view of earnings-related welfare benefits), the level 
bf earnings is less important for the analysis of class relations 
than the trend in earnings differentials. As just mentioned, 
the trend has been for these differentials to narrow considerablY. 
The following tables provided by Chapman indicate this very 
clearly. 
1945 
1950 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
Table 18 
Relationship between Earnings of 
Workers and Earnings of Managerial-Technical 
Personnel and of 'Office Workers in Soviet Industry 
1945-76 
(Average earnings of workers = 100) 
Average. Earnings of 
Managerial-Technical A verage Earnings of 
Personnel Office Workers 
230 101 
176 93 
166 89 
,148 82 
142 83 
136 ;, 85 
134 84 
130 83 
127 81 
126 82 
124 82 
122 83 
..... 
Source: J.G. Chapman, ibid. , page 173 
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This table shows clearly that in terms of earnings, 
non-manual occupations cannot be considered as a homogeneous 
group. Office workers clearly earn between 15 and 20 per cent 
less than the average (including industrial 'manual workers), 
while managerial and technical personnel earned over 20 per cent 
more than overag~. This table also shows clearly that managerial 
and technical personnel are now much closer to average earnings 
than formerly. 
The following table shows the earnings distribution for all 
Soviet wage earners and salaried workers. 113 
Table 19 
Indicators of the Distribution of Earnings 
bf Workers and Salaried Employees 
1946-75 (P) 
(Ratio between earnings at inclicated 
percentiles of the distribution) 
P90 P90 P}O 
PI0 P50 P50 
Reported Computed a Computed a 
M C M C 
1946 7.24 2.7 .38 
1956 4.4 2.0 2.2 .41 .46 
1959 4.2 2.0 2.0 .47 .49 
1961 (3.9-4.2)b 2.0 2.0 .46 .50 
1964 3.7 1.8 1.9 .54 .53 
1966 3.2~ 1.9 1.8 .58 .55 
1968 2.7' 1.7 1.8 .61 .56 
1970 3.2 1.7 .58 
P1975 2.9 
Source: J.G. Chapman, ibid., page 174 
This table shows that the overall range of earnings 
(first column) has narrowed considerably, even from 1964 to 
1970, and this ratio was expected to fall further by 1975 as a 
result of the delayed second wage reform of the,1970s. The first 
wage reform was started in 1956, but did not become widespread 
until the second half of the 1960s.114 The table also shows 
(second column) that the' higher paid have had slower relative 
wage increases, and (third column) that low-paid workers have had 
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relatively large increases. This shows the effects of the 
substantial rise in the minimum wage, and the freezing of the 
11 5 
upper-level salary rates. 
To place these figures into perspective, Chapman points out 
that these differentials are higher than in the rest of Eastern 
Europe, which when coupled with the lower level of earnings in 
the Soviet Union (compared to Eastern Europe) must be quite 
embarrassing for the Soviet authorities. 116 However, she also 
points out that the decile ratio (as in the first column of the 
above table) was 4.48 in the U.S.A. in 1972. This refers to 
non-agricultural workers and salaried employees. On this 
evidence, the Soviet earnings ~ifferentials are much narrower 
than in the U.S.A., even ignoring U.S. income from profits and 
dividends. It will be recalled that Wiles117 gave ~ figure of 
5.5:1 for the ratio of top to average incomes in the U.S.S.R. 
This is much higher than Chapman's 1.7:1 for the Soviet Union in 
1970 (second column of the above table). The difference is 
largely explained by the fact that Chapman is referring to earnings 
from wages only, whereas Wiles is accepting Matthews' estimates 
of the real income addition of fringe benefits when added to the 
very top wages and salaries. It will be remembered that even 
accepting those estimates, Wiles found that they corresponded 
almost exactly to the British ratio of top to average incomes, 
defined as wages and salaries plus fringe benefits, but excluding 
orthodox social services of the state, and excluding 'profits and 
professional earnings'. Chapman is more sceptical than Matthews, 
it seems,' on the income differentials generated by fringe benefits, 
for she points out that ordinary jobs also provide access to scarce 
goods and other sources of extra income. 118 However, even 
accepting Matthews' views on this issue, Wiles is correct to point 
out that if one takes capitalist incomes such as profit into 
459. 
account, Britain is considerably more unequal in incomes that 
1:he U.S.S.R. Chapman's evidence on the U.S.A. shows that in terms 
of earnings (ignoring fringe benefits and profits) it too was more 
unequal than the U.S.S.R. Thus it is -quite clear that, although 
the U.S.S.R. has lower real earnings levels and wider earnings 
differentials than other countries in Eastern Europe, it also 
has narrower earnings differentials than the U.S.A. and Britain. 119 
However, earnings are only part of the re~l income of the 
popUlation. The other major components of the real income of 
the Soviet population are of course comprised of housing, transport 
and basic food subsidies, as well as expenditures under the 
heading of the social consumption funds. If one is attempting to 
examine whether differentials in the distribution of income have 
declined~ the impact of these measures must be assessed in some 
way. At the end of Chapter Four I attempted a rough assessment 
of the overall effects of such non-wage forms of income and 
concluded that arguments that such forms of state expenditure 
were regressive were not substantiated. McAuley is convinced 
that the authorities adopted a new approach to questions of 
economic welfare in the mid_1950s,120 and that while neither 
wage and salary policy nor expenditures on social consumption 
have been administered as consistently or effectively as Soviet 
accounts would have us believe, there has been substantial 
h · t 1 21 ac J..evemen • 
McAuley points to three main deficiencies in most Western 
accounts of income inequality in the Soviet Union. Firstly, 
they tend to concentrate on earnings, or welfare measures, 
taken in isolation. If one is going to examine income, it is 
meaningless to consider the employed in isolation. This point 
is certainly correct since many welfare measures are directed at 
those not in employment. McAuley's approach requires that in the 
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study of inequality, occupational groups should be considered in 
their social context, including their family circumstances. In 
view of the fact that the contemporary Soviet family is an object 
of social policy y as well as an agent of consumption, it seems to 
me that there is no denying this. Secondly y he argues that 
Western analyses concentrate on the state industrial sector. 
This leads to a neglect of non-industrial state employees (for 
example, in retail trade or office work) and of kolkhozniki. 
Both types of neglect, but particularly the latter, lead to an 
exaggeration of the degree of equality of incomes. Thirdly, they 
ignore the importance of regiona~, linguistic and ethnic factors 
in income inequality. (While the last criticism is certainly 
applicable to this work, since such features of the Soviet Union 
are beyond its scope, it is hopefully clear that the other two 
deficiencies have been less in evidence). McAuleyls awareness 
of these problems makes his analysis particularly useful for a 
discussion of the distribution of income. Thus, for example, 
he points out that, whatever measure is used, the gap between 
kolkhozniki and state employees closed between 1960 and 1970~ 
so that by the end of the decade, total or per capita personal 
income for kolkhozniki for the U.S.S.R. as a whole was some 
78 to 85 per cent of that of state employees. He rightly argues 122 
that this "gives a better indication of the relative living 
standards of the two classes than money income, which suggests 
that peasants received about two-thirds as much as the rest of 
the P?pulation." He also argues that the available evidence 
indicates that there was a marked reduction in inequality among 
the non-agricultural population between 1958 and 1967. 123 Not 
surprisingly, this is related to the reform of social security, 
the re-organisation of the wage and salary system, and the 
increased exp endi ture on pensions and other transfers. 
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Yet his claim that the momentum in this respect which was 
evident up to 1970 may not have been maintained, that the drive 
to equality may have slackened or even been reversed, is perhaps 
open to question, although it is difficult to refute without as 
careful an appraisal of the evidence for the 1970s as he has 
conducted for the pre-1970 period. There are certainly reasons 
wby he should think this. As he points out, the continued growth 
~n living standards between 1970 and 1974 (which is related to 
the reduction in inequality of income, because the latter has 
been achieved by a process of levelling up incomes) has only 
been achieved at the cost of some open inflation. Furthermore, 
the increase in living standards inthe years 1970 to 1974 was 
at a slower rate than previously. It could (at present growth 
rates) only be increased more quickly at the expense of other 
forms of state expenditure, such as defence, which is unlikely. 
The alternative would be for a further equalisation in incomes to 
be achieved, not by a levelling up, but by an actual reduction in 
the incomes of the most affluent (by means of a change in tax 
policy). In either case, the effect of further equalisation of 
income would be inflationary and may well be resisted by the 
central authorities for this reason. Yet, despite these problems, 
some measures of equalisation of income have been implemented in 
the 1970s: for example, the child allowances in 1974~ the 
increase in minimum wage in 1975, the retention of part of their 
pension by retired people who return to employment. In addition 
to ~his, the higher wage levels of the early 1970s must by now be 
working through to higher pensions, and it is clear from the 
discussion of wages and productivity at the end of Chapter Two 
of this work that wage increases probably exceeded productivity 
increases in'the late 1970s. While the inflationary pressures 
generated by most of these measures cannot be doubted, all these 
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developments occurring at the same time as the restrictions on 
upper earnings mentioned by Chapman suggest that the process of 
levelling up may have continued. Whatever the reasons for this 
{and McAuley is probably correct to doubt that the main reason 
concerns the radical socialist egalitarianism of the leadership}, 
it does suggest that the pressures for equalisation are fairly 
strong. 
Some of McAuley's work is complemented by the work of 
Vinokur and Ofer,124 although their analysis is primarily 
restricted to industrial workers. They confirm that the rise 
in real per capita income continued until 1975, being around 
73 per cent higher than in 1965 if the Soviet retail price index 
is used, or 50 per cent higher if the Schroeder-Severin index is 
taken. 125 They also confirm that the gap in real incomes between 
kolkhozniki and state employees probablY continued to narrow 
after 1970~ They do this by comparing income per family member 
for industrial workers with average income per capita for the 
Soviet population as a whole (which as McAuley reminds us, 
contains retail and office workers as well as kolkhozniki, so 
this is only a rough indication). Their conclusion is as follows: 126 
"In 1965, per-capita income for the Soviet Union as a whole was 
41.1 rubles per month, while our estimate for industrial workers 
is between 54 and 58 rubles. Corresponding figures for 1970 are 
57.1 rubles as against between 72 and 76, and in 1975, 72.6 rubles 
as against between 96 and 99. Over the ten-year period, the 
relative gap between the two levels narrowed slightly, from about 
36 to 32 per cent. This is reasonable since incomes of kolkhozniki 
and low-paid urban workers, as well as of pensioners, rose more 
rapidly than incomes of better-paid industrial workers." However, 
on the basis of survey evidence they suggest that the predominance 
of industrial workers in terms of wages (in comparison with office 
staff and with manual workers in agriculture and services) is 
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offset by lower supplementary income from social consumption 
funds. 127 This latter phenomenon would not affect the overall 
distribution of income very much. 
Overall, the distribution of income {not simply wages) has 
been considerablY equalised from about 1955 to 1975. While the 
evidence is not available to form judgements about developments 
since then, and while it is clear that further equalisation of 
incomes may be fraught with difficulty and is perhaps only 
recently a process which has been monitored with any sophistication,128 
it is very clear that the combiried effect of various policies has 
been to raise general living standards and to equalise incomes. 
Whatever the reasons for these developments, increases in the 
wages of the lowest pa±d and improvements in welfare are not 
the sort of outcome which one would expect of the central state 
and party agencies, in a situation where their room for manoeuvre 
in running the economy has been declining. The available evidence 
on the trends in the distribution of real income is thus quite 
compatible with the argument in the preceding section (on the 
occupational structure and class relations) that no category of 
agents seems to be capable of establishing privileged access'to 
the means of production. 
Conclusion: The Presence of Class Relations in the Soviet Union 
It is clear from the fact that substantial changes in the 
occupational structure have taken place since the late 1920s, 
that the central state and party agencies are capable of 
co-ordinating the division of labour in a manner which broadlY 
speaking enables them to fulfill their objectives. This has 
continued to be the case despite the slowdown in the rate of 
economic growth since the mid-1960s. However, it is equally 
clear that there are limits on the capacity of the central 
agencies to co-ordinate the division of labour. The difficulties 
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of economic reform of various kinds since the 1957 Sovnarkhoz 
Reform are evidence in support of such a conclusion. Some of 
these limits on their capacity derive from their form of 
calculation and on the organisational resources at their 
immediate disposal. However,the main limits on their capacity 
derive from the capacities of other economic agents such as 
Ministries~ and from their sub-agents such as production 
associations, state enterprises (and in future even perhaps 
autonomous brigades within enterprises). While the access of 
each of these economic agents to the means of production is 
different, and hence their capacities are each somewhat different, 
the available evidence strongly suggests that within the state 
sector such differential access does not give rise to class 
relations .. 
I 
This conclusion seems to hold not just for relations between 
collective agents but for those between individual agents: the 
examination of the occupational structure suggested quite clearly 
that the most systematic enhancement and restriction of 
individuals' capacity for action derived from gender attribution 
rather than class relations. The effect of this on the 
occupational distribution of men and women and on the consequent 
distribution of income between these two categories:was quite 
clear. Apart from this, while there are certainly differences in 
individual capacities deriving from occupational location, and 
associated differences in income level, it is clear that within 
the state sector these derive largely from membership of state 
agencies rather than being an attribute of the occupation itself~ 
for example the educational level required to enter that occupation. 
Hence attempts to define class or stratum boundaries within the 
occupational structure without an examination of the differential 
capacities of state ~gencies suffer from the usual difficulty .6f 
, 
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stratification theories, namely that they are unable to define 
the boundaries of classes or strata because they do not attempt 
to do so in terms of the relations of production, the relations 
operative between economic agents, which determine their relative 
capacities. This problem is perhaps most clearly evident in 
attempts to define the 'intelligentsia' in the Soviet Union. 
Thus the failure to find to find any class relations between 
occupations is related to the la~k of class relations between 
state agencies. The predominance of such collective agents is 
of course an effect of the nationalisation of the means of 
production, which means that the only legal access which an 
individual has to' the means of production is in the capacity of 
a member of a party or state agency. Hence the importance of 
analysing the relative capacities of the various state economiG 
agents, as was attempted in Chapter Two. The complex relations 
between these agents, with tdual subordination'~ and a multiplicity 
of arenas in which the decisions of superior agents can be 
challenged, and a degree of autonomy at the level of sub-agents 
due partly to the sheer burden of information at the centre, these 
complex relations have important effects. Firstly, because the 
capacities of various state agencies cannot be strictly delimited 
(we saw in Chapter Three the difficulties of even achieving a 
legal codification of these various capacities), the processes 
of plan formulation and plan implementation are inevitably 
politicised. Secondly, these relations are such that, while 
there is adequate delimitation of sub-agents to enable an overall 
national co-ordination of the division of labour to be achieved~ 
this delimitation is not sufficient to render the sub-agents 
incapable of having any serious impact on the division of labour. 
In other words, while the central agencies are capable of 
formulating and effectively implementing a national plan {which 
means they are capable of preventing sub-agents from taking over 
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the means of production), the various agencies of plan implementation 
are nevertheless capable of exerting considerable control over 
that part of the total means of production which is at their 
disposal. This means they are also in a position to resist or 
even block certain kinds of economic policies, and to press for 
others. While this state of affairs continues, it will be 
difficult for either the central agencies or the Ministries or 
other sub-agents to gain sufficient control of the means of 
production to be able to decide their own investment and income 
distribution policies. Consequently, the various forms of access 
of different agents, even those with a more restricted capacity 
for action such as enterprises, do seem to be such that within the 
state sector there is 'multiple access'to, or 'social ownership' 
of, the means of production. This is not to say that the present 
forms of 'social ownership' in the Soviet Union are the most 
politically desirable or economically effective. 
The conclusion that the relations of production within the 
state sector do not give rise to class relations within it 
does not mean that there are no class relations in the Soviet 
Union. The kolkhozy are not simply juridically distinct,' they 
are a category of collective agents whose access to the means 
of production is clearly restricted to the terms set by state 
agencies~ While the incomes of their members are evidently 
approaching those of employees of·state agencies, that income 
depends more on the economic performance of each collective 
farm (each collective private property) than is the case in 
state agencies, where individual incomes are much more dependent 
on state policy. However, it is not the dependence of their 
members' incomes on their economic performance which places 
collective farm members in a different class position from state 
employees. The connection between individual wage and economic 
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performance could be strengthened in the state sector if the 
autonomous brigade reforms go through on the lines of the 
5hchekino and Zlobin experiments. Rather it is their effective 
subordination to various state agencies, which, by their 
investment, pricing and delivery policies, determine the farms' 
access to the means of production and consequently the disposition 
of their prcduct. These state policies operate in a way which 
enables the state agencies to completely predominate in determining 
the farms' conditions of existence y and even their 'choice' of 
chairman and internal organisational form. Yet they are (or 
have been in the past) denied the Ministerial backing which 
would enable them to lobby for investment. These relations 
between state agencies and collective farms are of course the 
legacy of forced collectivisation. Fortunately conditions on 
collective farms are steadily improving. Yet the massive 
investment in agriculture must be much less effective than it 
could be, as indicated in Chapter Two. This is because collective 
farms do not appear to have the autonomy to co-ordinate their own 
division of labour (to develop their own most effective 
organisational forms for combining labour and the means of 
production) and hence to decide on the most appropriate kinds 
of on-farm investment. Agricultural invBstment off the farm 
(that is, infrastructural work on roads and kolkhoz markets, and 
so on) is controlled by the state, which further enables the 
state to determine the conditions of existence of thekolkhozy. 
In the absence of rapid improvements in agricultural performance, 
it will be difficult for the state to speed up the transformation 
of kolkhozy into sovkhozy. However, it would seem that in current 
50viet conditions this is the only feasible way to eliminate these 
class relations. 
Finally, there is the possibility that class relations operate 
in the 'informal sector' of the 50viet economy, the ~o-called 
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'parallel market 1 which is sometimes divided into various 
different kinds of market. While it is possible that capitalist 
relations operate here, and in aggregate the 'informal sector' 
must be economically significant, it appears that most of the 
economic activity in this sector takes the form of self-employed 
'moonlighting'. Consequently, such class relations as exist 
here are not of major importance at the moment~ and would only 
become so if the 'informal sector' seriously disrupted the 
national planning process, which would imply a fairly serious 
social upheaval on the scale of, say, recent events in Poland 
connected with the rise of Solidarity. 
One can sum up by saying that there are class relations in 
the Soviet Union, which operate by means of mechanisms of state 
control of the kolkhozy. While other class relations may operate 
in the 'informal sector', they are much less important, and their 
exact extent is unknown. The class relations between state 
agencies and the kolkhozy~ which put their respective members in 
different class positions, are being steadily if slowly eroded, 
by measures to transform kolkhozy and by opening up the access of 
kolkhozy to the means of production (by organisational devices 
such as inter-kolkhoz associations). In this sense, the official 
Soviet theory of the class structure, which treats the form of 
property (or collective agent) as important for defining the class 
position of individuals and which argues that class differences 
are diminishing, is defensible. However, the basis of this theory 
is not very clear and it is weakened by the insistence on 
attempting to find grounds for defining the 'intelligentsia' 
as a separate stratum. 
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is possible that these problems are worse in Poland than in the 
Soviet Union. 
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APPENDIX 
KRITSMAN'S "CLASS STRATIFICATION OF THE SOVIET COUNTRYSIDE" 
The purpose of this Appendix is to provide an account of 
one of Kritsman's works which indicates how he developed his 
approach. As indicated in Chapter One, such an exposition, 
amounting at times to almost verbatim translation, is felt 
necessary in view of the controversy surrounding his work, 
which is not available in English. This should help readers 
to formulate their own appraisal of his approach to the empirical 
material on the class structure, since such material is of 
considerable importance in developing or evaluating a strategy 
of socialist development. 
Kritsman begins Class Stratification of the Soviet 
Countryside (pages 117-268 inclusive of Kritsman,1929) by 
stressing that the development of capitalism in the countryside 
gave no basis for panic because large-scale industry in the 
hands of the proletariat was then (1926) growing more quickly 
than rural capitalism, and at the same time the dependence of 
all agriculture, including its capitalist part, on state large-
scale industry, transport, wholesale trade and credit was growing. 
The development of capitalism in the countryside was taking place 
at the same time as the fall in the share of agricultural capital 
in the general production of the country. So clearly Kritsman 
did not see the development of rural capitalism as a serious 
threat, but neither did it provide grounds for compacency. The 
way to avoid both complacency and panic was to study the country-
side, groping around for those specific forms of approach (methods 
of study) which corresponded to the specific peculiarities of the 
process of class stratification of the peasantry in the Soviet 
countryside only after such work was done 
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would it be possible to actually study the process itself. Otherwise 
one would just be piling up useless data. For this reason Kritsman 
concentrated in this work on the elaboration of data which did not 
cover the m.ajority of regions, but was detailed. Evidently this was 
a m.odest, cautious approach, and the "ideological com.m.ittm.ent to 
:j. 
detect a rising tide of polarisation" is not its m.ostim.m.ediately 
striking feature. Kritsm.an drew a distinction between 'dynam.ics' 
and 'statics' which am.ounted to distinguishing between indices of 
determ.inants of 'class stratification' (as he called itr on the one hand, 
and the categorisation of individual farm.s as capitalist or proletarian, 
on the other. To say that a farm. 'was becom.ing f capitalist was not 
to say, how for that process of 'becom.ing' had gone. He considered 
that the proces s of clas s stratification in the Soviet countryside was 
only beginning and hoped that his work would help to clarify the ques-
tion. In brief, then, the concentration in this work upon detailed studies 
was to help develop m.ethods of research. This required both a discussim 
of the historically specific context of the stratification and a critique of 
the other m.ain approach to these issues, which Kritsm.an called the 
'banal' approach. 
The specific result of the antifeudal revolution (in the countryside) 
was the growth in the mas s of independent sm.all- scale farm.s, not 
em.pt~ying wage-labour, that is, the econom.ic rise of the m.iddle peasan1ry, 
transform.ing the feudal or sem.i-feudal organisation of peasant agriculture. 
This was the econom.ic root of the union of the proletariat and m.iddle 
peasantry, strengthened after the Revolution by the NEP legalising the 
com.m.odity form. of connection between the state econom.y of the prole-
tariat and the sm.all farms (as well as am.ong the sm.all farm.s them.selves, 
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of cour se). This was the form demanded by the interests of the 
farming peasantry and of small farms in general. The transition to 
the NEP signified the eradication of the use, on a compulsory, free 
of charge basis, by the poor peasants of the stock and livestock of 
the well- to- do. This led to the transformation of the potential of the 
capitalist strata of the peasantry and the deterioration among the poor 
of their own farming. Nevertheless Kritsman argued (page 127) that 
the proces s of clas s stratification was relatively slow. 
In his critique of the 'banal' approach, Kritsman explicitly 
cautioned against the use of 'direct' indices of the development of rural 
I 
capitalism such as the juridical._ renting of land or the hiring of wage-
labour. This was because of historical circumstances, including the 
illegality of some of the 'direct' indices, which meant that they were 
partly hidden, and because he was dealing with the early stages of the 
process of class stratification, folloWing the Civil' War. (Elsewhere he 
referred to' Lenin's remarks op the inappropriatenes s of using wage-
labour as an indicator of the presence of small scale- rural capitalism, 
80 wage-labour was not played down because it~ next to nil, nor was 
there any 'purity' of a Marxist definition of capitalist relations in terms of 
v.age_ JaJ::mr to be defended 3). K ritsman defined the weak and the poor 
farms as those whose labour power could not be fully used on their own 
farm: in other words, for whom there were insufficient means of produc-
tion. The prosperous (or well-to-do) farms were those whose means of 
production could not be fully used by means of their own labour power: 
in other words. for whom there was insufficient labour power. Thus 
in its initial stages the process of class stratification appeared as the 
strengthening of differences in the power (capacity) of farms. The need 
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to study the process of class stratification on the basis of groupings 
of peasant farms according to indirect indices (the extent of the farms) 
made the lbc:.nal 1 approach to the resolution of the problem particularly 
dangerous. The material on the dynamics of stratification was not 
large and was quite ill-assorted, Kritsman argued. All these materials 
suffered from mistakes both in the primary sources and in the approach 
to the matter (methodology) not to mention mistakes in calculation. "As 
an example of the mistakes in primary sources Kritsman (on page 139) 
cited an article by Vislmevsky (in NaAgrar.nom Fronte, No. 5-6) which 
used some data from the Altaiskii Ezhegodnik for 1922/1923: 
TABLE 1 
Sown Area for one 
Farm according to 
Sown Area D~namic Short Excess according 
Groups Studies Budget to Short Budget 
Studies Studies 
Dessiatines 
Without sown area 0.98 0.98 
Up to 0.5 Des 0.34 0.72 0.38 
Q .. 6 - 1 .0 Des 0.85 1 .41 0.56 
1 • 1 
-
2.0 Des. 1 .53 2.35 0.82 
2.1 
-
3.0 Des. 2.49 3.78 1 .29 
3.1 
-
4.0 Des. 3.56 4.68 1 .1 2 
4.1 - .6.0 Des. 5.02 6. 11 1 .09 
6.1 
-
8.0 Des. 6.69 7.34 0.65 
8.1 - 10.0 Des. 9.59 12.0 2.41 
1 0.1 - 16.0 Des. 12.52 15. 75 3.23 
Thus farms which according to the Dynamic Studies had no sown 
area, had (according to the more reliable data of the Short Budget Studies 
of the same farms at the same time) a sown area of an average around 1 
dessiatine, and the range of error for other groups is evident from the 
right-hand column. 
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According to Kritsman, the entirely relative character of 
groupings by sown art:amade particularly dangerous its routine 
introduction into the explanation of the process of class stratification 
of the countryside. Under such circumstances, a judgement as to 
the stratification or equalisation of the peasantry was made only accord-
ing to the growth or decline in the percentage of the extreme sown area 
groups, which in any case did not coincide with the extreme class 
groups of the peasantry {capitalistically exploited and exploiting}. In 
other words, sown area in the 'banal' {or routine} approach constituted 
a principle of stratification, as I have called it. Kritsman argued that 
only a comparison of different kinds of data on the different groups of 
the peasantry could give sufficient material for judgement on the process 
of stratification of the peasantry 4 
Consequently, although studies of individual villages, volosti' 
and regions were particularly 'sinful' in their approach to the matter , 
they contained much more detailed data which made it possible to call 
into question their economic analysis. In addition, because of the small 
extent of the region and of the groupings themselves {in particular group-
ing by sown area} they bore a much less abstract character because 
of the unified trend of agriculture {the inter-relation of different branches 
of agriculture} within the limits of a small region. The analysis of data 
on individual villages, volosti and regions gave - besides the imme-
diate results - the chance to judge the adequacy of less detailed data 
on bigger territorial :units {gubernii and so on} for the explanation of 
the process of rural class stratification. 
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Kritsman concluded his critique of the routine {or banal} 
approach by an analysis of data from six rural Soviets {eel 'sovety} 
in the Bogaevskii and Semikarakorsktii. regions of the Don area, 
which showed the interrelation between sown area and working 
livestock in 1924. The figures covered 3573 farms, and were taken 
from a brochure entitled The Face of the Don Countryside. The group-
ing by sown area gave the following results: 
Farms 
Without sown area 
Up to 1 Des. 
1 - 2 Des. 
2- 4 Des. 
4 - 6 Des. 
6 -10 Des. 
10 -16 Des. 
16- 25 Des. 
Over 25 Des. 
TABLE 2 
Percentage of 
all fia:rms 
1 5.4 
23.1 
15.5 
1 9.3 
1 1 • 8 
9.6 
3.8 
1 .3 
0.2 
100.0 
Percentage of 
sown area 
4 
7 
1 9 
1 9 
25 
1 6 
8 
2 
100 
These figures showed that while 54 per cent of farms disposed of 
only 11 per cent of sown area, less than 15 per cent of farms disposed 
51 per cent of sown area. Yet while they revealed deep differences 
between groups of peasants distinguished by the extent of their farms, 
they did not show the interrelations between the different groups of 
peasants. It would be quite mistaken, argued Kritsman, to group peasart 
farms on the basis of sown area into poor, middle and prosperous. 
The grouping by working livestock told more of the relations of different 
groups of the peasantry: 
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Farms 
Without working livestock 
With head 
With 2 head 
With 3 head 
With 4 head and more 
TABLE 3 
Percentage of 
all farms 
70.2 
9.B 
1 3. 7 
3.3 
3.0 
100.0 
Percentage of 
working livestock 
1 3 
37 
14 
36 
100 
This table showed that half the working livestock was in the 
hands of 24 per cent of the farms, and the other half was in the 
hands of 6 per cent of the farms. Regrouping the two distributions 
(as Kritsman did) into three groups with the large scale owning half 
of all working livestock (or sown area), the smaller owning the other 
half, and the third group consisting of farms owning no sown area or 
working livestock, Kritsman presented the following comparison: 
TABLE 4 
Percentage of farms 
Large-scale Smaller Posses- Total 
ing Ncne 
Grouping by working livestock 6 
Grouping by sown area 15 
24 
70 
70 
1 5 
100 
100 
This table showed that the 70 per cent of farms dpvoid of the basic 
means of production - working livestock - could not for this reason be 
actually independent farms, but were the objects of exploitation. Accord-
ing to Kritsman, the exploiting farms were hidden among the remaining 
30 percent, in all probability, among the higher group classified by 
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working livestock. But only the comparison of both groupings, 
that is, by the farm and by the extent of its own means of 
production, uncovered the picture of the interrelations of the different 
groups of the peasantry. But to establish these relations more 
clearly it was necessary for Kritsman to examine the technical divi-
sion of labour. The brochure indi cated that the 'loading' on one animal 
was 4 dessiatines, that is, that one animal was necessary to cultivate 
this area. Kritsman pointed out that the loading differed in each 
type of farm, depending on its agrkultural stock (implements), the 
quality of its working livestock and so on. It was les s in a small-
scale and greater in a large-scale farm (where one horse could 
provide the basis for the cultivation of a greater area). For this 
reason the establishment 6f a general norm of loading concealed the 
actual stratification. Nevertheless, using this norm gave the following 
grouping: 
Without working livestock 
or sown area 
Without working livestock 
and with sown area 
With insufficient working 
livestock 
With su'fficient working 
livestock 
With a surplus of working 
livestock 
TABLE 5 
Percentage of 
all farms 
15 
55 
4 
1 6 
10 
100 
Percentage 
working 
livestock 
8 
39 
53 
100 
The average 
for 1 farm 
of head of 
working 
livestock 
1 • 6 
1 .8 
4.0 
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If one wished to subdivide the highest 10 per cent of farms, 
then 3 per cent disposed of more than 36 per cent of the working 
livestock, averaging 8.9 head of livestock per farm. Relating this 
to sown area, Kritsman produced the following table, which excludes 
farms with no sown area: 
TABLE 6 
Among Farms 
Without working jvestockand with sown area 
With insufficient working livestock 
With sufficient working livestock 
With a surplus of working livestock 
Percentage of 
all sown area 
36 
14 
32 
1 8 
100 
Thus the 10 per cent of farms with a surplus of working livestock 
officially concentrated in their hands only 18 per c-e.nt of all sown 
area, but actually (assuming those with insufficient livestock used half 
of their own land, that is, 7 per cent of all sown area), the farms 
with 'excess' livestock concentrated no less than 61 per cent of all 
sown area in their hands, according to Kritsman. Relating this to 
Table 5, Kritsman argued that this same 10 per cent of farms disposed 
of 53 per cent of working livestock and held in dependence on them-
selves 74 per cent of the farms. Only 16 per cent of farms, disposing 
of 39 per cent of the working livestock and 32 per cent of the sown 
area, could be considered as independent farms, neither exploiting 
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nor exploited, ignoring the pos sibility that some of these could be 
hiring wage-labour. 
Comparing the results of the groupings by sown area and by 
working livestock, Kritsman found that of the 15 per cent of the 
.farms in the highest sown area grouping, 6 per cent had insufficient 
working livestock, around 6 per cent had sufficient working livestock 
and around 3 per cent had 'exces s ' livestock. Of the 51 per cent of 
sown area which this 15 per cent of highest sown area farms disposed 
of, more than 20 per cent belonged to farms with insufficient working 
livestock, 18 per cent to farms with sufficient working livestock and 
only 12 per cent to farms with 'excess' working livestock. In other 
words, using the technical norm of the 'loading' on livestock as an 
index for calculating access to the means of production, Kritsman was 
able to establish that the grouping by sown area did not coincide with 
the class grouping of the peasantry. He was similarly able to estab-
lish a discrepancy between the grouping by working livestock and his 
class grouping of the peas~ntry, but it was not so great as that between 
sown area and class. 
Despite the apparent power of this critique of the use of sown 
area as an index of class differentiation, Kritsman was very careful 
to point out its limitations, as a means of analysing the class structure. 
The full details of these qualifications cannot be reproduced here, but 
they show that Kritsman understood that the above analysis did not 
apply to the whole of the U.S.S.R., and that among other things he 
understood the importance of organisational forms of the unit of produc-
tion, that is, of the technical division of labour, for class analysis. 
Briefly though, he indicated that a part of those with no sown area 
q~"/ • 
could be petty bourgeois or even capitalists in other branche s of 
the economy than agriculture. -In addition, some of those without 
working livestock could be petty bourgeois or even capitalists, in 
so far as they'~re not engaged in agriculture but in market garden-
ing or viticulture (vine- growing), each of which was developed in one 
of the 6 sel'sovety being investigated. However, a horse was still 
ne~essary to them as means of transport. Some of the biggest farms 
hiring working livestock would be doing so not as exploited farms, 
and finally some (but not many) of the farms with insufficient working 
li vestock might be using tractors. On the other hand, the grouping 
introduced above defined only by the comparison of the extent of the 
farms and the extent of the working livestock, employing a general 
norm of a loading on I head of livestock which concealed class stratifi-
cation, did not catch exploitation on the basis of the hiring of stock, 
or the open exploitation on the basis of hiring day workers or time-
rate workers. Having thus made his critique of the 'banal' approach 
and established the need to use as many indices as possible, taking 
account of the specific situation in different parts of the country, 
Kritsman was in a position to examine the few detailed studies then 
available which contained pertinent information. 
He pegan with studies of individual villages. He knew of only 
one investigation containing serious material, which covered seven 
villages and five auly. It had been conducted by a commis sion of the 
South :East Bureau of the Central COmmittee of the Russian Communist 
Party. The results were published in 1924, and it will be referred 
to here as the South. East study. This was followed by a study of 
individual volosti. To illustrate the relation of these volosti to the 
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overall economy, the following map shows the gubernii in which 
most of the volosti and villages analysed by Kritsman are to be 
found. The map is taken from page 71 of Grosskopf (1976) and 
indicates the proportion of non-peasant private property in the total 
cultivated surface of Russia in 1916. This in itself provides a use-
ful pre-Re~olutionary reference point for the developments in the 
, 5 
first half of the 1920s analysed by Kritsman The map provides 
a rough indication of the extent of capitalist development before the 
Revolution in various gubernii (or provinces, as Grosskopf calls them). 
Unfortunately, it only covers European Russia 6 
The material that was used by Kritsman, then, is as 
follows: 
A. The South East Stud)t This consists of villages in the 
Don and Kuban regions of the Stavropol Gubernia and 
the Georgian Republic. 
B. The Agricultural Centre: 
(i) The Nikol'skaya Volost' in Kursk Gubernia 
(ii) The Znamenskaya Volost' and the Pavlodarskaya 
Volost', both in the Tambov Gubernia. 
C. The T ransvolga: 
The MaJotolkaevskaya Volost' in th'e' Samara Gubernia 
D. The Ukraine: 
The Shamraevskaya Volost' in the Kiev Gubernia 
E. The Industrial Centre and the N orth- West: 
(i) The Yaropolskaya Volost' in the Moscow Gubernia 
(ii) The Tsurikovskaya Volost' in the Smolensk Gubernia 
(iii) The Go:ritskaya Volost' in the Tver Gubernia 
Map 1 
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PROVINCES 
1. Arkhangelsk 
2.0lonee 
3. Vologda 
4. Pctrograd 
5. Novgorod 
6. Pskov 
7. Estonie 
8. Livonic 
9. Kourlandc 
10. Kovno 
11. Vilna 
12. Grodno 
13. Minsk 
14. Vitcbsk 
15. Miogilev 
16. Smolcnsk 
17. Kalouga 
18. Moscou 
19.~ 
20. laroslavl 
21. Vladimir 
22. Kostroma 
23. Nijegorod 
24. Viatka 
25. perm 
26. Toula 
27. Rjasan 
28.0rcl' 
29. Koursk 
30. Voron~je 
31. Tambov 
32. p;;nza-
33. Simbirsk 
34. Kazan 
35.0ura 
36. Orcnbourg 
37. Samara 
38.~ 
43. Cernigov 
44. Kicv' 
4 S Pcid'Olie 
46. Volynic 
47. Ekaterinoslav 
48. Khcrson 
49. Tauric 
50. Bcssarabic 
51. Koubane 
52. de la mcr Noirc 
53. Stavropol 
54. Ter 
55. Dagcstan 
56.I.i!lli. 
58. Baku 
59. Elizavetopol 
60. Erivan 
61. Region de Kar 
57. Koutai"{ Batoumi ct Soukhoumi) 
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(iv) The Prokshinskaya Volost' in the Pskov Gubernia 
F ... The Urals: 
The Petrovffiay aVolost' in the Bashkir Republic 
This refers to data from three former volosti 
which were combined into one, and from several 
villages of the Chelyabinsk and Perm areas. 
G. Siberia and Kazakhstan 
(i) The Shchuch' inskaya Volost' in the AkmolinSkov 
Gubernia 
(ii) The Alexandrovskaya Volost' in the Kustallid 
Gubernia 
(iii) The Tisul'skii Region of the Tofflsk Gubernia 
The Urals, Siberia and Kazakhstan are not shown on the map 
presented by Grosskopf. 
A. The South East Study 
Although this study covered only 12 villages (aul being 
the kind of village found in the Caucausus and Central Asia), Kritsman 
devoted a considerable amount of space to their analysis, on the 
already mentioned principle that examination of detailed studies could 
provide the basis for the evaluation of studies of lar ger territorial 
units. The biggest failing of the research for Kritsman was the 
arbitrary selection of reported data, for example, for some villages 
the data reported only sown area groupings, in others grouping by 
working livestock, and so on. Yet the data were quite interesting and 
relatively detailed, for example, on the decline in sown area between 
1917 and 1922, followed by a rise in 1923 to about half the 1917 sown 
area. The research report claimed that the contemporary kulak' 
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was different from the pre- revolutionary kulak in trying not to 
distinguish himself from the peasant mass. Exploitation was often 
I 
hidden in the forrn;of the ' spryaga' (a form of apparently communal 
use of implements) or 'nephew's service', and sown area registered 
as belonging to the poor in fact partly included sown area belonging 
to kulaks (for tax evasion punposes). Grouping by sown area gave 
the following picture 7 
TABLE I 
Staro-Mar'evskii Village . Percentage of Farms . 
Without Up to 2 2-4 4-10 1 0-1 6 Over 1 (:, 
sown area Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Total 
1 91 7 8.8 3.8 12.8 28.0 24.6 22.0 100.0 
1920 1 . 3 7.0 27.0 55.0 8.5 1 . 1 100.0 
1922 3 .1 20.4 37.3 38.1 1 . 1 O. , 100. , 
1923 7.0 1 3. 1 2.7 44.3 11. 3 1 .6 100.0 
Thus from 1920-1922 there was a so- called 'movement downwards' 
and from 1922-1923 an almost pure 'movement upwards' but from 
1920-1923 there was undoubtedly differentiation by sown area. 
TABLE 8 
Giagiiskii Station 8 : Percentage of Farms 
Without sown Up to .1 1-2 2-4 4-6 6-8 8-10 10-13 13-16 Over.16 
area Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. . Des. Des. Des • Total 
1917 3B.2 2.6 3.6 B.B 13.7 7.2 7.7 5: 1 5. 1 8.0 100 
1920 25.1 .B .4 B.5 20.6 1 2.1 9.B 6.2 5.3 2.0 2.0 100 
1 921 1 6.2 11 .4 10.6 25.9 11 .4 6.8 8.1 5.1 2.6 1 .9 100 
1922 1 5.6 5.6 9.3 24.1 1 8.8 11 • 7 7.1 4.6 2.0 1 .1 100 CI1 
a 
1923 15. 7 5.9 9.4 1 9. B 1 9.6 12. B 6.B 5.5 2.7 1 • B 100 N . 
TABLE 9 
: I?y3chkino Settlement . Percentage of Farms . 
Up to 1 1-4 4-10 10-19 Over 19 
Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Total \ 
\ 
1917 27.6 12.2 28.0 16.8 1 5.4 100 
1920 1 3.6 21 .4 47.4 13.7 3.9 100 
1921 1 5.4 ·49.4 30.9 2.4 1 .9 100 
1922 24.0 26.8 33.9 11 .5 3.8 100 
1923 1 3.0 24.5 29.3 23.1 1 0 • 1 100 
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In Staro-Mar1evskii the extreme groups grew only in the 
latter period. In Giagiiskii Station the same was true, although 
the growth in the lowest groups was completely insignificant. In 
Dyachkino Settlement, there was a growth only of the highest 
groups, evidently because farms without sown area were not 
distinguished from those with up to 1 dessiatine. There were no 
quantitative data on sown area for other villages, so Kritsman 
proceeded to data on the provision of working livestock uiJed by each 
farm when the farms w,ere grouped by sown area. 
TABLE 10 
Staro - Mar'evskii Village : Livestock per farm 
Without Up to 2 2-4 4-10 10-1 6 Over 16 
sown area Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. 
1 91 7 1 0.35 0.5 1 • 6 3 4.25 
1920 0.27 1 .03 2.22 3.65 4.1 
1922 0.4 0.25 0.8 1 .4 3.1 4 
1923 0.07 O •. 08 0 .. 36 . 1.9 2 2.8 
The general fall in livestock did not hit the highest groups so 
hard (those with over 4 dessiatines of sown area). A similar pattern 
was evident for Dyachkino Settlement: 
:JU'io 
TABLE 11 
Dyachkino Settlement : Livestock per farm 
Up to 1 1-4 4-10 10-19 Over 19 
Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. 
1917 0.12 0.73 2.24 3.64 6 
1920 O. 6~9 2.23 2.92 5.33 
1922 0.3 0.99 1 .' 36 1. 73 3.42 
1924 ·0.11 0.95 1.53 3.74 
This difference in the provision of working livestock weighed 
most heavily on the lowest strata of the c'Ountryside, in that the 
number of farms without livestock grew: 
TABLE I? 
Percentage of farms without working livestock 
Dyachkino Settlement Kie~skii Village Bystryanskii Khutor 
1915 11 .0 
1917 15.8 13.8 
1920 ',I' 53.9 _.1."" 
1 921 28 50.3 
1922 36 52.1 
1923 43.4 52.7 
1924 37.5 
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In Bystryanskii Khutor, the farITls without working livestock were 
alITlost entirely those with up to 4 dessiatines, and by 1923 they also 
included 42 per cent of those with between 4 and 10 dessiatines. A 
siITlilar pattern was evident in the growth of farITls without stock (instru-
ITlents of production); in Bystryanskii l)hutor 23.8 per centof farITls had 
no stock in 1917, 38 •. 5 per cent in 1922 and 41. 8 per cent in'1923. As 
with livestock, these farITls were alITlost entirely those with up to 4 
dessiatines, but also included around 40 per cent of fa rITl s between 4 
and 10 dessiatines. While such evidence ITliglit suggest that at least in 
the South East, sown area was a reasonable index of cas s differentiation 
in the early 1920s, it was only possible to decide this on the basis- of data '-on 
stock and livestock. What is ITlost clear froITl this .is the extent of clas s 
differentiation, and it was supported by other evidence. The researchers 
claiITled that the hiring of stock and livestock froITl the prosperous farITls 
was growing all the tiITle in Giagiiskii Station. This sbITletiITles occurred 
under the cover of 'neighbourly work' - the' spryaga'. In Bystryanskii 
Khutor, the percentage of farITls engaged in the 'spryaga' was as follows: 
TABLE 13 
Bystryanskii Khutor percentage of farITls with a sown area of: 
Up to 1 
Des. 
92.3 
1-4 
Des. 
187.4 
4-10 
Des. 
69.8 
10-19 
Des. 
92.7 
Over 19 
Des. 
100.0 
The ITliddle farITls engaged in the 'spryaga' least, and when 
they did so, according to the researchers, they did so with other 
middle farms, so that it bore a cooperative character, and could 
l_: 
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form the basis collective peasant agriculture. The lowest f~rms 
did so with the highest farms, when it amounted to a form of 
'9 
exploitation (a form of hiring of wage labour). There was also a 
growth of rural wage labour - for example, among the roughly 200 
households of the .Dfachkino Settlement, there were!65 batraki in 
1917, 5 in 1920, 7 in 1922 and 29 in 1924. According to the researchers, 
this was probably an underestimate, since it was hidden by both those 
hiring and by the batraki themselves. In addition, work was paid for 
by the day but there was no fixed limit to the working day, which 
meant it was a quite oppressive form of employment. The prosperous 
farms also ruled on the grain market as the following table indicates: 
TABLE 14 
Purchases and Sales of Grain Dvachkino Settlement 
Farms selling Grain Sold Farms buying Grain bought 
qrain* per farm gr~in! _____ ~er farm 
Up to.l Des. 27 24 
1 -4' Des. 22 >31 22 ' 12 
4-10 Des. 48 41 24 ' 20 
1 0-19 Des. 63 '7.8 31 11 
Over 19 Des. 100 141 25 102 
* percentages within each sown area grouping. 
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Thus the none of the farms in the lowest group sold grain, 
but more than a quarter of them bought it. Furthermore the 
percentage selling grain increased in the groups with a larger sown 
area, while the percentage buying fell on the whole among these 
highest groups. The purpose of buying among these higher sown area 
groups was in any case the resale of grain later as the following 
table shows: 
TABLE 15 
Bystryanskii Khutor : percentage of grain sold 
at different times"of the year 
In August- In October- In DecemDer-Farms September November Februarv Tgtal 
Up to 1 100 
1 .... 4 D e5 • 74 8 82* 
4-10 Des. 24 43 33 100 
10-19 Des. 8 25 66 100 
Over 19 Des. 3 15 82 100 
* there is evidently a mistake in this grouping, but it does 
not affect the overall relationship. Probably~ per cent 
was sold in December-February. 
The faltTIS with up to 4 dessiatines sold about three-quarters 
of their grain at the end of the summer at low prices} the farms with 
over 19 dessiatines sold four-fifths of their grain in the spring at 
higher prices. The prosperous also gained more benefits from coopera~ 
tion: 
Up to 1 Des. 
1 - 4 Des. 
4-10 Des. 
10-19 Des. 
Over 19 Des. 
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TABLE 16 
Dyachkino Settlement 
Number of Farms 
27 
51 
61 
48 
21 
Members of Percentage in 
Cooperative. C(lOperative 
2 
8 
20 
14 
9 
7 
1 6 
33 
29 
43 
This refers to a consumer cooperative with a membership 
fee of 5 roubles, and could be compared with~e figures provided 
by Yakovle:v in the brochure "Our Countryside'." fo 
TABLE 17 
Percentage of Farms 
Up to 1 Des. 1-4 Des. 4-10 Des. 10-19 Des. Over 19 D=s. Total 
Among 
membelB 
of coop-
ratives 4 1 5 38 26 1 7 100 
Among 
non-
membelB 16 28 26 22 8 100 
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The only contrary evidence in the South East Study was 
a remark that the poor predominated in a cooperative with a 
membership fee of rouble 50 kopecks, but no data were provid.ed .• 
The overall picture is sustained by the access of the prosperous 
to credit cooperatives: 
TABLE 18 
Dyachkino Settlement 
Number Members of per;cent Number Percen Roubles 
of . credit coop- in credit rece~ cen- per 
farms eratives coop era.:.. ing tage farm 
tive credit recei~ receiv-
ing in.9 
credit credit 
Up to 1 Des. 27 4 
1- 4 Des. 51 24 47 
4-10 Des. 61 26 43 8 1 3 74 
1 0..,.1 9 Des. 48 32 67 1 1 23 87 
Over 19 Des. 21 1 8 86 -3 14 100 
According to the researchers, the same farms were receiving 
credit who were exploiting the poor by means of the 'spryaga' 
and 'working off' (as a form of repayment). The poor in the 
credit cooperative received no credit, but 7 cases were recorded 
of credit being given to the poor by the kUlaks. There was a 
similar situation in Bystryanskii Khutor: 
Up to 1 Des. 
I 1-4 Des. 
4-10 Des. 
10-19 Des. 
Over 19 Des. 
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TABLE 19 
Bystryanskii Khutor 
Number of 
members of 
credit 
cooperative. 
1 3 
1 5 
1 5 
3 
·Number receiv-
ing credit. 
5 
5 
1 
Roubles per farm 
receiving credit 
100 
88 
50 
The prosperous farms also paid relatively less agricultural 
desscantine of sown area 
tax. In Vinodel' ny the rate of tax per i was as follows: 
TABLE 20 
Vmodel1ny Village: Agricultural Tax 
Farms of Sown area Roubles per farm 
Up to 2 Des. 5.2 
2 - 4 Des. 5.6 
4 -10 Des. 12 .1 
10 - 16 Des. 14.5 
Over 16 Des. 11. 6 
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ThUS farms with a greater sown area paid,less tax per 
dessiatine, partly because they obtained reductions due to 
a better knowledge of the law and better farm management. 
Even the Committee of Mutual Aid ran enterprises which were 
profitable for the prosperous, effectively making it a committee 
of 'self-supply'. 
The data on the Georgian countryside were quite scanty. 
The researchers had claimed that there was a growth of the 
middle type of peasantry, but this was on the basis of provi-
sion of land. They also provided the following table, showing 
that differentiation was beginning again in 1923. (It should 
be borne in mind that there was famine in 1921 in the U~S.S.R.). 
TABLE 21 
Working Livestock in Georgia percentage of farms 
Without 
Working With 1 With 2 With 3 With 4 
livestock head head head head Total 
1920 1 7.3 47.9 26.4 5.5, 2.9 100 
1922 27.9 49.3 1 9.4 2.8 0.6 100 
1923 19.1 44.9 27.4 6.3 2.3 100 
The percentage of farms without sown area in Georgia 
were 1920-5.8, 1922-6.5, 1923-3.1, so the number of (presumably 
dependent) farms grew, that is, those with a sown area but no 
working livestock. 
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Kritsman concluded his analysis of the South East 
Study by saying that despite the partial and somewhat chaotic 
nature of the data, there was no doubt that a process of (class) 
stratification of the peasantry was taking place, with the 
lowest groups in terms of sown area being transformed by 
their dependence on the highest groups, sb that they were 
working with alien means of production, and with the growth 
of rural wage labour, although its extent was not clear. I 
have Hiscussed thi~ part of Kritsman's analysis at some length 
both because it is a good example of how to ~e-work rather 
poor data and because it gives an idea of the sort of pro-
cesses taking place at village level. 
B. The Agricultural Centre 
B. (i) Nikol'skaya Volost', Kursk Gubernia 
These figures were much more systematic than the South 
East Study and all referred to the same subject of research -
the volost' .. Yet they were much less detailed, and did not 
include the farms which had been liquidated between 1917 and 
1922. This undersampling was quite significant for 1917 and 
less so for 1922. The following table compared the survey 
by Yakovlev published in 1923 with the results of the 
agricultural census: 
1917 
1920 
1922 
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TABLE 22 
Farms .E.9.I?ulation Sown Area 
Survey Census Survey Census Survey Census 
1917 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1920 119 101 103 98 119 89 
1922 126 101 109 95 120 94 
Kritsman also discussed the undersampling in terms of 
absolute figures. For this reason, Kritsman proposed to 
compare both sets of figures where possible. The survey gave 
the following distribution of farms by sown area: 
Without sown 
area 
TABLE 23 
Percentage of farms 
Up to 1 1-2 
Des. Des. 
2-4 
Des. 
4-8 
Des. 
8-13 
Des. 
Over 13 
Des. Total n 
16.5 12.5 18 23.5 20 7.5 2 100 612 
5 6 14 39.5 32 3 0.5 100 730 
4 7 15.5 42 29 2.5 100 775 
Thus the middle groupings by sown area grew. Such a result 
was, said Kritsman, usually taken to mean that a procBss of 
equalisation rather than stratification was taking place. A 
similar result appeared in a grouping by (official) 1and-
holding. However, the distribution by working livestock gave 
a somewhat different impression: 
Without working 
livestock 
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With 1 
head 
TABLE 24 
With 2 
head 
With 3 
head 
With 4 
head 
With 5 head Total 
and more 
1917 24 36 26 9.5 2.5 2 100 
1920 19;5 
22.5 
57.5 
64 
18.5 4 0.5 o 100 
1922 12.5 1 o o 100 
However, the actual meaning of these tables was only 
possible if one compared them (the figures in brackets are 
those from the agricultural census): 
TABLE 25 
Percentage of farms 
Excess of farms 
Without Without Without working without working Hiring livestock over land sown area livestock farms without horses 
sown area 
1917 6 17 (10) 24 (18) 7 ( 8 ) 8 
1920 0.6 ,-5 19.5 14.5 15 
1922 0.4 4 22.5 18.5 26 
While there was a steady decline in the proportion of farms 
without land or sown area, after 1920 there was an increase in 
the percentage of farms without working livestock. In addition 
there was a steady increase in the percentage of farms hiring 
horses. Kritsman calculated that the number of farms hiring 
horses was directly proportional to the excess of farms without 
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working livestock over farms without sown area, so the 
hiring of horses was clearly a direct economic necessity 
for those farms with a sown axea but no livestock. Not only 
horseless farms hired horses, as could be seen from the 1922 
figures. Often they were hired by one-horse farms because of 
some mis10rtune, such as the horse being ill. The main con-
clusion which Kritsman drew from this data·was that in '1917 
farms without livestock did not sow, that is did not conduct 
their farming, but in 1920 and especially in 1922, they did 
conduct their farm with alien working livestock. The acute-
ness of the change between 1917 and 1920 showed that this process 
of hidden transition of farms to an essentially proletarian state 
took place to a significant degree during "War Communism". 
It was impossible to forget that simultaneously with the 
growth in such hidden forms of capitalist exploitation went 
the decline in open forms, so that with the transition to the 
NEP the extent of capitalist exploitation was not very great. 
It was possible to estimate this by the number of farms with-
out working livestock. The transformation of more small 
farms into capit~list Dnes doubtless took place in connection with 
the lowering (economically) of those very farms possessing 
means of production. With the sharpening of competition, 
this phenomenon would doubtless begin to disappear. The 
farms with a small sown area were predominant in hiring 
horses: 
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TABLE 26 
Percentage of farms within each sown area grouping who hired horses 
Without sown 
area 
20 
Up to 1 
Des·. 
58 
(1922) 
1-2 
Des. 
33 
2-4 
Des. 
19 
4-10 
Des. 
12 
Over 10 
Des. 
This picture was confirmed by the data on stock, the 
other main means of production: 
Without stock 
1917 168 
1920 168 
1922 172 
TABLE 27 
Number of farms 
Excess of those 
without stock 
over those 
without sown 
area 
67 
132 
141 
Renting ploughs, 
sokhi and 
harrows 
34 
94 
118 
Again-the hiring of implements was proportional to the 
excess of farms without stock over farms without sown are~ so 
the hiring of stock was evidently necessary for those farms 
with a sown area but no implements. This was confirmed by 
the following data showing that farms with little sown area 
were the ones hiring implements: 
)",1 
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TABLE 28 
Percentages of farms renting stock 
1917 
1922 
Without some area 
or with up to 2 Des 
7 
33 
With sown area 
over 2 Des. 
5 
9 
Thus the basic forms of dependence of the weak on the 
prosperous farms were the hiring of horses and the renting of 
stock, although this dependence was covered by the use among 
the peasants themselves of the terms 'family', 'friendly' or 
'neighbourly' help. 
There was also clear evidence of changes in the hiring 
of wage labour (in open form): 
TABLE 29 
Number of farms hiring 
Time-Rate Day and 
Workers Piece-Rate Total Workers 
1917 17 13 30 
1920 7 18 25 
1922 3 31 34 
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Parallel to the decline in time-rate workers was the 
increase in day and piece-rate workers, yet official statistics 
only 'recorded time-rate workers. (Presumably this is why it 
appeared to Shanin to be next to nil, although in percentage 
terms the figure for this volost' was still pretty low). 
The number of farms engaged in the so-called 'promysly' grew. 
There were 126 farms in 1917, 114 in 1920 and 148 in 1922. 
(The term 'promysly' is usually translated as 'handicrafts 
and trades'.) The extreme sown area groups above all were 
engaged in 'promysly': 
TABLE 30 
Percentage of farms with 'domestic promvs~' 
within each sown area group 
Without sown 
area 
60 
Up to 1 
Des. 
28 
1-2 
Des. 
22 
2-6 
Des. 
15 
6-10 
Des. 
20 
10-13 
Des. 
50 
K±itsman concluded that these 'promysly' indicated the 
growth in the sale by the poor of their labour power.ll Of 
25 farms renting out their land in 1922, 19 had no livestock. 
In contrast, 232 farms (29 per cent of all farms) since the 
Revolution had constructed new buildings or made capital 
repairs to the old, all the more striking in an area without 
wood, which implies that such repairs or constructions required 
the purchase of at least the materials. The prosperous farms 
sold proportionately more grain: 
Without sown 
area 
13 
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TABLE 31 
Percentage of farms selling grain 
within each sown area group 
Up to 4 
Des. 
18 
4-8 
Des. 
26 
8-10 
Des. 
33 
10-13 
Des. 
50 
The research report also claimed that the tax in kind 
particularly hit the weakest farms, unlike the razverstka 
(requisition) system of the old economic policy. During "War 
Communism" the president of the sel'sovet was usually a poor or 
middle peasant, according to the report, whereas under the 
NEP it was usually a prosperous peasant. To sum up the study 
of Nikol'skaya Volost', Kritsman argued that the years 1920-
1923 showed an indubitable process of proletarianisation (an 
increase in the proportion of farms without stock or livestock) 
and an increase in work with alien livestock and agricultural 
implements (so that the means of production were in essence 
being used as capital). This was a process of class stratification 
of the peasantry, at the same time as the grouping by sown area 
showed a sharp decline in the extreme groups, that -is, an 
equalisation. 
B. (ii)a. Znamenskaya Volost'. Tambov Gubernia 
This study, like the preceding one, was conducted by 
Yakovlev and published in 1924. It was free from the under-
s~mpling error of the previous study and was more systematic, 
if less detailed. The sown area grouping gave the following 
1920 
1923 
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stratification: 
TABLE 32 
Percentage of farms with a sown area of 
Without sown area 
and up to 0.1 Des. 
2.1 
5.7 
0.1-2 2-4 4-6 
Des. Des. Des. 
6-10 10-16 16-25 
Des. Des. Des. 
17.1 31.0 29.1 20.1 0.6 o 
17.9 25.8 23.8 22.1 4.2 0.5 
Total 
100 
100 
Even using the criterion of sown area, the stratification 
process was more intense than this table indicates, Kritsman 
argued. He supported this claim by showing the proportion 
of the total sown area held by each sown area grouping, as 
well as the population in each sown area grouping. This is 
not reproduced here, but the population was, as Kritsman 
argues, concentrated in the smallest sown area groupings, and ' 
the total sown area of the smaller farms fell, even though the 
number of such farms grew. In my view, this is hardly compatible 
with Chayanov's biological life cycle explanation of rural 
differentation, although there was a population increase among 
the highest sown area farms (over 10 dessiatines). The average 
sbwn area per farm changed as follows: 
TABLE 33 
Average Sown Area per farm (in dessiatines) within each sown 
1920 
1923 
0.1-2 
Des. 
1.21 
1. 03 
2-4 
Des. 
2.91 
2.89 
area group 
4-6 
Des. 
4.60 
4.82 
6-10 
Des. 
7.13 
7.38 
10-16 
Des. 
11.25 
11. 28 
16-25 
Des. 
19.00 
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At the same time there was, especially among the 
bourgeois peasantry, a fall in the old "large families" and 
the establishment of a family of bourgeois type, as the following 
table shows: 
TABLE 34 
Average family size per farm, within 
each sown area group 
Without sown 0.1-2 2-4 4-6 6-10 10-16 16-25 
area and up to 0.1 Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. 
1920 4.3 3.8 4.5 6.3 8.9 13.7 
1923 4.2 4.1 4.5 5.6 7.0 7.7 11.7 
This indicated a complete change in the character of the 
sown area groups, as could be seen from changes in the sown 
area per person within each sown area group: 
1920 
1923 
TABLE 35 
Changes in sown area per person (in dessiatines), 
within each sown area group 
0.1-2 
Des. 
0.32 
0.25 
2-4 
Des. 
0.65 
0.64 
4-6 
Des. 
0.73 
0.86 
6-10 
Des. 
0.80 
1.05 
10-16 
Des. 
0.82 
1.46 
16-25 
Des. 
1.62 
Kritsman argued that this was a whole revolution. The 
difference between the average sown area per person in the .lowest 
and highest groups changed from 2} times in 1920 to 6} times 
in 1923. The commodity character of the highest groups was 
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indicated by the fact that in them were concentrated the 
special crops, as was evident in the case of flax: 
TABLE 36 
Distribution of farms, total sown area and 
flax production 
Farms 
Total Sown Area 
Flax Production 
Without sown 
area and 
Up to 2 Des. 
24 
4 
o 
2-6 
Des. 
49 
44 
32 
6-10 Over 10 
Des. . Des. 
22 5 
38 14 
43 25 
Total 
100 
100 
100 
The highest sown area groups also predominated in terms of 
productive livestock: 
TABLE 37 
Percentage of farms, population, sown area and 
livestock, within lack sown area group for 1920 and 1923* 
Young 
Farms Population Sown Pigs Horned Grown Area Live- Sheep 
stock 
ithout sown area 1920 19.2 12.6 5.2 25.0 25.0 5.1 
nd up to 2 Des. 1923 23.6 18.0 4.3 15.4 13.2 7.4 
2-6 Des. 1920 60.1 55.4 56.9 50.0 50.0 55.1 
1923 49.6 46.1 44.1 19.2 43.9 38.0 
6-10 Des. 1920 20.1 30.6 36.2 25.0 25.0 38.0 
1923 22.1 28.6 38.0 34.6 33.7 41.5 
Over 10 Des. 1920 0.6 1.4 1.7 0 0 1.4 
1923 4.7 7.3 13.6 30.8 9.2 13.1 
* each column for each year sums to 100 per cent. 
Cows 
13.7 
16.1 
60.8 
47.9 
24.6 
28.3 
0.9 
7.7 
1920 
1923 
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However, Kritsman also attempted his usual comparison 
of farms without sown area and farms without livestock: 
TABLE 38 
Percentage of farms 
Without working Excess of those without Without sown 
working livestock over those 
area livestock 
without sown area 
2.1 29.9 27.8 
S.7 Sl.2 4S.S 
This indicated that there was a colossal growth in the 
number of farms being run with alien working livestock. The 
loss of working livestock was borne primarily by the lowest 
sown area groups: 
1920 
1923 
TABLE 39 
Percentage of farms without working livestock, 
within each sown area group 
Without sown area 
and up to 0.1 Des. 
8S.7 
97.4 
0.1-2 
Des. 
67.S 
91.1 
2-4 
Des. 
37.7 
69.7 
4-6 
Des. 
13.8 
34.1 
6-10 
Des. 
4.S 
lS.l 
Over 10 
Des. 
The same process was indicated by the number of working 
horses per farm (not reproduced here), but the evidence of class 
differentiation in terms of stock was not so clear: in 1920 
37.1 per cent of farms had no stock at all, as against 37.7 in 
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1923. Similarly for complex machinery, 86.8 per cent of the 
farms had none in 1920, as against 89.6 per cent in 1923. 
However, the stock tended over the three years to become 
concentrated in the highest sown area groups. Kritsman showed 
this in various tables, but I have chosen one which compares 
working horses with ploughs and complex machinery in percentage 
terms, which makes it comparable with Table 37: 
TABLE 40 
Percentage of working horses, ploughs and complex machinery, 
within each sown area group for 1920 and 1923* 
Working horses Ploughs Complex Machinery 
Without sown area 1920 7.1 3.1 4.2 
and up to 2 Des. 1923 3.3 1.5 0 
2-6 Des. 1920 57.6 47.3 38.9 
1923 44.5 31.6 13.2 
6-10 Des. 1920 33.3 47.3 52.1 
1923 39.0 47.8 53.8 
Over 10 Des. 1920 2.0 2 .. 3 4.8 
1923 13.2 19.1 33.0 
* each column for each year sums to 100 per cent 
These figures seem to corroborate the analysis of the 
distribution of stock and livestock by Grosskopf based on figures 
referring to the overall economy. Kritsman summarised these 
results as follows: the lowest sown area groups (up to 2 
dessiatines) had lost a little sown area, but a great.deal of 
stock and livestock, and were thus usi~g alien means of production. 
The middle groups (2-6 dessiatines) had lost sown area, but 
1920 
1923 
Percen-
tage 
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this had been offset by the decline in the number of farms 
and in population; however the loss of stock had been much 
greater than the loss of sown area. In the group from 
6-10 dessiatines, the position was not definite. The 
highest group (over 10 dessiatines) had a concentration, 
not only of sown area (officially), but also stock and 
livestock. The data did not allow the grouping by livestock, 
nor the comparison of the extent of the farms (sown area) 
with the extent of means of production. But if one 
proceeded from the number of farms without working live-
stock and from the average sown area per farm within each 
sown area group, it was possible to estimate the sown area 
of farms without livestock: 
TABLE 41 
Estimate of the sown area of farms without livestock 
(a) as a 
Sown area percentage of 
in Des. total sown 
area 
(a) (b) 
487 l8~ 
913 31 
+ 87 
Excess of no. of 
farms without 
livestock over 
no. of farms 
without sown 
area 
(c} 
186 
314 
+ 69 
(c) as a 
percentage of 
total no. of 
farms 
(d) 
28 
46 
increase 
Thus the number of farms being run without working livestock 
grew, but their sown area grew more quickly and the capitalist farms 
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in this way held in their hands almost half the farms with 
almost one third of the sown area. Farms with insufficient 
livestock were not counted in this calculation, nor were farms 
with no stock or not enough stock, nor, finally, were the 
open forms of capitalist exploitation (day and time-rate 
labour). On the basis of this picture of concentration of 
the means of production in the highest sown area groups, 
Kritsman used the data available to describe the inter~ 
relations between the groups. 
Between 1920 and 1923, over 8 per cent of the farms 
emigrated or were liquidated; two-thirds of these farms in 
1920 had no horses, and four-fifths of them had no stock. 
The same could be seen from the sown area groupings: 
TABLE 42 
Percentage of farms which emigrated or became extinct, 1920-1923 
Without sown Up to 2 2-4 4-6 6-10 10-16 
area Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. 
86 23 6 1.S 0.8* 0 
* this is an estimate since the figure given is 'less 
than l' 
The farms without sown area in 1920 had almost fully 
disappeared during the three years, and since the number of 
such farms almost trebled up to 1923 (see Table 32) this was 
because of other farms losing their sown area. Farms without 
means of production were compelled to rent it: Eighty per 
cent of farms hiring horses were horseless farms, or to put 
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it another way, 67 per cent of all horseless farms hired 
livestock of some kind (74 per cent if one excluded farms 
without sown area wh£ch were effectively not being run as 
farms) .'" Of the remaining horseless farms (these not hiring 
stock) most ploughed by some other means: cow, bullock, 
pulling a scraper by hand, or harnessing themselves' to the 
plough. Clearly t,hese 'independent' farms were ones which 
could find no buyer for their labour power. The renting 
of stock showed a similar pattern: of those renting stock, 
73 per cent were horseless farms, and 27 per cent were farms 
with horses. After a critique of a table showing the hiring 
of stock, livestock and workers according to a conventional 
definition of poor, middle and prosperous peasants (bednyaki, 
serednyaki, zazhitochnYe), a critique which showed that the 
peasant running his own farm was one step from giving it up 
and renting out the land, Kritsman examined the renting of 
land for arable or fodder purposes: 
TABLE 43 
Renting of land, by sown area groups 
Up to 2 2-6 6-10 Over 10 Total Des. Des. Des. Des. 
Farms 24 49 22 5 100 
Sown Area 4 44 38 14 100 
Rented Arable Land 1 28 47 24 100 
Rented Haymaking Land a 19 48 33 100 
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Thus the farms with highest sown area were renting 
in extra land, particularly for haymaking. All farms over 
10 dessiatines were renting extra land, as were 77.6 per 
cent of farms between 6 and 10 dessiatines. Even state 
land was being rented by the peasants, and between one-third 
and one half of the weakest farms were renting out land, 
that is, no less than 15 per cent of all farms. 
There were no data on wage-labouT, but data were 
available on the so-called 'promysly'. The number of 
farms engaged in 'promysly' declined slightly between 1920 
and 1923; in percentage points the decline was from 22.2 
per cent to 20.9 per cent. However, closer examination 
revealed a different aspect to this decline: 
TABLE 44 
Farms with 'Erom'ysl~' 
Without 
sown 
area 
and up Up Overall 
to 0.1 to 2 2-4 4-6 6-10 10-16 Percen-
Des. ,Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Total taqe 
Number 1920 7 43 46 33 19 0 148 22.2 
of 
farms 1 923 37 53 25 14 14 144 20.9 
Percen- 1920 50 38 22 1 7 14 22.2 
tage of 
farms 1 923 95 43 1 4 9 9 3 20.9 
Percen- 1920 42 36 21 1 3 6 1 6.2 
tage of 
men 
working 
in 1923 83 45 14 6 6 2 1 6.4 
it. promysly' 
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Thus 'promysly' were not 'trades and crafts' in the 
sense in applicable to an 'independent' farm. The 
highest sown area farms were most engaged in special crop 
production (see Table 36), yet their commitment to 'promysly' 
declined, and the percentage of male workers engaged in 
'promysly' rose dramatically ~mong the lowest sown area 
groups. Kritsman does not say so in so many words, but it 
is reasonable 'to conclude that this was a hidden form of 
wage-labour. 
The prosperous farms also made most use of co-operation: 
TABLE 45 
Farm membershiQ of co-oQeratives in 1923* 
Without 
sown 
area 
and up Overall 
to 0.1 0.1 -2 2-4 4-6 6-10 1 0-1 6 16-25 Perc en-
Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Total ~e 
Number 
of farms 
in co- 7 1 6 29 74 11 6 29 4 275 
operatives 
Percen-
tage of 
all farms 2.5 6 10.5 27 42 1 0.5 1 .5 100 
in co-
operatives 
Percen-
tage of 
all farms 
within 1 8 1 3 1 6 45 76 100 100 40 
sown area 
grouQ 
*Distribution 
of farms 8 25.5 36 21 .5 9 0 0 100 not in co-
operatives 
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The highest sown area groups (over 10 dessiatines) 
were all members of co-operatives. Although only 5 per 
cent of all farms, they were 12 per cent of co-operative 
members. Comparing the middle row with the distribution 
of farms not in co-operatives, it was clear that mQre than 
half the co-operative members had a sown area of over 6 
dessiatines, whereas almost 70 per cent of the non-members 
had less than 4 dessiatines. The research report claimed 
that these co-operatives were only used as a cover for the 
large-scale peasants to rent government land. The poor 
peasants! share in these co-operatives were de facto the 
property of their rich relatives, according to the research 
report. Deliveries at the local railway station for one 
co-operative, for example, were not transported to the 
village co-operatively. Each farm had to transport its own 
se~loan from the station for itself. No-one, not even a 
relative, carried the seed free to any horseless farm. 
The transport charges were quite high. Similarly in the 
autumn each farm had to carry away its own harvest 
independently. The attitude of the peasants not entering 
co-operatives (due to poverty) to the agricultural 
co-operatives was very hostile. Sometimes wage-labourers 
were described by those hiring them as members of the 
artel'. However, some of the artelv were typically 
composed of serednyaki. The prosperous also used the 
Committees of Mutual Aid, and predominated among the 
leadership. These committees only helped themselves and 
were composed of those who needed no help. Only those who 
could provide shoes and clothes for their children sent 
them to school. Even the tax burden fell most heavily on 
the poor, since they paid tax on the harvest they paid to 
those who had ploughed their land, or on the harvest of 
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the land they had rented out, whereas the larger farms 
renting the land, who disposed of the harvest, paid no tax 
on it. 
In general the analysis of Znamenskaya Volost'confirmed 
the analysis of the data from the other region~. Hence 
the stratification of the peasantry took place significantly 
more quickly than could be judged from the movemente in the 
percentages of the extreme sown area groupings. This 
circumstance was not surprising for the grouping was 
produced on the basis of data of sown area of 'onss own' 
farm juridic ally., and not in the economic sense of sown 
area, and hence were consciously distorted by the population. 
B (ii) b. Pavlodarskaya Volost', Tambov Gubernia 
This analysis was based on a report by G. Dronin, 
published in 1923, and suffered from the same problem as 
the Nikol'skaya Volost'. It counted only farms existing 
in 1922 and did not count farms which had been liquidated 
in 1922. For 1917 this undersampling comprised 11.4 per 
cent of all farms, and 10.8 per cent of the population. 
The significance of this for the weak farms could be seen 
by comparing their distribution on various indices in the 
survey with their distribution infue agricultural census: 
TABLE 46 
Percentages of farms in 1917 
Without Without 
sown working 
area livestock 
Survey 4.5 21 .4 
Census 13.5 33.5 
Without 
cows 
12.5 
24.3 
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The sown area grouping showed the following changes: 
TABLE 47 
Percentages of farms with sown area 
Without 
sown Up to 1 -2 2-4 4-7 7-10 10-15 Over 
area 1 Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. 15 Des. Total 
191 7 4.5 7.0 18.0 32.9 22.5 9.4 3.5 2.2 100 
1920 3.0 3.5 17.3 42.2 28.0 5.3 0.7 100 
1922 3.4 6.2 18.4 36.1 27.4 6.6 1 .8 1 .0 100 
Evidently there was an equalisation from 1917 to 1920 
and stratification from 1920 to 1922, but the grouping by 
working livestock bore a different character: 
TABLE 48 
Percentage of farms with working livestock 
Without With 4 
working With 1 With 2 With 3 horses 
livestock horse horses horses and more Total 
1 91 7 21 .4 43.3 27.7 5.3 2.3 100 
1920 36.3 49.4 1 3.0 1 .2 0.3 100 
1922 49.3 46.4 4.2 0.1 100 
The volost' suffered quite a lot in 1920-1921 from 
banditry which killed off a significant part of the working 
a nd oth er livestock. 
TABLE 49 
Distribution of stock among farms:percentages 
191 7 
1920 
1922 
Without With 
any Without sokha &, 
agricultural plough without 
stock or sokha plough 
23.8 
29.2 
33.0 
3.5 
4.9 
8 .1 
29.9 
27.1 
23.1 
With 
plough &, 
without 
sokha 
6.9 
9.7 
1 o. 1 
With 
plough 
and 
sokha 
35.9-
29.1 
25.7 
Total 
100 
100 
100 
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Judging by these groupings there was a general process 
of impoverishment. (The sokha was a kind of wooden plough). 
Kritsman tried to show the actual situation by comparing 
farms without sown area, farms without stock, and farms 
without livestock. 
1 91 7 
1920 
1922 
TABLE 50 
Percentages of farms 
Excess of 
farms 
wi thout 
livestock or 
over farms 
Without Without without sown 
sown working area 
area livestock 
4.5 21 .4 1 6.9 
(13.5) ( 33.5 ) (20.0) 
3.0 36.3 33.3 
3.4 49.3 45.9 
Excess of 
farms 
without 
sokha or 
Without plough 
sokha over farms 
or without sown 
Qlough* area 
27.3 22.B 
34.1 31 • 1 
41 .1 37.7 
*This appears to be columns 1 and 2 of Table 49 a dded 
together 
There was thus a clear and quite significant grow~h in 
farms without stock or livestock which were nevertheless 
running as farms. The figures in brackets were those of the 
agricultural census, so the effects of undersampling were 
not too great in this respect. Kritsman drew attention to 
the difference between the corr.pulsory use of means of 
production by the poor in the early post-Revolutionary years 
and the later, dependent use of stock and livestock. However, 
the compulsion had not been heavy in the early years since 
many of the poor were at the front. There was only anecdotal 
evidence in the report on the hiring of livestock and stock, 
but apparently the conditions for doing so were burdensome. 
The peasantry were concentrating on repair and construction 
work on their own farms, despite the lack of wooden materials. 
Kritsman pointed out that the horseless farms could not be 
bringing the wood, and were giving themselves into servitude 
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in buying ready-made constructions. The report mentioned 
the development of renting land of up to 9, 13 and even 
18 dessiatines and said "The conditions of exploitation of 
labour and of renting land out of the state funds and from 
the sovkhozy favour the process of growth of a new bourgeoisie 
•.•.•• at the expense of the Soviet state and the poor." 
The report claimed that those hanging on to farms did so 
because there was not enough work outside the farm, and that 
this process could not last for long. While not objecting 
to this as the reason for the poor staying on their farms, 
Kritsman pointed out that the situation was that the poor 
were running their farms with alien means of production, 
a hidden form of proletarianisation which accounted for 
the relatively few farms without sown area, and which 
showed why this state of affairs could be a long-lasting 
one. 
ThePa0~ddarskaya Volost' research was interesting 
because it gave the chance to compare the groupings by 
sown area, working livestock and stock with the general 
grouping by wealth which it also used. The wealth groups 
were defined as follows, with Kritsman's p~nctuation: 
"(1) Prosperous - those with full (7) presence of livestock, 
both working and productive (!),and with a male work 
force and agricultural stock. 
(2) Middle - those with a partial (7) presence of the 
above 
(3) Weak - those with a lack of working livestock, a small 
quantity of productive livestock and a decline (7) in 
agricultural stock. 'Promysly', as a rare phenomenon, 
is only taken into account in the volost' when the 
degree of prosperity depends on it." 
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This definition of degree of wealth gave the following 
results: 
TABLE 51 
Percentage of farms 
Prosperous Middle Weak Total 
191 7 23 47.2 29.8 100 
1922 4.5 38.2 57.3 100 
The effects of this theoretical vagueness were shown 
by Kritsman by comparing the percentages of 'weak' farms 
with other relevant indices: 
TABLE 52 
Comparison of percentages of farms 
Without Without 
sown sown 
Without area area and 
Without plough Without and up up to 4 
working or sown to 2 Des. 
Weak livestock sokha area Des. 
191'7 29.8 21 .4 27.3 4.5 29.5 62.4 
1922 57.3 49.3 41 .1 3.4 28.0 64.1 
Neither the farms without horses nor those without 
stock exhausted the number of weak farms dependent on other 
farms, which apparently included those farms with stock but 
without livestock, and vice versa. In 1917 the lack of 
stock seemed fundamental, but in 1922 it was the lack of 
livestock which placed the weak in great dependence on 
the more powerful households (the impossibility not only of 
cultivating the land, but also of transport both of produce 
and of things bought in). The comparison showed that neither 
in 1917 nor in 1922 did the number without sown area correspond 
to the weak, but if in 1917 those with no sown area or up 
to 2 dessiatines roughly corresponded to the weak, then in 
1922 it was those with up to 4 dessiatines. In other words, 
those sowing 2-4 dessiatines had changed from petty-bourgeois 
to proletarian farms (although hidden). 
536. 
On the basis of a similar comparison for the prosperous, 
Kritsman concluded that if in 1917 not all two horse farms 
were prosperous, 
were prosperous. 
in 1922 all farms with two or more horses 
In 1917 most farms with a plough and 
sokha were prosperous, but in 1922 this was not enough to 
be prosperous. It was more difficult to draw conclusions 
about the middle peasants; in 1917 they roughly coincided 
with the numbers owning one horse, whereas in 1922 some of 
those with one horse (evidently those lacking stock) were 
weak. At the sams time there was an increase in the 
proportion of middle farms with a plough and sokha by 1922, 
and their sown area also increased. This raised doubts 
about the definition of middle farms: the partial presence 
of necessary means of production could mean that they were 
insufficient in the means of production, that is, weak farms. 
In addition, a small quantity of productive livestock (yet 
with the necessary means of production) could mean that they 
were actually middle farms in the sense of independent but 
not exploiting. Yet despite all the inadequacies of the 
data on the Pavlodarskaya Volost', it showed the same process 
of stratification as the more detailed data collected 
earlier. 
c. The Transvolga 
Malotolkaevskaya Volost', Samara Gubernia 
Tijis was based on a report by M. Prokontsev, published 
in 1923. The data on this volost' were very scanty. There 
was 22 per cent undersampling of farms in 1917, and 30 per 
cent in 1920. The volost' had undergone famine and from 1920 
to 1922 lost almost half its working horses, two-fifths of 
its cows, almost three-quarters of its sheep, more than 
90 per cent of its pigs, and one quarter of its ploughs 
and machines. The sown area grouping gave the following 
results: 
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TABLE 53 
Percentage of farms with a sown area of 
Without Over 
sown Up to 1 -3 3-5 5-7 7-1 0 1 0-1 5 1 5 
area 1 Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Total 
1 91 7 1 6 26 25 1 9 12 6 5 100 
1920 2 1 3 44 26 1 0 4 100 
1922 4 1 9 50 19 6 2 0 100 
This showed an apparent overall decline in sown area. 
Other groupings were not produced by the survey, unfortunatel~ 
but there was a comparison of the number of farms, working 
horses and agricultural stock: 
TABLE 54 
Number of farms'~£Eki~horses and~ricultural stock 
191 7 
1920 
1922 
Farms 
889 
997 
1054 
Working 
Horses 
2040 
1553 
784 
Ploughs 
927 
947 
703 
Agricultural 
Mach iner.v 
830 
857 
596 
Clearly a significant part of the peasantry in 1922 
conducted their farms0ith the help of alien working horses 
and agricultural stock. In particular it was noted that the 
report said that for ploughing two or more horses were 
harnessed together (the ploughs were two-horsed, the soil 
was solid). In 1922, almost half the farms had no working 
livestock, as the following table showed. 
TABLE 55 
Distribution of farms, livestock and stock in 1922 
Number of 
working 
Farms horses Ploughs Machines 
Prosperous 157 297 209 258 
Middle 419 416 670 287 
Weak 478 J1 124 51 
Total 1054 784 1003 596 
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This suggests that the 1922 figure for ploughs in 
Table 54 should be 1,003, but there are few misprints in 
this work. The table demonstrated that around 410 (weak) 
farms had no working livestock (that is, around 39 per cent 
of farms), and about 354 had no ploughs (of whom 41 had no 
sown area). Kritsman paid no other attention to the 
grouping by wealth because it Was not shown in the report 
how th~ categories Were defined. The report claimed that 
the costs to the poor of hiring livestock were extraordinarily 
high, but the prosperous paid a low rent to the poor who 
rented out land to them. It also claimed that the poor, 
not having the strength to cope with the land which 
remained after the distribution according to the number 
(in the family), were compelled to give their allotment to 
peasants with horses and stock, either for rent or for 
cultivation. The poor often worked as day workers not 
because they needed to, but to 'work off' (as a way of 
paying for) the use of horses, stock, seed grain and other 
things. The prosperous parts of the peasantry often bought 
horses in Siberia. The following data on the interrelation 
of time-rate and day workers was interesting: 
TABLE 56 
The hire of workers 
Time-rate Day-rate 
in person-months in person-months 
1 91 7 635 519 
1922 41 483 
Time-rate working had almost been extinguished, but 
day working had hardly diminished, being used during 
harvesting and threshing. The count of hired labour, 
especially day workers, was without doubt not complete in 
1922 (and was far from full for day workers in 1917) but it 
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did express the change in the hiring of time-rate workers. 
If it was counted in person-months (at 25 working days in a 
month) then the open hiring of labour on a daily basis was 
3 per cent in 1917 and 32 per cent in 1922. 
D. The Ukraine 
Shamraevskaya Volost', Kiev Gubernia 
Thls analysis was based on a report by Z. Tsybul'skii, 
published in 1923. There was no undersampling, compared to 
the agricultural census. It was correctly remarked in the 
report that Kiev Gubernia was the region of the sugar 
industry, which had a great influence on the peasant 
economy. In the town of Shamraevka itself there was a 
sugar factory which was starting to have an economic 
relation with the peasantry. Nevertheless, there was not 
a sound on the sown area of sugar beet or its distribution 
in the report. There was the same banal sown area grouping 
without understanding that the sown area of beetroot was 
the determinant feature of a sugar beet region. The sown 
area grouping gave the following picture of equalisation, 
slowing down in the period 1920-1922: 
TABLE 51 
Percentage of farms with sown area of 
Without From 
sown Up to '.1._1 1 -2 2-3 3-5 5-B Over B • 2 
area t Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Total 
1 91 7 10. B 5.9 14.B 39.4 15.4 11 2.2 0.5 100 
1920 3.7 2.9 15.2 49.4 17.4 9.B 1 .5 0.1 100 
1922 3.B 2.9 1 7. 7 4B 17 9.2 1 . 3 O. 1 100 
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The grouping by working livestock bore a similar 
character: 
TABLE 58 
Percentage of farms with working livestock of 
Without 
working With With With With 
livestock 1 head 2 head 3 head 4 head Total 
191 7 46 8 43 2 100 
1920 45 14 38 1 . 5 1.5 100 
1922 49 28 22 0 0 99 
On stock there Was only the following data: 
TABLE 52-
Percentage of farms with stock 
Without 
any Without With 
stock plough plough Total 
1 91 7 50 20.3 29.7 100 
1920 54.2 20.8 25 100 
1922 55.4 21 .6 23 100 
Thus in 1922 all ploughs were concentrated in the 
hands of less than one quarter of the farms. The comparison 
of farms without sown area, without livestock and without 
ploughs gave the following results: 
1917 
1920 
1922 
TABLE 60 
Percentage of farms 
Without Without 
Excess of 
farms without 
working live-
stock over 
farms without 
sown area 
sown 
area 
10.8 
3.7 
3.8 
working 
livestock 
46 
45 
49 
35.2 
41 .3 
45.2 
Without 
ploughs 
70.3 
75.0 
77.0 
Excess of 
farms without 
plough over 
farms without 
sown area 
59.5 
71 .3 
73.2 
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Apparently almost half the farms were running without 
" 
working livestock, but the report produced no data on this. 
The following comparison indicated the hiring of stock: 
TABLE 61 
Percentage of farms 
Excess of 
farms without 
ploughs over Renting in Without 
Without farms without agricultural working 
ploughs sown area stock livestock 
191 7 70.3 59.5 51 .3 46 
1920 75.0 71 .3 63.8 45 
1922 77.0 73.2 76.4 49 
The percentage of farms renting in stock was colossal 
and grew in proportion with the excess of farms without 
ploughs over the per cent without sown area, showing that 
it was an economic necessity. Even some of the farms with 
wo~king livestock rented in stock - in fact, more than half 
of them in 1922. The report said that the one-horse peasant 
was a serednyak (middle peasant) of a new type who was 
trying to move into the ipresent-day serednYaki', and 
supported the latter (the two horse peasant). He lived 
in friendship with the 'present-day seredn~' for he used 
(for a 'working off' payment, of course) a plough, a 
cultivator and a chaff-cutter. Kritsman pointed out that 
since no farms had more than two horses in 1922, the 'present-
day serednvak' with two horses disposed of almost two-thirds 
of the horses, although they were only one quarter of the 
farms. One had to look among them for those who were 
exploiting to some degree or other, three-quarters of the 
peasantry. The political effects of this were, according 
to the report, that the one-horse peasant felt himself 
strong, fearing neither the horseless peasant nor the local 
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powers, and together with the two-horse peasants ran the 
village. 
There was also a grouping by wealth in the report 
(weak, prosperous, middle) which showed how careful one 
must be with such a grouping. Among the 'weak' were 
133 farms with two horses, almost half the two-h6rse farms. 
The report then excluded them on the grounds that they were 
middle peasants! The report sai~ that the peasants 
themselves considered the two-horse peasants as middle 
peasants. 
E. The Industrial Centre and North West 
E (i) Yaropol'skava Volost'. Moscow Gubernia 
The data on both these industrial regions were quite 
unsatisfactory and took no account of the influence on the 
class stratification of the peasantry of the basic features 
of these regions: industrial crops, livestock rearing and 
the non-agricultural occupations of the peasantry. The 
most detailed data were those on Yaropol'skaya Volost', 
largely thanks to the fact that two investigations were 
conducted. The first, in 1922, was by P. Gurov and was 
published in 1923. The second, in 1924, was by F. Kretov 
and was published in 1925. It was only possible to 
compare them in rare cases, since the first contained data 
on 1917, 1920 and 1922, while the second concerned 
predominantly 1915, 1923 and 1924 (and rinly sometimes 1912, 
1920 and 1922). Besides each author tended to remain 
silent on the issues discussed by the other. The earlier 
1922 investigation only counted farms existing in 1922, 
excluding farms liquidated between 1917 and 1922, but 
undersampling was only 6 per cent for 1917, 1920 and 1922. /2 
For this reason the comparison of the number of farms and 
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sown area in 1917, and the number of farms and working 
livestock for 1920 did not show a special undersampling 
of the weak farms: 
TABLE 62 
1917 1920 
Sown Working 
Farms Area Farms Livestock 
Counted 94.0 93.7 94.6 96.0 
Not counted 6.0 6.3 5.4 4.0 
A direct comparison for the 1922 research showed a 
certain undersampling of farms without working livestock, 
and without cows, and a more significant undersampling of 
farms without sown area. 
TABLE 63 
Percentage of farms 
Without Without 
working sown Without 
livestock area cows 
1 91 7 1920 1 91 7 1 91 7 1920 
Agricultural 16.0 1 5 . 1 7.2 12.5 1 1 . 3 Census 
1922 Research 12. 7 12.8 3.7 9.4 9.3 
The apparent undersampling of farms without cows was 
possibly because 100 farms had somehow disappeared from 
the distribution of farms by number of cows, and it was not 
clear from which grouping they had been lost. Both 
investigations for Yaropol'skaya Volost' gave almost no 
data on the industrial crops or on the non-agricultural 
occupations of the peasantry. In the 1922 research there 
was only the remark, unsupported by data, that for the 
five-year period from 1917 to 1922 the number of farms 
with 'promysly' and the number of people occupied in 
seasonal and local 'promysly' had grown. 
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In the 1924 study, Kritsman found (besides the 
remark that lithe peasantry receives its means of subsistence 
from agriculture, from earnings on the side and to an 
insignificant degree from handicraft Ipromyslylll) the following 
data en the number of passports issued to people going out 
to get earnings: 
TABLE 64 
1924 Study Number of passports issued 
Number of 
passports 
2357 
As a percentage 
of the number 
of farms 
1 91 3 
1 914 2730 (136 per cent of the 
number of farms 
in 1915) 
1921 269 
1 922 11 5 5.4 
1923 480 21 . 7 
1924 893 38.2 
Clearly there was a rapid revival in~e proportion 
going out to work after 1922, but there was no grouping 
of farms on this basis. The figures referred to both men 
and women. This was clearly a region of people primarily 
occupied outside their farms as workers. There was a growth 
in the sown area and in the amount of productive livestock, 
but not horses, after the Revolution: this process started 
in 1921 or 1922. Taking 1915 as 100 for sown area, and 1914 
as 100 for livestock: 
TABLE 65 
Changes in crops and livestock 
Sown Area Livestock 
All Sown 
~ Oats Potatoes Area Cows Sheep Pigs Horses 
1 923 105 47 104 93 135 208 63 100 
1924 120 1 52 165 128 143 275 310 99 
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This growth was composed of the growth in the farms 
of actual farm owners (middle and prosperous) and of the 
increase in sown area and productive livestock of the 
essentially unemployed (including many demobilised Red 
Army men) running their farm of necessity and going off to 
the city as soon as the possibility opened up. And in 
fact t he growth in sown area and its transit ion to th e 
pre-war level arrived in 1 925 when 'the practice of leaving 
(for the town) was already quite widespread. On flax 
CUltivation the 1922 study only gave remarks in brackets 
such as "Flax cultivation is highly developed in this 
region" or "Here flax is a quite important factor in peasant 
commodity circul~tion". There was a rapid growth in the 
number of farms selling flax: 
TABLE 66 
1922 Study Percentage of farms 
1 91 7 
1920 
1922 
Selling 
flax 
7.6 
17.2 
31 .4 
n 
332 
640 
Selling, but not 
buying, grain 
2.3 
7.9 
5.6 
n 
152 
11 3 
Thus with a reduction in the percentage of farms 
selling grain, there was a sharp increase in the percentage 
of farms selling flax. In the 1924 research, there was the 
following data on sown area of flax (in dessiatines): 
1 91 5 
1 ,557 
1924 Studv 
1 921 
578 
TABLE 67 
Sown area of flax 
1922 
663 
1923 
700 
1924 
928 
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Thus there was a direct growth from 1921 to 1924 of 
61 per cent. However there was no grouping by flax 
cUltivation in this study either. There was also a 
significant growth in pig and sheep rearing according to the 
1924 study (which differs somewhat on pigs from the 1922 
study in brackets): 
1 91 4 
1 91 5 
( 1 91 7) 
( 1 920) 
1922 
(1 922~ 
1923 
1924 
TABLE 68 
1924 Study Livestock Rearing 
Pigs 
807 
360 
( 451) 
( 496) 
153 
( 705) 
509 
2505 
Sheep 
1672 
1097 
2565 
3474 
4591 
Again there was no grouping in terms of these indices, 
but primarily by sown area (Kritsman pointed out various 
minor problems with this table): 
TABLE 69 
1922 Stud~ Percentage of farms with sown area of 
Without 
sown Up to 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-7 7-10 10-15 
area 1 Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Total 
1 91 7 3.7 7.1 20.8 29.5 18.0 9.9 8.0 2.0 0.9 100 
1920 3.4 7.7 21.3 28.6 19.2 9.7 7.9 2. 1 0.1 100 
1922 3.4 7.6 24.4 28.1 17.7 9.7 6.9 2 .1 0.1 100 
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There was no grouping by sown area in the 1924 study, 
but grouping by working livestock gave the following 
results: 
TABLE 70 
1924 Study Percentage of farms with working livestock 
1915 
1920 
1923 
1924 
Without 
working' With 1 With 2 With 3 With 4 
livestock horse horses horses or more Total 
29.5 
1 5. 1 
11 . 8 
1 3.4 
47.8 
72.5 
77.9 
76.3 
20.2 
1 2 • 1 
9.9 
10.0 
2 • 1 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
0.4 100 
10'0 
100 
100 
There was no grouping by stock incither study, but in 
the 1922 study there was given the percentage of farms 
without ploughing equipment: 
TABLE 71 
1922 Study Percentage of farms without ploughing equipment 
1 91 7 1920 1922 
11 .3 11 .8 12.6 
Kritsman combined the tables on the grouping by number 
of cows, although he was aware of various problems with 
this procedure: for example the 1922 study tended to 
undersample farms with 2 or more cows: 
TABLE 72 
Both studies Percentage of farms with cows 
With 4 
Without With 1 With 2 With 3 and more 
cows cow cows cows cows Iotal 
1 91 5 26.9 41 .3 26.7 3.6 1 .5 100 
1920 11 .3 55.4 32.0 1 .2 0.1 100 
1922 7.7 63.3 27.5 1 .3 0.1 100 
1923 5.9 60.2 30.7 3.0 0.2 100 
1924 2.3 57.9 36.2 3.3 0.4 100 
I 
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This was interpreted in the 1924 study as a "general 
improvement in the material well-being of the peasantry", 
which implied a growth in the farms of all strata of the 
peasantry, but the decline in the number of farms without 
cows was paralleled by a growth in the number of horseless 
farms and in the number of passports issued to those leaving 
for paid employment. In a certain proportion of cases, what 
was happening was the growth of the domestic farm of workers 
and employees, usually in the care" of their wives, so that 
the peasant could achieve a rise in living standards and 
improve the domestic farm by acquisition of a cow. Yet the 
farm, as the enterprise of an independent owner, collapsed: 
from being petty bourgeois, although very poor, he was 
transformed into a proletarian, although his living standard 
improved because of this. To a special degree this referred 
to peasants without horses, that is, without basic means of 
production. 
Kritsman stated that he had noted earlier that the class 
stratification of the peasantry could appear in the form of 
the transition of farms with no sown area into sowing farms; 
and he asked rhetorically whether it was now appearing in 
the form of the transition of farms without cows into farms 
with cows. To avoid putting in the same pile those who 
lived by the alienation of their labour power outside their 
own farm, and those who conducted their own farm (enterprise), 
that is, to distinguish the economic types of the proletarian 
and the petty-bourgeois: this was for Kritsman the first 
demand which must be put to the researcher, which he was 
obliged to fulfill, if he were not to 'play games with 
numbers'. Up to that time, unfortunately, this demand was 
always transgressed. (In a footnote, Kritsman cited evidence 
that children of the poor did not go to school since they 
.1 
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had no clothes, no footwear and no text books). The growth 
in proletarianisation was shown by the growth cited above 
in the farms without plough instruments and without horses. 
It could be seen from the comparison of the farms without 
sown area, without livestock and without stock: 
TABLE 73 
1922 Study Percentages of farms without sown ar~ 
working livestock and stock 
Excess of 
farms wi tliout Excess of 
working live- farms without 
Without Without stock over stock over 
sown working farms without Witho~t farms without 
area livestock sown area stock ~ area 
1 91 7 3.7 12.8 9.1 11 • 3 7.6 
1920 3.4 12.8 9.4 11 .8 8.4 
1922 3.4 11 .9 8.5 12.6 9.2 
Not surprisingly, the 1922 report stated that the 
general number of farms renting in stock was growing 
continuously. The general number of implements and machines 
had grown. 
According to the report, after the Revolution, and 
especially after the" NEP, the prosperous and middle peasants 
by some means took over the machines, and the poor fell into 
the role of renting these machines, to be paid by 'working 
off' in the field, house or farmyard, although originally 
they had access to these machines on a friendly basis. The 
prosperous rented out at hiring points a large part of the 
complex machinery, but the middle and poor rented simple 
machines from their prosperous fellow-countrymen. The 
1924 report only said one word on this issue: in the 
single official machine co-operative there were 9 members 
and 40 ploughs and several other items of stock, that is, 
4.4 ploughs per member! 
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The author of the 1924 study almost completely lacked 
a class approach to the analysis of the countryside, as can 
be seen from the fact that after introducing a table on the 
hiring of wage-labour by traders and the owners of dairy 
factories and other enterprises, he claimed that it showed 
that the base of the kulak was not in agriculture. This 
implied that a kulak was defined by the hiring of wage labour. 
1923 
1924 
TABLE 74 
Hiring of wage labour 
Yaropol'skaya Volost' 
(1924 Stud.v) 
0.7 
0.6 
Moscow Gubernia 
(Ts.S .. U. data) 
1 • 1 
7.2 
Clearly the volost' was not typical of the whole 
Moscow Gubernia, if the 1924 study was accurate, but 
Kritsman demonstrated that wage-labour was also shown in 
data about workers and employees in rural co-operatives. 
Apart from the significance of cows in some domestic 
farms, the growth (already indicated in Table 72) of the 
percentage of farms with more than 3 cows was somewhat 
more significant than it seemed, since the average number 
of cows in farms with 3 or more grew from 3.7 in 1922 to 
7.4 in 1923, and 7.9 in 1924. But dairy farming was only 
one direction in which Yaropol'skaya Volost' was developing 
its commodity agriculture, it seemed. However, there were 
no data on other branches of agriculture. There were data 
on the number of permits for construction: 
·1 
191 5 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
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TABLE 75 
Permits for Construction 
Living Accommodation 
1 3 
1 3 
22 
47 
84 
42 
Outhouses 
5 
70 
148 
Thus the construction of houses suddenly declined 
after 1923 and the construction of economic (outhouse) 
buildings suddenly increased greatly in 1923. Kritsman 
refused to use the 1922 study's grouping by wealth, because 
there was no indication of how it was constructed or how 
it could be corrected (some of the mistakes may have been 
simply printing errors in the research report). Kritsman 
concluded this section by saying that although these two 
reports did not give many of the most important data, 
nevertheless they could be used to show the growth of the 
class stratification of the peasantry. 
E (ii) Tsurikovskaya Volost'. Smolensk Gubernia 
This was based on a study by A. Vinogradov publi~hed 
in 1923. It only included 41 per cent of the farms in its 
sample, and also omitted those farms liquidated between 1917 
and 1922. There was no agricultural census data available, 
so the extent of undersampling of particular groups could 
not be estimated. From the research it was evident that 
in the volost' whole villages went off on paid carpentry 
work on occasions, but there were no numerical data on this. 
There were data for 1917, 1920 and 1922 only on agricultural 
stock: 
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TABLE 76 
Percentage of farms without ploughing equipment 
191 7 
1 7 
1920 
14 
1922 
1 6 
The report obscurely referred to "horseless and stock-less 
(farms), who for the use of horses and stock give away part 
of the grain harvested by them." It naively remarked that 
the farms without horses and without stock received help 
from their closest relatives, so the possibility of 
exploitation was reduced. But the 14 per cent in 1920 
(and 16 per cent in 1922) of farms without stock signified 
a large grawth in the number of exploited farms, because in 
1920 they had compulsory access to the stock of the prosperous, 
but in 1922 this had already become impossible. Evidently, 
one-third of farms were engaged in 'promysly', that is, 
for every 100 farms there were 32 people so engaged in 
1917, 1920 and 1922. 
The best indication of the situation on working livestock 
was that the percentage of farms without it was 16.5 in 1917 
and f1 per cent in 1922. According toaDynamic Study, the 
percentage of farms without working livestock for the whole 
Smolensk Gubernia was 10.9 in 1920 and 12.4 in 1922. 
Evidently the percentage of farms without livestock had 
changed from 1917 to 1922 in a manner analagous to the 
changes in farms without stock (Table 76), that is a reduction 
to 1920 and an increase to 1922. 
How far the situation had changed from 1920 to 1922 could 
be judged from the following statements of the report: "The 
struggle for equalisation in the years 1918, 1919 and 1920 
included villages occupied in going off for carpentry work. 
Here the victory of the weak was most complete •..... In 
another region ........ impelled by tax pressure the weak 
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in the year just past of 1922 went over on to a definite 
offensive with the aim of achieving equalisation. But there 
was already not enough time. Here and there the struggle was 
not completed. And where it was completed, it finished not 
with the victory of the poor, but a compromise with the 
prosperous." "The taxes were heavy for the weak, not even 
mentioning those without livestock or without stock. Tax 
pressure above all hindered the weak farm from sustaining 
itself, and on the other hand, the relative weakness of taxes 
for the prosperous assisted them." 
The research report had a grouping by wealth but it was 
not known how it was arrived at and it did not include all 
the farms studied; without indicating which farms were 
excluded or why. According to this classification, the 
middle peasantry had the best chance of changing their farm 
into a khutor, which again showed the dangers of the banal 
approach to the peasantry. 
E (iii) Goritskaya Volost', Tver Gubernia 
Kritsman relied here on a study conducted by A. Bol'shakov, 
published in 1925, which included liquidated farms. The main 
problem with the study was the introduction of the 1924 figures, 
which were not comparable due to a large increase in population 
and number of farms when the volost' was enlarged. Kritsman 
left them out of the tables. According to the report, 
formerly many went off on seasonal 'promysly' to factories 
and plants, but at the time of the study factory and plant 
workers stayed at home willy-nilly. In 1913 the volost' 
had received 159,298 roubles in this way, but in 1924 on~y 
14,638 roubles. Before the war there had been a large amount 
of bazaar trade$ which was evidently in flax:in Goritskaya 
Volost' there had been a fair eight times a year with an 
554. 
annual turnover of a million roubles. In the volost' the 
percentage of sown area devoted to flax was: 
TABLE 77 
Percentage of sown area devoted to flax 
1 91 3 
21 
1920 
8 
1923 
9 
Unfortunately there was no grouping of the 'peasantry 
taking account of these features, but there was a classification 
by working livestock: 
TABLE 78 
Percentage of farms with horses 
With 4 
Without With 1 With 2 With 3 or more 
horses horse horses horses horses Total 
1 91 6 31 .5 54.6 12.8 0.7 0.4 100 
1920 34.0 65.0 1 .0 0.1 0.0 1 00.1 
1922 33.2 66. 1 0.7 0.0 0.0 100 
1923 32.7 66.5 0.8 0.0 0.0 100 
There was no grouping by sown area, only the percentage 
of farms with no sown area: 
TABLE 79 
Percentage of farms 
Excess of farms 
without horses 
over farms 
Without sown Without without sown 
area horses area 
1 91 6 11 .9 31 .5 19.6 
1920 1 3.2 34.0 20.8 
1922 12.8 33.2 20.4 
1923 11 .9 32.7 20.8 
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In the bazaar trade of Goritsa, a large part was 
taken up by cow butter (1,000 puds against 3,500 puds of 
rye). The following percentages were under grass: 
1.21.§. 
3.9 
TABLE BO 
Percentage under grass 
1920 
0.2 
1922 
1 • 3 
1923 
1 .5 
For this reason, the classification by catt~e was 
interesting: TABLE B1 
Percentage of farms with cattle 
Without With 1 With 2 With 3 With 4 
cattle head head head head Total 
1 91 6 1 B • 7 49.4 2B.3 3.2 0.4 100 
1920 1 8.3 4B.8 28.8 3.7 0.4 100 
1922 17.8 46.3 30.2 4.9 0.8 100 
1923 1 6.6 45.8 31 .4 4.5 0.7 100 
Thus the increase in the proportion of farms with 2 or 
more cows was an indication of the developing commodity 
relations. This could be seen more clearly by showing the 
proportion of cattle owned by these groupings: 
1 91 6 
1920 
1922 
1923 
TABLE 82 
Distribution of cattle among different 
cattle-owning groups 
Farms 
without 
cows & 
with 1 
cow 
68.1 
67.1 
64.1 
62.4 
Percentage 
of all cows'Farms 
owned by with 2 
this group cows 
42.2 28.3 
41 .3 28.B 
37.2 30.2 
35.5 31 .4 
Percentage 
of all cows 
owned by 
this group 
48.2 
48.0 
48.4 
48.9 
Farms 
with 3 
cowsor 
more 
3.6 
4.1 
5.7 
6.2 
Percentage 
of all cows 
owned by 
this group 
9.6 
10. 7 
14.4 
15.7 
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The report also made the interesting remark that the 
.tax policy and line of conduct of the most important 
Kommissariat for th e peasantry, Th e People's Kommissariat of 
Agriculture, during the NEP had weakly supported the poorest 
farms, and weakly defended them from the stronger prosperous 
farms. The prosperous farms made better Use of the 
co-operatives :. 
TABLE 83 
Percentages of farms in Co-operatives in 1924 
Without With 1 With 2 With 3 Not 
horses horse horses or more counted Total 
Among peasantry 9.0 84.0 2.5 0.3 4.2 100 in co-operatives 
Among the whole 27.0 71 .4 1 .6 0.0 100 peasantry 
Unfortunately, for the reasons indicated above, these 
data were insufficient to form a judgement on the class 
stratification in the volost'. 
E (iv) Prok2hinskaya Volost'. Pskov Gubernia 
The basis of this section was the study by A. Grafo.v, 
published in 1923. The data were even more scanty than 
for the previous volost'. Only farms existing in 1922 
were count ed. It was impossible to estimate the undersampling 
of liquidated farms since there was no agricultural census. 
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According to the report the Pskov peasantry were an 
unfailing supply of labour power to the Petrograd factories and 
plants, and the remaining part of the free hands were used in farms 
cultivating flax, but neither of these circumstances was taken 
into account in- the research. According to the report, the 
Pskov peasantry were now being suffocated by a surplus of labour-
power. It was interesting that, judging by the fanns left in 1922~ 
the main mass of land redistributions ('54 per cent) and of returns 
(to the country) from the city (80 per cent) were in 1918. The 
following was the percentage of total sown area devoted to flax: 
TABLE 84 
Percentage of total sown area devoted to flax 
191 7 
1 3 
1920 
4.2 
1922 
3.4 
In 1923, it was expected to grow by 1 or 2 per cent. However 
data on the number of farms selling flax showed its growing significance 
since 1920: 
191'7 
1920 
1922 
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TABLE 85 
Percentage of farms selling but not buYing 
Flax 
20 
2.5 
8.5 
n 
31 
1-3-1 
Grain 
7 
2 
0.5 
n 
26 
5 
Consequently, despite what the report said, not all peasants 
were cautious in their approach to growing flax. There were 
also data on the growth of the renting of 1 1and: 
1 91 7 
1920 
1922 
TABLE 8.:6 
Percentage of Farms 
Renting in 
37.7 
1 .2 
3.8 
Renting out 
1 5.8 
2.3 
1 .4 
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According to the report, the forms of payment were varied: 
metayage, money, grain, hay, a field for tilling another field. 
There were cases when the poor received from the prosperous 
peasant' livestock and stock and seed, but a large part of these 
deals were connected with the renting of land. Elsewhere the 
report remarked that there was a mass movement of peasants into 
migration. Unfortunately there was no grouping by sown area of 
flax or by working livestock, nor even by sown area. There was 
only a grouping by wealth, and it was not known how it was arrived 
at. The prosperous were said in the report to be almost entirely 
traders, and were more friendly to Soviet power than before the 
NEP. The tax in kind, the new economic law, the opening of free 
trade and a series of other measures enabled them to pursue their 
well- being unhindered. 
Despite the H~ade(pla1Cices~ of the data on the volosti of the 
industrial regions, the root of which lay in the banal approach to 
the question, the data for soJ:l:'le volosti confirmed, in Kritsman's 
view, the growth of hidden capitalist exploitation, and in the others 
left the question open for further investigation. Evidently, the 
grouping by stock had a basic significance for these regions (besides 
the special groupings, such as by flax or by cows). For two of the 
four volosti examined above on which there were data on the per-
centage of farms without stock (Tsurikovskaya and Yaropol'skaya) 
there was growth in the percentage from 1920 to 1922 of the farms 
without stock at the same time as the percentage of farms without 
,: 
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livestock .(for example, in Yaropol'skaya) fell somewhat. The 
percentage without stock in both volosti up to 1922 exceeded the 
percentage without livestock. The same phenomenon could be 
seen in' the Shamraevskaya Volost' in Kiev GUbernia, where the 
sown area of sugar beet played a big role. Only the analysis of 
the special groupings (by sown area of industrial crops, by cow~ 
and so on) could uncover the significance of this fact; in addition 
the analysis of the essentially separate matter of the domestic 
agriculture of industrial and other workers. or small owners whose 
basic occupation was not cultivation would help clarify the significance 
of this fact, as would the separate analysis of the actual rural owner-
cultivators, but unfortunately there were no data on these in the 
studies of the above four volosti. 
F. The Urals 
Petrovskaya Volost' in the Bashkir Republic 
The data on the Bashkir Republic were based on the unpublished 
report by S. Said- Galiev and referred to 1925, in comparison with 
19'12. 
1 912 
1925 
Without sown 
area 
27.7 
7.2 
TABLE 87 
Percentage of Farms 
Without 
horses 
1 8. 7 
48.2 
Excess of farms Without 
without horses cows 
over farms with-
out sown area 
- 9.0 24.0 
+41 .0 30.5 
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r'his table described in unusually clear fashion the sharp 
decline in farms without sown area and the huge increase in 
farms without horses. The enlarged Petrovskaya Vol os V was 
composed of three former economically different volosti: two 
cultivating and one livestock rearing. Hence the data on the 
three former volosti were examined s'eparatelY, using th e same 
indices as Table 87 for the two cultivating volosti: 
1912 
1925 
1 912 
1925 
1912 
1925 
TABLE 88 
Former Petrovskaya Volost' 
7.0 12.2 +.5.2 
o 43.7 +43.7 
Former Makarovskaya Volost' 
~1 .8 25.4 + 3.6 
2.5 64.6 +62.1 
Former Girei-Konchakshaya Volost' 
Without sown 
area 
Without 
horses 
Without cows 
99.8 1 9 • 1 26.5 
98.0 65.3 38.0 
1 5.8 
28.2 
31 .5 
41~2 
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The former Girei-Konchakskaya Volost' was purely livestock 
rearing and engaging in handicraft 'promysly'. In it because of the 
famine the population had declined catastrophically by 61.5 per cent, 
working livestock by 94 per cent, large horned livestock by 76 per 
cent and other livestock by 93-95 per cent. The character of the 
change indicated above is quite distinct. For example, in the 
former Petrovskaya yolost' all provided themselves with sown area, 
but the proportion of horseless farms quadrupled, going to almost 
half of all farms. In the former Makarovskaya Volost' the percentage 
of farms with no sown area declined by almost 9 times, while the 
percentage with no horses increased by 2.5 times, going up to almost 
two- thirds of the farms. 
Kritsman also had recourse to a study of some villages in the 
Chelyabinksk and Perm areas, although he regarded it as "not serious" 
and "insignificant". It was published in 1925, and showed a lack of 
uunderstanding of the stratification of the peasantry, since it constant-
ly discussed distributions in tenus of per farm averages of the whole 
sample. There was nothing on changes in the stratification of the 
peasantry. But there was a certain interest in the data on rural 
wage labourers working on farms in the Etul ' sku region: in 1915 
they counted up 1,500 people, whereas in 1924 there were 900 to 
1, pOO people. Since there were 4613 households in the region, then 
there was at least 1 wage labourer to every 4 or 5 households. The 
distribution of batraki {rural wage-laboures} by place of work was as 
follows: 
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TABLE 89. 
Worked People Percent 
In farms of Red Army men 52 7.5 
In farms without labour power 48 7 
In 15 dairy artelJL 62 9 
For the more prosperous and kulaks 51 5 76.5 
677 100 
That meant that only in less than 15 per cent of cases could 
the friring be explained by the lack of labour power in the family. 
The researchers argued for a reduction in the land available to 
peasants so that it would correspond to the fertiliser available and 
the smaller farms could be properly run~ They also analysed the 
khutory quite separately from the village where they hired their 
wage labour, with the result that class differentiation was less 
apparent. These four khutory in 1924 sowed 440 dessiatines. There 
was also a quite strange commune which hired a significant amount 
of wage labour. The better off peasants received on credit various 
machines, which were very expensive. The most 'needy' received 
ploughs, horses and grain on credit. Thus in the Perm area a 
process of stratification was taking place. 
In the village of Starkii the distribution of farms in terms of 
arable' land changed a s follows: 
.J 
! 
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TABLL..9.Q 
Arable land per farm 
From 1.5 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 Over 6 
2 Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Des. Total 
Number of Farms 
1923 5 14 9 3 1 32 
1924 2 11 12 3 4 33 
This indicated some differentiation, but there was no grouping 
by sown area. The amount of haymaking land increased by 46 per 
cent. This shift into haymaking was to avoid the tax on sown area, 
not total arable land, indicating how statistics could express legal 
rather than economic changes. In 1923 there were 3 farms without 
horses, 28 with 1 horse and I with two horses, whereas in 1924 
there were no farms without horses, 30 with One horse and 3 with 
2 horses. In another village, Novye Tumachi; there were 10 horse-
less farms in 1923 and 1924, 16 farms with 1 horse in 1923 (18 in 
1924) and one farm with 2 horses in 1924 only. The horseless farms 
paid for the hire of· horses in grain or by 'working off'. The data 
on sown area and arable land were in a complete mess, so no more 
could be gained from this study. 
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G. Siberia and Kazakhstan 
G. (i) Shthuch' inskaya V010st', Akmolinskaya Gubernia 
The data were taken from. a document by A. 
Morosanov (of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist 
Party). The date of publication was not given, but it was published 
in numbers 7-8 of Na Agrarnom Fronte and contained data up to 
1925. The volost" was characterised by an abundance of sown area 
because of the colossal decline of sown area up to 1923. For this 
reason the extent of individual peasant farms was here determined 
not by their land, but by their means of production. Taking 1917 
data as 100, there was the following distribution (based on tax returns): 
TABLE 91 
Number of Sown Large Horned 
farms PeopJe area Horses Livestock Bullocks 
1 91 7 100 100 100 1 00 100 100 
1920 11 3 105 91 126 128 11 8 
1923 106 94 42 52 97 58 
1924 11 2 96 47 54 1 01 49 
In 1925 this process of restoration continued, as the following 
data on Shchuch'aya Station (1st April 1925) showed, as a percentage 
of 1923: 
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TABLE 9z. 
Large Horned 
Farms Horses Livestock Bullocks 
1923 100 100 100 100 
1924 112 1 01 96 82 
1925 11 0.5 111 96 108 
The groupings by sown area and working livestock were only 
available for Shchuch'inskaya Volost' for 1923-1924, so material 
for a judgement on the dynamics of stratification was .only available 
for an interv.al of one year. To understand the adual character of 
the changes occurring, Kritsman started with the centre of the volost', 
Shahuch'aya Station, for which there were data for 1924-1925 as well. 
TABLE 93 
Percentage of households, Sfuchuch'aya Station 
Without With 1 With 2 With 3 With 4 With 5 With 6 over6 
working head head head head head head head Total livestock 
1923 21 .9 23.9 1 6. 7 16.3 7.4 8.4 2.1 3.3 100 
1924 29.6 26.7 15.8 14.4 5.6 4.8 1 .4 1 • 7 100 
1925 25.9 24.8 14.3 15.9 5.8 6.9 2.6 3.8 100 
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Thus there was a so- called movement downwards from 1923 
to 1924 in the possession of livestock, and a so-called movement 
upwards from 1924-1925, but the result, although not so clear as 
the two movements, from 1923 to 1925 was differentiation. This 
conclusion was confirmed by data on the percentage of livestock 
within each livestock group. 
TABLE 94 
Distribution of livestock within each livestock group 
Without 
working With 1 With 2 With 3 With 4 With 5 With 6 Over 6 
livestock head head head head head head head Total. 
1923 11.3 15.7 22.8 1 3 . 7 1 9.3 5.9 11 .3 100 
1924 1 5.2 18.3 24.8 12.4 13.9 4.7 10.2 99.5 
1925 11 .9 13.7 23.0 1 0.9 16. 7 7.3 16 .. 5 100 
The working livestock was concentrated in the highest groups. 
Because the differentiation was somewhat hidden by the movement 
downwards it was especially unsatisfactory to limit oneself only to 
the percentage distribution of farms: more detailed data was necessary. 
The grouping by sown area for the whole volost' was as follows: 
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TABLE 95 
Classification by sown area 
Percentage Percentage Working" ~;Y 
of farms of so~n area livestock per 
1923 1924 1923 1924 farm in 1922 
Without sown area 5.5 6.0 0.5 
Up to 1 Des. 28.4 25.6 9.1 7.1 0.46 
1-2 Des. 25.0 24.9 17.5 16.2 0.95 
2-4 Des. 25.34 26.7 32.0 32.7 1. 95 
4-6 Des. 9.3 10.1 19.0 19.6 3.3 
6-8 Des. 3.8 4.1 10.8 11.6 4.2 
8-10 Des. 1.5 1.3 5.7 4.4 4.8 
10-12 Des. 0.6 0.5 2.7 2.3 5.2 
12-15 Des. 0.5 0.4 2.7 2.3 6.9 
15-2oDes. 0.03 0.2 0.2 2.2 8.9 
Over 20 Des. 0.03 0.2 0.3 1.6 6.4 
T'Jtal .1:00 100 _100 100 100 
---
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The researcher I s conclusion that stratification had decreased 
was a hasty one. KritSrnan showed that there were problems in 
the report's treatment of the highest sown area groups, and 
consequently treated those with over 15 dessiatines as a single 
group for some purpos::s. Kritsman regrouped the table into the 
folbwing groups: without sown area, up to 2 cessiatines, 8-15 
dessiatines, and over 15 a;ssiatines. This gave an increase in 
the extreme groups and in the 2-8 dessiatine group, but a decline 
\ 
in the other two groups. It was therefore not possible on the sown 
area index to reach a definite conclusion, but this wa...s related to 
the fact that in the volost ' there was a lot of fallow land which was 
much harder to improve, since it was closely connected to virgin 
land (and thus rapidly returned to the wild), and it required two 
pairs of horses or oxen to plough any land, even soft land which 
was being ploughed again. Only 3 or 4 pairs made it possible to 
plough fully properly. Thus only farms with over 2 dessiatines (see 
Table 95.) had enough horses to plough even easy lc}nd, and in most 
cases the 2-8 dessiatine group had insufficient working livestock to 
plough. Thus the growth registered in their number and their sown 
area was to a significant degree based on taking on alien livestock. 
Table 95 also showd that the 'loading' of horses in the very highest 
sown area farms was lower than in the ones just below them. 
Calculating the 'loading' per dessiatine on horses for the different 
sown area groupings, Kritsman concluded tla t the very highest 
group (over 20 dessiatines) did not rent out horses, but took on 
I 
r 
570. 
hired wage labour, whereas the groups of from 12-20 dessiatines 
hired out livestock to the groups with a lower sown area. Kritsman 
then turned to the distribution of farms grouped by working livestock: 
TABLE 96 
Percentage of farms with livestock 
Without 
Working 
livestock 
Percentage 
of Farms 
1923 
1924 
I 
Percentage 
2'8.3 
30.8 
of livestock 
1923 
1924 
Percentage 
of sown area 
.'-,.,f 
1923 
1924 
1 2.4 
14.4 
With 1 With 2 With 3 With 4 With 5 With 6 Over6 
head head head head head head head Trr01 
24.6 17.7 
28.2 15.6 
13.3 18.9 
17.4 19.5 
12.8 
13. 7 
20.9 
25.4 
1 6.51 7.6 ,1 6. 7 
19.0 16.3· 20.7 
6.1 
4.4 
1 3.2 
10.9 
10.5 
8.7 
6.3 
4.4 
1 7.1 
13.6 
13.9 
10.5 
1 . 9 
1 .4 
6.4 
5.5 
5 • 1 
4.5 
2.3 100 
1 .5 100 
10.2 100 
7.7 100 
7.3 100 
5.9 100 
These figures seemed to support the results for Shchuch1aya 
Statim:, giving a dovmward movement, but it was only a stage in the 
process of class stratification, as the following table also IndIcated: 
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TABLE 97 
Average sown area. within livestock groupings 
Wi tlr-
out 
Work-
ing With With With With With With Over 
live- 1 2 3 4 5 6 6 Overall 
stock head head head head head head head averaqe 
Average 
sown area 
per farm 
1923 1 . 1 1 .6 2.4 3. 1 4.1 5.3 6 . 1 7.9 2.4 
1924 1 .2 1 . 7 2.6 3.7 4.9 5.9 7.5 10.2 2.5 
Average 
sown area 
per head 
1923 1 • 6 1 .2 1 .0 1 .0 1 . 1 1 . 0 1.1(or less) 
1924 1.7 1 . 3 1 .2 1 .2 1 .2 1 . 3 1.5(or less) 
Taking Table 96 and 97 together, those with one or no horse 
had increased their sown area from 28.9 per cent in 1923 to 43.3 
per cent in 1924. This required the use of alien working livestock, 
and could thus be considered as the growth of the hidden sown area 
of the highest group. The sown area of farms with three head of 
working livestock it could be considered partly as a growth of the 
sown area on the basis of the "supryaga ll (joint use of stock} of 
farms of equal capacity, and partly the growth of sown· area of 
powerful farms which had for the time being sold a horse (to pay 
taxes, for example). The reduction in the sown area (and number 
of horses) among the highest livestock groups was thus interpreted 
by Kritsman as being partly offset by the growth in their hidden 
sown area. The livestock group went down ,proportionately less 
than the number of farms in that group. In other words, the 
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surviving highest livestock farms concentrated more sown area 
and livestock in their hands, which was not evident simply from 
the classification of farms by livestock. 
Finally, Kritsman compared the percentage of farms without 
sown area and without working livestock. 
1923 
1924 
TABLE 98 
Percentage of farms w~thout sown area 
and without working livestock: 1923-1924 
Excess of farms Percentage 
without live- sown area 
Without Without stock over farms farms 
sown working without sown without 
area livestock area livestock 
5.5 28.3 22.8 12.4 
6.0 30.8 24.8 14.4 
of Average 
ln sown area 
per farm 
without 
livestock 
1 . 1 
1 .2 
There were no data on the hiring of livestock or stock, but 
the report said that the basic feature of stratification was working 
livestock, and that the poor peasant was compelled to hire under 
conditions that were quite heavy for him. There was no accurate 
count for the volost' of farms hiring in (or hiring out) labour 
power, but according to local workers, in the working season no 
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less than 25 per cent of farms hired in workers, which corresponded, 
K ritsman noted, to the percentage of farms with 3 horses and more. 
It was reported th3.t there were around 1500 batraki in the volost', 
which for 3111 farms meant 1 rural wage worker for every 2 
farms, and 2 batraki for every farm actually hiring wage-labour •. 
G. (ii) Aleksandrovskaya Volost', Kustanaiskaya Gubernia 
This was taken from the article hy A. Ermolenko (of the 
Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party) entitled 'The 
Kazakhstan Countryside' in Na Agrarnom Fronte, No.9. It did not 
contain direct data on the dynamics of the class stratification of the 
peasantry. The report said that the ground was solid and needed 
4-5 horses to a one-horse plough, and 3-4 horses on waste ground. 
Hence 70 per cent of the horseless and one-horse farms depended 
on the remaining 30 per cent with many horses. Usually the one 
horse farms 'cooperated' (jointly used the yoke) with 2 or 3 horse 
farms, more rarely with other one horse farms. In the majority 
of cases the form of exploitation was 'worklng off' in very varied 
ways, right up to the brewing by the poor peasant of horne brew 
for the prosperous peasant. Ploughing was done almost exclusively 
with a plough, rather than, say, a sc::lkha (wooden plough). In 1924 , 
the distribution of peasant farms in terms of horses was as follows: 
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TABLE 99 
Grouping by horses: 1924 
Percentage of farms 
Percentage of sown 
area 
Shortage or surplus 
of grain in puds 
per farm 
Sown area per 
farm (Des.) 
Average per 
horse 
With With With With With Over 
Without 1 2 3 4 5 5 
horses head head head head head head Total 
35.6 35.1 20.0 5.8 2.1 1.00.4100 
9.6 26.0 31.4 1 6 . 5 9 . 8 4.9 1.8 100 
-17 +1.5 +63 +158 +260 +341 +259 
1 . 37 3 . 1 3 6. 62 11. 99 1 9 • 71 2 o. 1 8 1 B. 00 -
3.133.31 4.00 4.93 4.04 <3.00 -
Thus, in a manner similar to the previous study, the lloadingl 
on 1 horse (and sown area) was slightly lower in the highest 
livestock farms, than in the group just below them. This was 
partly explained by the fact that the most prosperous peasants 
bought wheat in the villages, using horses that were doing nothing 
in winter, and were hired out in summer. Thus the extra horses 
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were not used on their own farm.s, Characteristically, only 17 
per cent of farm.s without horses did not sow. There were farm.s 
sowing up to 70 dessiatines, harvesting over 2,000 puds of grain. 
There were 170 registered batraki, averaging 1 to every 3 farm.s 
with 2 or m.ore horses (and no less than 1 toevery 6 farm.s living 
by 'working off'). 
Since it was sim.ilar to Shchuch'inskaya Volost', it was interest-
ing to see the social com.position of various kinds of rural organisa-
tions. On the direction of the cooperatives, it was reported that 
one was in the hands of the prosperous, one had three m.iddle peasants 
running .it (of whom. one was a form~r local shop keeper), the third 
was run by the poor, but its Auditing CommIssion was run by 
prosperous and m.iddle peasants, and the fourth was directed by two 
poor peasants and one middle peasant. Defining the poor as with one 
or no horse, the m.iddle with 2 horses (although the report was not 
clear or this) and prosperous as those with 3 or more, the following 
table indicated access to school: 
Percentage of farms 
Percentage of children 
in school in autumn 
TABLE 100 
Poor 
74 
41 
Middle Prosperous 
1 7 9 
29 30 
I 
Ii 
!!I 
576. 
Fifteen per cent of children of school age never studied, 
mostly because of lack of footwear and clothing. During the 
summer 25 per cent of children, most of them poor, were absent., 
The following table showed the social composition of the sel1sovety 
of four (or in brackets five) viliages: 
TABLE 101 
Social Composition of rural Soviets 
With- With With With With With Over 
out 1 2 3 4 5 5 
horses head head head head head head Total 
Percentage of 
all farms 
Among members of 
rural Soviets 
Percentage of 
farms with members 
in rural Soviets 
Among the president 
and members of the 
praesidium 
Percentage of farms 
with president or 
members of the 
praesidium 
36 
( 36) 
29 
9 
20 
( 1 5 ) 
0.4 
(0.4) 
---- ---- ---- ----
37 1 9.5 
(36) (20) 
36 21 
11 12 
40 20 
(31) (15) 
0.8 0.8 
( 0 • 8 ) ( O. 7 ) 
5 
( 5 ) 
7. 
14 
2 
( 2 ) 
5 
29 
10 
( 1 5 ) 
4.1 
(6. 7) 
0.3 0.2 
( 0 . 8 ) 
0.7 
25 
(0.4) 
1 . 3 
67 
10 
(23) 
33.3 
(50) 
100 
100 
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Three quarters of the most prosperous farms had 
merebers in rural soviets, and one half were in the praesidium 
(as member or president). The author remarked that the contemporary 
13 
Soviet people were to be found among the very prosperous peasants. 
A similar conclusion could be reached_on the basis of figures on 
membership of the Russian Communist Party in one village. 
Agricultural tax fell primarily on the poorest peasants: 
TABLE 102 
Incidence of taxation on harvest 
Without With 6 
and 
more 
sown area horse horses horses horses horses horses 
horse, 
but with 
With 
1 
With 
2 
With 
3 
With 
4 
With 
5 
Gross harvest 
per farm 41 . 1 
Surplus grain 
(after deducting 
seeds and family 
produce) -13.7 
Tax per farm 
(translated 
into puds) 3.6 
As a percentage 
of the surplus 
As percentage of 
gross harvest 
As a percentage 
of all the tax 
9 
5 
93.9 198.6 359.7 591.3 605.4 540 
18.3 99.5 219.8 371.8 402.5 330 
1 6 • 9 36 • 9 61 • 5 11 2 61 71 
92 37 28 30 1 5 21 
18 1 8 1 6 19 1 0 1 3 
28 35 1 7 11 3 
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This was a slightly misleading picture since the report 
took the harvest per dessiatine as the same. Consequently , 
for the lowes t group the gros s harvest and surplus is exaggerated, 
and is reduced for the highest group. The translation of the tax 
into puds assumed a single price for all groups, while the author' 
indicated that the poor received 80 kopecks for their :grai'n, while 
the rich got 2 roubles, so the tax for the rich was exaggerated 
by up to 2t time s. Thus one could truly say that in this volost' 
the prosperous actually paid a proportionately lower tax on their 
gross harvest than the horseless farm. The agricultural tax took 
all the surplus of a one horse farm, forcing them to work as batraki 
or by 'working off' for the prosper ous. However, not only tax, but 
also state help to the poor (in the form of seed loans for sowing) 
sometimes became an instrument for the subordination of the poor by 
the prosperous, since it would be used as a means of payment to the 
pro.sperous, ending up among the two and three horse farms. 
G (iii) Tisul'kii Region, Tomsk Gubernia 
Once again this was based on a document by a member of the 
Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, A. Musatorv. 
This one was unpublished. (Even where there was a published version, 
Kritsman worked from longer unpublished documents). It contained 
data (from the Gubstatburo) on changes from 1922 to 1924 in working 
livestock and sown area, repnoduced in the following two tables: 
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TABLE 103 
Percentage of farms with working livestock 
Without With With With 
working 1 2 3 
livestock head head head 
1922 3.82 20.61 40.84 .1 8. 70 
1924· '0.35 11 .85 38.33 28.57 
TABLE 104 
Percentage of farms with sown area 
Without sown area 
Up to 1. 1. Des. 
1 .1 -2.1. Des. 
2.1.-3.1. Des. 
3.1.-4.1. Des. 
4.1.-6.1. Des. 
6.1.-8.1. Des. 
8.1-10.1. Des. 
10.1.-16.1. Des. 
Total 
1922 1924 
0.76 
1 9.47 
22.14 
19.85 
17.1 7 
15.65 
1 .91 
1 .51 
1 .90 
100 
0.35 
10.80 
17.77 
18.82 
1 9.51 
20.21 
7.32 
3.83 
1 .39 
100 
With 
4 
head Total 
1 6.03 100 
20.90 100 
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The report claimed that these data were somewhat doultful, 
since the Gubstatburo figures showed no farms with more than 4 
horses, yet there were many farms with more than 6 horses and 
even 20 or 30 (that is, less than 1 per cent) with more than 10 
horses. The same 'could be said in relation to sown area. The 
author claimed that in 1924 there were around 20 per cent (not 12) 
of farms with one horse, around 68-69 (not 67) per cent with 2 or 
3 horses and with 4 or more horses 10-11 per cent (not 21). The 
author claimed that hidden sown area was a mass phenomenon in 
this region. 
Yet Kritsman pointed out that on this evidence the kulaks 
were an insignificant part of the population, so that along with 
hidden sown area there was hidden stratification! In a word, it was 
impossible to take the figures presented seriously. Kritsman in 
a footnote showed that other figures were no better - they were 
absurd for Siberian conditions. The report claimed that the position 
of the rich was improving, and of the poor was deteriorating, but 
there was no evidence on how widely the rich exploited the poor 
since the peasantry simply hid the: kulaks., If One defined the kulak 
as a peasant hiring wage-labour the whole year round, then the 
number of such kulaks was growing all the time, but in the region 
there were other forms by which the kulaks exploited the poor, 
such as: 
(a) Paying for the use of machines. In this region, 
because of the very short and rainy summer and autumn, it was 
difficult without harvesting machinery to sow, harvest the grain 
II 
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and provide sufficient fodder for the livestock. Grain was threshed 
exclusively by a thresher. Wheat in the region was full of weeds, 
so a sorting :machine was co:mpletely necessary. The rich rented 
out the s e :ma chine s. By the accounts verified by the co:m:mission 
of the Sibrevko:m and well known to the peasants the:mselves, a 
thresher paid for itself in a year, as did a harvester ~ There were 
far:ms which reduced their sown area on even stopped sowing and 
lived off their :machinery. There were :more' than 30 such £a,xms, 
that is, half of one per cent of the far:ms, 
(b) Paying by 'working off' loan of grain, hay and so on. 
Such a for:m of payment was usually twice as dear to the peasant 
if one considered the cost of wage-labour. 
(c) Renting out the best land. Often five or six of the rich 
used the best land, for 'help' with the grain or hay harvest. In 
1923 this was because tJ::e poor could not afford to pay rent. Even 
the old obshchina (called 'love') was a form of exploitation. It 
widely and systematically used free labour power, employing on an 
annual basis an entire village within its boundaries, whose :members 
brought their own horses, ploughed, threshed and so on, and were 
paid worse rates than by the local kulaks. Kritsman cited the 
figures - the obshchina paid between one quarter and one· half of the 
rates paid by kulaks, depending on the task. 
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The political influence of the prosperous was also growing 
in the region: the members of prosperous peasants (with four or 
more horses) on the praesidium of the sell, sovet grew from two 
to five. Four peasants were elected to the Regional Executive 
Committee, all very rich, and poor and batrak candidates were 
often removed. The batraki did not go to the sel'sovet because 
they were not peasants. Where there was a clash of groups, the 
prosperous were the deciders. 
Preliminary Conclusions 
Following this survey of the emJ:liricaJ,. material of all these 
volosti, Kritsman drew his 'Preliminary Conclusions'. The data 
were not artificially selected. He had used all the material avail-
able to him. Despite problems of generalising from the data (they 
were small- scale- studies,although covering the main regions of 
the U.S.S.R.), Kritsman felt able to draw out from the data 
definite :methods of approach to a greater mass of material. Only 
on the basis of the latter would it be possible to arrive at definite 
conclusions on the problems indicated, in further works. Nevertheless, 
it was pos sible to draw certain preliminary conclusions: 
1. Until now the basic growing form of capitalist agriculture 
III the U. S. S. R. was the capitalist agrirnlture (predominantly petty-
capitalist) based on the hiring out of working live stock and agricultural 
stock, under which the hidden capitalist appeared as a worker, work-
ing on another farm with his own working livestock and stock, and 
the hidden proletarian appeared as an owner without working livestock 
or without stock ( or with insufficient livestock and stock) hiring the 
possessor of these indispensable means of production. The 'hirer' 
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paid by 'working off' on the farm of the person hired, which 
often left insufficient wages to the 'hirer'. Whether the 'hired' 
peasant worked on the farm of the hirer did not change the 
essence of the matter. In some areas this form of exploitation 
covered 70 to 75 per cent of peasant farms (the South East and the 
Ukraine). The hidden sown area went up to 30 or 40 per cent of 
the total sown area (in Tambov and the South East). In some 
regions the hiring of livestock predominated: the South East, 
Siberia, the Central Agricultural Region, areas of grain production. 
In others, the hiring of stock predominated: the Ukraine, the Industrial 
Centre, generally regions of industrial crops and livestock rearing. 
The recording of this kind of capitalist development was entirely 
unsatisfactory. Having sown area without livestock or stock led 
to a subordinate role. The' supryaga' (literally yoking orharne s sing 
together, sometimes called the 'spryaga') was often a cover for the 
hiring of working livestock and stock, depending on the different 
'strengths' of the farms involved. Where there was equal strength, 
in some conditions it could be an embryo of collective agriculture. 
2. There also existed the usual type of capitalism; based 
on the hiring of rural wage-workers. It also appeared to a small 
degree in covert form: every sort of fictitious family relationship 
served as a screen. This was a quite widely dispersed phenomenon 
in 'the Soviet countryside, judging by statements in the press, yet 
doubtless most cases went undetected. Even when not covert, rural 
wage labour was often not registered: daily wage labour was completely 
unregistered, despite Lenin's analysis of a quarter of a century 
584. 
earlier indicating that the hiring of day labourers was to the 
greatest degree the characteristic sign of the peasant 
bourgeoisie. This had increased significantly after the 
Revolution. Finally, the statistical registration of time-rate 
hiring of wage labour was to the greatest degree unsatisfactory, 
so the increase in wage labour might have been simply due to 
better recording. 
3. Besides these two forms of capitalist development, there 
were also the forms of action of manufacturinQ capita114 , as 
opposed to trading and usury capital. Both the latter forms 
of capital appeared as ruler~ of changes in its means of 
production, whose activity in the countryside appeared to be 
widespread. The basis of usury capital was the instability of 
the majority of peasant farms, whereas the basis of trading 
capital was the monopoly of connections with the market (lack 
of working livestock). Usury and trading capital were also 
interlaced with credit, as also frequently were usury and 
manufacturing capital~he widely dispersed phenomenon of 
advances of grain was accompanied by the unpaid 'working off' 
on the farm of the lender. This Was in effect a form of 
interest on the loan, although they would claim they made no 
profit out of it. There was a lack of recording of trading and 
especially usury capital. 
4. The state apparatus operated in the same direction as 
trading, usury and industrial capital, by the pressure of its 
taxes. It forced the poor to bring their labour power on to 
the market. This situation might have changed somewhat with 
the removal of the tax burden on the poor and on 35 per cent 
of peasant farms in general, since the studies were conducted. 
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5. The pro~perous (capitalists and those becoming capitalists) 
were, as well as the collectives, the bearers of progress in 
agriculture. (In an interesting footnote giving a critique 
of the ideologues of the petty-bourgeoisie, Kritsman nevertheless 
pointed out that capitalist farms were reactionary in Soviet 
conditions). Capitalist farms more than all the others used 
technical (agrotechnical and other) improvements, engaged in 
agricultural co-operation, used the Soviet school and so on. 
They tended to gain influence on these~~ovety. their 
praesidiums, the Volost' Executive Committee and the apparatus 
of local power, and appeared as the leaders of the whole 
peasantry. 
6. An index of the growth of the economic power of the 
capitalist part of the peasantry was the growth of rented 
land, relieving the poor of the land they received as a 
result of the agricultural revolution, partly being the land 
which they received in its second stage, the Committees of the 
Poor. The prosperous rented in the land rented out by the 
state, but renting in of land often took the form of hiring 
out working livestock and stock. 
7. The growth of the class stratification did not occur as 
the stratification by land, but as stratification by working 
livestock. In so far as it occurred in a hidden form, it 
appeared in the form of equalisation in terms of sown area. 
Livestock and stock were the border dividing the proletarian 
from the petty bourgeois, but these indices did not distinguish 
among the peasantry with the means to conduct their own farm; 
in particular they did not characterise differences in the 
capitalist peasantry, because of the many sided character of 
capital. 
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8. The growth of class stratification was not only the 
growth in the numbers of lowest and highest groups, but in terms 
of the average means of production of these groups. There was 
an absolute and relative decline in means. of production among the 
lowest peasants, and an absolute (and sometimes only relative) 
growth in the means of production of the highest groups, that is, 
a concentration of the means of production in the highest groups. 
9. In the latter cases similar changes in the means of 
production characterized the hidden phases in the class stratification 
of the peasantry, which occurred dialectically, in quite often in the 
form of the so- called movement downwar-ds and mov-ement upwards, including 
in it as its own phase, a phase mainly of destruction (in all Sown area or 
other' groupings) of the--weak farms, and then a phase mainly of increase of 
the strong farms. 
10. The proces s of clas s stratification took different forms 
In connection with the ruling commodity direction of peasant farming 
(grain, special crops, dairy farming and so on) and proceeded 
basically by means of commodity peasant farming. This had radical 
significance for the industrial (and several oth er) regions, where 
grain production had a consumptionist character, based on the domestic 
farms of wage labourers or small farms engaged in non- cultivating 
activities, or cultivating non-grain crops. In so far as t4is was the 
case, then grouping was by the extent of the domestic farm, in which, 
generally speaking, the influence of capitalist differentiation was not 
present (for example, in the farms of industrial workers or town 
artisans). Where some farms were engaged in these regions in 
comlnodity grain production, the data would give an unclear picture 
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of the capitalist differentiations of peasant farming. For this 
reason, the consumptionist peasant household required special 
investigation. 
These conclusions needed wider material, better prepared 
for this purpose in future. Kritsman also drew attention to the 
other processes besides ~apitalist differentiation: the· 
co-operative unification of small farms (at the time only 1 or 
1.5 per cent of them, although in a footnote added in 1928 
Kritsman pointed to the speeding. up of this process). He argued 
that all commodity farms were being drawn in by the many sided 
aspects of co-operation, into the general system of the Soviet 
national economy, with large-scale agriculture already in the 
hands of the proletariat (sovkhozy). Finally, there was the 
increase in the mass of active middle peasants, as well as 
capitalist differentiation, the middle peasantry no longer being 
the objects of feudal exploitation. All these processes were 
influencing and being influenced by the process of capitalist 
development. Without taking them into account, it was impossible 
to arrive at a correct judgement as to where the Soviet Union 
was going. 
One can conclude this account of one of Kritsman's earlier 
works by stressing that the tentative nature of its conclusions 
is not indicative of a failure to develop an adaquate strategy 
for the socialist transformation of the countryside. Rather it 
is indicative of an awareness of the need for careful research, 
taking account of differences in the technical division of labour 
and the division of social production, into the different forms 
of development of capitalist and socialist relations of production, 
before refining a strategy taken over in broad outline from Lenin. 
--=-' 
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Notes to Appendix 
1. The phrase is that of T. Shanin (1972), op • cit., pages 60-61, 
as quoted in Chapter One of this thesis. 
2. The phrase 'class stratification' carries the connotation of 
stratification as a process, rather than a settled state of 
affairs. For some reason, Kritsman seemed reluctant to use 
the word 'differentiation'. 
3. On pages 141-146 of Class Stratification, Kritsman provides 
a critique of data on wage labour, using ~.S.U. figures on 
Tula Gubernia. He argues that the figures are inaccurate, 
reflecting juridical relations, not economic ones. In 
particular they refer to permanent time-rate wage labour, 
ignoring, say, day wage labour or seasonal wage labour. It 
is in a footnote on page 144 that there is reference to 
Lenin's conception of a worker with an allotment. There is 
fUrther discussion of wage labour where there are data on it 
in the individual surveys which he analyses later in Class 
Stratification. But it is clear even from the discussion on 
pages 141-146 .that Kritsman does not treat wage-labour as a 
unitary phenomenon - it is related to the organisational forms 
of 'enterprise' occurring in the process of development of 
capitalism, and thus to hidden forms of capitalist exploitation. 
Hence Shanin's remarks on wage-labour seem to be misdirected; 
Shanin (1972), op • cit., pages 60-61. 
4. In my view this approach enables one to take into consideration 
various determinants of relations of production, including 
various aspects of the division of labour. 
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5. Grosskopf is careful to point out that in 1916 there were 
evidently large prope;ties which could properly be called 
capitalist, but that in the black earth zone, where in 1917 
two-thirds of large properties possessed more than 500 
dessiatines, the mixed type of enterprise was the most frequent: 
a capitalist organisation of the enterprise and a feudal 
organisation df peasants co-existed. See S.M. Shipley (1979) 
The Sociology of the Peasantry, P£Qglism and the Russian 
Peasant Commune, M.Phil. Thesis, University of Lancaster, 
for the historical background (up to the end of the 19th 
century) of this geographical distribution of forms of 
enterprise. 
6. The gubernii containing the volosti analysed by Kritsman 
are outlined with a continuous line,and their names are 
underlined in the list of gubernii below the map. Grosskopfts 
French transliteration of the Russian names has been retained 
in the list, but not in the main text. In addition, the Don 
gubernia, where the 6 seltsovet~ used in Kritsmants critique 
of the lbanal t approach were located, is also outlined on this 
map. It is geographically close to the South East Study. 
7. Kritsmants calculations of the percentage changes over the 
years are not presented here. I have corrected misprints. 
8. 'Station t in the context means a large village. 
9. The rates of pay by the poor farm for this form of the tspryaga t 
where the prosperous peasant used his means of production on 
the poor farm can be indicated by the following examples: 
1. For proughing and harvesting of 1 dessiatine - 2 workers 
(from the poor farm working on the prosperous farm) for 
the whole harvest and threshing. 
2. For ploughing and harvesting - 50 per cent of the 
harvested grain. 
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3. For ploughing t dessiatine - a youth working for the 
whole summer (on the prosperous farm). 
4. For sowing three dessiatines - 50 per cent of the harvest 
and one worker for 18 days. 
5. For ploughing and harvesting 3 dessiatines - two workers 
for almost the whole summer. 
10. Kritsman gives no indication of whether or not Yakovlev's 
figures refer to the whole country. I assume that they do, 
since there would otherwise be little point in introducing 
them at this juncture. 
11. This is consistent with the impression given by the note on 
'promysly' called 'Crafts-and Trades (English)' by R.E.F. Smith 
in The Journal of Peasant Studies, Volume 2, No.4, July 1975, 
pages 489-490. Smith is discussing primarily the use of the 
term in relation to an earlier note by Shanin, 'Promysly 
(Russian)' in The Journal of Peasant Studies, Volume 2, No.2, 
pages 224-225. Both Shanin and Smith are aware that at times 
'promysly' refers to wage-labour. 
12. According to my calculations, the undersampling for 1917 was 
9.2 per cent, but as I have indicated before, there are few 
misprints or arithmetical errors in Kritsman's work. Table 62 
is thus slightly misleading for the 1917 number of farms, but 
there is no reason to doubt the sown area figure. 
13. This corroborates the analysis of the sel'sovet given for the 
period up to about 1926 by M. Lewin on pages 81-84 of Russian 
Peasants and Soviet Power, George Allen and Unwin, London, 
1968. Lewin points out, of course, the spectacular change 
in policy towards the sel'sovet in 1929. 
14.' Promyshlenny' is probably used here in th e sense of ' promysly' , 
referring to handicraft production. 
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Gosbank: 
Gosplan: 
Gossnab: 
Gubernia: 
Khozraschet: 
Kolkhoz: 
Kolkhoznik: 
Oblast': 
Politburo: 
Raiispolkom: 
Raion: 
Sel'khoztekhnika: 
Sovkhoz: 
Tolkach': 
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GLOSSARY 
The State Bank, which has the constitutional 
status of a State Committee, attached to the 
Council of Ministers. 
State Planning Committee 
State Committee on Material Technical Supply 
Province, that is an administrative region 
under the Tsarist state, and in the 1920s 
A form of 'economic accounting' which gives 
the agent using it a certain degree of 
financial autonomy, and is consequently 
regarded by some commentators as being a 
concession to 'the market' in a predominantly 
'command economy'. 
A collective farm (plural kolkhozy) 
A collective farm member (plural kolkhozniki) 
An administrative region within one of the 
constituent republics of the U.S.S.R. 
The 'executive committee' of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union. 
Raion executive committee of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union 
A district, a sub-unit of an Oblast' 
'Agricultural Technique!, an agency responsible 
for the supply of means of production to 
kolkhozy and sovkhozy 
A state farm (pluralsoVkhoz~) 
A 'pusher', an agent who uses informal 
connections to secure supplies, usually for 
a state enterprise. 
Trudnden' : 
Volost' : 
602. 
A 'labour day unit', which was prior to 1966 
the main method of payment of kolkhozniki. 
The value of each 'labour day unit', calculated 
on a points system depending on the type of 
work contributed to the collective farm by 
an individual, was not known until the value 
of the harvest net of state planned 
procurements was known~ This meant that 
the income of kolkhozniki was subject to 
considerable variations due to annual 
variations in the harvest_ 
An administrative district within a Gubernia 
under the Tsarist state and in the 1920s 
(plural volosti). 
